Opinion

Maurice Goudeau v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P.

  • 793 F.3d 470
  • 2015 WL 4385621
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jul 16, 2015
Status
Published
Author
Costa
On the bench
Benavides, Southwick, Costa
Nature of suit
Civil Rights
Cited by
199 cases
Authority
More cited than 93.6%

concluding, on a summary judgment posture, the allegations that the ADEA plaintiff’s superior made ageist comments about “old farts” and that the plaintiff wearing “old man clothes” together with other evidence satisfied his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination

How later courts described this case

  • concluding, on a summary judgment posture, the allegations that the ADEA plaintiff’s superior made ageist comments about “old farts” and that the plaintiff wearing “old man clothes” together with other evidence satisfied his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination
  • finding that doubts raised about the defendant's justification, “combined with the ageist comments” that the plaintiff put forward, “would allow a jury to conclude that age was the reason for the termination”
  • holding that remarks can be circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination if the comment has a discriminatory animus and it is made by someone who has the power over the employment action
  • stating the CSC Logic test applies “only when the remarks are being used as direct evidence of discrimination,” and the test is “more demanding” than when the remarks are being used as one piece of a circumstantial case

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 14-20241 Document: 00513117616 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/16/2015

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 14-20241 FILED

July 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

MAURICE R. GOUDEAU, Clerk

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, L.P.,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before BENAVIDES, SOUTHWICK, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:

Maurice Goudeau appeals the district court’s summary judgment

dismissal of his age discrimination and retaliation claims. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the dismissal of the retaliation claim but reverse the

dismissal of the discrimination claim.

I.

The following background construes factual disputes in favor of Goudeau

as courts must when the opposing party has moved for summary judgment.

Goudeau began his career in 1993 as a mechanic and millwright at

ReedHycalog. He was promoted through the ranks and obtained the position

of maintenance supervisor, a post he held when ReedHycalog was acquired by

National Oilwell Varco (NOV) in 2008. Goudeau continued to be employed as

Case: 14-20241 Document: 00513117616 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/16/2015

No. 14-20241

a maintenance supervisor at NOV’s Conroe, Texas facility until he was

terminated in 2011 at the age of fifty-seven.

At NOV, Goudeau first worked under a supervisor named Tim Taylor.

During that time, Goudeau had no disciplinary problems. In August or

September 2010, Mike Perkins became Goudeau’s supervisor. On one occasion,

when they stepped outside to smoke, Perkins told Goudeau that “there sure

are a lot of old farts around here,” and asked Goudeau about his job duties. In

the same exchange, Perkins inquired about the ages of two older employees

whom he also supervised, Joe Jett and Bill Fisher, and how long they had been

working for NOV. Perkins then said that he planned to fire both Jett and

Fisher.

Goudeau complained to Human Resources (HR) about Perkins’s “old

farts” comment and about the plan to fire the older workers. Although the HR

representative told Goudeau a meeting would be arranged with Perkins, it is

unclear if HR ever actually discussed the allegations with Perkins. In any

case, following the HR complaint, Perkins stopped socializing with Goudeau,

reduced Goudeau’s managerial authority, and “really turned the heat up on

[him].” Perkins also continued to make ageist remarks. On a number of

occasions, Perkins asked if the facility’s smoking area was “where the old

people meet.” Perkins also once remarked that Goudeau wore “old man

clothes.” Goudeau contends that Perkins also referred to Goudeau as an “old

fart.” Goudeau does not recall the exact dates when Perkins made the various

ageist comments described above, other than that they were all made

sometime between August/September 2010, when Perkins became Goudeau’s

supervisor, and January 2011, when Goudeau received his first disciplinary

write-up.

Perkins issued Goudeau that “First Warning” for ignoring a direct

request to complete a task. It was the first disciplinary action of Goudeau’s

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No. 14-20241

eighteen-year career with NOV and its predecessor. Goudeau signed the write-

up, but filed written objections to the substance of the allegations and

complained to HR that the write-up was a retaliatory measure for opposing

Perkins’s plan to fire Jett and Fisher. In March 2011, Goudeau received his

first annual performance review from Perkins and was given a below-standard

rating. Goudeau again complained to HR that the poor review was retaliation,

and filed a written statement disputing the deficiencies listed in the review.

The remaining documents in Goudeau’s personnel file consist of four

write-ups—three are dated July 2011 and one is dated August 2011. Goudeau

maintains that he not was presented with these four write-ups until the

meeting on August 11 when he was terminated. The three July write-ups

include: a “Second Warning,” for failing to get machines repaired and costing

the plant unnecessarily; a “Third Warning,” for failing to perform a monthly

inspection of fire extinguishers; and a “Final Warning” for failing to commence

an assigned project. Each of these write-ups was signed by Perkins and HR on

July 15, 2011, even though the violations described in each write-up occurred

on different dates. The “Second Warning” involved a violation that occurred

on June 26, 2011. The “Third Warning” described a violation that occurred on

July 12, 2011. The “Final Warning” detailed a violation that occurred on July

14, 2011. None contains Goudeau’s signature, even though there is an

“acknowledgement of receipt of warning” section with a line for “employee

signature.” Moreover, Goudeau contends that the infractions described in the

write-ups did not involve tasks within his job duties. The personnel file also

contains a fifth write-up— a second “Final Warning,” dated August 10, 2011,

for failing to complete a task requested by Perkins on August 9, 2011. This

write-up contains no signatures.

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No. 14-20241

At the August 11 meeting at which Goudeau contends he first saw these

written warnings, 1 Perkins terminated Goudeau’s employment citing poor job

performance and insubordination. Goudeau was not replaced; his duties were

instead absorbed by existing employees. At some point after the “old farts”

discussion, Perkins also terminated Fisher due to performance problems. Jett,

meanwhile, was terminated by HR after failing a random alcohol test.

Goudeau brought suit asserting claims of age discrimination and

retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),

29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act

(TCHRA), Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051, 21.055. ROA. 22–28. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of NOV on both claims. Goudeau

timely appealed.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Reed v. Neopost USA,

Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012). In doing so, we “draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and avoid credibility

determinations and weighing of the evidence.” Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis,

Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

1 Goudeau’s testimony is inconsistent concerning whether Perkins had orally

communicated the performance problems discussed in these warnings prior to the day of his

termination. Goudeau concedes that Perkins talked to him about the incidents alleged in the

second write-up, and fourth write-up (i.e., the first “Final Warning”). But in another part of

the record, Goudeau appears to concede that Perkins discussed the incidents contained in all

of the write-ups with him in “passing” before his termination. Inconsistent with this position

is Goudeau’s claim elsewhere in the record that, “Because [he] was unaware of these issues

prior to [his] termination, [he] was not given the opportunity to improve or correct the alleged

performance problems.”

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No. 14-20241

A.

The ADEA and the TCHRA both prohibit an employer from discharging

an employee on account of that employee’s age. 2 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);

Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051. Because “there will seldom be eyewitness

testimony as to the employer’s mental processes,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141

(citation and quotation marks omitted), claims brought under these laws

typically rely on circumstantial evidence that is evaluated under the burden-

shifting framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas for Title VII claims

of employment discrimination. See Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d

1503, 1504–05 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973)). “Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a

prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that (1) he was discharged;

(2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class at

the time of discharge; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone outside the

protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged

because of his age.” Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir.

2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff successfully

makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Id.

Only at the third and final “pretext” stage of this analysis do the federal

and state laws provide different standards. Squyres v. Heico Cos., L.L.C., 782

F.3d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The third step of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis involves a different causation inquiry under the ADEA and the

2 The analytical framework for Goudeau’s ADEA claim applies equally to his TCHRA

claim, except when otherwise noted. See NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142,

144 (Tex. 1999) (“The [TCHRA] purports to correlate state law with federal law in the area

of discrimination in employment . . . Thus, in light of the Legislature's express purpose, we

look to analogous federal precedent for guidance when interpreting the Texas Act.” (citations

and quotation marks omitted)).

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No. 14-20241

TCHRA.” (citing Reed, 701 F.3d at 440)). “Under the ADEA, the employee

must ‘prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons

offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

discrimination.’” Squyres, 782 F.3d at 231 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143).

The ADEA thus requires a showing of “but-for” causation. See Squyres, 782

F.3d at 231 (citations omitted). The TCHRA requires a less demanding

showing as a plaintiff can prove discrimination at the third stage by

establishing that “either (1) the reason stated by the employer was a pretext

for discrimination, or (2) the defendant's reason, while true, was only one

reason for its conduct and discrimination is another motivating factor.” Reed,

701 F.3d at 439–40 (quoting Michael v. City of Dallas, 314 S.W.3d 687, 691

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)); see also Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies,

47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001).

Although the district court found that Goudeau established a prima facie

case of age discrimination, we begin with that issue because NOV challenges

that finding and we may uphold a grant of summary judgment on an

alternative ground raised below and supported by the record. See Rogers v.

Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). The first three

elements of Goudeau’s prima facie case are undisputed: Goudeau was qualified

for the position and older than 40 when he was discharged. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 631(a). Goudeau contends that the ageist comments satisfy the fourth prima

facie element—that he was “otherwise discharged because of his age.” NOV

counters that the remarks Goudeau attributes to Perkins are insufficient

under the four-part “stray remarks” test articulated in Brown v. CSC Logic,

Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996). This issue requires us to again

emphasize the two different contexts in which we evaluate so-called “stray

remarks” evincing discrimination. See Reed, 701 F.3d at 441 n.5 (recognizing

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that “this court’s application of this distinction has been somewhat messy,

complicating matters for district courts”).

The CSC Logic test that NOV invokes requires that any ageist remark

be proximate in time to the terminations, made by an individual with authority

over the employment decision, and related to the challenged decision. 82 F.3d

at 655. That more demanding test applies, however, only when the remarks

are being used as direct evidence of discrimination. Reed, 701 F.3d at 441

(explaining that CSC Logic test applies only to comments offered as direct

evidence of discrimination). Such a case is analyzed outside the more common

McDonnell-Douglas framework, as the comments are being relied on to prove

the entire case of discrimination. We thus allow such comments to defeat

summary judgment—that is to serve as sufficient evidence that by itself would

allow a jury to find discriminatory motive—only if they are not stray, but

instead are tied to the adverse employment action at issue both in terms of

when and by whom they were made. See Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp.,

602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating, in analyzing “old, gray-haired fart”

remark offered as direct evidence of age discrimination, that “[c]omments that

do not meet [CSC Logic’s] criteria are considered ‘stray remarks,’ and standing

alone, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment”) (citations omitted).

In a circumstantial case like this one, in which the discriminatory

remarks are just one ingredient in the overall evidentiary mix, we consider the

remarks under a “more flexible” standard. See Reed, 701 F.3d at 441 (citing

Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir.2000)). To be

relevant evidence considered as part of a broader circumstantial case, “the

comments must show: ‘(1) discriminatory animus (2) on the part of a person

that is either primarily responsible for the challenged employment action or by

a person with influence or leverage over the relevant decisionmaker.’” Squyres,

782 F.3d at 236 (quoting Reed, 701 F.3d at 441). The district court properly

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found that comments allegedly made by Goudeau’s supervisor about, among

other things, “old farts” and Goudeau wearing “old man clothes” easily meet

this less stringent standard. 3 See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376

F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding ADEA plaintiff “easily establishe[d] a

prima facie case” when terminating supervisor had made ageist comments

about plaintiff and plaintiff had complained to human resources about the

comments); see also Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 353 (finding that “age

stereotyping remarks” made by terminating supervisor to plaintiff supported

inference of age discrimination at prima facie stage). And the comments are

not the only evidence Goudeau can point to in support of showing that he was

discharged because of age. Perkins also terminated one of the two “old fart”

coworkers whom he allegedly told Goudeau he was going to fire after asking

about their age; the second “old fart” was terminated by HR for failing an

alcohol test.

We therefore conclude that Goudeau has satisfied his initial burden.

NOV has also satisfied its burden of production in identifying two

nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination—poor performance and

insubordination. The age discriminations claims thus come down to the

pretext question which is the stage at which the district court found Goudeau’s

evidence insufficient.

At this step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, an ADEA plaintiff must

prove “that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true

reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Squyres, 782 F.3d at 231

3Although the Texas Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, we have recently

concluded that “because Texas courts consistently look to federal case law in interpreting the

TCHRA,” the state courts would likely follow the two-part Russell test for considering

discriminatory remarks in circumstantial cases. Reed, 701 F.3d at 442 n.6; see also Squyres,

782 F.3d at 238 n.8 (noting same and applying Russell to ageist comments offered as

circumstantial evidence in TCHRA claim).

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(quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143). “That is, the plaintiff may attempt to

establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination ‘by showing that

the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Reeves, 530

U.S. at 143 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256

(1981)); see also Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010).

As the district court noted, “[t]he issue at the pretext stage is whether [the

employer’s] reason, even if incorrect, was the real reason for [the plaintiff’s]

termination.” Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 899. “[A] plaintiff's prima facie case,

combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted

justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer

unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147–48.

Goudeau seeks to undermine the genuineness of NOV’s explanations on

two fronts. First, he contends that the warnings he was given involved

infractions related to tasks not within his job duties. For example, with respect

to the second warning for failing to get machines repaired, and the third

warning for failing to perform a monthly fire extinguisher inspection, Goudeau

claims these were not tasks within his job duties but were the responsibilities

of other managers. Second, he argues that the fact he was not given the four

written warnings until the day he was fired, even though they related to events

occurring on different dates before that meeting, shows that these infractions

were just an attempt to conceal the discriminatory motivation.

We are convinced that the doubts that Goudeau has raised about the

warnings, combined with the ageist comments that are potentially

corroborated by the firing of both Goudeau and Fisher, would allow a jury to

conclude that age was the reason for the termination. See Russell, 235 F.3d at

224 (holding that evidence that plaintiff “was not given a formal oral warning,

a written warning, or a ‘corrective action plan,’ all of which are required by [the

employer’s] own internal procedures” prior to being terminated, among other

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evidence, was sufficient to create jury issue on pretext); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333

F.3d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding, in a Title VII pregnancy discrimination

case, that evidence was sufficient to create jury issue on pretext when, among

other things, plaintiff’s “supervisors never gave [the plaintiff] the chance to

explain her conduct or improve it” prior to terminating her and noting that

“[h]ad [the employer] bothered to do so, progress might have been made”). The

district court did not consider as pretext evidence the ageist comments it found

sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The Supreme Court has instructed,

however, that the strength of the prima facie evidence may also be considered

at the pretext stage, see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, and we have more directly

held that comments showing discriminatory animus are part of the analysis at

this stage. See, e.g., Russell, 235 F.3d at 225 n.9 (noting that remarks by a

supervisor showing discriminatory animus may “be utilized by a plaintiff to

demonstrate pretext”). This makes sense as the pretext inquiry is asking the

ultimate question whether a jury could find that discrimination caused the

termination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43.

NOV responds to the questions surrounding the written warnings by

correctly pointing out that the law does not require warnings; it could have

fired an at-will employee like Goudeau for his first infraction or without any

cause, so long as there was no discriminatory motive. We have recognized,

however, that when an employer opts to have a disciplinary system that

involves warnings, failure to follow that system may give rise to inferences of

pretext. See Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 354 n.29 (noting that even the non-

mandatory nature of a progressive discipline plan did “not eliminate the

inference of pretext raised by [the] failure to follow an internal company policy

specifically stating that it should be ‘followed in most circumstances’”); cf.Feist

v. Louisiana, Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454–55 (5th

Cir. 2013) (noting that relevant evidence for establishing prima facie

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retaliation case “may include . . . an employer’s departure from typical policies

and procedures”). And Goudeau’s evidence bears more directly on pretext than

a failure to follow steps in a progressive discipline policy; he contends that the

employer manufactured steps in the disciplinary policy by issuing written

warnings to paper his file after it had decided to fire him. If Goudeau’s

testimony that he never saw the warnings until he was terminated is believed,

and we must believe it at this stage, 4 the very purpose of the warnings—

presumably to warn so that an employee may take corrective steps to avoid

losing his job—is undermined and thus may give rise to an inference of pretext.

At the end of the day, the pretext inquiry asks whether there is sufficient

evidence “demonstrating the falsity of the employer’s explanation, taken

together with the prima facie case,” to allow the jury to find that discrimination

was the but-for cause of the termination. See Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897.

Perhaps the best way to answer that question is by considering a succinct

summation that Goudeau’s lawyer could make at trial based on the evidence

presented at the summary judgment stage:

Mr. Goudeau’s new boss repeatedly made negative

comments about old people. He said Goudeau wore “old man

clothes,” called him an “old fart,” and said a smoking area was

“where the old people meet.” The supervisor also made a comment

that “there sure are a lot of old farts around here” during a

conversation in which he asked Goudeau about the ages of two

other employees. After hearing their ages, he said he was going to

fire them. The boss followed through on that statement and

ultimately fired two of the three “old farts,” including Mr.

Goudeau. He couldn’t fire the third only because he left the

company for another reason.

NOV says that it fired Goudeau because of his poor

performance. Those complaints about Goudeau only started with

this new boss after 18 years of a solid work record with the

4There is also corroborating evidence given that his signature does not appear in the

employee acknowledgement section of any of the forms.

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company. The final four warnings involved duties that were not

Goudeau’s responsibility. And those written warnings sure are

suspicious because Goudeau never received them prior to being

fired—what’s the point of that kind of warning—and three of them

were signed by his supervisor on the same date even though the

infractions supposedly happened on different days.

NOV would no doubt offer a compelling closing argument in response. It

vigorously disputes Goudeau’s testimony concerning both the ageist comments

and the warnings. And a jury may well disbelieve Goudeau’s testimony on all

these points or find that there are innocent explanations for the problems with

the warnings that he identifies. But given the summary judgment stage at

which we must credit Goudeau’s testimony and find inferences in his favor, we

conclude that the evidence he has identified is sufficient to allow a finding that

age discrimination was the cause of his termination in violation of the ADEA.

That necessarily means the evidence meets the lesser “motivating factor”

standard under Texas law.

B.

We reach a different result with respect to the retaliation claim. The

ADEA’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from discriminating

against an employee for opposing an unlawful practice or asserting a charge,

testifying, assisting, or participating in an ADEA proceeding or investigation.

29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The TCHRA similarly prohibits retaliation for such

conduct. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055. “The analytical framework for a

retaliation claim is the same as that used in the employment discrimination

context.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001). To

establish a prima facie retaliation case, a plaintiff must show that “1) he

engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision;

and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse

employment decision.” Id.

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Goudeau alleges that Perkins fired him in retaliation for Goudeau

reporting the “old fart” comments to HR. 5 We agree with the district court that

Goudeau is unable to establish the causal link in light of the temporal gap of

8–10 months between Goudeau’s complaint to HR and the adverse employment

action (Goudeau’s termination) and the absence of evidence that Perkins even

knew of the complaint to HR about the “old farts” comment.

We therefore AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the judgment of

the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

5 Goudeau does not recall the exact date when he lodged his complaint with HR

regarding Perkins’s “old farts” comment, only that it was sometime before he received his

first write-up in January 2011.

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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