Opinion

WildEarth Guardians v. United States Department of Agriculture

  • 795 F.3d 1148
  • 81 ERC (BNA) 1338
  • 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13485
  • 2015 WL 4604142
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Aug 3, 2015
Status
Published
Author
Friedland
On the bench
McKeown, Murguia, Friedland
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
56 cases
Authority
More cited than 82.3%

holding that where APHIS and Nevada Department of Wildlife shared 11 responsibility for Nevada’s predator management program, it was possible that, 12 without APHIS, Nevada would spend less on predator management or would 13 implement control methods that were less harmful to the plaintiff’s interests than 14 those used by APHIS

How later courts described this case

  • holding that where APHIS and Nevada Department of Wildlife shared 11 responsibility for Nevada’s predator management program, it was possible that, 12 without APHIS, Nevada would spend less on predator management or would 13 implement control methods that were less harmful to the plaintiff’s interests than 14 those used by APHIS
  • finding that plaintiff environmental 1 organization could challenge a failure to update a programmatic environmental impact 2 statement through its member’s assertion of recreational and aesthetic injury to a specific 3 impacted geographic area
  • holding that “the mere existence of multiple causes of an injury does not defeat redressability” where a defendant “is at least partially causing the alleged injury”
  • "[T]he mere existence of multiple causes of an injury does not defeat redressability, particularly for a procedural injury. So long as a defendant is at least partially causing the alleged injury, a plaintiff may sue that defendant, even if the defendant is just one of multiple causes of the plaintiff's injury."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, No. 13-16071

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:12-cv-00716-

MMD-PAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE, Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service, OPINION

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda Du, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 9, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed August 3, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Mary H. Murguia, and

Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

2 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

SUMMARY *

Environmental Law

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing a

case brought by WildEarth Guardians, alleging violations of

the National Environmental Policy Act, and seeking to

enjoin the federal government’s participation in the killing

of predatory animals in Nevada.

The district court dismissed for lack of standing, holding

that WildEarth had not shown that its alleged injuries were

caused by the government’s reliance on a decades-old

programmatic environmental impact statement (“PEIS”);

and that, in any event, WildEarth’s injuries were not

redressable where Nevada could choose to implement an

independent predator damage management program if the

federal government ceased its activities.

The panel held that both of the district court’s reasons for

dismissal were erroneous. Concerning Claims One and Two,

which challenged the government’s failure to supplement

the 1994/1997 PEIS for its predator damage programs

nationwide, the panel held that the injuries WildEarth

member Don Molde alleged were concrete enough, and were

sufficiently causally related to the government’s failure to

update the PEIS, to support WildEarth’s standing for those

claims.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 3

Concerning Claims Three and Four, which alleged that

the government violated the National Environmental Policy

Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment

for Nevada and consequently failing to prepare a Nevada-

specific Environmental Impact Statement, the panel held that

the standing requirements were met and WildEarth member

Don Molde’s injury was redressable. The panel held that the

mere existence of multiple causes of an injury did not defeat

redressability, particularly for a procedural injury.

COUNSEL

Ashley D. Wilmes (argued), WildEarth Guardians,

Louisville, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert G. Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Emily

A. Polachek (argued), Andrew C. Mergen, J. David Gunter

II, and Brian Collins, United States Department of Justice,

Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington,

D.C.; Annalisa Jabaily, and Lauren Axley, United States

Department of Agriculture, Office of General Counsel,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent-Appellee.

Rebecca J. Riley, Natural Resources Defense Council,

Chicago, Illinois, for Amici Curiae Natural Resources

Defense Council, Defenders of Wildlife, Predator Defense,

TrailSafe Nevada, Northeast Oregon Ecosystems, Center for

Biological Diversity, Southwest Environmental Center,

Friends of Animals, Mark E. Smith Foundation, Western

Watersheds Project, and Boulder-White Clouds Council.

4 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

Thomas M. Gremillion and Hope M. Babcock, Institute for

Public Representation, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae

Professors of Environmental Law.

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

Environmental organization WildEarth Guardians sued

to enjoin the federal government’s participation in the killing

of predatory animals in Nevada. WildEarth alleged that the

program’s continued reliance on a decades-old

programmatic environmental impact statement (“PEIS”)

causes the government to use outdated and unnecessarily

harmful predator control techniques that interfere with

WildEarth’s members’ enjoyment of outdoor activities. The

district court dismissed for lack of standing, holding that

WildEarth had not shown that its alleged injuries were

caused by the government’s reliance on the PEIS, and that,

in any event, Nevada could choose to implement an

independent predator damage management program if the

federal government ceased its activities, so WildEarth’s

injuries were not redressable. Both of these reasons for

dismissal were erroneous, so we reverse.

I. Background

A. National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)

requires federal agencies to assess and publicly disclose the

environmental impacts of proposed federal actions.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347. For federal actions that

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 5

“significantly affect[] the quality of the human

environment,” the agency must develop an environmental

impact statement (“EIS”) that “provide[s] full and fair

discussion of significant environmental impacts” and

“inform[s] decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable

alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts

or enhance the quality of the human environment.” 42

U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. When it is unclear

whether the federal action will have a significant effect on

the environment, the agency must prepare an “environmental

assessment” to determine whether an EIS is required. 40

C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). If, after completing the environmental

assessment, the agency decides not to prepare an EIS, the

agency must prepare a “finding of no significant impact” to

explain its decision. Id. § 1501.4(e).

An agency with an existing EIS must supplement it if the

“agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action

that are relevant to environmental concerns” or if “[t]here are

significant new circumstances or information relevant to

environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action

or its impacts.” Id. § 1502.9(c)(1). “If there remains major

Federal action to occur, and if the new information is

sufficient to show that the remaining action will affect the

quality of the human environment in a significant manner or

to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental

EIS must be prepared.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council,

490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989) (brackets omitted).

6 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

B. APHIS and Its 1994/1997 Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement

The United States Department of Agriculture is

authorized to protect the nation’s agricultural resources from

damage associated with predatory wildlife. See 7 U.S.C.

§§ 426-426c. The Department’s Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service (“APHIS”) carries out wildlife control

programs through Wildlife Services. 1 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 371.6,

371.11. APHIS conducts its programs in cooperation with

other federal, state, and local agencies, as well as with

private organizations and individuals.

In 1994, APHIS assessed the environmental impact of its

full program of ongoing wildlife damage control nationwide

and issued an EIS, referred to as a “programmatic EIS”

(“PEIS”). The PEIS was revised in 1997 to make technical

corrections. The 1994/1997 PEIS discusses thirteen

alternatives for wildlife management and identifies a

preferred approach—the “Current Program Alternative.” 2

Rather than requiring the preferred approach to be

implemented nationwide, however, the Record of Decision

for the PEIS identifies five “viable alternatives discussed” in

1

Wildlife Services was formerly called Animal Damage Control.

2

The Record of Decision in the Federal Register defines this

alternative: “The current program (the integrated pest management

alternative) . . . consists of various practices and techniques, including

both nonlethal and lethal actions, that are available for formulating a

damage control strategy consistent with applicable State and local

requirements, cooperative agreements, and interagency arrangements.”

Animal Damage Control Program, Record of Decision Based on Final

Environmental Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 13399, 13400 (Mar. 13,

1995).

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 7

the PEIS and states that they would be forwarded to regional

and local decision makers “for consideration as management

approaches.” Animal Damage Control Program, Record of

Decision Based on Final Environmental Impact Statement,

60 Fed. Reg. 13,399, 13,400 (Mar. 13, 1995).

C. Predator Damage Control Activities in Nevada

APHIS and the Nevada Department of Wildlife currently

share responsibility for predator damage control in Nevada.

Together, the two form the Nevada Wildlife Services

Program (“NWSP”). NWSP has been conducting predator

damage management in Nevada for over eighty years.

APHIS provides significant funding, staffing, and

supervision for NWSP’s activities. Nevada also provides

some funding and personnel.

In 2010, the then-Director of the Nevada Department of

Wildlife, Kenneth Mayer, wrote a letter to APHIS (the

“Mayer Letter”) stating that, if APHIS stopped conducting

predator damage management in Nevada, the Nevada

Department of Wildlife would retain statutory responsibility

for wildlife control and would either “carry out the

management of wildlife with existing personnel or contract

the work to other capable entities.”

In June 2011, APHIS issued an environmental

assessment for NWSP’s ongoing predator damage

management program in Nevada. The 2011 environmental

assessment incorporated by reference APHIS’s 1994/1997

PEIS.

The assessment considered five alternatives for predator

management in Nevada, including ending federal

involvement. The assessment stated that, if federal

8 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

involvement ceased, Nevada likely would engage in some

predator damage management, but that it was “unlikely” that

Nevada would conduct predator control at the level of the

current program. The assessment noted that the effects on

the environment of ceasing federal involvement were

uncertain because they would depend on the actions of

private individuals, who might attempt predator

management on their own. The assessment nevertheless

made some predictions about the likely rates of certain

methods of predator control. Specifically, the assessment

stated that the killing of ravens (a Nevada predator) “would

be likely to decrease substantially” because Nevada would

not have access to the same avicide used by APHIS. The

assessment further hypothesized that ending federal

involvement would greatly reduce aerial hunting of predator

species, but would increase other forms of predator hunting.

Ultimately, the 2011 environmental assessment

concluded that continuing the joint APHIS-Nevada predator

damage management program would not have significant

environmental impacts, but that monitoring of the program’s

impacts on wildlife populations should continue. APHIS

issued a finding of no significant impact and therefore did

not order a Nevada-specific EIS.

D. Litigation History

WildEarth sued APHIS in 2012, asserting four claims

based on alleged violations of NEPA and one claim under

the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. WildEarth

sought injunctive and declaratory relief. WildEarth alleged

that the data, science, and analysis used in the PEIS were

based on studies from the 1970s and 1980s that have been

called into question by more recent research. Claims One

and Two alleged, respectively, that APHIS’s failure to

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 9

supplement the 1994/1997 PEIS for its predator damage

programs nationwide is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, not in accordance with law, or without

observance of procedures required by law, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A), (D); and (2) an agency action unlawfully

withheld or unreasonably delayed, id. § 706(1). Claim Three

alleged that the 2011 Nevada environmental assessment was

inadequate under NEPA, and Claim Four alleged that the

2011 Nevada finding of no significant impact was arbitrary

and capricious, or without observance of procedures

required by law, id. § 706(2)(A), (D). Claim Five alleged

that the NWSP’s aerial hunting practices violate the

Wilderness Act.

APHIS moved to dismiss Claims One through Four

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of

standing, arguing that WildEarth had not alleged that any of

its members had suffered a concrete, redressable harm.

APHIS additionally asserted that Claims One, Two, and Five

should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim.

In response to APHIS’s motion to dismiss, WildEarth

submitted a declaration from Don Molde, a WildEarth

member, who engages in outdoor recreation in parts of

Nevada affected by NWSP’s predator control. 3 Molde’s

declaration described his frequent recreational use of areas

in Nevada impacted by NWSP’s activities, his plans to

continue visiting those areas, and the negative effect of

3

WildEarth also submitted a declaration from another member, George

Weurthner, whose injuries were substantially the same as Molde’s for

purposes relevant here. For convenience, and because Molde’s injuries

are sufficient to support standing, we discuss only Molde’s declaration.

10 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

NWSP’s predator damage management on his recreational

and aesthetic enjoyment of the impacted areas. For example,

Molde stated that he has curtailed his walks with his dog for

fear that the dog would be caught in NWSP’s predator traps.

Molde further described how NWSP’s activities reduce the

number of ravens that he is able to observe during his bird-

watching, and how NWSP’s aerial hunting practices reduce

his chances of seeing coyotes.

The district court dismissed Claims One through Four for

lack of standing. With respect to Claims One and Two, the

district court concluded that WildEarth had not alleged a

sufficiently concrete injury traceable to APHIS’s 1994/1997

PEIS. Regarding Claims Three and Four, the district court

concluded that WildEarth’s injury was not redressable

because the Mayer Letter indicated that Nevada would carry

out predator damage management even if APHIS was

enjoined from engaging in predator control in Nevada.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss Claim

Five, but WildEarth then voluntarily dismissed that claim so

that it could immediately appeal the standing holdings.

II. Standard of Review

“We review a motion to dismiss for lack of standing de

novo, construing the factual allegations in the complaint in

favor of the plaintiffs.” Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v.

Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff has

the burden to establish that it has standing. Salmon

Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1225

(9th Cir. 2008).

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 11

III. Discussion

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he

or she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and

particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is

likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” Salmon

Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1225 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).

To demonstrate standing to bring a procedural claim—

such as one alleging a NEPA violation—a plaintiff “must

show that the procedures in question are designed to protect

some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate

basis of his standing.” W. Watersheds Project v.

Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 485 (9th Cir. 2011). For an

environmental interest to be “concrete,” there must be a

“geographic nexus between the individual asserting the

claim and the location suffering an environmental impact.”

Id. “[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in

fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are

persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the

area will be lessened by the challenged activity.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

183 (2000). Once plaintiffs seeking to enforce a procedural

requirement establish a concrete injury, “the causation and

redressability requirements are relaxed.” W. Watersheds

Project, 632 F.3d at 485. “Plaintiffs alleging procedural

injury must show only that they have a procedural right that,

if exercised, could protect their concrete interests.” Salmon

Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1226.

12 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

A. The Claims Challenging the 1994/1997 PEIS

The district court dismissed Claims One and Two,

holding that WildEarth had not shown that any of its

members had a concrete injury caused by the PEIS. But the

injuries Molde alleges are concrete enough, and are

sufficiently causally related to APHIS’s failure to update the

PEIS, to support WildEarth’s standing for Claims One and

Two.

“An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of

its members when its members would otherwise have

standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are

germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim

asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of

individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth,

528 U.S. at 181 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). As to the second and

third prongs, it is clear that Molde’s interest in recreational

and aesthetic enjoyment of predators in the Nevada

wilderness is related to WildEarth’s purposes of “protecting

and restoring wildlife” and “carnivore protection.” And

neither WildEarth’s claims for procedural violations of

NEPA nor its requested relief require the participation of any

individual WildEarth members. The only dispute is over the

first prong—whether the harm to Molde satisfies the

concrete injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability

requirements for standing. We therefore focus on those

issues.

Molde’s injury is his reduced recreational and aesthetic

enjoyment of areas in Nevada impacted by NWSP’s predator

damage management programs. His declaration names

specific wilderness areas in Nevada that he has visited and

has specific plans to visit again. The declaration states that

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 13

NWSP’s predator control negatively impacts Molde’s

enjoyment of those areas by causing him to curtail his

recreational activities and reducing his likelihood of seeing

predators, including coyotes and ravens. This satisfies the

injury-in-fact requirement. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity

v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2009)

(holding that a declaration from plaintiffs that they have

viewed animals in the affected region previously, enjoy

doing so, and have plans to return satisfies the requirement

for a concrete injury in fact with geographic nexus to the

challenged action).

Because WildEarth seeks to enforce a procedural right

under NEPA, the requirements for causation and

redressability are relaxed. W. Watersheds Project, 632 F.3d

at 485. Under that relaxed standard, WildEarth’s

allegations, based on Molde’s experience, are sufficient to

support standing. WildEarth alleges that APHIS implements

its predator damage management programs pursuant to the

1994/1997 PEIS, and that APHIS has improperly failed to

update that PEIS. The Record of Decision for the final PEIS

specifically states that APHIS will rely on information from

the final PEIS for NEPA compliance. 60 Fed. Reg. 13,399,

13,400. Indeed, the Nevada environmental assessment did

incorporate the 1994/1997 PEIS. This is a sufficient causal

link between APHIS’s alleged procedural violations of

NEPA and Molde’s injury to satisfy the relaxed causation

requirement for procedural claims. See Salmon Spawning,

545 F.3d at 1229 (holding that causation is satisfied under

the relaxed requirements for procedural claims when “[t]he

asserted injury is not too tenuously connected to the

agencies’ failure” to take action).

Contrary to APHIS’s arguments, the fact that the PEIS

also applies to programs in states for which WildEarth has

14 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

not submitted member declarations does not prevent

WildEarth from challenging the continued use of the PEIS.

WildEarth has adequately alleged that Molde’s injury in

Nevada is caused by the failure to update the PEIS, which is

sufficient to allow WildEarth to challenge that failure to

update. That the PEIS also applies to other geographic

regions that Molde does not visit is irrelevant to the standing

analysis. See Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300,

1303 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f plaintiffs did not have standing to

challenge a non-site-specific EIS, the program as a whole

could never be reviewed. To the extent that the plan pre-

determines the future, it represents a concrete injury that

plaintiffs must, at some point, have standing to challenge.”);

Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,

1515-18 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs had

standing to challenge a non-site-specific EIS that caused

their injury in fact); see also Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v.

Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding

standing for challenge to statewide failure to regulate water

quality when the plaintiffs alleged specific injury relating to

some, but not all, streams within Alaska).

Molde’s injury also satisfies the relaxed redressability

requirement for procedural claims. This requirement is

satisfied when “the relief requested—that the agency follow

the correct procedures—may influence the agency’s

ultimate decision.” Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1226.

This relaxed redressability standard governs procedural

challenges to programmatic actions as well as to specific

implementing actions. See Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631, 2015 WL

3756708, at *6 (9th Cir. June 17, 2015) (“As in Salmon

Spawning, Cottonwood’s allegation of a procedural injury

relaxes its burden of showing causation and redressability.

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 15

Cottonwood need not show that [the procedures sought]

would lead to a different result at either the programmatic or

project-specific level.”) (internal citation omitted). Here,

updating the PEIS could influence APHIS’s predator

damage management in Nevada, which is sufficient to

satisfy the redressability requirement for standing for a

procedural claim.

Because Molde would have standing to bring Claims

One and Two on his own, and WildEarth also satisfies the

other associational standing requirements, WildEarth has

standing for Claims One and Two. 4

B. The Nevada-Specific Claims

Claims Three and Four allege that APHIS violated

NEPA by preparing an inadequate environmental

assessment for Nevada and consequently failing to prepare a

Nevada-specific EIS. In support, WildEarth argues that

APHIS’s Nevada analysis was deficient because, among

other things, it failed to analyze the environmental impacts

of trapping, aerial hunting, and avicide use—all practices

that Molde contends negatively impact his aesthetic and

recreational enjoyment of affected areas in Nevada. The

district court dismissed these claims for lack of

4

APHIS alternately asks us to affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Claims One and Two under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. The district court has yet to address this

issue, and we decline to reach it in the first instance. See Am. President

Lines, Ltd. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore

Div., Unit 60, 721 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (“It is the general rule

. . . that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed

upon below.”).

16 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

redressability. Specifically, the district court held that the

Mayer Letter, which asserted that Nevada would perform

predator damage management independently if APHIS were

to withdraw from Nevada, demonstrated that enjoining

APHIS would not redress WildEarth’s injury.

For the same reasons discussed above, WildEarth meets

the injury-in-fact and causation requirements for standing to

challenge APHIS’s predator damage management activities

in Nevada based on Molde’s injuries, as well as the other

requirements for associational standing. The only question

in dispute is whether Molde’s injury is redressable. We hold

that it is.

APHIS argues that, if WildEarth prevailed on Claims

Three and Four, APHIS would have to cease its predator

management activities in Nevada altogether at least until a

new environmental assessment was completed. On the basis

of this premise, which we accept as true, 5 APHIS’s primary

argument against redressability is that, if federal

involvement in predator management in Nevada ceased as a

result of this lawsuit, Nevada would pick up where the

federal government left off. APHIS argues that Nevada’s

current participation in NWSP’s predator control activities

and its legal authority to conduct predator control make

Nevada an independent cause of the underlying injury,

5

We note that if APHIS’s activities would only be altered rather than

halted if WildEarth prevailed, there is no question that WildEarth’s

injury would be redressable. Partial relief through a reduction in

APHIS’s activities would qualify as redress for standing purposes,

Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1987), and APHIS has not even

argued that Nevada would step in to fill a gap left by a reduction in

federal activity rather than a cessation.

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 17

rendering Molde’s injury not redressable by relief against

APHIS. But the mere existence of multiple causes of an

injury does not defeat redressability, particularly for a

procedural injury. So long as a defendant is at least partially

causing the alleged injury, a plaintiff may sue that defendant,

even if the defendant is just one of multiple causes of the

plaintiff’s injury.

The Supreme Court applied this principle in

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007).

Massachusetts, along with several other plaintiffs, had

brought a procedural challenge to EPA’s failure to regulate

greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. Id. at

505. The underlying concrete injury—harms to

Massachusetts and its citizens from climate change caused

by greenhouse gas emissions—had multiple causes. EPA

pointed to the fact that there were numerous contributors to

greenhouse gas emissions, including developing nations

such as China and India. Id. at 523–24. EPA further argued

that “predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from

developing nations . . . [were] likely to offset any marginal

domestic decrease” that would result from the type of

regulations Massachusetts sought. Id. Nevertheless, the

Court held that Massachusetts satisfied the relaxed

redressability requirement for procedural claims because a

favorable decision by the EPA could reduce “to some

extent” the risk posed by global warming. Id. at 526.

In Salmon Spawning, we likewise held that the plaintiffs

had standing to bring a procedural claim for prospective

relief based on the United States’ alleged failure to engage

in procedures under the Endangered Species Act that might

lead to changes in future salmon harvesting practices. 545

F.3d at 1229. Although salmon harvesting was carried out

by both the United States and Canada pursuant to the terms

18 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

of a treaty, the existence of two causes of the plaintiffs’

injury did not defeat redressability. 6 Id.

Similarly, in Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, we held that a

litigant challenging an agency action “need not eliminate any

other contributing causes to establish its standing.” 633 F.3d

894, 901 (9th Cir. 2011). The relevant inquiry is instead

whether a favorable ruling could redress the challenged

cause of the injury. See id. Specifically, in Barnum we

concluded that a landowner had standing to sue EPA because

EPA regulations decreased the landowner’s property’s

value, even though California also regulated the property in

question. Id. at 900–01 & n.4. We stated that “[w]hether

Barnum might have a cause of action against California does

not affect whether Barnum has standing to sue EPA, just as

whether Barnum will be successful on the merits in its suit

against EPA does not affect whether Barnum has standing to

pursue such a suit.” Id. at 900 n.4; see also id. at 901 (“We

do not think Barnum must allege that EPA is the sole source

of the devaluation of its property.”).

Nuclear Information and Resource Service v. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (“NIRS”), 457 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.

2006), upon which APHIS relies, is not to the contrary. In

NIRS, we held that the plaintiffs had not alleged a concrete

injury caused by the challenged Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (“NRC”) regulation, because none of the

declarations from the plaintiff association’s members

6

In contrast to the prospective claim in Salmon Spawning, the

retrospective claims were not redressable because the remedy sought was

the undoing of a treaty with Canada, and the court could not influence

the decision, which had already been made by the Executive Branch, to

enter into that treaty. 545 F.3d at 1225–29.

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 19

“explain[ed] in any way how [the members’] health may be

affected by this regulation,” and because the plaintiff

association’s “interest (even if sufficiently concrete) in the

health of its members also appear[ed] to be served, not

harmed, by the enactment of the new regulations.” Id. at

953, 954. We emphasized that this lack of injury was

“dispositive of [the] appeal.” Id. at 951. We went on to

explain, however, that to the extent the plaintiffs were

harmed by the existence of the NRC regulation, their injury

was no longer redressable because the Department of

Transportation had a regulation identical in effect to the

challenged NRC regulation, and the statute of limitations for

any challenge to the Department of Transportation

regulation had already run. Id.at 955; Nuclear Info. & Res.

Serv. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. Research & Special Programs

Admin., 457 F.3d 956, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2006). In contrast,

here, Nevada does not already have an independent predator

damage management program that is entirely redundant with

APHIS’s in terms of its effect on WildEarth. And, even if

Nevada did have such a program, nothing suggests that

litigation challenging it would be time barred or otherwise

precluded.

Nor does Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon,

732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013), show that redressability is

lacking here. In Bellon, we held that plaintiffs alleging

concrete injuries from climate change had not satisfied the

causation and redressability requirements for standing to

challenge a failure to adequately regulate oil refineries in

Washington because the alleged link between the absence of

such regulation and climate change was too tenuous. Id. at

1141–47. Bellon did not involve a procedural right, so the

redressability requirements there were not relaxed in the way

they are here. Id. at 1145 (distinguishing Massachusetts v.

20 WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA

EPA on the ground that it involved a “procedural right”). In

addition, causation was lacking because the defendant oil

refineries were such minor contributors to global greenhouse

gas emissions, and the independent third-party causes of

climate change were so numerous, that the contribution of

the defendant oil refineries was “scientifically

indiscernible.” Id. at 1143–44. Molde’s injury, in contrast,

has at most two causes, and APHIS contributes very

discernibly to that injury. It is the program led by APHIS

that is carrying out the hunting, trapping, poisoning, and

other acts of predator damage management that detract from

Molde’s enjoyment of the outdoors.

The conclusion that Molde’s (and thus WildEarth’s)

injury is redressable is bolstered by the fact that any

independent predator damage management activities by

Nevada are hypothetical rather than actual. What, if any, the

extent of a Nevada predator damage management program

would be if APHIS stopped its activity in Nevada is entirely

a matter of speculation because Nevada currently has no

such independent program. Nevada has stated, through the

Mayer Letter, that it would implement some form of predator

damage management if APHIS withdrew from Nevada. But

the Mayer Letter states only that the Nevada Department of

Wildlife would retain statutory responsibility for predator

management if APHIS ceased its involvement. It does not

describe what the Department of Wildlife would do to carry

out that responsibility on its own. Nevada might adopt

practices that would be less harmful to WildEarth’s interests,

or it might devote less funding to predator damage

management than APHIS currently provides. Indeed, the

Nevada environmental assessment found that, at a minimum,

a Nevada-run program likely would greatly reduce aerial

hunting and the killing of ravens, both of which would

WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. USDA 21

partially redress Molde’s injuries. The notion that Nevada

would replace everything APHIS currently does is therefore

speculative at best. Such speculation does not defeat

standing. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703

(9th Cir. 1993) (“Speculation that logging might not occur

because of as yet unknown intervening circumstances, or

because redrafting the EIS might not change the Secretary’s

decision to adopt [the challenged policy] as its owl

management plan is not relevant to standing.”).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

court’s order dismissing this case for lack of standing and

REMAND for further proceedings. 7

7

We address WildEarth’s requests for jurisdictional discovery and

judicial notice in a concurrently filed order.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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