Veasey v. United States

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No. 15-694C

HLED

July 30, 2015 JUL 3 0 20t5

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FRANCIS EDWARD VEASEY, * 'Hii.8oo.'3&ff*

Plaintiff.

* Pro Se Plaintiff; ln Forma

* Pauoeris Application; Lack of

,* Subject Matter Jurisdiction;

* Injunctive Relief.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant. :

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Francis Edward Veasey, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

Martin M. Tomlinson, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendant. With him were

Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director, Benjamin

C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation Branch,

Civil Division, Washington, D.C.

ORDER

HORN. J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On July 6,2015, plaintiff Francis Edward Veasey filed a two-and-a-half-page pro

se complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, along with an application to

proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff's complaint was filed "against the United States and

its agency, the Department of Veteran Affairs." Plaintiff's complaint, which seeks an

unidentified amount of monetary damages and "emergency injunctive relief in the form of

a cease and desist order to be directed to the said agency for the violation of

Constitutional Protections ensuring Due Process and adverse actions in the absence of

Probable Cause," appears to arise from the implementation of certain restrictions on how

Mr. Veasey would be allowed to use the Philadelphia Veterans Administration Medical

Center (VAMC), a facility operated by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs

(VA) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

ln a March 18,2015 letter sent to plaintiff, which was attached as an exhibit to

plaintiff's complaint, Laszlo Gyulai, MD, Chair of the Philadelphia VAMC's Disruptive

Behavior Committee, informed plaintiff that he would be subject to certain behavioral

restrictions governing his future visits to the VAMC, effective immediately. The

implementation of these restrictions was apparently prompted by an incident on March

12,2015, in which Mr. Veasey threatened to physically harm VAMC staff during a visit to

the Philadelphia VAMC. Specifically, the March 18 letter informs the plaintiff that:

During all of your future visits to the Philadelphia VAMC you may be seen

in the presence of a police officer stationing [sic] in the hallway close to the

room in which you are examined. We would ask you to present yourself to

the police when you arrive to the Philadelphia VAMC so you can be

escorted to your visit. lf you become disruptive, Philadelphia VAMC Police

will immediately escort you from the Philadelphia VAMC grounds and you

will not be permitted to return that day, except for evaluation of potentially

life-threaten ing emergencies. You may return at the time of your next

appointment. However, continued disruptive, threatening or violent

behavior may result in additional restrictions.

According to the letter, these restrictions were approved by the facility's Chief of Staff and

would remain in place for two years, but could be relaxed sooner if recommended by

plaintiff's care providers. The letter also indicated that the restrictions did not reduce Mr.

Veasey's eligibility for any medically appropriate health care. Additionally, the letter

informed Mr. Veasey of his right to appeal the decision to implement these restrictions to

the Philadelphia VAMC's Chief of Staff within thirty days. According to his complaint, upon

receiving the letter, plaintiff "registered Disagreement with the DVA [Department of

Veterans Affairsl actions both by letters to the affected and instituting parties, and in

informal conversations with medical professionals, psychological evaluators, and Patient

Advocates." According to plaintiffs complaint, having not received a response, plaintiff

claims "a formal Notice of Disagreement [was] sent to the designated DVA Regional

Office in Philadelphia, PA on the 29th of June, 2015."

Mr. Veasey's apparent next course of action was to file a complaint in this court.

In his complaint, plaintiff makes a number of claims against the United States and the VA

relating to the restrictions placed on his use of the VAMC. ln particular, plaintiff claims

that the restrictions precipitated the following "Adverse Effects":

The Restriction, in effect, becomes an armed prevention of the acquisition

of benefits and treatment for disability incurred while in service to the United

States and rated at 100%, an effectual total disability.

The Restriction produces a climate of tension and hesitancy on the part of

medical personnel, benefits workers, and other patients and clients of the

Department,

The Restriction presents an opportunity for authorities to apprehend the

Plaintiff in the absence of probable cause directly due to the circumvention

of Due Process Protections.

The restriction causes harm to the Plaintiff in that reputation and furtherance

of business with government are impeded in an unlawful manner.

The imposition of the Restriction prevents representation as provided by the

co-located Disabled American Veterans service organization in both

locations.

To redress these claimed injuries, plaintiff seeks "emergency injunctive relief in the form

of a cease and desist order," an "explicit prohibition to retaliation for this filing in the

prevention to the acquisition of medical treatment, benefit application and approval, or the

receipt of DVA [Department of Veterans Affairs] Compensation," and "any and all

Compensatory and Punitive Damages that the court finds appropriate."

DISCUSSION

The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, without the assistance of

counsel. When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to

invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their

pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations

contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers"), reh'q denied, 405 U.S. 9aB (972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007): Huqhes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'q denied,429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750

F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl.516,524

(2014),a'ff'd,603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1909 (2015). "However,

"'[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiffl has

not spelled out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lenoen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl.317,328

(2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scoqin v. United States,33 Fed. Cl.285,293

(1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.

1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, atf d,443 F. App'x 542 (Fed.

Ci.2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. C|.249,253 (2007). "While a pro se plaintiff

is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the

oro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by

a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010)

(citing Huqhes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Tavlor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359

(Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence."), reh'o and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofskv v.

UnitedStates, 119Fed.Cl. 133, 139(2014) ("[W]hilethecourtmayexcuseambiguities

in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."'

(quoting Henke v. United States,60 F.3d 795,799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United

States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiffs pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard, such leniency'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the

burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."' (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed.

cl. at 253)).

Even granting the more liberal construction afforded to a complaint filed by a 4

se plaintiff, it is not clear from Mr. Veasey's brief complaint what would be the grounds for

this court's jurisdiction over his various claims. lt is well established that "'subject-matter

jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or

waived "' Arbauqh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to

ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must

raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to

press." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1 1 97, 1202 (2011); see also

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) ("When a requirement goes to subject-

matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponfe issues that the parties

have disclaimed or have not presented."); Hertz Coro. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,94 (2010)

("Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction

exists, even when no party challenges it." (citing Arbauqh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at

514)); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA. Inc., 269 F.3d 1340,1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A] court

has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v.

Pav Less Druq Stores N.W.. lnc., 918 F.2d 160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); View Enq'q, Inc.

v. Robotic Vision Svs.. Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always

look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties raise the issue or not."). "Objections to a

tribunal's jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the

tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction overthe controversy." Sebelius v. Auburn Req'l Med.

Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 82a (2013); see also Arbauqh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506 ("The

objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party,

or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the

entry of judgment.''); Cent. Pines Land Co.. L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1364

n.1 (Fed. Cn. 2012) ("An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by

any party or the court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of

judgment." (citing Arbauoh v. Y & H Coro., 546 U.S. at 506-07)); Rick's Mushroom Serv.,

lnc. v. United States,521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may challenge,

or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (citing Arbauqh

v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344,1354 (Fed. Cir.),

reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and

Fanninq, Phillios & Molnarv. West, 160 F.3d 717,720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United

States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71,76, apoeal dismissed, 425 F. App'x 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In fact,

"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponfe, even

where . . . neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite Labs.. Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.

Holdinqs,370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc. v, Mead Corp., 134

F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied and en banc suqsestion declined (Fed. Cir.),

cert. denied,525 U.S.826 (1998)), reh'o and reh'q en bancdenied (Fed. Cir.2004), cert.

qranted in pgd sub. nom Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdinqs v. Metabolite Labs.. Inc., 546 U.S.

975 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently sranted, 548 U.S. 12 (2006); see also Avid

ldentification Svs.. Inc. v. Crvstal lmport Coro.,603 F.3d 967,971(Fed. Cir.) ("This court

must always determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case before it, even

when the parties do not raise or contest the issue."), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied, 614

F.3d 1330 (Fed, Cir.2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.909 (2011).

Pursuant to the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only state in the complaint "a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," and "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(aX1), (2) (201a); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(aXl), (2) (2015); see also Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662,677-78 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544,555-57,570 (2007)). "Determination of

jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded in that it must state the

necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim, independent of any defense that may be

interposed." Hollev v. United States,124F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise

Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir.

1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States,97 Fed. C|.203,208

(2011); Gonzalez-McCaullev Inv. Grp.. Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl.710,713 (2010\.

"Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to

support a claim." Bradlev v. Chiron Coro., 1 36 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also

McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir.2007) (Dyk, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure S 1286 (3d ed. 2004)). "A plaintiffs factual allegations must'raise a right

to relief above the soeculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to olausible."'

Three S Consultino v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'o denied (Fed. Cir.

2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. lqbal, "[a] pleading that offers'labels and conclusions'or

'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' 550 U.S. at 555.

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual

enhancement."' Ashcroft v. lobal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv,

550 U.S. at 555).

The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,

or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. S 1491(aXl)(2012). As interpreted bythe United States Supreme Court, the

Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United

States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking

a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal

constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal

government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navaio Nation, 556 U.S. 287,

289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,216 (1983); see also Greenlee

Cntv., Ariz. v. United States,487 F.3d871,875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q and reh'q en bancdenied

(Fed. Cir.2007), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1142(2008); Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d

1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is

cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the

United States . . . ." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see alss United States v.

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709

F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Coro. v.

United States,566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir.2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv.. lnc. v.

United States, 521 F.3d at 1343 (''[P]laintiff must . . . identify a substantive source of law

that creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."); Golden

v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl.764,768 (2014). In @

United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three

types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of

Federal Claims. The court wrote:

The underlying monetary claims are of three types. . . . First, claims alleging

the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall

within the Tucker Act's waiver. Second, the Tucker Act's waiver

encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the

Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum."

Eastport S.S. lCorp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599,605-06,1 372F.2d

[1 002,] 1007-08 [(1 967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in

which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting

Clapp v. United States,127 Cl. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954)) . . . .

Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where

"money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless

entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007.

Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the

government, either directly or in effect, require that the "particular provision

of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a rlght to

be paid a certain sum." ld.; see also lUnited States v. lTestan, 424 U.S.

1392,J 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the

plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of

the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation-

does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court

of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself . . . can fairly be interpreted as

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage

sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is

commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating"

statute.

Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir.2004);

see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).

To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v.

Navaio Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan,424 U.5.392, 400

(1 976)); see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472: United

States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374,

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting

monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navaio

Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply

al jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims

premised on other sources of law (e.9., statutes or contracts)."). "'lf the statute is not

money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal

shou|dbefor|ackofsubjectmatterjurisdiction'',,@

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir.2008) (quoting Greenlee Cntv., Ariz. v.

United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisher v. United States, 402 F .3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction under

the TuckerAct."); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he seeks relief "for the violation of

Constitutional Protections ensuring Due Process and adverse actions in the absence of

Probable Cause." This court, however, lacks jurisdiction over these allegations of

constitutional claims. To the enent that plaintiff might be asserting that the restrictions

placed on his use of the VAMC create "an opportunity for authorities to apprehend the

Plaintiff in the absence of probable cause," in theory, such a claim would be based on

Fourth Amendment rights, which provision of the Constitution is not money-mandating,

and, therefore, such claims are not within this court's jurisdiction. See LaChance v. United

States, 15 Cl. Ct. 127,130 (1988) ("[T]he fourth amendment does not mandate the

payment of money by the United States." (citing Shaw v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 796, 800

(1985))); Roberson v. United States, '1 15 Fed. C1.234,240 ("The Fourth Amendment is

not money-mandating." (citing Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621 ,623 (Fed. Cir.

1997))), apoeal dismissed, 556 F. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Haka v. United States, 107

Fed. Cl. 111,113-14 (2012); Kam-Almaz v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 84, 89 (2011)

("[T]his Court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims contesting the lawfulness of a

search and seizure because due process and Fourth Amendment claims are reserved to

the District Court.'' (citing LeBlancv. United States, 50 F.3d 1025,1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995))),

aff'd,682 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012);Treecev. United States, 96 Fed. Cl.226,231 (2010)

(finding that the Fourth Amendment is not money-mandating (citing Tasbv v. United

States,91 Fed. Cl. 344,346 (2010))); Frvv. United States,72Fed. Cl.500,507 (2006)

("As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable search and

seizure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment are not money-mandating."

(citation omitted)). Therefore, plaintiff's claims based on the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution are not within this court's jurisdiction.

Similarly, to the extent that plaintiff's complaint attempts to assert violations of his

right to due process, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held

that this court does not possess jurisdiction to consider claims arising under the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Crocker v. United States,

125 F .3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (no jurisdiction over a due process violation under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d at 1028));

see also Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d at 1116 ("The law is well settled that the Due

Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the

payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act."); ln

re United States, 463 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (Fed. Cir.) ("[B]ecause the Due Process Clause

is not money-mandating, it may not provide the basis for jurisdiction under the Tucker

Act."), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Scholl v.

United States, 552 U.S. 9a0 (2007); Acadia Tech.. lnc. & Global Win Tech.. Ltd. v. United

States, 458 F.3d 1327,1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Collins v. United States, 67 F.3d 284,288

(Fed. Cir.) ("[T]he due process clause does not obligate the government to pay money

damages.''), reh'o denied (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mullenberq v. United States,857 F.2d770,

773 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the Due Process clauses "do not trigger Tucker Act

jurisdiction in the courts"); Munav v. United States , 817 F .2d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987)

(noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause does not include language

mandating the payment of money damages); Haroer v. United States, t04 Fed. Cl. 287,

291 n.5 (2012); Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 235,238, affd,429 F. App'x 995

(Fed. Cir. 201 1), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1105 (2012); McCullouoh v. United States,76

Fed. Cl. 1,4 (2006), appeal dismissed,236 F. App'x615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied (Fed.

Cir.), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1050 (2007) ("[N]eitherthe Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause . . . nor the Privileges and lmmunities Clause provides a basis for jurisdiction in

this court because the Fifth Amendment is not a source that mandates the payment of

money to plaintiff."). Due process claims "must be heard in District Court." Kam-Almaz v.

United States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 89 (citing Acadia Tech.. Inc. & Global Win Tech.. Ltd. v.

United States,458 F.3d at 1334); see also Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 238.

Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of his constitutional

rights to due process, no such cause of action can be brought in this court.

Plaintiff also asserts in his complaint that the restrictions placed on his use of the

VAMC harmed him in the sense that his "reputation and furtherance of business with

government are impeded in an unlawful manner." These apparent claims of defamation

and interference with a business relationship sound in tort, and, therefore, also are

outside of the jurisdiction of the court. The Tucker Act expressly excludes tort claims,

including those committed by federal officials, from the jurisdiction of the United States

Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a) ("The United States Court of Federal

Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of

an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,

or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."); see also Keene

Corp. v. United States,508 U.S.200,214 (1993); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United

States, 521 F.3d at 1343; Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454,1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998);

Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d at 623 ("Because Brown and Darnell's complaints for

'fraudulent assessment[s]' are grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court lacks

jurisdiction over those claims."); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066,

1070 n.8 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied, en banc suqqestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 961 (199a); Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 238; Jumah v. United States,

90 Fed. Cl. 603, 607 (2009) ("|lt is well-established that the Court of Federal Claims does

not have jurisdiction over tort claims, Here, Mr. Jumah seeks damages for '[n]eglect,

Im]isrepresentation, [flalse Ii]mprisonment, [c]onspiracy, Ii]ntentional Ii]nfliction of

emotional [d]istress, [i]nvasion of [p]rivacy, [n]egligence and li]respass and lplunitive

[d]amages.' These are all claims sounding in tort." (internal citation omitted; all brackets

in original)), affd, 385 F. App'x 987 (Fed. Cir.2010); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed.

Cl. 640,650 (2009); Fullard v. United States,77 Fed. C1.226,230 (2007) ("This court

lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs conspiracy claim because the Tucker Act specifically

states that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims 'sounding

in tort."'); Edelmann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 379-80 (2007) ("This Court'does

not have jurisdiction over claims that defendant engaged in negligent, fraudulent, or other

wrongful conduct when discharging its official duties' . . . [and] Plaintiffs' claims of fraud,

misrepresentation, slander, perjury, harassment, intimidation, coercion, theft, and

defamation, and their claims that the Government deprived Ms. Edelmann of her right to

a fair trial, are tort claims." (quoting Cottrell v. United States,42 Fed. Cl. 144,149 (1998)));

McCullouoh v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3 (2006); Aqee v. United States ,72 Fed. Cl.

284, 290 (2006); Zhenoxinq v. United States,71 Fed. Cl. 732,739, aff d,204 F. App'x

885 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir. 2006). Therefore, plaintiffs apparent allegations

of defamation and interference with business relationships sound in tort and, accordingly,

also must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to seeking "any and all Compensatory and Punitive Damages that the

court finds appropriate," Mr. Veasey appears to seek injunctive relief in the form of "a

'Cease and Desist ' order directed to the VAMC Philadelphia, The VAROIC [VA Regional

Office and Insurance Centerl, also in Philadelphia, and the Department of Veteran Affairs

Police Force," as well as an "explicit prohibition to retaliation for this filing in the prevention

to the acquisition of medical treatment, benefit application and approval, or the receipi of

DVA Compensation for the referenced Disability." This court's ability to grant equitable

relief is limited, and does not extend to the sort of injunctive relief requested by Mr.

Veasey. See Unlted States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1729 (2011)

(The United States Court of Federal Claims "has no general power to provide equitable

relief against the Government or its officers."); Massie v. United States,226 F.3d 1318,

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Except in strictly limited circumstances, see 28 U.S.C.

S 1491 (bX2), there is no provision in the Tucker Act authorizing the Court of Federal

Claims to order equitable relief." (citing United States v. Kinq, 395 U.S. 1 , 4 (1969) ("cases

seeking relief other than money damages from the court of claims have never been 'within

its jurisdiction"') and Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.

Cir. 1990))); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh'q denied (Fed.

Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims has no power 'to grant affirmative non-

monetary relief unless it is tied and subordinate to a money judgment."' (quoting Austin v.

United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719,723, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 91 1 (1 975))); Westlands Water

Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 177,192QA13); Haka v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl.

at 113; Halim v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl.677,684-85 (2012); Smalls v. United States,

87 Fed. Cl. 300, 307 (2009); Voisin v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 164, 178 (2008) ("lt is

well-established that the Court of Federal Claims generally does not have the authority to

entertain declaratory judgment requests."). In the above captioned case, Mr. Veasey has

not identified a jurisdictional basis for this court to entertain the injunctive relief he has

requested, and any such claims must also be dismissed.

The court notes that Mr. Veasey has been a frequent litigant in federal courts, filing

a number of complaints and a number of appeals, all of which have been dismissed. See

In re Francis Veasev, No. 08-8015 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 2008) (denying petition for writ of

mandamus for lack of jurisdiction); Veasev v. Fisher, No. 07-cv-01446, 2008 WL 1758908

(W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2008) (granting defendant's dismissal motion because plaintiff had

failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil-rights complaint against

prison officials), aff'd, 307 F. App'x 614 (3d Cir.2009); Veasev v. The Att'v Gen. Office

Pa., No. 08-cv-00242,2008 WL 1019731 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2008) (dismissing two of eight

claims in plaintiffs habeas corpus petition for being raised in a prior claim, while giving

leave to apply for a certificate of appealability with respect to the others), oerm. app.

denied, No. 0B-2113 (3d Cir. July 11, 2008), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (3d Cir. Dec.

17, 2008); Veasev v. Connor, No. 01-cv-00523, 2002 WL 31355252 (D. Del. Oct. 17,

2002) (dismissing plaintiffs petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, because plaintiff was not in custody in Delaware at the time petition was filed),

appeal dismissed sub nom. Veasev v. Blaine, No. 03-1084 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2003); Veasey

v. Connon, No. 00-cv-05745 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3,2002) (denying plaintiffs petition for writ of

habeas corpus on ground that he "has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a

constitutional right"), appeal withdrawn sub nom. Veasev v. Blaine, No. 01-1659 (3d Cir.

Apr.17,2001), appeal withdrawn sub nom. Veasev v. Blaine, No. 01-1720 (3d Cir. Apr.

17,2001), appeal denied, No. 02-2067 (3d Cir. June 24,2002); (dismissed because

plaintiff's application for certificate of appealability was untimely).

Along with his complaint, plaintiff submitted an application to proceed in forma

pauperis, asserting that he is unable to pay the required filing fees, and requesting waiver

of court costs and fees. In this application, plaintiff indicates that he is unemployed and

has not received income from any source in the last twelve months. Plaintiff, however,

indicated "Yes" in response to a query asking, "Do you own any cash, or do you have

money in checking, savings, or any other accounts?" and stated '$500.00 month average"

when asked to estimate the total value thereof. Mr. Veasey's application further provides

that he does not own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable

assets, does not have any dependents, and is not currently a prisoner.

In order to provide access to this court to those who cannot pay the filing fees

mandated by RCFC 77 .1(c) (2014), the statute at 28 U.S.C. S 191 5 (2012) permits a court

to allow plaintiffs to file a complaint without payment of fees or security under certain

circumstances. The standard in 28 U.S.C. S 1915(aX1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is

"unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Determination of what constitutes

"unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and, therefore, whether to allow a

plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based

on the information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See, e&, Rowland v. Cal. Men's

Colonv, Unit ll Men's Advisorv Council, 506 U.S. 154,217-18 ('1993); Fuentes v. United

States, 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). In Fiebelkorn v. United States, the United States Court

of Federal Claims indicated:

[T]he threshold for a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is not high: The

statute requires that the applicant be "unable to pay such fees." 28 U.S.C.

S 1 91 5(a)(1). To be "unable to pay such fees" means that paying such fees

would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment

would render plaintiff destitute.

Fiebelkorn v. United States,77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Haves v. United States,

71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (2006). The court notes that the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously denied an Application to Proceed ln Forma

Pauperis, filed by Mr. Veasey along with a pro se complaint, based on its determination

that the $450.00 difference between his monthly income and monthly expenses, as he

10

reported on his application, was sufficient to cover the court's $350.00 filing fee. S

Veasevv. Pennsvlvania, No. 12-cv-03297 (E.D. Pa. June 14,2012). Ultimately, however,

regardless of whether Mr. Veasey has any present income, which might disqualify him

from in forma pauperis eligibility, which is not clear from the form he completed and

submitted to the court, for the reasons discussed above, his complaint is being dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff s complaint is DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge

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