Harold Hodge v. Pamela Talkin

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2014 Decided August 28, 2015

No. 13-5250

HAROLD H. HODGE, JR.

APPELLEE

v.

PAMELA TALKIN, MARSHAL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT, AND VINCENT H. COHEN, JR., ESQUIRE, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00104)

Beth S. Brinkmann, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants.

On the briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney

General, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Michael

S. Raab and Daniel Tenny, Attorneys. Jane M. Lyons,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Jeffrey L. Light argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

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Arthur B. Spitzer was on the brief for amicus curiae

American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area

in support of appellee.

Before: HENDERSON and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: For more than sixty-five

years, a federal statute has restricted the public’s conduct of

expressive activity within the building and grounds of the

Supreme Court. The law contains two prohibitions within the

same sentence. The first makes it unlawful “to parade, stand,

or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court

Building or grounds” (the Assemblages Clause). The second

makes it unlawful “to display in the Building and grounds a

flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into

public notice a party, organization, or movement” (the

Display Clause). 40 U.S.C. § 6135. The statute defines the

Supreme Court “grounds” to extend to the public sidewalks

forming the perimeter of the city block that houses the Court.

In United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), the

Supreme Court held the statute’s Display Clause

unconstitutional as applied to the sidewalks at the edge of the

grounds. The Court found “nothing to indicate to the public

that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds”

or that they “are in any way different from other public

sidewalks in the city.” Id. at 183. Like other public

sidewalks, consequently, the sidewalks surrounding the Court

qualify as a “public forum” for First Amendment purposes, an

area in which “the government’s ability to permissibly restrict

expressive conduct is very limited.” Id. at 177, 179-80. But

the Court left for another day the constitutionality of the

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statute’s application to the rest of the grounds, including the

Court’s plaza: the elevated marble terrace running from the

front sidewalk to the staircase that ascends to the Court’s

main doors.

We confront that issue today. The plaintiff in this case,

Harold Hodge, Jr., seeks to picket, leaflet, and make speeches

in the Supreme Court plaza, with the aim of conveying to the

Court and the public what he describes as “political

messages” about the Court’s decisions. Hodge claims that the

statute’s Assemblages and Display Clauses, by restricting his

intended activities, violate his rights under the First

Amendment. The district court, persuaded by his arguments,

declared the statute unconstitutional in all its applications to

the Court’s plaza. We disagree and conclude that the

Assemblages and Display Clauses may be constitutionally

enforced in the plaza.

In marked contrast to the perimeter sidewalks considered

in Grace, the Supreme Court plaza distinctively “indicate[s]

to the public”—by its materials, design, and demarcation from

the surrounding area—that it is very much a “part of the

Supreme Court grounds.” Id. at 183. The plaza has been

described as the opening stage of “a carefully choreographed,

climbing path that ultimately ends at the courtroom itself.”

Statement Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance,

2009 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 831, 831 (2010) (Breyer, J.). For that

reason, the Court’s plaza—unlike the surrounding public

sidewalks, but like the courthouse it fronts—is a “nonpublic

forum,” an area not traditionally kept open for expressive

activity by the public. The government retains substantially

greater leeway to limit expressive conduct in such an area and

to preserve the property for its intended purposes: here, as the

actual and symbolic entryway to the nation’s highest court

and the judicial business conducted within it.

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Under the lenient First Amendment standards applicable

to nonpublic forums, the government can impose reasonable

restrictions on speech as long as it refrains from suppressing

particular viewpoints. Neither the Assemblages Clause nor

the Display Clause targets specific viewpoints. They ban

demonstrations applauding the Court’s actions no less than

demonstrations denouncing them. And both clauses

reasonably relate to the government’s long-recognized

interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse

and in assuring the appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary

uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure. The Supreme

Court recently, in its just-completed Term, strongly reinforced

the latter interest’s vitality, along with the government’s

considerable latitude to secure its realization even through

speech-restrictive measures. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135

S. Ct. 1656 (2015). The statute’s reasonableness is reinforced

by the availability of an alternative site for expressive activity

in the immediate vicinity: the sidewalk area directly in front

of the Court’s plaza. We therefore uphold the statute’s

constitutionality.

I.

A.

The federal statute in issue, 40 U.S.C. § 6135, makes it

unlawful “to parade, stand, or move in processions or

assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to

display in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device

designed or adapted to bring into public notice a party,

organization, or movement.” Congress enacted the statute in

1949. See Act of Aug. 18, 1949, ch. 49, 63 Stat. 616, 617

(1949) (current version at 40 U.S.C. § 6135) (originally

codified at id. § 13k). Another provision defines “the

Supreme Court grounds” to extend to the curbs of the four

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streets fixing the boundary of the city block in which the

Court is situated. 40 U.S.C. § 6101(b). The statute thus

encompasses “not only the building,” but also “the plaza and

surrounding promenade, lawn area, and steps,” together with

“[t]he sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court

grounds.” Grace, 461 U.S. at 179.

The front of the Supreme Court grounds, from the street

to the building, appears as follows (according to the record in

this case and sources of which we take judicial notice, see

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545,

552 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The Court’s main entrance faces

west towards First Street Northeast, across which sits the

United States Capitol. Eight marble steps, flanked on either

side by marble candelabra, ascend from the concrete sidewalk

along First Street Northeast to the Court’s elevated marble

plaza: an oval terrace that is 252 feet long (at the largest part

of the oval) and 98 feet wide (inclusive of the front eight

steps). Decl. of Timothy Dolan, Deputy Chief of the Supreme

Court Police, ¶ 6 (Dolan Decl.) (J.A. 17-18). The terrace is

“paved in gray and white marble” in “a pattern of alternating

circles and squares similar to that of the floor of the Roman

Pantheon.” Fred J. Maroon & Suzy Maroon, The Supreme

Court of the United States 36 (1996). The plaza contains two

fountains, two flagpoles, and six marble benches. Another

thirty-six steps lead from the plaza to the building’s portico

and “the magnificent bronze doors that are the main entrance

into the building.” Id. at 38. A low marble wall surrounds the

plaza and also encircles the rest of the building. And the

plaza’s white marble matches the marble that makes up the

low wall, the two staircases, the fountains, and the building’s

façade and columns. Pamela Scott & Antoinette J. Lee,

Buildings of the District of Columbia 138 (1993).

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Supreme Court Building, Architect of the Capitol,

http://www.aoc.gov/capitol-buildings/supreme-court-building

(last visited Aug. 20, 2015).

B.

Prior challenges to § 6135 and related provisions form

the legal backdrop for the case we consider today. Section

6135’s restrictions on expressive activity in the Supreme

Court grounds mirror a parallel statute restricting the same

activity in the grounds of the United States Capitol. See 40

U.S.C. § 5104(f) (originally codified at id. § 193g). The

statute applicable to the Capitol became the subject of a

constitutional challenge in Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief

of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1972). There, a

three-judge court declared the statute unconstitutional under

the First and Fifth Amendments, enjoining the Capitol Police

from enforcing it. Id. at 587-88. The court ruled that the

government’s interest in maintaining decorum failed to justify

a ban on political demonstrations outside the building housing

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the nation’s elected representatives. Id. at 585. The Supreme

Court summarily affirmed. Chief of the Capitol Police v.

Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 409 U.S. 972 (1972).

A few years later, the statute applicable to the Supreme

Court grounds also came under attack in the courts. The

plaintiffs, Mary Grace and Thaddeus Zywicki, experienced

run-ins with the Supreme Court Police when engaged in

expressive activity on the public sidewalk fronting the Court

along First Street. Grace, 461 U.S. at 173-74. Zywicki had

distributed written material to passersby on multiple

occasions, including articles calling for the removal of unfit

judges and handbills discussing human rights in Central

American countries. Id. Grace had stood on the sidewalk

holding a sign displaying the text of the First Amendment. Id.

at 174. The district court declined to reach the merits of

Grace and Zywicki’s suit, Grace v. Burger, 524 F. Supp. 815,

819-20 (D.D.C. 1980); but our court did, declaring the statute

unconstitutional on its face in all of its applications to the

Court grounds, Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193, 1205-06

(D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court affirmed our judgment

in part and vacated it in part. Grace, 461 U.S. at 184. Given

the decision’s obvious salience to our consideration of this

case, we review the Court’s analysis in some detail.

Before addressing the merits, the Supreme Court

significantly narrowed the case in two ways. First, the Court

noted that the conduct giving rise to the challenge—solitary

leafleting on Zywicki’s part, and solitary sign-holding on

Grace’s—could violate only the statute’s Display Clause, not

the Assemblages Clause. Id. at 175. The Court thus

understood the decision under review to be confined to the

Display Clause. Id. at 175 & n.5. Second, the Court decided,

based on the location of Grace’s and Zywicki’s past conduct,

that their “controversy” only concerned the “right to use the

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public sidewalks surrounding the Court building” to engage in

expressive activity. Id. at 175. The Court therefore chose to

resolve “only whether the proscriptions of [the statute] are

constitutional as applied to the public sidewalks,” without

addressing the constitutionality of the statute’s application to

the remainder of the Court’s statutorily defined grounds. Id.

The Court then set out to determine the character of the

sidewalks in question for purposes of the “forum” taxonomy

used to assess the constitutionality of speech restrictions on

public property. Under that taxonomy, the Court explained,

“‘public places’ historically associated with the free exercise

of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks,

are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’” Id. at

177. “In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly

restrict expressive conduct is very limited,” such that “an

absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be

upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling

governmental interest.” Id. On the other hand, in public

property constituting a “nonpublic forum,” the government

enjoys significantly greater latitude to regulate expressive

activity, including the ability “in some circumstances” to “ban

the entry . . . of all persons except those who have legitimate

business on the premises.” Id. at 178.

Applying those principles to the “sidewalks comprising

the outer boundaries of the Court grounds,” the Court

reasoned that they “are indistinguishable from any other

sidewalks in Washington, D.C.,” and there is “no reason why

they should be treated any differently.” Id. at 179.

“Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public

property that traditionally have been held open to the public

for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of

public property that may be considered, generally without

further inquiry, to be public forum property.” Id. With

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respect to the perimeter sidewalks specifically, the Court

observed, there is “no separation, no fence, and no indication

whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and

sidewalks . . . that they have entered some special type of

enclave,” and “nothing to indicate to the public that these

sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds.” Id. at 180,

183. “Traditional public forum property” of that variety, the

Court explained, “will not lose its historically recognized

character for the reason that it abuts government property that

has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public

expression.” Id. at 180. The Court therefore held that the

“public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme

Court grounds . . . are public forums and should be treated as

such for First Amendment purposes.” Id.

The Court next assessed the constitutionality of the

Display Clause under the heightened standards applicable to

public forums. It examined the necessity of the Display

Clause’s restrictions by reference to two asserted

governmental interests: first, the interest in maintaining

“proper order and decorum” in the Supreme Court building

and grounds and in protecting “persons and property therein”;

and second, the interest in avoiding the “appear[ance] to the

public that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence

or that picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an

acceptable or proper way of appealing to or influencing the

Supreme Court.” Id. at 182-83. The Court did not doubt the

importance and legitimacy of those interests. Id. But it found

a “total ban” on leafleting and sign-holding on the

surrounding public sidewalks unnecessary to promote them.

Id. For instance, without any indication “to the public” that

the “sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds or are

in any way different from other public sidewalks,” the Court

“doubt[ed] that the public would draw a different inference

from a lone picketer carrying a sign on the sidewalks around

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the building than it would from a similar picket on the

sidewalks across the street.” Id. at 183. The Court therefore

declared the Display Clause unconstitutional as applied to the

public sidewalks surrounding the Court, but it vacated our

court’s invalidation of the statute with regard to the remainder

of the grounds. Id. at 183-84.

C.

Although Grace concerned the Display Clause alone, the

Supreme Court Police ceased enforcement of both the Display

and Assemblages Clauses on the perimeter sidewalks. Dolan

Decl. ¶ 5 (J.A. 17). The Police have continued to enforce

both clauses elsewhere in the Supreme Court building and

grounds, including in the Court’s plaza. This case arises from

the enforcement of the statute in the plaza.

On January 28, 2011, Harold Hodge, Jr., stood in the

plaza approximately 100 feet from the building’s front doors.

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20 (J.A. 10). He hung from his neck a

two-by-three-foot sign displaying the words “The U.S. Gov.

Allows Police To Illegally Murder And Brutalize African

Americans And Hispanic People.” Id. ¶ 18 (J.A. 10). After a

few minutes, a Supreme Court Police officer approached

Hodge and told him he was violating the law. Hodge declined

to leave. After three more warnings, the officer arrested him.

On February 4, 2011, Hodge was charged with violating 40

U.S.C. § 6135. He entered into an agreement with the

government under which he promised to stay away from the

Supreme Court grounds for six months in exchange for

dismissal of the charge, which occurred in September 2011.

In January 2012, Hodge filed the present action in federal

district court. His complaint alleges that he “desires to return

to the plaza area . . . and engage in peaceful, non-disruptive

political speech and expression in a similar manner to his

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activity on January 28, 2011.” Id. ¶ 28 (J.A. 12). In addition

to again wearing a sign, Hodge wishes to “picket, hand out

leaflets, sing, chant, and make speeches, either by himself or

with a group of like-minded individuals.” Id. ¶ 29 (J.A. 12).

Hodge says that the “political message that [he] would like to

convey would be directed both at the Supreme Court and the

general public, and would explain how decisions of the

Supreme Court have allowed police misconduct and

discrimination against racial minorities to continue.” Id. And

he states that he desires to engage in those activities

“immediately” but is “deterred and chilled” from doing so by

“the terms of 40 U.S.C. § 6135” and by his prior arrest and

charge. Id. ¶ 30 (J.A. 12).

Hodge’s complaint asserts a series of constitutional

challenges under the First and Fifth Amendments. First, he

claims that the Assemblages and Display Clauses amount to

unconstitutional restrictions of speech. Second, he claims that

both clauses are overbroad. Finally, he claims that both

clauses are unconstitutionally vague. (The complaint also

raises claims alleging that the Supreme Court Police

selectively enforce the law in a manner favoring certain

viewpoints, but the district court did not pass on those claims

and Hodge does not press them in this appeal.) As relief,

Hodge seeks a declaration of § 6135’s invalidity “on its face,

and as applied to [Hodge],” and a permanent injunction

barring the government defendants (the Marshal of the

Supreme Court and the United States Attorney for the District

of Columbia) from enforcing the statute against Hodge or

others. Id. p. 10 (J.A. 15).

The district court, finding the statute “plainly

unconstitutional on its face,” granted summary judgment in

favor of Hodge. Hodge v. Talkin, 949 F. Supp. 2d 152, 176 &

n.24 (D.D.C. 2013). In a thorough opinion, the court

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invalidated the statute under the First Amendment based on

two grounds. The court first held that, regardless of whether

the Supreme Court plaza is considered a public forum or a

nonpublic forum, the statute amounts to an unreasonable

restriction of speech as concerns the plaza. Id. at 182-85.

Second, the court found the statute unconstitutionally

overbroad in light of the potential sweep of its prohibitions.

In that regard, the court examined a range of hypothetical

applications of the Assemblages and Display Clauses in the

plaza which it found to be troubling. Id. at 187-89. The

court’s result was to declare § 6135 “unconstitutional and

void as applied to the Supreme Court plaza.” Id. at 198. The

court declined to reach Hodge’s alternative challenges,

including his vagueness claim. Id. at 176 n.24.

The government appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. We review that court’s legal

determinations de novo. Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d

36, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

II.

Before addressing the merits of Hodge’s constitutional

challenges, we initially assure ourselves of his standing for

purposes of satisfying Article III’s case-or-controversy

requirement. The question is whether he demonstrates an

“injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the statute’s

challenged provisions. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

There is no dispute about Hodge’s standing to challenge

the Display Clause. He has been arrested and charged for

displaying a political sign while standing in the plaza, and he

would do so again “immediately” if not for his fear of another

arrest. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-30 (J.A. 12). The government does

not contest those facts. Given the Supreme Court Police’s

13

policy of enforcing § 6135 in the plaza, see Dolan Decl. ¶ 7

(J.A. 18), there is a “substantial risk” of another arrest and

charge if Hodge were to act on his stated intentions. That

suffices to demonstrate a cognizable injury vis-à-vis the

Display Clause. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134

S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).

Hodge’s solitary display of a sign, however, did not

violate the statute’s Assemblages Clause—the prohibition on

“parad[ing], stand[ing], or mov[ing] in processions or

assemblages.” 40 U.S.C. § 6135. The government maintains

that the complaint’s allegations fail sufficiently to establish

Hodge’s desire to engage in future conduct that would bring

him within that prohibition’s scope. The sole allegation

bearing on his standing to challenge the Assemblages Clause

conveys his desire “to return to the plaza area . . . and picket,

hand out leaflets, sing, chant, and make speeches, either by

himself or with a group of like-minded individuals.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 29 (J.A. 12) (emphasis added). The allegation’s

“either/or” phrasing, the government submits, renders

Hodge’s future intent to violate the Assemblages Clause

unduly speculative: Hodge might return with a group of

people, but then again, he might go it alone.

Hodge’s articulation of his intentions suffices to establish

his standing under our precedents. In Lederman v. United

States, we considered a plaintiff’s standing to bring a First

Amendment challenge to a regulation banning a laundry list

of “demonstration activit[ies]” (including “parading,

picketing, leafleting, holding vigils, sit-ins, or other

expressive conduct or speechmaking”) in designated “no-

demonstration zones” within the Capitol grounds. 291 F.3d at

39. The plaintiff had been arrested and charged after

leafleting on the Capitol’s East Front sidewalk. Id. at 39-40.

In his complaint asserting a facial challenge to the entire

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regulation, the plaintiff alleged that he “wishe[d] to come to

Washington in the future . . . to engage in constitutionally-

protected demonstration activity in the no-demonstration

zone—including, but not necessarily limited to, leafleting and

holding signs.” Id. at 40.

Based on the plaintiff’s arrest for leafleting and “his

intent to return to the Capitol Grounds to engage in other

expressive activity,” we found that he had standing to

challenge the entire regulation. Id. at 41. If the Lederman

plaintiff’s stated desire to engage in prohibited activity

“including, but not necessarily limited to” leafleting and

holding signs adequately established his intention to violate

other parts of the regulation, Hodge’s plans to return to the

plaza “either by himself or with a group of like-minded

individuals” suffices as well.

We therefore proceed to address the merits of Hodge’s

challenges to both the Display and Assemblages Clauses.

III.

Hodge attacks 40 U.S.C. § 6135 as unconstitutional “on

its face and as applied to his desired activities.” Am. Compl.

¶ 1 (J.A. 6). In granting summary judgment, the district court

examined what it conceived to be two separate First

Amendment arguments. First, the court found § 6135 facially

unconstitutional as an unreasonable restriction of expressive

activity on public property. Second, the court determined that

§ 6135 is overbroad. With respect to both conclusions,

however, the court confined its analysis to the Supreme Court

plaza. See Hodge, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 198.

We address below whether Hodge’s overbreadth claim

affords a separate basis for relief independent of his claim that

§ 6135 is an unreasonable restriction of speech. See Part IV,

15

infra. Regarding the restriction-of-speech claim, though, one

might ask at the outset whether it is best considered a “facial”

or an “as-applied” challenge. We briefly note the question

because the distinction sometimes affects the applicable

standards.

The Supreme Court often cautions that a facial challenge

can succeed only if “‘no set of circumstances exists under

which the [statute] would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is

unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State

Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449

(2008) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745

(1987)). Yet the Court has also indicated that the standard for

facial invalidity may be less stringent in some situations,

instead turning on whether the statute lacks any “plainly

legitimate sweep.” See id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702, 739-40 & n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in

judgments)); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472

(2010). An ordinary as-applied challenge, by contrast, asks a

court to assess a statute’s constitutionality with respect to the

particular set of facts before it. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisc. Right

to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456-57 (2007).

Hodge’s challenge eludes ready classification. In

examining Hodge’s claim that the statute impermissibly

restricts speech, we will naturally hypothesize applications of

the law beyond his own particular conduct. On the other

hand, notwithstanding Hodge’s entreaties to invalidate the

statute on its “face,” he raises no meaningful challenge to the

statute’s application anywhere other than the plaza (within the

Supreme Court building, for instance). Hodge’s claim thus

might be conceived of as “as-applied” in the sense that he

confines his challenge to the statute’s application to a

particular site, but “facial” in the sense that he asks us to

examine circumstances beyond his individual case.

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There is no need for us to definitively resolve those

questions of characterization. The “distinction between facial

and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has

some automatic effect.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.

310, 331 (2010). For our purposes, it suffices to say that we

adhere to the Supreme Court’s approach in Grace: we will

examine the validity of the statute’s application to a particular

portion of the Supreme Court grounds—the plaza—looking

beyond the plaintiff’s particular conduct when assessing the

statute’s fit. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps.

Union, 513 U.S. 454, 487 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in

judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing Grace as

a case in which the Court “declared a statute invalid as to a

particular application without striking the entire provision that

appears to encompass it,” though noting that the Court’s

“jurisprudence in this area is hardly a model of clarity”).

Having noted the “facial/as-applied” doctrinal undercard,

we can now move on to the main event. In asking us to

declare § 6135 unconstitutional in all its applications in the

Supreme Court plaza, Hodge’s claim implicates “the gravest

and most delicate duty that [courts are] called on to perform”:

invalidation of an Act of Congress. Blodgett v. Holden, 275

U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). We are not

compelled to do so here. We reach that conclusion by

examining Hodge’s challenge in accordance with the

Supreme Court’s analysis in Grace. First, we assess whether

the Supreme Court plaza is a public forum or a nonpublic

forum, determining that the plaza is the latter. Next, we apply

the First Amendment rules applicable in nonpublic forums.

Under those relaxed standards, we conclude that the statute

reasonably (and hence permissibly) furthers the government’s

interests in maintaining decorum and order in the entryway to

the nation’s highest court and in preserving the appearance

17

and actuality of a judiciary unswayed by public opinion and

pressure.

A.

Hodge’s desired activities in the Supreme Court plaza—

picketing, leafleting, and speechmaking—lie at the core of the

First Amendment’s protections. Still, he does not have an

automatic entitlement to engage in that conduct wherever (and

whenever) he would like. Rather, the “Government, ‘no less

than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve

the property under its control for the use to which it is

lawfully dedicated.’” Grace, 461 U.S. at 178 (quoting

Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)). That principle

finds voice in the Supreme Court’s “forum analysis,” which

“determine[s] when a governmental entity, in regulating

property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.”

Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings

Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010).

Some public property, as a matter of tradition, is deemed

dedicated to the exercise of expressive activity by the public.

The “quintessential” examples of such traditional public

forums are streets, sidewalks, and parks, all of which, “time

out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing

public questions.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local

Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting Hague v.

CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)). A

public forum can also arise by specific designation (rather

than tradition) when “government property that has not

traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally

opened up for that purpose.” Pleasant Grove City v.

Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). The government “must

respect the open character” of a public forum. Oberwetter,

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639 F.3d at 551. “In such places,” accordingly, “the

government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive

conduct is very limited.” Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.

A nonpublic forum, by contrast, is public property that is

“not by tradition or designation a forum for public

communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. “Limitations on

expressive activity conducted on this . . . category of property

must survive only a much more limited review.” Int’l Soc’y

for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679

(1992). In a nonpublic forum, a “challenged regulation need

only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to

suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the

speaker’s view.” Id.; see Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.

We find the Supreme Court plaza to be a nonpublic

forum. The Court’s analysis in Grace directly points the way

to that conclusion. In finding that the sidewalks marking the

perimeter of the Court’s grounds are a public forum, the Court

emphasized that there is “no separation, no fence, and no

indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the

curb and sidewalks” that “they have entered some special type

of enclave.” 461 U.S. at 180. Although certain sidewalks

might constitute nonpublic forums if they serve specific

purposes for particular public sites (such as providing solely

for internal passage within those sites, see United States v.

Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-30 (1990) (plurality opinion);

Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 685 F.3d

1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2012)), the Grace Court viewed the

Supreme Court’s perimeter sidewalks to be “indistinguishable

from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C.,” 461 U.S. at

179. The Court therefore saw “nothing to indicate to the

public that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court

grounds” in particular. Id. at 183. As a result, there is “no

reason why they should be treated any differently” from the

19

mine-run of public sidewalks, which are “considered,

generally without further inquiry, to be public forum

property.” Id. at 179.

Grace’s analysis makes evident that the Supreme Court

plaza, in contrast to the perimeter sidewalks, is a nonpublic

forum. The Court considered it of pivotal significance that

there was “nothing to indicate to the public that these

sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds,” id. at 183,

or that “they have entered some special type of enclave,” id.

at 180. The opposite is very much true of the Court’s plaza.

The plaza’s appearance and design vividly manifest its

architectural integration with the Supreme Court building, as

well as its separation from the perimeter sidewalks and

surrounding area. The plaza is elevated from the sidewalk by

a set of marble steps. A low, patterned marble wall—the

same type of wall that encircles the rest of the building—

surrounds the plaza platform and defines its boundaries. And

the plaza and the steps rising to it are composed of white

marble that contrasts sharply with the concrete sidewalk in

front of it, but that matches the staircase ascending to the

Court’s front doors and the façade of the building itself. As

one account explains, perhaps with a degree of romanticism,

the “unusually high mica content” of the marble produces

“[r]eflections . . . so brilliant on sunny days that they almost

blind the viewer.” Scott & Lee, supra, at 138.

From the perspective of a Court visitor (and also the

public), the “physical and symbolic pathway to [the Supreme

Court] chamber begins on the plaza.” Id. Cass Gilbert, the

Supreme Court’s architect, conceived of the plaza, staircase,

and portico leading to the massive bronze entry doors as an

integrated “processional route” culminating in the courtroom.

Id. Commenting on that design, a sitting Justice has written

20

that, “[s]tarting at the Court’s western plaza, Gilbert’s plan

leads visitors along a carefully choreographed, climbing path

that ultimately ends at the courtroom itself.” Statement

Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance, 2009 J.

Sup. Ct. U.S. at 831 (Breyer, J.).

In short, whereas there was “nothing to indicate to the

public that [the] sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court

grounds,” Grace, 461 U.S. 183, there is everything to indicate

to the public that the plaza is an integral part of those grounds.

The plaza’s features convey in many distinctive ways that a

person has “entered some special type of enclave.” Id. at 180.

And in serving as what amounts to the elevated front porch of

the Supreme Court building (complete with a surrounding

railing), the plaza—like the building from which it extends,

and to which it leads—is a nonpublic forum.

The Court in Grace, in fact, appeared to foreshadow

precisely that result. Referring to the Court’s perimeter

sidewalks, Grace explained that “[t]raditional public forum

property” of that kind does “not lose its historically

recognized character for the reason that it abuts government

property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum

for public expression.” Id. at 180. When it described the

perimeter sidewalks as “abut[ting] government property that

has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public

expression,” the Court presumably had in mind the plaza.

The plaza, after all, “abuts” the perimeter sidewalk marking

the front edge of the Supreme Court grounds along First

Street Northeast. The Court thus seemed expressly to assume

that its plaza is a nonpublic forum—i.e., property “dedicated

to a use other than as a forum for public expression.”

That conclusion is consistent with the treatment of

courthouses more generally. The area surrounding a

21

courthouse traditionally has not been considered a forum for

demonstrations and protests. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

559 (1965), the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment

challenge to a Louisiana law prohibiting picketing or parades

“in or near” courthouses if aimed to impede the

administration of justice or influence a court officer. Id. at

560. The Court found there to be “no question that a State has

a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the

pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create.”

Id. at 562.

Citing Cox, the three-judge court in Jeannette Rankin

Brigade (which is “binding precedent” in light of the Supreme

Court’s summary affirmance, Lederman, 291 F.3d at 41)

observed that the “area surrounding a courthouse” may “be

put off limits to parades and other political demonstrations.”

342 F. Supp. at 583. Whereas the “fundamental function of a

legislature in a democratic society assumes accessibility to

[public] opinion,” the “judiciary does not decide cases by

reference to popular opinion.” Id. at 584. As a result, while

the grounds of the United States Capitol are considered a

public forum, see id.; Lederman, 291 F.3d at 41-42, the

grounds of a courthouse are not.

Going beyond the realm of courthouses, moreover, the

Supreme Court plaza bears a family resemblance to another

plaza held not to be a public forum for expression by the

general public: the plaza located in the Lincoln Center

performing arts complex in Manhattan. See Hotel Emps. &

Rest. Emps. Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Parks &

Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 547-53 (2d Cir. 2002). That plaza

is a large, paved “outdoor square that serves as the

centerpiece of the Lincoln Center complex.” Id. at 540. Like

the relationship of the Supreme Court plaza to the Court

building, the Lincoln Center plaza’s “main purpose” is “to

22

serve as the ‘forecourt’ for the performing arts hall.” Id. at

547. Although the plaza’s “design clearly invites passers-by

to stroll through or linger,” the Second Circuit reasoned,

“plazas that serve as forecourts in performing arts complexes

are not the types of public spaces that have traditionally been

dedicated to expressive uses.” Id. at 551-52.

The court thus considered it “self-evident that permitting

speech on all manner of public issues in the Plaza would

compromise the City’s ability to establish a specialized space

devoted to contemplation and celebration of the arts.” Id. at

552. So too, here: opening the Supreme Court plaza to

“speech on all manner of public issues,” id., would

compromise the plaza’s function as an integrated forecourt for

“contemplation of the Court’s central purpose, the

administration of justice to all who seek it.” Statement

Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance, 2009 J.

Sup. Ct. U.S. at 831.

Importantly, the Supreme Court plaza’s status as a

nonpublic forum is unaffected by the public’s unrestricted

access to the plaza at virtually any time. Indeed, in Grace

itself, the Court emphasized that “property is not transformed

into ‘public forum’ property merely because the public is

permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically

all times.” 461 U.S. at 178; see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,

836 (1976). The Second Circuit therefore concluded that the

Lincoln Center plaza is not a traditional public forum despite

the fact that “public access to the Plaza is unrestricted” and

non-patron pedestrians frequently “cross the Plaza en route to

other destinations in the neighborhood.” Hotel Emps., 311

F.3d at 540. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding the

ease and frequency of public access, visitors understand the

plaza’s function in terms of the property to which it

23

corresponds and accordingly sense that they are not in “a

typical . . . town square.” Id. at 550.

The same is true of open-air monuments held by this

court to be nonpublic forums. See Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at

553. As our court observed in reference to the interior of the

Jefferson Memorial, “[t]hat the Memorial is open to the public

does not alter its status as a nonpublic forum. Visitors are not

invited for expressive purposes, but are free to enter only if

they abide by the rules that preserve the Memorial’s solemn

atmosphere.” Id. Although those visitors may “regularly talk

loudly, make noise, and take and pose for photographs, . . .

none of this conduct rises to the level of a conspicuous

demonstration.” Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). Much the same could be said of the

Supreme Court plaza.

While a nonpublic forum thus is not “transformed into

‘public forum’ property” by virtue of the government’s

permitting access for non-expressive purposes, Grace, 461

U.S. at 178, the near converse is also true: a traditional

public forum is not transformed into nonpublic forum

property by the expedient of the government’s restricting

access for expressive purposes. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v.

Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133

(1981); Lederman, 291 F.3d at 43. The Supreme Court has

been clear that the government “may not by its own ipse dixit

destroy the ‘public forum’ status of streets and parks which

have historically been public forums.” Greenburgh Civic

Ass’ns, 453 U.S. at 133. In Grace, accordingly, the statute’s

restriction on expressive activity in an area defined to include

the perimeter sidewalks did not itself transform the sidewalks

into a nonpublic forum. The Court explained that

governmental attempts to “destr[oy]” public-forum status via

24

such restrictions are “presumptively impermissible.” 461

U.S. at 179-80.

While Hodge seeks to invoke that “ipse dixit” principle

here, his effort is misdirected. The principle has no

applicability with respect to the Supreme Court plaza because

there is no background assumption—grounded in tradition—

that the property is a public forum. The plaza plainly is not a

street or sidewalk. Nor is it a park.

With regard to any suggestion that the Court’s plaza

could be considered some kind of park, the Second Circuit

held that the Lincoln Center plaza is not a park for purposes

of rendering it a traditional public forum even though the

City’s regulations define it as a “park” for purposes of

establishing the Parks Department’s authority over it. Hotel

Emps., 311 F.3d at 548-49 & n.10. We reached essentially

the same conclusion concerning the Jefferson Memorial,

which “is located within the National Park system.”

Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at 552. “[O]ur country’s many national

parks are too vast and variegated to be painted with a single

brush for purposes of forum analysis,” we recognized, and

many areas within national parks “never have been dedicated

to free expression and public assembly.” Id. (quoting

Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C.

Cir. 2010)). Here, Hodge makes no argument that the

Supreme Court plaza is defined as a “park” for any reason

under the law. And regardless, the plaza, like courthouse

grounds in general, has never been dedicated to the public’s

conduct of assemblages, expressive activity, and recreation in

the manner of a traditional park.

None of this is to say that Congress could not choose to

dedicate the Supreme Court plaza as a forum for the robust

exercise of First Amendment activity by the general public.

25

The plaza could be transformed into a setting for

demonstrations and the like. And if Congress were to open up

the plaza as a public forum, the space would become subject

to the same First Amendment rules that govern across the

street on the grounds of the Capitol. See Summum, 555 U.S.

at 469-70.

But whereas the Capitol grounds are a public forum by

requirement of the First Amendment, see Lederman, 291 F.3d

at 41-42, the Supreme Court plaza would become a public

forum by choice of Congress. The difference exists because

“[j]udges are not politicians.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at

1662. And although “[p]oliticians are expected to be

appropriately responsive to the preferences” of the public, id.

at 1667—and therefore are expected to accommodate public

expression on the grounds of the legislative chamber, see

Jeannette Rankin, 342 F. Supp. at 584-85—the “same is not

true of judges,” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667. So while

Congress could elect to dedicate the Court’s plaza as a public

forum, Congress has not done so. To the contrary, Congress

has restricted expressive activity in the plaza through statutes

like § 6135.

Nor have the Supreme Court’s own enforcement

practices transformed the plaza into a nonpublic forum. The

Court’s allowance of two forms of highly circumscribed

expressive activity in the plaza—attorneys and litigants

addressing the media immediately after a Supreme Court

argument, and the occasional granting of approval to conduct

filming on the plaza for commercial or professional films

relating to the Court, Dolan Decl. ¶ 9 (J.A. 18)—is

immaterial. The “government does not create a public forum

by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by

intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public

discourse.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,

26

473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); see Arkansas Educ. Television

Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998); Greer, 424

U.S. at 438 n.10.

For the same reason, it is of no moment that the Supreme

Court Police in certain situations might opt to allow

demonstrators onto the plaza for a brief period, presumably in

an effort to exercise enforcement authority with responsible

(and viewpoint-neutral) discretion in unique circumstances.

For instance, notwithstanding the Court Police’s usual

practice of strict enforcement, see Dolan Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9 (J.A.

17, 18), the Police apparently did not attempt to prevent a

crowd of about 200 demonstrators from briefly “surg[ing] up

the off-limits steps of the U.S. Supreme Court” late one night

last fall “as part of nationwide protests against a Missouri

grand jury’s decision not to indict the police officer who

fatally shot a Ferguson teenager.” Tony Mauro, Ferguson

Protesters Swarm Steps of Supreme Court, Legal Times, Nov.

25, 2014 (archived on LexisNexis). The protesters evidently

moved on after about fifteen minutes, and the Police made no

arrests. Id. The fact that the protesters made their way onto

the plaza for a quarter of an hour did not somehow transform

the plaza into a public forum for all time. Rather, the plaza

was then, and remains now, a nonpublic forum.

B.

Having concluded that the Supreme Court plaza is a

nonpublic forum, we now examine whether the Assemblages

and Display Clauses “survive . . . [the] much more limited

review” governing speech restrictions in such areas. Lee, 505

U.S. at 679. Under that review, the restrictions “need only be

reasonable, as long as [they are] not an effort to suppress the

speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s

view.” Id.

27

There is no suggestion that either clause discriminates on

the basis of viewpoint. The Assemblages Clause makes it

unlawful “to parade, stand, or move in processions or

assemblages,” and the Display Clause makes it unlawful to

“display” a “flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to

bring into public notice a party, organization, or movement.”

40 U.S.C. § 6135. Whatever the scope of expressive activities

within the reach of those prohibitions (a matter we explore in

greater depth below), they operate without regard to the

communication’s viewpoint. Demonstrations supporting the

Court’s decisions and demonstrations opposing them are

equally forbidden in the plaza.

The question, then, is whether the restrictions are

reasonable in light of the government’s interest in preserving

the property for its intended purposes. See Perry, 460 U.S. at

46. We find that they are.

1.

The government puts forward two primary interests in

support of § 6135’s application in the Supreme Court plaza.

First, the government argues that the statute helps maintain

the decorum and order befitting courthouses generally and the

nation’s highest court in particular. Second, the government

contends that the statute promotes the appearance and

actuality of a Court whose deliberations are immune to public

opinion and invulnerable to public pressure. Precedent lies

with the government as to both interests.

With respect to the first, in Grace, the government relied

on the statute’s purpose “to provide for the . . . maintenance

of proper order and decorum” in the Supreme Court grounds.

461 U.S. at 182. The Supreme Court concluded that the

Display Clause bore “an insufficient nexus” to that interest

under the strict standards applicable in a traditional public

28

forum. Id. at 181. But for present purposes, what matters is

that the Court did “not denigrate the necessity . . . to maintain

proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court

grounds.” Id. at 182. Reinforcing the point, the Court later

reiterated that it did “not discount the importance of this

proffered purpose for” the statute. Id. at 183. The Court’s

opinion therefore has been cited for the proposition that “it is

proper to weigh the need to maintain the dignity and purpose

of a public building.” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in judgment).

That need fully applies to the Supreme Court plaza. As

the actual and figurative entryway to the Supreme Court

building and ultimately the courtroom, the plaza is one of the

integrated architectural “elements [that] does its part to

encourage contemplation of the Court’s central purpose, the

administration of justice to all who seek it.” Statement

Concerning the Supreme Court’s Front Entrance, 2009 J.

Sup. Ct. U.S. at 831. And as the public’s staging ground to

enter the Supreme Court building and engage with the

business conducted within it, the plaza, together with the

building to which it is integrally connected, is an area in

which the government may legitimately attempt to maintain

suitable decorum for a courthouse.

The government’s concern with preserving appropriate

decorum and order in the Court’s plaza is not altogether

unlike its interest in “promoting a tranquil environment” at

the site of an open-air national monument or memorial, where

visitors might “talk loudly, make noise, and take and pose for

photographs,” but cannot engage in “conduct ris[ing] to the

level of a conspicuous demonstration.” Oberwetter, 639 F.3d

at 552 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We

have described the interest in maintaining a tranquil

environment in such places to be “substantial.” Id. at 554; see

29

Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

And that interest, as with the interest in maintaining suitable

decorum in the area of a courthouse, is “no less significant for

being subtle, intangible and nonquantifiable.” Henderson,

964 F.2d at 1184.

The second interest the government invokes here was

also recognized in Grace. There, the Court described the

interest in preserving the appearance of a judiciary immune to

public pressure as follows:

Court decisions are made on the record before

them and in accordance with the applicable

law. The views of the parties and of others are

to be presented by briefs and oral argument.

Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do

not entertain visitors in their chambers for the

purpose of urging that cases be resolved one

way or another, and they do not and should not

respond to parades, picketing or pressure

groups.

Grace, 461 U.S. at 183. Because the Court viewed the

perimeter sidewalks to be no “different from other public

sidewalks in the city,” it “doubt[ed] that the public would

draw a different inference from” picketing on the perimeter

sidewalks than from picketing “on the sidewalks across the

street.” Id. But the Court did “not discount the importance”

of the interest in averting an “appear[ance] to the public that

the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence or that

picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or

proper way of appealing to or influencing the Supreme

Court.” Id.

The Supreme Court has credited the same interest both

before and after Grace. When it upheld a ban on courthouse-

30

area demonstrations aimed to influence the judicial process in

Cox v. Louisiana, the Court recognized the state’s prerogative

to “adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that

the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside

control and influence.” 379 U.S. at 562. And, while allowing

that “most judges will be influenced only by what they see

and hear in court,” the Court affirmed that a state “may also

properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged in

the minds of the public.” Id. at 565. The Cox Court

hypothesized a scenario in which “demonstrators paraded and

picketed for weeks with signs asking that indictments be

dismissed,” and then “a judge, completely uninfluenced by

these demonstrations, dismissed the indictments.” Id.

“[U]nder these circumstances,” the Court explained, a state

“may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the

public . . . that the judge’s action was in part a product of

intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly

working of the judicial process.” Id.

The decision in Cox came down fifty years ago. Since

then, it may have become fashionable in certain quarters to

assume that any reference to an apolitical judiciary “free from

outside control and influence,” id. at 562, should be met with

a roll of one’s eyes, or perhaps to view any suggestion to that

effect as antiquated or quaintly idealistic. If so, the

government’s interest in preserving (or restoring) the public’s

impression of a judiciary immune to outside pressure would

have only gained in salience. In fact, in its just-completed

Term, the Supreme Court forcefully reaffirmed the vitality of

the interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of

the judicial process.

In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the Court considered a

First Amendment challenge to a Florida ban on judicial

candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign contributions.

31

Calling “public perception of judicial integrity” a

governmental interest of “the highest order,” 135 S. Ct. at

1666, the Court upheld the Florida ban as narrowly tailored to

meet that compelling interest, id. at 1672. The Court

explained that “[t]he importance of public confidence in the

integrity of judges stems from the place of the judiciary in the

government”:

Unlike the executive or the legislature, the

judiciary “has no influence over either the

sword or the purse; . . . neither force nor will

but merely judgment.” The Federalist No. 78,

p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)

(capitalization altered). The judiciary’s

authority therefore depends in large measure

on the public’s willingness to respect and

follow its decisions. As Justice Frankfurter

once put it for the Court, “justice must satisfy

the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United

States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666.

The Williams-Yulee Court acknowledged that “[t]he

concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not

easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to

proof by documentary record.” Id. at 1667. Despite the

interest’s “intangible” character, id. at 1671, “no one” could

deny “that it is genuine and compelling,” id. at 1667. The

government therefore is on strong footing in invoking that

interest here.

2.

Unlike in a public forum, there is no requirement in a

nonpublic forum “that the restriction be narrowly tailored” to

32

advance the government’s interests. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at

809. Rather, the government’s “decision to restrict access to a

nonpublic forum need only be reasonable,” and even then, “it

need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable

limitation.” Id. at 808. Judged by those standards, § 6135, as

applied to the Supreme Court plaza, reasonably serves the

government’s interests in maintaining order and decorum at

the Supreme Court and in avoiding the impression that

popular opinion and public pressure affect the Court’s

deliberations.

a.

To begin with, restricting expressive assemblages and

displays promotes a setting of decorum and order at the

Supreme Court. Congress could reasonably conclude that

demonstrations and parades in the plaza, or the display of

signs and banners, would compromise the sense of dignity

and decorum befitting the entryway to the nation’s highest

court. A nonpublic forum like the plaza “by definition is not

dedicated to general debate or the free exchange of ideas.” Id.

at 811. Instead, “when government property is not dedicated

to open communication the government may—without further

justification—restrict use to those who participate in the

forum’s official business.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 53. Here, the

Supreme Court plaza serves as the integrated staging area

through which to approach the Supreme Court building and

encounter the important work conducted within it. Rather

than “restrict use” of the plaza “to those who participate in the

[Court’s] official business,” id., the government grants access

to all comers. In doing so, the government does not lose its

ability to require visitors to comport themselves in a manner

befitting the site’s basic function.

33

The statute also promotes the understanding that the

Court resolves the matters before it without regard to political

pressure or public opinion. Allowing demonstrations directed

at the Court, on the Court’s own front terrace, would tend to

yield the opposite impression: that of a Court engaged with—

and potentially vulnerable to—outside entreaties by the

public. At the least, the appearance of a Court subject to

political pressure might gain increasing hold.

This case illustrates the point. Hodge tells us he wants to

use the plaza to send a “political message . . . directed . . . at

the Supreme Court” explaining how its decisions “have

allowed police misconduct and discrimination against racial

minorities to continue.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29 (J.A. 12).

Congress may act to prevent just those sorts of conspicuous

efforts on the courthouse grounds to pressure the Court to

change its decision-making—efforts that could well foster an

impression of a Court subject to outside influence. Reserving

the plaza as a demonstration-free zone counters the sense that

it is appropriate to appeal to the Court through means other

than “briefs and oral argument.” Grace, 461 U.S. at 183. It

thereby protects the judicial process, and the Supreme Court’s

unique role within that process, “from being misjudged in the

minds of the public.” Cox, 379 U.S. at 565.

Insofar as the prohibitions of the Assemblages and

Display Clauses may reach beyond what is strictly necessary

to vindicate those interests, Congress is allowed a degree of

latitude in a nonpublic forum. The Supreme Court’s

admonition that a restriction “need not be the most reasonable

or the only reasonable limitation” captures that understanding.

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808. Considered in that light, Hodge

reaches too far in arguing that § 6135 is unnecessary because

another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1507, already addresses the

government’s concerns. Especially when operating under the

34

relaxed standards applicable in a nonpublic forum, there is

nothing “improper in Congress’ providing alternative

statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective

protection of one and the same interest.” United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380 (1968); see Initiative &

Referendum, 685 F.3d at 1073.

Section 1507, at any rate, does not fully address

Congress’s concerns. That statute bars enumerated expressive

activities near a courthouse “with the intent of interfering

with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or

with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or

court officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1507. It therefore contains a

specific-intent requirement not present in § 6135. The latter,

unlike the former, accounts for protesters in the Supreme

Court plaza who may create the appearance of attempting to

influence the Court’s deliberations while lacking any

subjective intent to do so.

There is also a difference between the two statutes with

regard to the interest in maintaining decorum and order within

the Supreme Court grounds. Section 1507 is principally

addressed to protests directed at judicial business. But people

may—and do—wish to use the Supreme Court’s front porch

as a platform for attracting attention to a wide range of causes,

some of which might have no evident connection to the

Supreme Court or the administration of justice. And

Congress is generally concerned with any demonstration,

regardless of subject, tending to compromise the decorum and

order it seeks to maintain in the Court’s grounds. Because the

Grace Court interpreted § 6135 to reach “almost any sign or

leaflet carrying a communication”—including leaflets about

“the oppressed peoples of Central America,” 461 U.S. at 173,

176—the statute addresses Congress’s concerns to an extent

that § 1507 likely cannot.

35

b.

Hodge, echoing the district court, argues not only that the

Assemblages and Display Clauses are unreasonably narrow in

failing to do work not already done by § 1507, but also that

the clauses are unreasonably broad in prohibiting various

conduct in the Supreme Court plaza that should remain

permissible. The prohibitions’ terms, the latter argument

runs, carry the capacity to sweep in a range of expressive

activity bearing an inadequate connection to the government’s

interests. For instance, a solitary, peaceful protester

unassumingly holding an inconspicuous sign in the corner of

the plaza, perhaps on a day when the Court conducts no

business, might seem an unlikely candidate to raise

substantial concerns about breaching appropriate decorum in

the Supreme Court grounds or engendering a misperception

regarding the Court’s receptiveness to outside influences.

It is often possible, however, to formulate hypothetical

applications of a challenged statute that may call into question

the law’s efficacy in those discrete instances. But “the

validity of [a] regulation depends on the relation it bears to

the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on

the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests in an

individual case.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.

781, 801 (1989). It bears reemphasis in this regard that

restrictions of expressive activity in a nonpublic forum need

not satisfy any least-restrictive-means threshold, and “a

finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the

speech . . . and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not

mandated.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808-09. Rather, Congress

may prophylactically frame prohibitions at a level of

generality as long as the lines it draws are reasonable, even if

particular applications within those lines would implicate the

government’s interests to a greater extent than others.

36

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee

affords an illuminating reference point on that score. The

petitioner, a former candidate for state judicial office,

acknowledged that Florida’s interest in preserving the

appearance of judicial integrity might justify a ban on

individualized, in-person solicitations for campaign

contributions. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670. She

argued, though, that Floridians were unlikely to lose

confidence in their judiciary as a result of “a letter posted

online and distributed via mass mailing” to “a broad

audience.” Id. at 1671. The Supreme Court was

unpersuaded. Although Florida’s interest “may be implicated

to varying degrees in particular contexts,” the Court reasoned,

the state had “reasonably determined that personal appeals for

money by a judicial candidate inherently create an

appearance . . . that may cause the public to lose confidence in

the integrity of the judiciary.” Id. “The First Amendment

requires” that the law “be narrowly tailored,” the Court

explained, “not that it be perfectly tailored.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

If that understanding won the day even when applying

“strict scrutiny,” id. at 1666, it carries even more force when

(as in this case) the First Amendment does not call for narrow

tailoring. Here, as in Williams-Yulee, certain kinds of

expressive conduct barred by the Assemblages and Display

Clauses “of course . . . raise greater concerns than others.” Id.

at 1671. “But most problems arise in greater and lesser

gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine [the

government] to addressing evils in their most acute form.” Id.

Congress therefore was under no obligation to fashion

§ 6135’s reach so as to encompass only those forms of

expressive activity in the Supreme Court plaza that most

acutely implicate the government’s concerns. Congress could

paint with a broader brush.

37

The Williams-Yulee Court went on to observe, moreover,

that the “impossibility of perfect tailoring is especially

apparent when the State’s compelling interest is as intangible

as public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Id.

That same “intangible” interest is at work here. And the

alternative interest in maintaining decorum and order likewise

forms a “subtle, intangible and nonquantifiable” baseline

against which to apply any rigorous tailoring inquiry.

Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1184.

Williams-Yulee highlights the limited utility of attempting

to address every conceivable application of § 6135 at the

margins. When the heartland of a law’s applications furthers

the government’s interests, the existence of hypothetical

applications bearing a lesser connection to those interests does

not invalidate the law. “The delicate power of pronouncing

an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised

with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.” United

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960), quoted in Wash.

State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450. While we are therefore

cognizant of the need to keep our judicial imagination in

check, we think it warranted to give a measure of attention to

the district court’s (and Hodge’s) concerns with certain

hypothetical applications of § 6135 in the Supreme Court

plaza, and to explain why those concerns may be borne of an

unduly expansive reading of the statute’s prohibitions.

We first consider the Assemblages Clause’s prohibition

against “parad[ing], stand[ing], or mov[ing] in processions or

assemblages.” 40 U.S.C. § 6135. The district court feared

that the clause would criminalize any group of people

standing together in the Supreme Court plaza. That might

include attorneys, tourists, Court employees gathering for

lunch, or even a “line of preschool students . . . on their first

field trip to the Supreme Court.” Hodge, 949 F. Supp. 2d at

38

188. Hodge similarly protests that the clause “is so broad as

to cover not only people congregating to engage in expressive

activity,” but also people “congregating for any other reason.”

Appellee Br. 6. But insofar as the clause covers congregating

for reasons other than expressive activity, those applications

to non-expressive conduct would raise no First Amendment

concern in the first place. In any event, we do not understand

the Assemblages Clause to prohibit every instance in which a

group of persons stands or moves together in the Supreme

Court plaza (nor, for that matter, does the government, see

Appellants Br. 35-37).

Though the language addresses “standing” and “moving”

in an “assemblage,” those terms should be understood in the

context of the words that surround them. And the

surrounding language bespeaks joint conduct that is

expressive in nature and aimed to draw attention. The verb

“parade” and the noun “procession” connote actions that are

purposefully expressive and designed to attract notice. See

Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2015) (definition 1a of

“parade”: “[t]o march in procession or with great display or

ostentation; to walk up and down, promenade, etc., in a public

place, esp. in order to be seen; to show off”); id. (definition 1a

of “procession”: [t]he action of a body of people going or

marching along in orderly succession in a formal or

ceremonial way, esp. as part of a ceremony, festive occasion,

or demonstration”).

In addition, the Assemblages Clause appears in the same

textual sentence as the Display Clause, and the conduct

addressed by one naturally informs the reading of the other.

The Display Clause plainly involves expressive conduct,

fortifying the understanding that its sister clause is

analogously addressed to expressive assemblages. Moreover,

the Display Clause’s modifying phrase “designed or adapted

39

to bring into public notice” reinforces the statutory focus on

conduct meant to attract attention. The more expansive

reading contemplated by Hodge, by contrast, would

presumably bar a familiar occurrence in the Court’s regular

course of business: the line of people assembled in the plaza

to enter the Court for an oral argument session. There is no

reason to construe a prohibition aimed to preserve the plaza

for its intended purposes in a manner that would preclude use

of the plaza for those very purposes.

We next consider the Display Clause’s bar against

“display[ing] in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or

device designed or adapted to bring into public notice a party,

organization, or movement.” 40 U.S.C. § 6135. Again, the

Grace Court understood that “almost any sign or leaflet

carrying a communication . . . would be ‘designed or adapted

to bring into public notice [a] party, organization, or

movement.’” 461 U.S. at 176. Signs or leaflets, as the Court

suggested, by nature aim to exhibit or relay the bearer’s

message to an audience—that is their essential purpose. The

inquiry has the potential to become more complicated,

however, with respect to certain types of “device[s].” The

district court expressed concerns about (what it perceived to

be) the government’s concession that the Display Clause

prohibits “an individual or group [from] . . . wearing t-shirts

displaying their school, church, or organization logo” in the

Supreme Court plaza. Hodge, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 188-89.

The government maintains that it never intended to make that

concession. It now takes the position that the statute’s

reference to the “display” of a “device” generally would not

apply to the passive bearing of written words or a logo on

one’s clothing. See Appellants Reply Br. 11-13.

We agree. Because the statute speaks in terms of an

affirmative act of “displaying” a “device,” and because the

40

other listed mediums of a “flag” or “banner” involve

brandishing an object for the purpose of causing others to take

note of it, we assume that the “display” of a “device,” within

the meaning of § 6135, would ordinarily require something

more than merely wearing apparel that happens to contain

words or symbols. The statute, moreover, not only

contemplates an act of display akin to brandishing an object,

but also requires a display that is “designed or adapted to

bring into public notice a party, organization, or movement.”

40 U.S.C. § 6135 (emphasis added). The passive bearing of a

logo or name on a t-shirt, without more, normally would not

cause the public to pause and take notice in the manner

presumably intended by § 6135.

Rather, we assume that the Display Clause means to

capture essentially the same type of behavior addressed by

rules we have considered in the context of open-air national

memorials—i.e., “conspicuous expressive act[s] with a

propensity to draw onlookers.” Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at 550.

We will not attempt to canvass the various forms of conduct

involving clothing that may come within the compass of that

description; those cases can await adjudication as they might

arise. But a single person’s mere wearing of a t-shirt

containing words or symbols on the plaza—if there are no

attendant circumstances indicating her intention to draw

onlookers—generally would not be enough to violate the

statute.

c.

With respect to expressive activity that does fall within

the statute’s prohibitions, it is a mark in favor of the statute’s

reasonableness that the barred activity can be undertaken in

an adjacent forum—the sidewalk running along First Street

Northeast. The Supreme Court’s “decisions have counted it

41

significant that other available avenues for the . . . exercise

[of] First Amendment rights lessen the burden” of a

restriction in a nonpublic forum. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561

U.S. at 690; see Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at 554; Hotel Emps.,

311 F.3d at 556. The sidewalk area fronting the Supreme

Court along First Street is over fifty feet deep. Dolan Decl.

Attach. (J.A. 20). And demonstrations, protests, and other

First Amendment activities “regularly occur” there, as is often

seen in pictures. Id. ¶ 5 (J.A. 17). The public generally must

pass through the sidewalk to enter the plaza, moreover,

arming someone engaged in expressive activity on the

perimeter with exposure to the vast majority of people who go

onto the platform.

Hodge makes no argument that the sidewalk in front of

the Court is a physically inadequate or less effective forum for

communicating his message. Instead, Hodge contends that

the sidewalk’s availability should count as a strike against the

statue’s reasonableness. He reasons that the adverse effects of

First Amendment activity in the plaza would also be felt from

the same activity on the adjacent sidewalk, rendering the

distinction between the two an unreasonable one. We are

unpersuaded.

Once again, the analysis in Williams-Yulee is highly

instructive. There, the former judicial candidate sought to

invalidate Florida’s bar against solicitations by candidates

themselves on the ground that Florida’s allowing solicitations

by a candidate’s campaign committee essentially raises the

same dangers. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669. In

rejecting that argument (and doing so under strict scrutiny),

the Court explained: “However similar the two solicitations

may be in substance, a State may conclude that they present

markedly different appearances to the public.” Id.

42

Here, the government could similarly conclude that

protests in the Supreme Court plaza and protests on the public

sidewalk “present markedly different appearances to the

public.” In Grace, the Court doubted whether the public

would view protest activity on the Court’s perimeter

sidewalks to be more suggestive of the Court’s vulnerability

to public opinion than if the same activity were conducted on

the public sidewalks across the street. 461 U.S. at 183. But

that was because there was “nothing to indicate to the public”

that the Court’s perimeter sidewalks “are part of the Supreme

Court grounds or are in any way different from other public

sidewalks.” Id. The opposite is true of the raised marble

plaza, as we have explained. For that reason, Congress could

conclude that the public might form a different impression

about the Court’s susceptibility to public opinion if it saw a

Court seemingly inviting demonstrators onto its own front

porch (as opposed to a Court tolerating demonstrators on a

public sidewalk “indistinguishable from any other sidewalks

in Washington, D.C.,” id. at 179).

* * *

In the end, unless demonstrations are to be freely allowed

inside the Supreme Court building itself, a line must be drawn

somewhere along the route from the street to the Court’s front

entrance. But where? At the front doors themselves? At the

edge of the portico? At the bottom of the stairs ascending

from the plaza to the portico? Or perhaps somewhere in the

middle of the plaza? Among the options, it is fully reasonable

for that line to be fixed at the point one leaves the concrete

public sidewalk and enters the marble steps to the Court’s

plaza, where the “physical and symbolic pathway to [the]

chamber begins.” Scott & Lee, supra, at 138.

43

Of course, this case would be decidedly different if the

line—wherever exactly it lay—were geared to shield the

Supreme Court from having to face criticism just outside its

own front door. A law that discriminated on the basis of

viewpoint in that way would plainly infringe the First

Amendment even in a nonpublic forum. Section 6135,

however, bans demonstrations and displays in the plaza

regardless of whether they support or oppose (or even

concern) the Court.

The statute requires that result because all demonstrations

on the Court’s front porch—even those seeking to give the

Court a pat on the back, not a slap in the face—could fuel the

impression of a Court responsive to public opinion or outside

influence, and could compromise the decorum and order

suitable in the entryway to a courthouse, the nation’s

highest. But demonstrations can take place on the adjacent

public sidewalk, where the concerns justifying the statute’s

restrictions of speech are not as much in evidence. For all

those reasons, § 6135 is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral—and

thus permissible—means of vindicating the government’s

important interests in the Supreme Court plaza.

IV.

In addition to his claim that § 6135 amounts to an

unreasonable restriction on First Amendment activity on

public property, Hodge also asserts a First Amendment

overbreadth claim as a separate basis for across-the-board

invalidation of the statute as to the plaza. The overbreadth

doctrine, traditionally understood, amounts to an exception to

the general rule against third-party standing. See Virginia v.

Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). Because overbroad laws have a

chilling effect, potential speakers who could assert successful

44

challenges to the law’s application against them might instead

refrain from speaking at all. Recognizing that possibility, the

overbreadth doctrine enables a person whose activity validly

falls within the challenged law’s scope to make a First

Amendment argument on behalf of those who might engage

in protected speech but for the law’s chilling effect. See

Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119.

This, however, is not such a case. Hodge never argues

that § 6135 may be constitutionally applied to his own

conduct but is unconstitutional in its application to the

protected speech of others. Instead, he contends that § 6135

cannot be applied to anyone (including himself) in the

Supreme Court plaza, because the law curtails too much

speech in light of the government’s underlying interests.

Descriptively, that is indeed an argument that the law is

“overly broad.” But we have already addressed the substance

of that argument in evaluating the reasonableness of § 6135’s

restrictions on speech in light of the purposes of the forum.

Having concluded that the government’s means-ends fit is

reasonable, we see no viable avenue for concluding

nonetheless that § 6135 has too many unconstitutional

applications to survive.

We therefore decline to run what would amount to the

same analysis a second time. Our approach breaks no new

ground. In Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008),

the plaintiff brought an overbreadth claim alongside a

challenge to a speech restriction in a government forum. Id.

at 894 & n.**. In that case, as here, we upheld the challenged

regulation as a reasonable measure in a nonpublic forum. Id.

at 894-98. We noted that the plaintiff “separately claim[ed]”

that the regulation was “unconstitutionally overbroad.” Id. at

894 n.**. But we declined to “address that claim separately”

because it was “analytically identical to [the] claim” of an

45

invalid restriction of speech in a government forum. Id. We

face the same situation here, and we follow the same course.

V.

Hodge advances an additional claim seeking across-the-

board invalidation of § 6135’s application to the Supreme

Court plaza: statutory vagueness. The district court, having

found the statute unconstitutional on other grounds, did not

reach Hodge’s vagueness challenge. See Hodge, 949 F. Supp.

2d at 197 n.37. Hodge nonetheless presses his vagueness

claim on appeal as an alternative basis for affirming the

district court’s judgment. While we generally refrain from

considering an issue not passed upon below, the “matter of

what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time

on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts

of appeals.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976).

Here, we find it appropriate to consider Hodge’s vagueness

claim. Not only does he ask us to address the challenge, but it

raises pure questions of law. And the government joins issue

with Hodge’s arguments on the merits rather than suggesting

that we forbear from resolving the matter.

“Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First

Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304

(2008). “A conviction fails to comport with due process if the

statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of

ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so

standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously

discriminatory enforcement.” Id. Hodge puts forth various

arguments urging that the terms of § 6135 suffer from one or

both of those failings.

Significantly, however, Hodge makes no claim that the

statute is vague with respect to its coverage of his own

46

conduct—either his act of displaying a sign that led to his

arrest or the additional expressive acts he intends to carry out

in the plaza in the future. His vagueness claim thus runs up

against “the rule that ‘[a] plaintiff who engages in some

conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the

vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’”

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010)

(quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule,” the

Supreme Court has explained, “makes no exception for

conduct in the form of speech.” Id. As a result, “even to the

extent a heightened vagueness standard applies” to statutes

prohibiting speech, “a plaintiff whose speech is clearly

proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack of

notice.” Id.

Here, the bulk of Hodge’s vagueness arguments fit in the

“lack of notice” category (i.e., claims that the statute “fails to

provide . . . fair notice of what is prohibited,” as opposed to

claims that the statute “is so standardless that it authorizes or

encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement,” Williams,

553 U.S. at 304). The sole exception is Hodge’s argument

that the Assemblages Clause reaches so broadly that it leaves

too much “discretion to law enforcement to determine which

assemblages and processions to allow and which to prohibit.”

Appellee Br. 38. That argument, however, rests on the

premise that the Assemblages Clause pertains to any

circumstance in which multiple persons stand or participate in

some sort of procession in the plaza, regardless of whether

they are engaged in expressive activity. Because we have

already rejected that premise, Part III.B.2.b, supra, Hodge’s

vagueness argument on this score necessarily fails. His

remaining vagueness arguments as to the Assemblages

47

Clause, including those sounding in “fair notice,” rest on the

same flawed premise.

With regard to the Display Clause, Hodge sees

unconstitutional vagueness in the terms “flag, banner, or

device,” as well as in the phrase “bring into public notice a

party, organization, or movement.” 40 U.S.C. § 6135. Again,

Hodge makes no argument that it is unclear whether his

carrying of signs and distribution of leaflets are prohibited,

nor whether his conveying a “political message” about police

misconduct and racial discrimination would qualify. See Am.

Compl. ¶ 29 (J.A. 12). Because his arguments instead rest on

the lack of fair notice as to the conduct of others, they

seemingly come within the rule generally barring the assertion

of a Fifth Amendment vagueness claim by someone to whom

the challenged statute unambiguously applies. See

Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 20. In United States

v. Williams, however, the Supreme Court engaged with a fair-

notice vagueness claim against a statute criminalizing speech

even though the claim was premised on the scope of the law’s

applicability to hypothetical persons not before the Court

rather than to the defendant himself. See 553 U.S. at 304-07.

We have no need here to examine precisely when, and to what

extent, there remains room to bring those sorts of vagueness

claims. Regardless, Hodge’s challenges to the Display Clause

fail on the merits.

The Display Clause’s language does not “fail[] to provide

a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is

prohibited.” Id. at 304. The words “flag, banner, or device”

do not call for “wholly subjective judgments”—unlike terms

such as “annoying” or “indecent,” which yield

“indeterminacy” of a kind occasioning invalidation on

vagueness grounds. Id. at 306. Of course, there might be

cases in which there is some ambiguity about the statute’s

48

applicability—whether the circumstances involve a “device,”

for instance. But as we have explained, the reference to

“device” takes meaning from the adjacent terms “flag” and

“banner,” connoting brandishing of an object in a manner

aimed to cause others to take note of it. Supra pp. 39-40.

And in any event, “[c]lose cases can be imagined under

virtually any statute,” and it is a “mistake” to “belie[ve] that

the mere fact that close cases can be envisioned renders a

statute vague.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-06.

The phrase “designed or adapted to bring into public

notice a party, organization, or movement” also lies well

outside the territory of “wholly subjective judgments.”

Hodge contends that the statute is ambiguous as to whether it

covers displays communicating “any expression of views,

regardless of whether the message is associated with an

identifiable party, organization, or movement.” Appellee Br.

43. But that alleged ambiguity, even assuming it would raise

Fifth Amendment vagueness concerns, was resolved in

Grace. The Supreme Court held that “almost any sign or

leaflet carrying a communication”—including Zywicki’s

leaflets concerning judicial tenure and foreign human rights

issues and Grace’s sign displaying the First Amendment’s

text—would “be ‘designed or adapted to bring into public

notice [a] party, organization, or movement.’” 461 U.S. at

176. The Court thus rejected the position advanced by Justice

Stevens that Grace’s conduct fell outside the Display Clause

because a “typical passerby could not, merely by observing

her sign, confidently link her with any specific party,

organization, or ‘movement.’” Id. at 188 (Stevens, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hodge evidently

thinks that Justice Stevens had the better view, see Appellee

Br. 43, but that is not a viable argument about the present

indeterminacy of the phrase.

49

We therefore find Hodge’s vagueness challenge to be

without merit.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.