Opinion

SPANE v. CENTRAL OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY

  • 346 P.3d 437
Court
Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
Filed
Feb 5, 2015
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.0%

The opinion

OSCN Found Document:SPANE v. CENTRAL OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY

OSCN navigation

Home

Courts

Court Dockets

Legal Research

Calendar

Help

Previous Case

Top Of Index

This Point in Index

Citationize

Next Case

Print Only

SPANE v. CENTRAL OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY

2015 OK CIV APP 29

346 P.3d 437

Case Number: 112215

Decided: 02/05/2015

Mandate Issued: 03/31/2015

DIVISION IV

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION IV

Cite as: 2015 OK CIV APP 29 , 346 P.3d 437

SHARON SPANE, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CENTRAL OKLAHOMA

COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY, Defendant/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY,

OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE JOHN G. CANAVAN, JR., TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Mark Hammons, Christine E. Coleman, HAMMONS, GOWENS & HURST, Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant

Jeffrey R. Schoborg, CONNER &

WINTERS, LLP, Tulsa, Oklahoma and Crystal A. Johnson, CONNER & WINTERS, LLP,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee

DEBORAH B. BARNES, JUDGE:

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Sharon Spane (Spane) appeals the trial court's

Judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of Defendant/Appellee Central

Oklahoma Community Action Agency (COCAA) on the basis that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction because Spane failed to comply with the notice provisions of

the Governmental Torts Claims Act (GTCA), 51 O.S. 2011 §§ 151-172. Based on our

review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In February, 2012, Spane filed a petition alleging that in March, 2010,

her employment with COCAA was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for pursuing

a workers' compensation claim. In the proceedings that followed, 1 COCAA asserted it is a

community action agency established pursuant to 74 O.S. 2011 §§ 5035-5040, and,

therefore, that it constitutes a "political subdivision" under the GTCA. It

argued that Spane, who was the Deputy Director of COCAA, was therefore required

to present notice of her claim within one year of the date of termination

pursuant to the notice requirements of the GTCA. COCAA argued that because Spane

failed to present such notice, the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction.

¶3 In response, Spane asserted, among other matters, that COCAA was never

properly established as a community action agency, and, therefore, the GTCA does

not apply.

¶4 A hearing was held in August, 2013, on COCAA's motion for summary judgment

and Spane's motion for partial summary judgment. 2 At the hearing, COCAA discussed the

evidence it had produced in support of its assertion that it is a properly

established community action agency, and that it has been so for many years.

Spane countered that although employees of the Oklahoma Department of Commerce

(ODOC) may believe COCAA to be a community action agency, and although COCAA may

receive funds from ODOC as a community action agency, that ODOC has failed to

properly designate COCAA as a community action agency because it has never

issued a "formally entered and recorded" designation. Spane implied at the

hearing, moreover, that no entities in Oklahoma - regardless of whether they

function as community action agencies and receive block grant funds as community

actions agencies - are properly established pursuant to 74 O.S. 2011 §§

5035-5040 because "there is no document that exists anywhere that reflects that

[ODOC] designated in terms of issuing a designation to any agencies as Community

Action Agencies." Spane stated: "The issue is did [ODOC] do what they were

supposed to."

¶5 COCAA responded at the hearing that

[Spane's] argument is with the state legislature. The state legislature

left it to ODOC to establish [its] process. ODOC has spoken. [It has]

established that process, and in fact, [it] distributed funds pursuant to

those processes consistent with Sections 5035 and through 5040 of Title

74.

But really the bottom line here . . . is [ODOC], an agency of the State

of Oklahoma through its general counsel[,] has spoken and said that [COCAA

is] designated as a Community Action Agency, and ODOC's corporate legal

representative also stated the same exact thing under penalty of

perjury.

[Spane is] taking issue with ODOC in whether or not [ODOC is] doing [its]

job right, that's not the issue that's before the Court. [Spane] can take

that up with the state legislature. As the process stands now everything has

been done to satisfy statutorily what is required of ODOC. ODOC has spoken

in absolutely unequivocal . . . terms.

¶6 At the end of the hearing, the trial court expressed concern "about the

fact that the process seems to be very informal for those designations," but

stated that the statutes "really [do not] say what that process should be.

Counsel [for COCAA] is correct, there is nowhere in there where it says after

you get a certificate you are designated, or after we do something in writing

you are designated." The trial court ultimately determined that "the [GTCA] does

apply, and therefore, I do not have subject matter jurisdiction." The trial

court's determination was memorialized in its Judgment filed in September,

2013.

¶7 From the Judgment, Spane appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 An order sustaining summary judgment in favor of a litigant presents

solely a legal matter. Feightner v. Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. , 2003 OK 20, ¶ 2 , 65 P.3d 624 . Questions of law

mandate application of the de novo standard of review, which affords this

Court with plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the

issues presented. Martin v. Aramark Servs., Inc. , 2004 OK 38, ¶ 4 , 92 P.3d 96 .

¶9 Examination of an order sustaining summary judgment requires Oklahoma

courts to determine whether the record reveals disputed material facts or

whether reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from undisputed facts.

Cranford v. Bartlett , 2001 OK

47, ¶ 3 , 25 P.3d 918 . All

facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party

opposing summary adjudication. Estate of Crowell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of

Cnty. of Cleveland , 2010 OK

5, ¶ 22 , 237 P.3d 134 . If

the essential fact issues are in dispute, or reasonable minds might reach

different conclusions in light of the inferences drawn from undisputed facts,

summary judgment should be denied. Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Okla.

City , 2008 OK 70, ¶ 39 , 188 P.3d 158 .

¶10 Finally, "interpretation of statutory law presents a question

of law and statutes are construed to determine legislative intent in light of

the general policy and purpose that underlie them." Troxell v. Okla. Dep't of

Human Servs. , 2013 OK 100, ¶

4 , 318 P.3d 206 (citation

omitted). 3

ANALYSIS

I. COCAA's Status as a Political Subdivision Under the

GTCA

¶11 The GTCA provides as follows:

A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees

acting within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental

or proprietary functions, shall be immune from liability for torts.

B. The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act,

waives its immunity and that of its political subdivisions. . .

.

51 O.S. 2011 § 152.1. The GTCA

further provides that "[t]he liability of the state or political subdivision

under [the GTCA] shall be exclusive . . . ." § 153(B).

¶12 The GTCA requires, first of all, that "claims against the state or a

political subdivision are to be presented within one (1) year of the date the

loss occurs. A claim against the state or a political subdivision shall be

forever barred unless notice thereof is presented within one (1) year after the

loss occurs." § 156(B). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained that "the

notice provisions contained in the GTCA are to protect governmental interests by

promoting prompt investigation, repair of dangerous conditions, [and] speedy

settlement of meritorious claims, and to give the governmental entity time to

meet possible fiscal liabilities." Pellegrino v. State ex rel. Cameron

Univ. , 2003 OK 2, ¶ 17 , 63 P.3d 535 (emphasis omitted).

¶13 It is undisputed that Spane failed to comply with the notice provisions

of the GTCA. In fact, Spane admits that she never filed "a GTCA notice," and

argues, instead, that "none was required" because COCAA is not a political

subdivision under the GTCA.

¶14 As indicated above, "'[p]olitical subdivision' means: . . . for purposes

of [the GTCA] only, any community action agency established pursuant to Sections

5035 through 5040 of Title 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes[.]" 51 O.S. 2011 § 152(11)(n). In

support of its assertion that it is a community action agency established

pursuant to the applicable statutes, COCAA has attached a letter from Donald R.

Hackler, Jr. (Hackler), the Deputy General Counsel and Public Information

Officer of ODOC, in which he states:

The service area for [COCAA] was designated by [ODOC] even before I

joined the Agency in 1990.

. . . .

Annually [COCAA] receives federal

and state funds from our offices to support [its] programs and services.

Only community action agencies designated by [ODOC] can receive these

funds.

¶15 COCAA has also attached an affidavit of Hackler, 4 in which he states, "I am responsible

for all legal matters concerning [ODOC], and oversight of federally funded

programs. Additionally, I am aware of what is required of community action

agencies related to designation." He further states as follows:

6. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Economic

Opportunity Act that created the nationwide Community Action Network.

Subsequently, COCAA, a private, non-profit corporation was formed in 1968.

At the time of COCAA's formation, oversight was provided by the Oklahoma

Department of Economic and Community Affairs ("DECA").

7. In 1986, ODOC was created by the Oklahoma legislature. As a result,

all powers . . . and obligations of DECA were transferred to ODOC.

8. Also in 1986, a new set of sections to Title 74 of the Oklahoma

Statutes were promulgated dealing with community action agencies. These

sections remain in effect.

9. Section 5036 of Title 74 defines a community action agency as a

"public or private nonprofit agency, designated by [ODOC]." Additionally it

provides that ODOC has the right to evaluate existing agencies, as may be

necessary, and/or rescind designation in accordance with statutory

procedures.

10. ODOC is solely responsible for designating community action agencies.

There is no certification or certificate issued to designated community

action agencies.

. . . .

12. Since 1968, COCAA has continually been

designated, originally by DECA, and since 1986 by ODOC, as a community

action agency pursuant to . . . § 5036. It is the designated community

agency for prov[id]ing services to Oklahomans in Cleveland, Pottawatomie,

Lincoln, Payne and Logan Counties.

13. Consistent with [§] 5035, COCAA has been an annual community action

agency recipient of federal Community Service Block Grant Funds for which

ODOC maintains administrative responsibility. . . .

14. COCAA's purpose and board make-up are consistent with . . . §§ 5034,

5037.

15. ODOC monitors COCAA on, at a minimum, an annual basis.

16. ODOC has never rescinded COCAA's designation as a community action

agency.

¶16 COCAA also attached excerpts from a deposition transcript of William

Vaughn Clark (Clark), the Director of Community Services at ODOC. Clark states

that COCAA was in existence in Oklahoma, and designated, as a community action

agency prior to the formation of ODOC; that ODOC monitors the community action

agencies in Oklahoma and "the annual monitoring has not indicated that [COCAA]

should be de[-]designated at any point"; that termination of the community

action agency status for COCAA has never been recommended; that ODOC has

continually recognized COCAA as a community action agency; that qualifying for

community block grant dollars by meeting "certain rules," including "the unique

formation of their board," constitutes being designated a community action

agency; and that there is no formal certificate bestowed by ODOC for designation

purposes.

¶17 Among other things, COCAA has also attached House appropriations bills

which list COCAA as a community action agency to receive funding, and COCAA has

attached two community services block grant allocation agreements, between COCAA

and ODOC, setting forth the amount of funds to be allocated, the funding period,

the source of the funds, and the project description: "Reduce the causes of

poverty through advocacy and institutional change, while lessening its effects

on low-income people through delivery of direct services."

¶18 COCAA has presented ample evidence in support of its assertions that it

is a properly established community action agency in Oklahoma; that it has been

established as a community action agency in Oklahoma for decades; and that

designation as a community action agency does not hinge on the existence of a

hypothetical certificate of designation. As indicated above, Spane attempts to

dispute COCAA's status as a properly established community action agency by

asserting that ODOC has failed to establish an appropriate process for

designating community action agencies pursuant to the controlling statutory

provisions.

¶19 The statutory language upon which Spane relies provides as follows:

A community action agency shall be defined as a public or private

nonprofit agency, designated by [ODOC].

[ODOC] shall have the right to evaluate existing service areas and

community action agencies and, as may be necessary, modify boundaries of the

service areas or rescind designation in accordance with the

provisions outlined in Section 45 of this act so that services will be

adequately and efficiently provided.

74 O.S. 2011 § 5036 (emphasis

added). Section 5038 further provides that, "[t]o ensure statewide delivery of

Community Services Block Grant services, [ODOC] shall establish a process to

designate community action agencies."

¶20 The Legislature chose not to dictate to ODOC precisely how it is to

designate, or rescind the designation, of community action agencies. Although

the Legislature has directed ODOC to "establish a process to designate community

action agencies," Spane has failed to explain how the series of actions,

monitoring, and rule enforcement functions performed by ODOC fails to constitute

such a "process." Spane has also failed to explain how this series of actions,

which relies, among other things, on annual monitoring of community action

agencies, rather than on a "formally entered and recorded" certificate process

as proposed by Spane, fails to carry out the legislative intent of the statutory

provisions in question. Furthermore, "[s]tatutory construction by agencies

charged with the law's enforcement is given persuasive effect especially when

made shortly after the statute's enactment." Cox v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep't

of Human Servs. , 2004 OK 17,

¶ 22 , 87 P.3d 607 (footnote

omitted).

Great weight is to be accorded the expertise of an administrative agency,

and a presumption of validity attaches to the exercise of expertise when the

administrative agency is reviewed by a court. A court should not substitute

its own judgment for that of an agency, particularly in the area of

expertise which the agency supervises.

Toxic Waste Impact Grp., Inc. v. Leavitt , 1988 OK 20 , ¶ 12, 755 P.2d 626 (footnote omitted).

¶21 We conclude that to determine COCAA and, indeed, all other community

action agencies, have not been properly established and officially recognized

because ODOC, from its inception, has chosen to rely upon an informal, flexible

system of designating community action agencies 5 would constitute a needless intrusion

into ODOC's area of expertise, especially given the fact that the Legislature

has left the degree of formality, and all other details of the designation (and

de-designation) process, in the hands of ODOC. Because Spane has not produced

any evidence controverting COCAA's status as a long-established community action

agency in Oklahoma, and because an informal, flexible process of designation is

not inconsistent with the statutes in question, we conclude that no genuine

disputes of material fact exist in this case as to COCAA's status as a properly

established community action agency.

¶22 Because there is no genuine dispute as to COCAA's status as a community

action agency established pursuant to the applicable statutes, it follows that

COCAA is a political subdivision under § 152(11)(n) of the GTCA. Therefore,

Spane was required to comply with the notice provisions of the GTCA. Because it

is undisputed that Spane failed to do so, the trial court properly determined it

lacked jurisdiction over the tort claim of retaliatory discharge set forth in

Spane's petition, and it properly granted summary judgment in favor of COCAA.

See Hall v. GEO Grp., Inc. , 2014 OK 22 , ¶ 1, 324 P.3d 399 ("The notice required

by the GTCA is a mandatory prerequisite jurisdictional requirement to

filing a claim for tort damages.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted);

Harmon v. Cradduck , 2012 OK

80, ¶ 28 , 286 P.3d 643

("Notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing an action under the

GTCA.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Shanbour v. Hollingsworth ,

1996 OK 67, ¶ 7 , 918 P.2d 73 ("[J]udicial power is

invoked by the timely filing of the governmental tort claims action pursuant to

§ 157[.]") (footnote omitted).

II. Spane's Application to Supplement the Issues on

Appeal

¶23 In January, 2014, during the pendency of this appeal, Spane filed an

application to supplement the issues on appeal. Spane seeks to raise an issue

for the first time on appeal - whether article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma

Constitution "prohibits the granting of immunity to private entities." 6 Spane requests

that this Court grant leave to allow her to file a supplemental brief on this

issue, which she asserts "is a new issue which surfaced in" Coates v.

Fallin , 2013 OK 108 , 316 P.3d 924 , a case decided during

the pendency of this appeal. However, the only issue addressed in Coates

was whether the Legislature, in enacting the Administrative Act which replaced

the Workers' Compensation Code, "acted outside its constitutional authority by

enacting a bill containing multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const.

art. 5, § 57." Id. ¶ 2. The Coates Court concluded the Legislature

did not act outside its authority in this regard.

¶24 Spane fails to mention in her application that the citation is contained

only in the concurring in part, dissenting in part, separate opinion of one

Justice. In that separate opinion, moreover, the constitutional language in

question is merely paraphrased: "[T]he legislature is prohibited from granting

any exclusive immunities to any association, corporation or individual by

Article 5, § 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution." Coates , ¶ 10 (Reif,

V.C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Clearly, Spane could have

raised a constitutional challenge based on article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma

Constitution prior to the date Coates was decided, and during the

proceedings below.

¶25 Regardless, article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution "was

intended to preserve equality between citizens who are similarly situated."

In re Okla. Dev. Fin. Auth. , 2004 OK 26, ¶ 20 , 89 P.3d 1075 (citing Kimery v.

Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. , 1980 OK

187 , 622 P.2d 1066 ). "Thus,

the clause may be invoked by a person who suffers injury because the legislature

has granted an exclusive right, privilege, or immunity to other persons

similarly situated." City of Moore, Okla. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe

Ry. Co. , 699 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 1983). Because COCAA has not been

granted any right, privilege, or immunity denied to other similarly situated

community action agencies, article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution

does not apply to the present case. 7 We deny Spane's application.

CONCLUSION

¶26 Based on our review, we conclude that no genuine disputes of material

fact exist and that the trial court properly determined it lacks jurisdiction

based on Spane's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the GTCA.

Consequently, we affirm.

¶27 AFFIRMED .

THORNBRUGH, J., and FISCHER, J. (sitting by designation), concur.

FOOTNOTES

1

Although procedural issues will be addressed, if necessary, in the analysis

section of this Opinion, a detailed recitation of the already lengthy procedure

of this case is unnecessary.

2 Spane

requested partial summary judgment, asserting "that the absence of a formally

entered and recorded designation is fatal to [COCAA's] GTCA immunity

defense."

3 In

Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co. , 2008 OK 21 , 184 P.3d 518 , the Oklahoma Supreme

Court stated:

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and follow the

intent of the Legislature. Where a statute's meaning is ambiguous or unclear, we

employ rules of statutory construction to give the statute a reasonable

construction that will avoid absurd consequences. It is important in construing

the Legislative intent behind a word to consider the whole act in light of its

general purpose and objective, considering relevant portions together to give

full force and effect to each. A statute will be given a construction, if

possible, which renders every word operative, rather than one which makes some

words idle and meaningless. We presume that the Legislature expressed its intent

and intended what it expressed, and statutes are interpreted to attain that

purpose and end, championing the broad public policy purposes underlying

them.

Id. ¶ 16 (footnotes omitted).

4 The

affidavit is attached to COCAA's supplemental brief in support of summary

judgment filed in July, 2013.

5 That

is, for purposes of summary judgment, and viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Spane, the recognition and designation of community action agencies

by ODOC has been informal.

6 Article

5, section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "The Legislature shall pass

no law granting to any association, corporation, or individual any exclusive

rights, privileges, or immunities within this State."

7 We note

also the following guidance set forth in the Coates case:

As in all causes involving constitutional challenges to statutory language,

we begin with the premise that the [language in question] is constitutional and

should be upheld against a constitutional attack unless it is clearly and

overtly inconsistent with the Oklahoma Constitution. In absence of a

constitutional defect, we are duty bound to give effect to legislative acts, not

to amend, repeal, or circumvent them. We will not exercise authority not vested

in this Court by rewriting statutes merely because the legislation does not

comport with our concept of prudent public policy.

2013 OK 108, ¶ 2 (citations

omitted).

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document

Cite

Name

Level

None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority

Cite

Name

Level

Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases

Cite Name Level

1988 OK 20 , 755 P.2d 626 , 59 OBJ 599, Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt Discussed

2001 OK 47 , 25 P.3d 918 , 72 OBJ 1792, CRANFORD v. BARTLETT Discussed

2003 OK 2 , 63 P.3d 535 , PELLEGRINO v. STATE EX REL. CAMERON UNIVERSITY Discussed

2003 OK 20 , 65 P.3d 624 , FEIGHTNER v. BANK OF OKLAHOMA, N.A. Discussed

2004 OK 17 , 87 P.3d 607 , COX v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES Discussed

2004 OK 26 , 89 P.3d 1075 , IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLIC. OF THE OKLA. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AUTHORITY Discussed

2004 OK 38 , 92 P.3d 96 , MARTIN v. ARAMARK SERVICES, INC. Discussed

1996 OK 67 , 918 P.2d 73 , 67 OBJ 1844, Shanbour v. Hollingsworth Discussed

2008 OK 21 , 184 P.3d 518 , ESTES v. CONOCOPHILLIPS CO. Discussed

2008 OK 70 , 188 P.3d 158 , SCHOVANEC v. ARCHDIOCESE OF OKLAHOMA CITY Discussed

2010 OK 5 , 237 P.3d 134 , ESTATE OF CROWELL v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Discussed

2012 OK 80 , 286 P.3d 643 , HARMON v. CRADDUCK Discussed

2013 OK 100 , 318 P.3d 206 , TROXELL v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES Discussed

2013 OK 108 , 316 P.3d 924 , COATES v. FALLIN Discussed at Length

2014 OK 22 , 324 P.3d 399 , HALL v. THE GEO GROUP, INC Discussed

1980 OK 187 , 622 P.2d 1066 , Kimery v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma Discussed

Title 51. Officers

Cite Name Level

51 O.S. 152 , Definitions Cited

51 O.S. 152 .1, Adoption of Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Cited

Title 74. State Government

Cite Name Level

74 O.S. 5036 , Community Action Agency - Right of Department of Commerce to Evaluate Service Areas and Community Action Agencies Cited

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.