State of Tennessee v. Rodney Bryant

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs August 4, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RODNEY BRYANT

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 1300088 Lee V. Coffee, Judge

No. W2014-01570-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 12, 2015

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Appellant, Rodney Bryant, was convicted of carjacking and sentenced to twelve years in

the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. GLENN and

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

James Edward Thomas (on appeal), and Juni S. Ganguli (at trial), Memphis, Tennessee,

for the Appellant, Rodney Bryant.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Tracy L. Alcock, Assistant

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Lessie Lee Calhoun

Rainey and Samuel David Winnig, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee,

State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted appellant for carjacking and employing a

firearm during the commission of a felony. He was tried by a jury in May 2014 and

convicted of carjacking. The jury found him not guilty of the firearm charge.

At appellant‟s trial, Devin Chatman testified that on August 27, 2012, she and her

fiancé, Michael Vincent, attempted to sell a vehicle on the website Craigslist, listing it at

$2000. A copy of the listing for a 1988 Chevy Caprice Brougham was submitted as an

exhibit. She explained that they wanted to sell the vehicle because they were trying to

move out of her mother‟s house. Ms. Chatman said that they showed the vehicle to a

couple of people who determined they did not want the vehicle. She stated that she and

Mr. Vincent then received a text message from another interested party who negotiated

the price down to $1600. They planned to meet the person to show him the vehicle. Mr.

Vincent drove the Caprice to the designated meeting location, and Ms. Chatman followed

in her own car. She said that they arrived between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. A man

approached them, having traveled to the location on foot. Ms. Chatman identified

appellant in the courtroom as the person they met. Ms. Chatman testified that Mr.

Vincent indicated to her that appellant was going to test-drive the car. Appellant drove

the Caprice away, with Mr. Vincent in the passenger seat. Ms. Chatman said that five

minutes later, Mr. Vincent returned to her, running. He told her that appellant had

carjacked him at gunpoint.

Ms. Chatman further testified that she and Mr. Vincent returned to her mother‟s

house and that they picked up Mr. Vincent‟s brother en route. Ms. Chatman believed that

they returned to the house at 10:00 p.m. They argued over whether to call the police. Ms.

Chatman said that she advocated calling the police but that Mr. Vincent was concerned

that appellant, who also had the title of the car, would retaliate. Eventually, Mr. Vincent

called the police. They reported to the police that appellant used the nickname “HotRod”

as his signature on text messages. They also gave the police “HotRod‟s” telephone

number. Ms. Chatman explained that she had to look at their T-Mobile bill to get the

number because the text messages were on Mr. Vincent‟s telephone, which he had left in

the stolen car. Ms. Chatman stated that she never tried to look at appellant‟s profile on

Facebook.

On cross-examination, Ms. Chatman testified that there were “For Sale” signs on

the vehicle. She further testified that no one else was with her and Mr. Vincent when

they went to meet appellant. Ms. Chatman said that when Mr. Vincent returned to her

after the carjacking, he told her that appellant had said, “„You know what this is,‟” and

that Mr. Vincent “demonstrated what [appellant] did to him as far as putting the gun up to

[Mr. Vincent‟s] head.” She stated that while Mr. Vincent had not directly said that he

had been struck in the head, his demonstration of appellant‟s actions caused her to ask

Mr. Vincent whether he needed to go to the hospital. He responded that “it wasn‟t that

bad.” Ms. Chatman agreed that they did not call 9-1-1 until several hours after the

carjacking and that while she could not remember the exact time, she would not disagree

if the 9-1-1 records indicated that they called at 1:40 a.m. on August 28. Ms. Chatman

testified that Mr. Vincent told her that he had seen appellant before the carjacking but did

not know his name.

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Michael Vincent testified that he bought the vehicle in question in Pine Bluff,

Arkansas, approximately one month before the carjacking for $1000. He stated that he

decided to sell the vehicle because his family “needed extra money.” He posted an

advertisement for the vehicle on Craigslist, listing it at $2000. He received a couple of

inquiries about the vehicle prior to appellant‟s contacting him. Mr. Vincent said that

appellant sent him a text message about the vehicle and that they negotiated a price of

$1650.1 He testified that the negotiations were made through text messages except for

one telephone call prior to the meeting. Mr. Vincent said that appellant chose the

meeting location and agreed that the chosen address was on Claybrook Cove. Mr.

Vincent testified that the text messages from appellant contained a signature line reading,

“HotRod.” He said that the meeting occurred “around seven-ish.”

Mr. Vincent further testified that he and Ms. Chatman drove separately to the

meeting location. When appellant approached on foot, Mr. Vincent exited the vehicle

and opened the hood to show appellant the engine. Mr. Vincent identified appellant in

the courtroom as the man to whom he had shown the vehicle. Appellant asked to test

drive the car, so Mr. Vincent signaled to Ms. Chatman to wait for him and re-entered the

car on the passenger side. Mr. Vincent explained the route that appellant drove using a

map of the area. He said that appellant asked about the vehicle title and that he removed

the title from his pocket. At that point, appellant pulled out a gun and ordered Mr.

Vincent out of the car. Mr. Vincent described the gun as “little,” silver, and semi-

automatic, possibly a .380 caliber. He said that appellant “shove[d]” him in the head with

the gun and said, “Get out [of] the car. You know what this is. Get out.” Mr. Vincent

said that he exited the car and ran back to Ms. Chatman. He stated that the car was

moving but only “a couple of miles per hour.” He left his cellular telephone and the

vehicle title in the car when he exited.

Mr. Vincent testified that he did not want to call the police but that Ms. Chatman

convinced him to do so. He thought that they called 9-1-1 around midnight. Mr. Vincent

said that on August 28, the day following the carjacking, he identified appellant in a

photographic array as the carjacker. He identified the photographic array and the

statement that he wrote on the array. Mr. Vincent said that his vehicle was returned to

him, along with the title, approximately a week later. He identified a copy of the car title.

He agreed that his name was not on the car title and that he did not know the person

whose name was on the title. He stated that he “wanted to sell it as an open title.” Mr.

Vincent said that when the car was taken, it had a license plate in the rear window that

was registered to a Ford Taurus previously owned by Mr. Vincent.

1

We note that there is a discrepancy in the witnesses‟ testimonies regarding the

negotiated price of the vehicle.

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On cross-examination, Mr. Vincent testified that it would be “inaccurate” to say

that he was having financial problems in August 2012. He agreed that Ms. Chatman had

looked at appellant‟s Facebook profile. Mr. Vincent stated that if he had told a defense

investigator in December 2013 that he never had “For Sale” signs on the Caprice, then

that statement was inaccurate. He further stated that he had not been truthful when he

testified in an earlier proceeding that his brother and child had been with him and Ms.

Chatman when they went to meet appellant. Mr. Vincent testified that appellant had been

wearing “[w]hite shorts, a Tshirt[,] and a ball cap” that day. He denied telling a police

officer that appellant had been wearing all black. Mr. Vincent said that he believed the

carjacking occurred at 7:45 p.m. but that he might have told a police officer that it

happened at 10:00 p.m. He explained that he had “lost total track of time.” Mr. Vincent

agreed that on August 28, 2012, he told police that appellant “kind of hit me with [the

gun] in the back of the head.” Mr. Vincent reiterated on the stand that it was “kind of

like a hit” but refused to characterize it as a “strike.” Mr. Vincent agreed that he told

police that he had not seen appellant before the evening of the carjacking but could not

remember whether he told officers that appellant “looked familiar.” He did not

remember what else he told officers on August 28, 2012. Mr. Vincent testified that he

was not injured when he jumped out of the vehicle because the vehicle was not moving

fast and he landed in grass. Mr. Vincent agreed that he told police that the carjacking

occurred at the corner of Claybrook Cove and Brown Avenue, and he explained that he

gave that cross-street because he was unfamiliar with the area and that was the only

cross-street he remembered. He stated that if he had said Watkins Street and Brown

Avenue in a previous hearing, he was “mixed up.”

Memphis Police Officer LaShunda Coleman testified that she took Mr. Vincent‟s

report after he called 9-1-1. She recalled that Mr. Vincent reported being carjacked when

he met a potential buyer for his car. She further recalled that Mr. Vincent was able to

provide a nickname and a telephone number for the suspect but no other information. She

broadcasted the information about the vehicle and the suspect to other officers and

informed her lieutenant. Officer Coleman agreed that she took the report after 1:00 a.m.

on August 28.

On cross-examination, Officer Coleman agreed that Mr. Vincent reported to her

that “this person had approached him and pulled a black handgun, while demanding the

keys and Mr. Vincent‟s cell phone.” He further reported to her that the carjacking had

occurred around 10:00 p.m.

Memphis Police Sergeant Kevin Williams testified that he was the lead

investigator in this case. Mr. Vincent gave “HotRod‟s” telephone number to Sergeant

Williams, and Sergeant Williams discovered through use of the police department‟s

database that the number had been used by appellant and by Herschel Bryant. Sergeant

Williams prepared two photographic arrays, one with appellant‟s photograph and one

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with Herschel Bryant‟s photograph. Sergeant Williams testified that Mr. Vincent chose

appellant‟s photograph, identifying appellant as the carjacker. Mr. Vincent did not

identify Herschel Bryant‟s photograph. Sergeant Williams said that he prepared a

“wanted flyer” with appellant‟s information and emailed the flyer to the North Precinct.

Just over thirty minutes after emailing the flyer, Sergeant Williams received a call that

appellant was “in custody in Mr. Vincent‟s car.” Appellant was then brought to Sergeant

Williams‟ office. Sergeant Williams testified that he viewed appellant‟s cellular

telephone, noting that it was the same number reported by Mr. Vincent. In addition,

appellant‟s telephone contained a text message to a number ending in 5020. The message

was a Claybrook Cove address, and the signature line was “:)HOT:$ROD%$#¿.”

On cross-examination, Sergeant Williams agreed that his supplement indicated

that Mr. Vincent had told him that he had bought the Caprice in Arkansas two days

before the carjacking for $1500. Sergeant Williams testified that Mr. Vincent told him

that the carjacking occurred while appellant was test driving the vehicle; however,

Sergeant Williams said that this information was not included in his supplement and that

he believed it was in another document.

Memphis Police Officer Benjamin Daugherty testified that on August 30, 2012, he

participated in the arrest of appellant. He said that he went to Claybrook Cove, noted that

the house where Mr. Vincent met appellant was boarded up, and then proceeded to

appellant‟s address on Lexington Circle. Appellant was not at that address. After leaving

appellant‟s street, he saw Mr. Vincent‟s Caprice being driven down Brown Avenue with

two individuals inside. Officer Daugherty and his partner, driving separate vehicles,

attempted to stop the Caprice. The driver of the Caprice did not stop but instead drove to

Lexington Circle. Officer Daugherty then apprehended the driver, whom he identified as

appellant. The passenger in the Caprice was appellant‟s mother, who allowed Officer

Daugherty to search part of their house. He did not find anything related to the case in

the house.

Memphis Police Officer Darrell Cherry testified that he also participated in

appellant‟s arrest. He corroborated Officer Daugherty‟s testimony and added that he

transported appellant to the robbery bureau.

The State rested its case-in-chief following Officer Cherry‟s testimony. Following

closing arguments and deliberations, the jury convicted appellant of carjacking but

acquitted him of employing a firearm in the carjacking. The trial court sentenced

appellant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

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II. Analysis

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

carjacking because the victim‟s testimony was not credible.

The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the

State‟s evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v.

Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). To obtain relief on a claim of insufficient

evidence, appellant must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319. This standard of review is identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370,

379 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977).

On appellate review, “„we afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of

the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn

therefrom.‟” Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857

(Tenn. 2010)); State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Cabbage,

571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In a jury trial, questions involving the credibility of

witnesses and the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual

disputes raised by the evidence, are resolved by the jury as trier of fact. State v. Bland,

958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

This court presumes that the jury has afforded the State all reasonable inferences from the

evidence and resolved all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State; as such, we will

not substitute our own inferences drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury,

nor will we re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379;

Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835; see State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

Because a jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence that appellant enjoyed

at trial and replaces it with one of guilt at the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts

from the State to the convicted appellant, who must demonstrate to this court that the

evidence is insufficient to support the jury‟s findings. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing

State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)).

To sustain a conviction for carjacking as charged in the indictment, the State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly took the

victim‟s vehicle from his possession by use of force or intimidation. Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-13-404. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial showed

that appellant contacted Mr. Vincent about purchasing Mr. Vincent‟s 1988 Caprice.

When they met for the exchange, appellant asked to test drive the vehicle. Ms. Chatman

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confirmed that appellant was the person who met her and Mr. Vincent at the location

chosen by appellant. During the test drive, Mr. Vincent said that appellant produced a

gun and told him to get out of the car. Mr. Vincent complied and ran back to Ms.

Chatman. This evidence was sufficient to support appellant‟s conviction.

Appellant‟s specific challenge to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence was

the credibility and veracity of one of the witnesses against him. This court has previously

stated,

[Appellant‟s] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence invites this court

to revisit the question of the victim‟s credibility . . . . Because the

resolution of questions of fact, including witness credibility, is within the

province of the jury, we must decline the defendant‟s invitation. By its

verdict, the jury accredited the [witness‟s] testimony despite its sometimes

inconsistent nature on particular details.

State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); see also State v.

Stephens, 264 S.W.3d 719, 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that appellant‟s

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was based on the credibility of a witness and

that this court will not discount the testimony of a witness and engage in a re-weighing or

re-evaluation of the evidence on appeal). All witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined,

and the jury assessed the testimony and evidence at trial. We will not substitute our own

inferences drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, nor will we re-weigh or

re-evaluate the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. Appellant is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

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ROGER A. PAGE, JUDGE

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