State ex rel. Williams v. Trim (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

State ex rel. Williams v. Trim, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3372.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be

made before the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3372

THE STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v. TRIM, WARDEN, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. Williams v. Trim, Slip Opinion

No. 2015-Ohio-3372.]

Mandamus—Prohibition—Injunction—Sua sponte dismissal on the merits without

notice warranted only when complaint is frivolous or claimant obviously

cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint—Court of appeals

lacks original jurisdiction to issue prohibitory injunction—Dismissal

affirmed in part and reversed in part—Cause remanded.

(No. 2014-0899—Submitted April 14, 2015—Decided August 25, 2015.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County, No. 14-13-18.

_____________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this appeal of an

original action, to allow briefing and consideration of the mandamus claim of

appellant, Agatha Martin Williams. Williams, an inmate, objects to the Ohio

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Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s attachment of money in her prison

account because it originated from a pension, and she claims that the money is

therefore exempt from garnishment or attachment under R.C. 2329.66.

{¶ 2} In her complaint below, Williams sought several different forms of

relief, including an injunction, a writ of prohibition, and a writ of mandamus.

Following a preliminary motion below, the court of appeals, without notice,

dismissed Williams’s entire case. The court of appeals correctly dismissed most

of Williams’s complaint, even without notice. However, her mandamus claims

regarding, among other things, the exempt status of the pension money placed in

her prison account, should not have been dismissed. Rather, the court should

have given her notice that it intended to consider her mandamus claims and

allowed her to brief the issues before deciding the merits.

{¶ 3} Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the court

of appeals to allow Williams to brief her mandamus claims before the court of

appeals decides them on the merits.

Facts

{¶ 4} Williams was convicted in Stark County on various counts of theft,

grand theft, and forgery. She is serving a 102-month sentence at the Ohio

Reformatory for Women.

{¶ 5} Williams is the beneficiary of a lifetime pension benefit from the

Timken Company, based on a qualified domestic-relations order, and she began

receiving $412.18 per month on March 1, 2011. Williams alleges that the benefit

is deposited directly into a checking account that she holds jointly with her adult

daughter, who occasionally transfers a portion of the funds from the checking

account into Williams’s prison account.

{¶ 6} In December 2012, Williams was served with a court order to pay an

obligation. The sentencing judgment in her criminal conviction ordered her to

pay restitution in the amount of $166,354.94 and a fine of $27,500. Williams

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went through the allowed prison procedures to object to the attachment of the

funds in her prison account, claiming that they were pension benefits exempt from

garnishment under R.C. 2329.66. Nevertheless, a hold was placed on her prison

account.

{¶ 7} Williams completed the inmate grievance process regarding her

objection to the collection of her funds. This and other grievances were

ultimately denied. She claims that the business office placed her account on

legal-hold status and allowed her only $25 per month to spend at the commissary

and that starting in January 2013, everything greater than that amount was

garnished and sent to the Stark County Clerk of Courts.

{¶ 8} In her complaint before the court of appeals, Williams sought

injunctive relief, a writ of prohibition, and a writ of mandamus ordering the

warden to exempt the funds in Williams’s account from attachment or

garnishment.

{¶ 9} The warden filed an answer to the complaint. Approximately three

weeks later, Williams filed a one-page motion seeking a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, with no memorandum in support. The warden

filed a memorandum in opposition. Williams did not reply. Based on this

briefing alone, the court of appeals dismissed the case in its entirety. Williams

appealed to this court.

Analysis

{¶ 10} We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing an

appellate court’s decision to deny a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Mun. Constr.

Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 141 Ohio St.3d 113, 2014-Ohio-

4364, 22 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers

Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-1777, 991 N.E.2d 218,

¶ 55.

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{¶ 11} Sua sponte dismissal of a case on the merits without notice is

warranted only “ ‘when a complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot

prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.’ ” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer

v. Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, ¶ 3, quoting State

ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923,

¶ 14, and citing State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-

3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 7.

Sua sponte dismissal of injunction and prohibition claims

{¶ 12} The court of appeals correctly dismissed Williams’s claims for

injunctive relief. A court of appeals lacks original jurisdiction to grant

prohibitory injunctions. State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77

Ohio St.3d 247, 248, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997). “Neither [the Supreme Court] nor

a court of appeals has original jurisdiction in prohibitory injunction.” Id., citing

State ex rel. Governor v. Taft, 71 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 640 N.E.2d 1136 (1994), and

State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967),

paragraph four of the syllabus. Because Williams “obviously cannot prevail on

the facts alleged in the complaint” with regard to injunctive relief, the court below

was correct in dismissing this part of her complaint, even without notice. See

Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3.

{¶ 13} The court of appeals also correctly held, even without notice, that

Williams obviously cannot prevail on her claim for a writ of prohibition. To be

entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Williams must establish that (1) the

warden is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power

is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which

no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v.

Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18, 23; State ex

rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623,

955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12. The last two elements may be established by showing that

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the respondent who is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power patently

and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil &

Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E. 2d 480, ¶ 11.

{¶ 14} The warden is not alleged to have engaged in judicial or quasi-

judicial power by putting a hold on Williams’s account. Judicial or quasi-judicial

power is defined as the power “to hear and determine controversies that require a

hearing resembling a judicial trial.” (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Bruggeman

v. Ingraham, 87 Ohio St.3d 230, 231, 718 N.E.2d 1285 (1999), citing State ex rel.

Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 647 N.E.2d

769 (1995).

{¶ 15} Therefore, Williams “obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged

in the complaint” as to her claims in prohibition, and those claims were properly

dismissed sua sponte by the court below. See Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-

Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3.

Sua sponte dismissal of mandamus claims

{¶ 16} The court of appeals erred in dismissing Williams’s mandamus

claims without giving her the opportunity to brief them. To be entitled to

extraordinary relief in mandamus, Williams must establish a clear legal right to

the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the warden to provide it, and

the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.

Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.

Williams must prove that she is entitled to the writ by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 17} Williams’s first request for relief involves the substantive question

whether the money transferred from her checking account into her inmate account

may be attached because it originally comes from a pension. R.C. 5120.133

allows the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to take and transmit funds

in a prisoner’s account to a court for payment of a stated obligation. R.C.

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5120.133(A). The department may also make rules specifying that a portion of the

inmate’s money may be retained and not used to satisfy the obligation. R.C.

5120.133(B). However, the rules cannot permit the disbursement of funds if

those funds are exempt under R.C. 2329.66. Id. R.C. 2329.66 exempts certain

pension benefits from garnishment or attachment. R.C. 2329.66(A)(10).

{¶ 18} In Daugherty v. Cent. Trust Co. of Northeastern Ohio, N.A., 28

Ohio St.3d 441, 504 N.E.2d 1100 (1986), we explored the question whether funds

remain exempt under R.C. 2329.66 when deposited in a checking account. We

concluded that statutorily exempt funds do not lose their exempt status when

deposited in a personal checking account and held that the rationale for that

conclusion was “to protect funds intended primarily for maintenance and support

of the debtor’s family.” Id. at 445. That rationale would be frustrated “if exempt

funds were automatically deprived of their statutory immunity when deposited in

a checking account * * * in order to pay by check those regular subsistence

expenses [the debtor] incurs.” Id.

{¶ 19} In Daugherty we held that “personal earnings exempt from

execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order * * *

retain their exempt status when deposited in a personal checking account, so long

as the source of the exempt funds is known or reasonably traceable.” Id.

{¶ 20} Unlike in Daugherty, the funds in this case are not simply

deposited in a checking account. The pension funds are deposited into a bank

account held jointly by Williams and her college-age daughter. Williams alleges

that her daughter uses most of the money to support Williams’s family but

periodically places amounts from this account into Williams’s inmate account for

her use at the prison. She claims that the source of the exempt funds is, as it was

in Daugherty, “known or reasonably traceable.”

{¶ 21} Because Williams has a colorable argument that the funds in her

inmate account are exempt from attachment, the court of appeals erred in

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dismissing Williams’s mandamus claim, sua sponte, on the merits. Her

arguments are not frivolous, nor is it true that she “obviously cannot prevail on

the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947,

918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3.

{¶ 22} Williams’s complaint raises some issues for which she may not be

able to satisfy the requirements for a writ of mandamus. Specifically, she alleges

that the warden violated her constitutional rights and did not follow the guidelines

for collection procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03 and federal and Ohio

laws governing collections. These laws and state and federal civil-rights statutes

such as 42 U.S.C. 1983 may provide Williams with adequate remedies for the

possible violation of due process and collections procedures. If that is the case,

her mandamus claims would be subject to dismissal, as Williams “obviously

cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint” where alternate remedies

exist. See Ronan at ¶ 3.

{¶ 23} However, the court below dismissed these claims on the basis that

the statutes and procedures authorizing collections are constitutional. Williams is

not asserting that the laws are unconstitutional, but that the procedures were

improperly followed. Williams must be given the opportunity to brief the

mandamus issue with regard to these claims before they may be dismissed.

{¶ 24} In addition, “ ‘if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of

mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a

prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in

mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ” State ex rel. Satow

v. Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074, 786 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 13,

quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d

704 (1999). If Williams’s complaint in mandamus is really asking for a

prohibitory injunction, she has an alternate remedy at law and a writ of mandamus

is precluded.

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{¶ 25} To divine the true objects of Williams’s mandamus action, the

court “ ‘must examine [her] complaint “to see whether it actually seeks to prevent,

rather than to compel, official action.” ’ ” Satow at ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel.

Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 762

N.E.2d 1012 (2002), quoting State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic

Data Processing Bd., 42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105 (1989).

{¶ 26} Williams couches her request for relief in mandamus as a request

for an order compelling the performance of an affirmative duty, that is, to exempt

her account from attachment. The warden in her brief below and before this court

asserts that Williams is actually seeking a prohibitory injunction preventing

official action by blocking the hold placed on Williams’s account. This too is a

close question, requiring notice to Williams before the court can dismiss her

complaint sua sponte. It is not clear as to this question that she “obviously cannot

prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-

Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3.

{¶ 27} Because the court of appeals erroneously dismissed Williams’s

mandamus claims on the merits without notice, we reverse and remand for that

court to allow briefing and presentation of evidence before deciding Williams’s

mandamus claims. “ ‘ “Generally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous

dismissal of a complaint based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted requires a remand [to that court] for further proceedings.” ’ ”

(Brackets sic.) State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contractors Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp.

Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 184, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998), quoting State ex rel.

Rogers v. McGee Brown, 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410–411, 686 N.E.2d 1126 (1997),

quoting State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288

(1995).

{¶ 28} Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the

case so that the court of appeals may order briefing with regard to Williams’s

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mandamus claims, both on the question of the true nature of her complaint and on

the merits of her claims. Once the issues are fully briefed, the court of appeals

may then decide the case.

Conclusion

{¶ 29} The court of appeals was correct in dismissing most of the relief

requested by Williams even without notice and a response from Williams.

However, the court of appeals’ dismissal of Williams’s request for a writ of

mandamus was in error. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

the case to the court of appeals for full briefing and decision of the outstanding

issues.

Judgment affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and cause remanded.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur.

O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of

appeals.

_____________________

Agatha Martin Williams, pro se.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Mindy Worly, Principal

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

_______________

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