The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-41285
Summary Calendar
STEVEN RANDOLL BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNKNOWN CARDIOLOGIST; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH;
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH, GALVESTON; REGINALD
STANLEY, M.D.; HELEN PEEK, Staff Nurse; ANNETTE THOMPSON,
Food Service Manager; MYRON FARRAR, Food Service Manager,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:00-CV-24
July 24, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven Brown, Texas prisoner no. 731528, appeals the district
court’s dismissal on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of
his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that various
medical and non-medical defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by showing deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
Brown complains of medical treatment, work requirements, and his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
diet, prior to and after he suffered a heart attack in 1998. The
district court dismissed the claims on grounds that the claims were
time-barred and lacked merit and that the defendants were entitled
to immunity.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the district court.1 Brown filed suit on January
24, 2000. His claims arising before January 24, 1998, are time-
barred under the two-year Texas statute of limitations applicable
to this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 We also pretermit any
analysis of Eleventh Amendment or qualified immunity because the
record contains no evidence showing deliberate indifference to
Brown’s medical needs, which is required to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Brown has alleged a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right under the Eighth
Amendment.3
The summary judgment record establishes that Brown received
competent medical care prior to and following his heart attack.
Brown’s disagreements regarding his medical treatment are
insufficient to establish a constitutional claim.4 Even a triable
1
Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 257 (5th Cir.
2001).
2
See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
3
See Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 753 (5th Cir.
2001).
4
See Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
2
issue of negligence would not preclude summary judgment dismissing
his Eighth Amendment claims.5 In addition, Brown fails to shows
that any delay in medical treatment he may have received caused his
heart attack or resulted in any other substantial harm.6
Brown’s deliberate indifference claims against the non-medical
defendants alleging that they refused his requests for work
restrictions, denied him a therapeutic diet, and allegedly
disregarded his injured wrist and burned fingers likewise cannot
survive summary judgment. Brown has provided no summary judgment
evidence that, inter alia, the non-medical defendants were aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm to Johnson existed or, even if they were, that
they drew such an inference.7
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, Barron’s motions for discovery of the
identity of the “unknown cardiologist” and appointment of counsel
are DENIED.
5
See id.
6
See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
7
See Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999).
3