Opinion

In re Makenzie L.

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed: Jun 17, 2015
Status: Published
On the bench: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 34.6%

―The appellate record provides the boundaries of an appellate court‘s review. . . . An appellate court may consider only evidence contained in the appellate record.‖

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The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 24, 2015 Session

Assigned on Briefs March 11, 2015

IN RE MAKENZIE L.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Davidson County

No. PT172865, No. 20131558 Ben H. Cantrell, Judge

No. M2014-01081-COA-R3-PT – Filed June 17, 2015

No. M2014-02285-COA-R3-PT - Filed June 17, 2015

In this termination of parental rights case, paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who were

named ―primary residential parents‖ of a minor child, filed a petition to terminate the

parents‘ rights to their daughter on the grounds of persistence of conditions that led to

removal, severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit, and abandonment by failure to

support. The trial court held that grounds did not exist for termination and returned the

child to the custody of the parents. We have reviewed the record and affirm the trial

court‘s findings with respect to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to visit.

However, we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged

sibling abuse in rendering its decision that the grounds of severe abuse were not proven.

In addition, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents

abandoned the child by failing to support her in the four months preceding the filing of

the petition. Finally, we affirm the trial court‘s holding with respect to attorney‘s fees.

Therefore, having found that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of

alleged sibling abuse and that a ground exists for termination, we remand the case for the

trial court to consider whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 36-1-113(g)(4) is proven by clear and convincing evidence and whether termination of

parental rights is in the child‘s best interest.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed in

Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M.S., and RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., joined.

Gary M. Williams, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Ronda and Eugene

Melton.

Connie Reguli, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellees, Adam and Ashley E.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Makenzie L. was born in May 2008 to Ashley L. (―Mother‖) and Adam E.

(―Father‖) (collectively, ―the parents‖). At the time of Makenzie‘s birth, Mother was

married to Brett L.; however, it is undisputed that Adam E. is Makenzie‘s biological

father. When Makenzie was approximately six weeks old, Mother and Father left her in

the care of Father‘s aunt and uncle, Ronda and Eugene Melton (collectively referred to as

―the Meltons‖). In 2009, Mother and Father had a son, Ashton L. When Ashton was

approximately one month old, Mother and Father left him in the care of his paternal

grandmother, Patricia Sparks. Ashton is not the subject of this appeal.1

February 2012 Order Naming the Meltons as Makenzie‘s Primary Residential Parents

In 2011, the Meltons filed a petition seeking to restrict Mother‘s and Father‘s

visitation rights.2 The case was heard by the Sumner County Juvenile Court, and an

order was entered February 1, 2012, in which the trial court named the Meltons as

Makenzie‘s primary residential parents. In support of its finding that it was not in

Makenzie‘s best interest to be in Mother‘s and Father‘s custody, the trial court found:

13. The Court does find that the parents Ashley and Adam E[.], do have

domestic violence issues and have subjected the children to their domestic

violence.

14. The Court finds that the parents, Ashley and Adam E[.], denied all the

allegations. The Court does not put credence in their testimony and finds

that the majority of their testimony is perjured.

15. The Court finds that the parents did little to get their children back

prior to the filing of the Complaints and that they were satisfied to have the

Mother and Father had another child, Levi, born in 2013; Levi resides with Mother and Father

and is not the subject of this appeal either. Mother also has a son, Eric L., from her first marriage, who is

in the custody of his father, Mother‘s ex-husband. Eric is also not involved in this appeal.

Ms. Sparks also filed a petition to limit Mother‘s and Father‘s parenting time with Ashton. Ms.

Sparks‘s petition was consolidated with the Meltons‘ petition for purposes of the final hearing.

children with relatives. They exercised sporadic parenting time at best;

and, that they paid little to no child support although the caregivers did not

ask for any child support.

16. The Court recognizes parents have superior rights over any third party

or government intervention unless it is proven that the child is in danger

due to the parents[‘] actions or lack of actions.

17. The Court finds Ms. Sparks and the Meltons have the best interest of

the children at heart but that it will be difficult for them to work with the

Court in an effort to reunite the children with their parents.

18. The Court finds that due to the children being with the Petitioners since

newborns, removing them from the Petitioners would be improper and

abusive to the children. It is in the best interest of the minor children, at

this time, for Patricia Sparks to be named as the primary residential parent

of the minor child, Ashton L[.], and for Ronda and Eugene Melton to be

designated as the primary residential parent of the minor child, Makenzie

L[.]. It is not in the best interest that the minor children be returned to the

custody of Ashley E[.] and Adam E[.] at this time.

19. The Court finds that the parents have domestic violence issues and

because the Court has little credence in their testimony, the Court has

concerns about the moral ability of the parents to raise the children at this

time. The Court reiterates its findings that it is not in the best interest of the

children to place them back in the custody of Ashley E[.] and Adam E[.] at

this time.

20. The Court admonishes the Petitioners to work together with the parents

in support of reuniting the parents with their children.

...

It is, accordingly,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ronda Melton and

Eugene Melton are designated as the primary residential parents of

[Makenzie] L[.] pending further Orders of the Court.

The court awarded parenting time to Mother and Father during alternating weekends, on

holidays, and during the summer.

On July 30, 2012, Mother and Father visited with Makenzie and Ashton. When

the children were returned to their respective primary residential parents, it was

discovered that Ashton had suspicious marks on his face and neck. Ashton was

examined, and the Department of Children‘s Services (―DCS‖ or ―the Department‖)

became involved. After this incident, Mother and Father‘s visitation with Makenzie and

Ashton ceased, although there was no court order requiring cessation of Mother‘s and

Father‘s visits with Makenzie. By letter dated March 12, 2013, Mother and Father‘s

attorney requested the Meltons to abide by the February 2012 order awarding parenting

time to Mother and Father.

April 2013 Petition to Terminate

The present appeal arises from the Meltons‘ filing a petition on April 11, 2013, to

terminate Mother‘s and Father‘s parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions,

severe abuse, and abandonment by failure to visit and support in the Davidson County

Juvenile Court.3 Attached to the petition were letters from Makenzie‘s pediatrician and

therapist who wrote in support of the petition to terminate. On April 19, 2013, the

Meltons filed an emergency ex parte motion requesting the court to suspend visitation

with Mother and Father. The trial court granted the order that same day and suspended

Mother‘s and Father‘s visitation ―pending further orders of the court.‖4

Several motions and orders were filed, including a petition for criminal contempt

by Mother and Father, which was ultimately nonsuited. A special judge was assigned to

hear the case following the recusal by the trial court judge. Prior to the hearing, Mother

and Father filed a motion in limine requesting the court to exclude any ―statements in the

medical records from Patricia Sparks or Ronda Melton, which are reported comments

made by Ashton [L.] or Makenzie [L.]‖

The Hearing

The trial court held a hearing on the petition to terminate on March 4, 5, and 6,

2014. Prior to hearing proof, the court announced its ruling on Mother and Father‘s

motion in limine, stating: ―it seems to me that the motion to restrict the treating

professionals‘ testimony, with respect to what has happened to Ashton, is well taken,

that‘s simply not - - it‘s not relevant to this proceeding.‖

The Meltons called Janet Weismark, a licensed clinical social worker as an expert

witness. Ms. Weismark testified that she began counseling Makenzie in May 2011 and

Prior to filing the petition to terminate, the Meltons filed a Petition for Adoption and to Terminate the

Parental Rights of Adam E[.] and Ashley E[.] in the Roberston County Chancery Court on February 11,

2013. That petition was ultimately dismissed. We will discuss this portion of the procedural history as it

relates to the issues on appeal.

In the May 7, 2014, memorandum and order, the trial court stated that Makenzie did not see her parents

from July 31, 2012, until ―this Court allowed supervised visitation in December of 2013.‖ However,

there is no order reflecting this award of supervised visitation in the record.

had engaged in approximately forty counseling sessions with Makenzie. Ms. Weismark‘s

testimony focused on counseling sessions that occurred from February 2012 to July 30,

2013. Ms. Weismark‘s ―progress notes‖ from those counseling sessions were entered

into evidence. When asked what statements or revelations Makenzie made regarding

potential abuse in Mother and Father‘s home, Ms. Weismark testified that Makenzie

reported: ―when she cried her [M]other says ‗go away‘‖; that she had to change her little

brother‘s diapers; that her parents told her little brother not to ―mess in his diapers

anymore‖; that she burned her finger at her Mother‘s house on an overturned lamp; that

her Mother and Father ―popped her on the butt‖; that she observed Mother and Father

taking a bath together and her Father ―playing with his private part in front of her‖; that

her Father swore at a broken tv set; that she witnessed her Mother hit Ms. Melton; that

she and Ashton were allowed to play outside in 108 degree weather and that Ashton

threw up; that she witnessed Ashton being hit in the face by Mother; and that Mother

―smacked‖ her in the face. Ms. Weismark further testified that Makenzie drew a hand

with long colored fingernails and talked about her Mother ―scratching Ashton‘s face.‖

Makenzie also stated she was having nightmares about a witch who was going to take her

away from the Meltons.

At a counseling session on December 19, 2012, Ms. Weismark recorded the

following progress notes:

Client said there was a time her mother (Ashley) put her and her brother in

the attic. She talked about the attic door being in the ceiling . . . a string on

the door. Ashley closed the attic door and left her and her brother there.

We screamed and daddy heard it and he got us out. When Adam and

Ashley fight, she feels scared.

Ms. Weismark‘s progress notes for a counseling session on February 27, 2013, state:

Makenzie said her mother put her in the bathroom [with] her brother (in the

brick house) and told them wait there. She brought a rope and tied them up

and then went to watch TV. ―I cried. I almost died because it was on my

throat.‖ Ashton cried too. Adam was at work. Makenzie said she was able

to get out of the rope and go to her room and watch TV.

During her counseling visits in March, April, and May, Makenzie discussed ―fearful

feelings‖ and described Mother and Father as ―mean.‖ In June, Makenzie reiterated that

―Ashley put Ashton in the attic because he kept pooping in his diaper.‖

On cross-examination, Mother and Father‘s counsel pointed out that when

Makenzie disclosed that she had been tied up with a rope, Makenzie ―ha[d]n‘t been

around her parents for some six months plus.‖ Ms. Weismark also testified that

Makenzie disclosed that Ms. Melton ―spanked‖ her. On re-direct examination, Ms.

Weismark addressed Makenzie‘s delay in disclosure of the rope incident and stated,

―Well, sometimes in, traumatic events, children put them out of their mind. And then

once they feel really safe, they‘ll come out with it.‖

Next, the Meltons called Dr. Catherine Dundon and tendered her as an expert

witness in pediatrics. Dr. Dundon testified that she treated Makenzie for ―routine check-

ups and all common childhood illnesses.‖ Dr. Dundon testified that Ashton is also her

patient. When Dr. Dundon was beginning to discuss her observation of Ashton following

an incident in 2012, counsel for Mother and Father objected to the introduction of a

photograph of Ashton‘s injuries. The following colloquy resulted:

THE COURT: Well, I think we‘ve been through that. And I have said that

the abuse of Ashton is not relevant to this proceeding, unless it somehow

amounts to abuse to Makenzie. Now, I‘m not sure that this witness can

give us an opinion about whether or not what happened to Ashton is an

abuse of Makenzie.

[Meltons‘ Counsel]: Well - - And I certainly understand and respect that,

Judge. But severe abuse of one sibling can be used in a - - or petition to

terminate parental rights. I mean, even - - We‘re alleging that the abuse of

Ashton could certainly be considered by [t]his Court in this petition to

terminate as relates to Makenzie. Because the abuse of one sibling has

relevance, if it please [t]he Court.

THE COURT: Well, I think we‘re going to spend a lot of time on that, and

so I‘m going to sustain the objection.

When asked about her concerns as it relates to abuse of Makenzie, Dr. Dundon

stated:

When the incident occurred with the brother, there had been so much

trouble with coordination, the two children live in different counties and

different D.C.S.s and the parents were in a different county. And I‘m

listening to all those concerns and it‘s not -- So we -- I kind of thought,

finally, when we had concrete evidence on Ashton, and when I spoke with

the people at Vanderbilt and social workers -- Their business, they do a lot

of child abuse -- that this would be enough to protect the children ‗cause

it‘s hard -- It is subjective and lots of bruising and lots of stories and

different people telling me whatever.

But then there was concern that they would apply that to Makenzie,

even though she‘s only a year older and right there in the household at the

same time, that it might not apply to her and that we needed to make a

statement about her separately. And I think there was family ‗cause they‘re

in the custody of a paternal great-aunt and a paternal grandmother, instead

of one person. And so I asked if -- if they -- she would help me pull

information together and then I would make a report for Makenzie, which

isn‘t as concrete as Ashton, where I feel fairly certain of my stand and what

I saw. Just lots of concerns with Makenzie with bruising, with statements

being locked up in closets and inappropriate discipline and negative

statements and fearful statements and not working together as a family,

trying to say awful things about caretakers and just destructive.

Next, Ronda Melton took the stand. After several objections, the trial court

requested the Meltons‘ attorney to focus his questions on events occurring after the

February 2012 order was entered. When asked how much visitation Mother and Father

have had with Makenzie since February 2012, Ms. Melton responded that they visited

with her ―sporadically.‖ Ms. Melton recounted several occasions where Mother and

Father would cancel their scheduled visitation with Makenzie. On one occasion they

canceled to ―move someone‖ and another time they canceled because of illness. Ms.

Melton testified that Mother and Father ―never sent Makenzie a card, a present, anything,

the entire time that we‘ve had her . . . they‘ve never called and wished her a happy

birthday, they‘ve never called her when she‘s been sick.‖ Ms. Melton stated that Mother

and Father gave Makenzie a horse a ―few weeks ago‖ after the court ordered supervised

visitation. Ms. Melton stated that Mother and Father failed to show up for visitations on

President‘s Day and on Memorial Day without explanation.

Ms. Melton explained that Mother and Father often cursed at the Meltons when

the parties would meet at the designated spot for parenting time exchanges. In June

2012, the hostility between the parties became physical when Mother put her finger in

Ms. Melton‘s face and Ms. Melton ―pushed her hand out of the way . . . [and] she started

tearing into me, hit me; pulling my hair; fighting at me; calling me names. She said ‗I‘m

gonna f--- you up, b---- . . . .‖ The children were present during the altercation.

Ms. Melton testified that in July 2012, Mother‘s and Father‘s visitation with

Makenzie ceased. She stated that ―D.C.S. stopped it‖ following an incident with Ashton.

The specifics of the incident with Ashton were not discussed due to the trial court

sustaining several objections by Mother and Father‘s counsel. Ms. Melton then explained

that Mother and Father did not visit with Makenzie, nor did they call the Meltons to

check on her, from July 2012 to April 2013. Next, Ms. Melton was asked whether

Mother and Father ever provided financial support for Makenzie. She answered:

A. There was only one time that they . . . ever give Eugene and I some

money, and that was . . . when she was a baby. . . . Probably four years ago.

Q. Okay. Since that time, have you received any financial assistance,

whatsoever, from either the mother or the father?

A. No, it was just that one time.

...

Q. Well, have the parents been by your house and dropped diapers off or

clothes or food, things of that nature - -

A. No.

Q. - - for their child?

A. Never.

...

Q. Have they ever inquired of you as relates to what they need to do to

assist in paying the medical expenses?

A. No.

Q. What about the counseling expenses?

A. No.

...

Q. Have you ever received any child support from your efforts to have the

parents pay child support?

A. No.

Next, Ms. Melton was asked to discuss any evidence of abuse Makenzie exhibited

following visits with Mother and Father from February 2012 until the visits with Mother

and Father ceased in July 2012. Ms. Melton stated:

She - - she‘s had bruises on her, she‘s had a bruise on her side before, she‘s

had scratches on her neck and her chest, she‘s had a bruise on her forearm

and a bruise on her buttocks before. She came home with burns on her

fingers and a cut on the other hand, at the same time.

Finally, Ms. Melton testified that she and Makenzie had a strong bond and that Makenzie

was performing well in school.

On cross-examination by the parents‘ counsel, Ms. Melton admitted that she did

not notify Mother and Father of every counseling session Makenzie attended, as the

February 2012 Order required. Ms. Melton also confirmed that she did not have any

―out-of-pocket expenses‖ for Makenzie‘s medical care because Makenzie was on

TennCare.

The guardian ad litem asked Ms. Melton why she felt it was in Makenzie‘s best

interest for Mother and Father‘s parental rights to be terminated, and Ms. Melton

responded:

Well, because they‘ve never really actually had much visitation with

her. I mean, from the time she was born, we‘ve been keeping her for weeks

and months at a time. They went off and left her without letting us know

where they were going or how long they were gonna be gone.

You know, we‘ve had her - - Like, one time we had her two-and-a-

half months straight, and we didn‘t even know where they were.

So, you know, all these times that she‘s been with us, from the time

she was two weeks old on, she‘s been with us 80 to 90 percent of her life,

until we got her, you know, the temporary custody and then full custody

with Judge Brown.

Eugene Melton was the next witness. He testified that he works 75 to 80 hours per

week as a paramedic and earns approximately $95,000 per year. He stated that he loves

Makenzie ―like she‘s my kid‖ and has been happy to provide for her over the past several

years. On cross-examination, Mr. Melton admitted that he filed for bankruptcy in 2002.

He stated that he has borrowed money to pay for his legal fees in the present case. He

also testified that his wife has long fingernails that are akin to the drawing Makenzie

provided to her therapist. When cross-examined by the guardian ad litem, Mr. Melton

reiterated that the parents have not paid ―so much as a penny‖ in child support for

Makenzie.

Patricia Sparks, Makenzie‘s paternal grandmother, testified next. She explained

that she has custody of Ashton, Makenzie‘s younger brother. Ms. Sparks testified that

she makes an effort to allow Ashton and Makenzie to spend time together and that she

communicates frequently with Ms. Melton. She described witnessing positive

interactions between Makenzie and the Meltons and discussed several outings that she

and Ashton went on along with the Meltons and Makenzie. Ms. Sparks testified

regarding a voicemail she received from Father in December 2012, and the voicemail was

played into evidence. Ms. Sparks believed that Father left the voicemail by mistake and

that she could hear the parents screaming at each other and Father accusing Mother of

cheating on him. On cross-examination, Ms. Sparks testified that Mother and Father

initially left Ashton in her care in order to be in Florida to care for Ms. Sparks‘s brother,

who was very ill.

Next, Mother was called to testify by the Meltons‘ attorney. She stated that she is

twenty-seven years old and has four children. Her oldest son, Eric L., is in the custody of

her ex-husband, and she has not exercised visitation with him because her ex-husband

―totally cut off all communication‖ with her when she married Father. Mother is a ―stay-

at-home-mom‖ with her six-month-old son, Levi. She stated she has not worked since

February 2012. Mother testified that Makenzie initially went to stay with Ms. Melton

when Makenzie was approximately six weeks old because Mother had to go work with

Father out of town.

When asked regarding the efforts she made to see Makenzie subsequent to

February 2012, Mother answered:

A. From February of 2012, we had visitations with Makenzie until July,

the end of July of 2012.

Q. What happened to your visitations in July of 2012?

A. We got a phone call from Jamilla Frazier[5] saying that they had been

suspended. And she had asked us to sign something, and we were not

gonna sign it. So then I went - - We went and hired - - we hired our

attorney, David, he said ―don‘t do anything,‖ he told us to just sit still and

pause - -

Mother stated that she did not keep records of her parenting time or the dates that she

showed up to exercise parenting time. When asked what she had done subsequent to

February of 2012 to try to get Makenzie back, Mother responded that ―we have paid over

$70,000 in attorneys [fees] to try to get Makenzie back.‖ The questioning then turned to

whether Mother had paid any child support or had offered any financial support to

Makenzie:

Q. May I ask you, ma‘am, have you paid a nickel for the financial support

of Makenzie?

A. Like I said, I had - - I‘m paying - - we‘re paying a thousand dollars - -

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. The question was how much have you

paid for Makenzie. Now, answer that, and then you can explain it

...

A. We have - - I haven‘t been ordered to pay child support for Makenzie.

THE COURT: Well, no, no - - . . . How much have you paid, answer that

first.

THE WITNESS: Nothing.

THE COURT: Okay. Then you can explain it.

THE WITNESS: The reason why is because we‘re paying our attorney a

thousand dollars a month. Number Two, I‘ve never been ordered to pay

child support. Number three, I‘m not even working, I - - How would I

provide even child support for Makenzie myself. Adam is the provider of

the home, we are married, that is her father.

Mother then testified that she believed her children had been ―stolen‖ from her and

that the Meltons had ―manipulated us and . . . the courts to take our children.‖ When

asked about the injuries that Makenzie had following visits with Mother and Father (such

as a burned finger or bruising), Mother responded that ―accidents are gonna happen . . .

[k]ids are very exploratory and are going to fall; they‘re gonna touch things; . . . things

Jamilla Frazier is apparently an employee of DCS.

are gonna happen, that is part of learning with them.‖ Mother testified that she didn‘t call

or send a card to Makenzie on her fifth birthday because she is ―afraid to call the

Meltons.‖ Mother stated she didn‘t know whether she notified the Meltons when she

moved, but that she felt like it was her ―attorney‘s job‖ to notify them.

The guardian ad litem then cross-examined Mother. Mother stated that she and

her husband are financially able to care for Makenzie, that she has a room set up for

Makenzie in her home, and that she is able to take her to school. The guardian ad litem

asked Mother regarding the February 2012 ruling as follows:

Q. Can you just tell me in as plainest terms as you can what you think that

order says about being reunited with your children?

A. I believe, in my terms, like Judge Brown left it up to the custodians to

reunite us with our children.

Mother testified that she never put Makenzie in the attic and that her attic did not have a

string; rather, it has a handle on the door. Mother testified that she did not contact

Makenzie from July 2012 to December 2013 because she ―had no way to.‖ She stated

she never sent Christmas presents because ―we were afraid that Ronda wouldn‘t give

them to her‖ and that she was scared to contact the Meltons.

Mother was again questioned about her financial support of Makenzie:

Q. The reason I ask is because you understand that Makenzie [needs food,

clothing, etc.] too, right?

A. Exactly.

Q. And you feel like you have an obligation to pay for that for her?

A. Yes.

Q. You do?

A. When she‘s with us.

Q. But not when she‘s with the Meltons?

A. I have not been ordered to pay child support.

Q. I understand that. But you don‘t think you have any obligation to pay

for any of those things for your daughter?

A. They‘ve never asked.

On cross-examination by her counsel, Mother testified that when Makenzie would

visit, she would repeatedly ask when would she be able to live with Mother ―for good.‖

Several photographs of Mother with Makenzie were entered into evidence. When asked

to describe any indications that Makenzie was emotionally or psychologically abused at

the Meltons‘ home, Mother stated that Makenzie told her she had to ―clean up cat vomit‖;

scrub the floors; that Ronda spanks her; and that Makenzie discussed talking with the

―judge.‖ Mother also described the altercation between herself and Ms. Melton. She

stated that Ms. Melton punched her in the back. Mother stated that she doesn‘t abuse

drugs, that she isn‘t a smoker. Mother testified that she did try to go to the parenting

exchange spots between August 2012 and April 2013 but that the Meltons never showed

up. Mother admitted that she didn‘t have any records or a calendar to confirm the dates

she showed up because she doesn‘t ―document [her] life.‖ Mother stated she was

unaware that Makenzie was in counseling until the guardian ad litem mentioned it to her.

Mother described a supervised visitation she had with Makenzie on December 22, 2013.

She stated that Makenzie enjoyed the visit and that their interactions were positive.

The trial court judge interjected and posed the following questions to Mother:

THE COURT: All right. Ms. E[.], I have a couple of questions. And I

don‘t want to open up this wh[o]le case, but your position has been

consistent that the Melton‘s [sic] stole your child from you; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: When was the first time, if you remember, that you asked to

get your child and they refused to let you have her?

THE WITNESS: In March, when they filed the order to have - - to have an

emergency removal, I tried to go pick her up that Monday that I was

supposed to go pick her up, and they didn‘t - - I don‘t - - they didn‘t even

have the order signed ‗til, I think, it was the day after. And Ronda kept her

from me and prevented me from picking her up.

THE COURT: And that was what year?

THE WITNESS: Two-thousand-eleven, when this all started.

THE COURT: All right. You also said in your testimony yesterday that

the reunification wasn‘t working. So what was it that wasn‘t working about

the reunification?

THE WITNESS: The Melton‘s [sic] would not work with us to bring her

back. They never wanted to increase any visitation. We went by the court

order, there was no reason for them not to go by the court order to reunion -

- reunify us with her. They have wanted her since they have - - from the

beginning. They have always wanted Makenzie ‗cause Ronda has always

wanted another daughter.

The more that I let Makenzie stay with them - - because I trusted her

as a family member and as a babysitter, I wanted her to spend time with

Makenzie, she enjoyed it, Makenzie enjoyed it. But I didn‘t think this

would happen from it, and I never got my baby back.

On re-direct examination, Mother admitted that she had been served with a

petition to set child support in June 2012. Mother stated that she gave the child support

petition to her attorney and she ―never heard anything else about it.‖

Kathy Williams, the executive director of Court Appointed Special Advocates

(―CASA‖) in Robertson County, testified next. Ms. Williams testified that CASA was

appointed to investigate Makenzie‘s case in September 2012. Ms. Williams stated that

the parents‘ attorney gave her phone numbers and two addresses to use to reach the

parents, but that neither of the phone numbers worked. Ms. Williams visited Makenzie in

the Meltons‘ home, and Makenzie was very well taken care of and seemed to be a very

―well-adjusted child.‖ On cross-examination, Ms. Williams admitted that she did not go

to the parents‘ home, nor did she try to send a letter to the addresses she had on hand.

James Porter was called by the parents‘ attorney to testify next. He stated that he

became a DCS caseworker for Makenzie in the fall of 2012. Mr. Porter testified that he

did not do anything to stop the visitation between Makenzie and her parents. Mr. Porter

observed a forensic interview of Makenzie and stated that Makenzie did not disclose any

occasions of physical or sexual abuse during that interview. Mr. Porter stated that he did

not investigate the allegations of abuse regarding Ashton because Ashton‘s case was

assigned to another county.

The Meltons‘ attorney questioned Father next. Father testified that he is employed

by Garland Nissan and makes over $100,000 per year and that he made over $100,000 in

2012. When asked whether he pays any child support for Makenzie, he stated, ―I‘m not

ordered any child support,‖ and later answered that he had not given any financial

support to the Meltons for their care of Makenzie. Then Father stated that, ―[t]he support

I have given for Makenzie is that I‘ve spent probably close to $100,000 trying to regain

custody of my own child that was stolen from me.‖ Father stated that he has not

attempted to place Makenzie on his insurance coverage, but that she could ―be added

very easily.‖ Father testified that he did not have any contact with Makenzie from July

2012 until December 2013. Father stated that the Meltons ―were ordered to reunite them

with us, and they did not. It‘s not my place to call the Melton‘s when - - Every time that

we have any contact with them, something bad comes from it.‖ Father stated that he

never contacted Makenzie‘s pediatrician because he did not know who her pediatrician

was.

When examined by the guardian ad litem, Father stated that he was ready to meet

Makenzie‘s needs by regaining custody of her. Father stated that it was ―impossible‖ to

work with the Meltons to reunify him and Mother with Makenzie. Father denied ever

putting Makenize in the attic, ever tying her up with a rope, or ever doing anything that

was sexually inappropriate to or in front of Makenzie.

The parents‘ attorneys called Angela Warden, Mother‘s sister, to testify next. She

testified that from her observation, Mother and Makenzie had a ―really good‖ mother-

daughter relationship. On cross-examination, Ms. Warden stated that, since February

2012, she had been in the parents‘ home to witness visitation on two or three occasions.

Finally, Matthew Williams, Father‘s friend, was called to testify on behalf of the

parents. Mr. Williams testified that he had never witnessed any domestic violence

between the parents.

Trial Court‘s Order

The trial court entered an order on May 7, 2014, dismissing the Meltons‘ petition

to terminate for failure to prove the grounds for termination alleged. The trial court held

that Mother‘s and Father‘s failure to visit and support within the four-month period

preceding the filing of the petition to terminate was not willful. With respect to

abandonment by failure to visit, the court stated:

Although the Sumner County Juvenile Court enjoined the parties to work

together to reunite Makenzie and her parents, those efforts never worked

without conflict. The [parents] are not without blame, but once the juvenile

court had spoken, the Meltons had a duty to recognize that the parents‘

rights were paramount and that they shouldn‘t continue to assume the

parental role.

After July 30 of 2012, the Meltons started proceedings on multiple fronts to

terminate the [parents‘] right to visit and ultimately to terminate their

parental rights. Their pleadings contain a parade of horribles on the part of

the [parents], but as the proof has shown, the only significant change since

February 2012 was the fact that DCS had started a dependent and neglect

investigation concerning Ashton.

In March of 2013, the [parents] filed an answer to the petition to terminate

parental rights in Robertson County. They also counter-claimed for

custody and notified the Meltons that they were insisting on compliance

with the juvenile court‘s visitation order. In short order the case was

transferred to Davidson County, non-suited, and re-filed in this Court on

April 11. By April 19 the Meltons had obtained an ex parte order shutting

off the [parents‘] right to visit.

When discussing failure to support, the court stated:

The failure to pay anything toward support is another matter. The [parents‘]

excuses (not being ordered to pay support and their extraordinary legal

expenses) do not merit much consideration from this Court. ―In Tennessee,

biological parents are expected under the common law to understand, even

in the absence of a court order, that they have an obligation under the law to

support their children if they have the ability to do so.‖ Smith v. Gore, 728

S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). However, when parents do not have

custody of their children, the nature and extent of their duty may be defined

and controlled by external factors other than ability to support. ―In these

circumstances, the nature and extent of the duty to support may be based on

a court order defining the support obligation.‖ In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d

643, 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). The Court finds that because the [parents]

were visiting with Makenzie prior to July 31, 2012 under a plan to restore

custody to them and thereafter were actively seeking custody, they were

seeking to support her. The record also shows that the [parents] were

following the process of the Child Support Division of the District Attorney

in establishing any support that may have been due. There is no evidence

that they were not cooperating in that process. So under all the

circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the failure to pay

support was not willful, either.

The Court, therefore, finds that the proof fails to show any ground for the

Court to terminate the [parents‘] parental rights.

With respect to severe abuse, the trial court stated that it ―does not believe that

Makenzie‘s stories of being locked in the attic and being tied up in the bathroom actually

happened‖ and the court found ―there is no proof of any exposure of Makenzie to abuse

or neglect that is likely to cause her great bodily harm or death.‖ In a footnote, the trial

court stated:

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) the Court can find severe child

abuse of a sibling as grounds for termination; however, any evidence heard

by the Court regarding Ashton was not sufficient to find that he was

subjected to severe abuse as defined in § 102, nor is there any order in the

record making such a finding.

The court further pointed out that the ―sole reason‖ the trial court provided for giving

primary custody to the Meltons in 2012 was the prevalence of domestic violence between

Mother and Father. The court stated that ―[t]he only proof of any violence between the

[biological parents] in the ensuing two-plus years is a recording of an angry shouting

match in December 2012.‖ Therefore, the court did not find clear and convincing

evidence that the conditions that led to the court‘s removal in February 2012 still persist.

The court concluded that ―the time has come to end the struggle over Makenzie‘s

custody‖ and ordered ―an immediate change of custody from the Meltons to her parents.‖

The court appointed a special master to assist with the transition and to ―ensure that

Makenzie‘s best interests will be kept in the court‘s purview.‖

On May 21, 2014, the parents filed a motion for attorney‘s fees pursuant to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), requesting $40,688.75 in fees and expenses. The parents also

filed a motion for discretionary costs, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. By order

entered September 25, 2014, the trial court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) does

not authorize the award of attorney‘s fees in this case. The court ruled that the parents

were entitled to $2,000 in discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04.

The Meltons appeal, asserting the trial court erred in declining to terminate

Mother‘s and Father‘s parental rights. They assert there is clear and convincing evidence

to support of a finding of the grounds of persistence of conditions, severe abuse, and

abandonment. They further argue that the court committed reversible error in excluding

evidence of sibling abuse and in changing a custody order without conducting a best

interest analysis. Lastly, the parents assert the trial court erred in denying their request

for attorney‘s fees.

ANALYSIS

Parents have a fundamental right, based in both the federal and state constitutions,

to the care, custody, and control of their own children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); Nash-Putnam v.

McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996); In re Adoption of Female Child, 896

S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995). While this right is fundamental, it is not absolute.

The State may interfere with parental rights in certain circumstances. In re Angela E.,

303 S.W.3d at 250.

Our legislature has listed the grounds upon which termination proceedings may be

brought. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g). Termination proceedings are statutory, In re

Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250; Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004), and a

parent‘s rights may be terminated only where a statutory basis exists. Jones v. Garrett,

92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002); In the Matter of M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

To terminate parental rights, a court must determine by clear and convincing

evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination and that

termination is in the child‘s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). ―Clear and convincing evidence enables

the fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and

eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual

findings.‖ In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted).

Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, ―[e]vidence satisfying the clear and

convincing evidence standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly

probable.‖ In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Appellate courts review the trial court‘s findings of fact in termination

proceedings de novo on the record and accord these findings a presumption of

correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); In re

Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246. ―In light of the

heightened burden of proof in [termination] proceedings . . ., the reviewing court must

then make its own determination regarding whether the facts, either as found by the trial

court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, provide clear and convincing

evidence that supports all the elements of the termination claim.‖ In re Bernard T., 319

S.W.3d at 596-97. Proof of only one statutory ground is necessary to support a court‘s

termination of a parent‘s rights. In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 641

(Tenn. 2013); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546. If a ground for termination is

established by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court conducts a best interests

analysis. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 251 (citing In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 498

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

A. Grounds for Termination: Persistence of Conditions

The Meltons assert that the record contains a preponderance of clear and

convincing evidence that the grounds of persistence of conditions exists. Although not

raised as an issue by either party on appeal, we will consider, as a threshold matter,

whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), which is referred to as ―persistence of

conditions‖ can serve as a ground for terminating Mother and Father‘s parental rights to

Makenzie. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Under Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), parental rights may be terminated where:

The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by

order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child's removal or other conditions that in

all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further

abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the child‘s safe return to the

care of the parent or parents or a guardian or guardians, still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an

early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or parents or

guardian or guardians in the near future; and

greatly diminishes the child‘s chances of early integration into a safe, stable

and permanent home[.]

In In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 874, this Court opined that ―Tenn. Code Ann. §

36-1-113(g)(3) applies as a ground for termination of parental rights only where the prior

court order removing the child from the parent‘s home was based on a judicial finding of

dependency, neglect, or abuse.‖ See also In re Alysia S., No. M2013-02596-COA-R3-

PT, 2014 WL 7204406, at *28 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014). The prior order at issue

in this case is the February 1, 2012 order naming the Meltons as Makenzie‘s primary

residential parents. There is nothing in that order adjudicating Makenzie dependent or

neglected.6 Moreover, with respect to abuse, the order specifically states, ―[t]he Court

has serious concerns that there were bruises on the children, especially Ashton L[.], but

there was no proof that the parents have abused the children.‖ The February 2012 order

does not contain judicial findings of dependency, neglect, or abuse. Therefore, Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) may not be considered as a potential ground for termination

of the parents‘ rights to Makenzie. Our holding in this regard pretermits our

consideration of the Meltons‘ arguments regarding the evidence of persistence of

conditions.

B. Grounds for Termination: Severe Abuse

A court may terminate parental rights when it finds, by clear and convincing

evidence, that:

The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child

abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found

by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition

for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against the child who is

the subject of the petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such

At the hearing on March 4, 2013, counsel for the Meltons clarified that the February 1, 2012 order did

not adjudicate Makenzie dependent and neglected in the following colloquy with the court:

THE COURT: -- as part of these preliminary matters, I think, are we concerned with

anything in this case that goes back beyond the judge in Sumner County‘s order, which I

think was February of 2012?

MR. PARSLEY: Judge, I believe by way of history that that may be helpful to The Court,

because --

THE COURT: I mean, he found that she was dependent and neglected.

MR. PARSLEY: I‘m sorry?

THE COURT: She -- He found that she was dependent and neglected.

MR. PARSLEY: No, Your Honor –

THE COURT: Well –

MR. PARSLEY: -- I don‘t believe Judge Brown did.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PARSLEY: And that‘s part of why we need this history if -- from a review of Judge

Brown‘s order, he had some serious concerns as relates to the parents. But he did not go

and say ―I find them dependent and neglected.‖

THE COURT: So -- But he left them in the custody of the Melton -- left her in the

custody of the Meltons.

MR. PARSLEY: That is correct, Your Honor.

child, or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of

such parent or guardian[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). ―Severe child abuse‖ is defined, in pertinent part, by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21)(A)(i) as:

The knowing exposure of a child to or the knowing failure to protect a child

from abuse or neglect that is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death

and the knowing use of force on a child that is likely to cause serious bodily

injury or death[.]

i. Notice

As an initial matter, the parents‘ contend that the Meltons‘ petition did not allege

severe abuse as a ground for termination. The parents assert that the Meltons‘ failure to

specifically plead allegations of severe abuse did not provide them adequate notice of the

grounds for termination sought against them.

With respect to abuse, the April 11, 2013 petition to terminate parental rights

alleged, in relevant part, the following:

21. Upon investigation by the Department of Children‘s Services and

subsequent Emergency Petitions, Magistrate Carlton Lewis of the Davidson

County Juvenile Court has terminated all of the respondents‘ visitation with

the child‘s sibling Ashton L[.] finding it was not in the minor child‘s best

interest to have any contact with the respondents.

22. The minor child was present and a witness to the physical and mental

abuse of her sibling Ashton L[.]

23. In addition to Ashton L[.]‘s abuse, this minor child has been a victim of

the respondents‘ mental and physical abuse.

24. Attached to this petition as a collective exhibit are letters from the

child‘s pediatrician and therapist stating that they do not recommend that

the children be returned to the parents.

...

26. For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioners aver that it is in the best

interest of the child pursuant to T.C.A. 36-1-113 and the public that any and

all parental rights that Adam and Ashley E[.] may hold to Makenzie L[.], be

forever terminated and that the complete custody, control and guardianship

of said child be awarded to the petitioners.

When handling preliminary matters prior to the beginning of trial, the trial court stated:

[A]lthough it‘s not pled very specifically, the court does find that the

ground in the petition is severe child abuse. . . . [I]t seems to me that that‘s

what we are here on is abandonment and persistence of conditions and

severe child abuse, all of which occurred after Judge Brown‘s initial order.

This Court has previously discussed the importance of strictly adhering to

procedural requirements in termination of parental rights cases. See In re Johnny K. F.,

No. E2012-02700-COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 4679269, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27,

2013); Weidman v. Chambers, No. M2007-02106-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2331037, at *6

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2008). ―Providing notice of the issues to be tried is considered a

fundamental component of due process.‖ In re Landon H., No. M2011-00737-COA-R3-

PT, 2012 WL 113659, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012) (citing In re W.B. IV., No.

M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005)).

Therefore, ―[a] trial court cannot terminate parental rights based on a ground that is not

alleged in the complaint.‖ In re Tristyn K., No. E2010-00109-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL

2867179, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2010).

Although the petition is not a model of clarity with regard to the ground of severe

abuse, we have reviewed the record and agree with the trial court that the ground of

severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), was pled in the Meltons‘

April 2013 petition to terminate parental rights. Moreover, the trial court went to great

lengths to clarify the grounds for termination prior to the beginning of the trial, and there

was no doubt that one of the grounds the Meltons were pursuing was a theory of severe

abuse. Therefore, we find that the parents had adequate notice regarding the grounds of

severe abuse.

ii. Evidence of sibling abuse

Next, we consider the Meltons‘ assertion that the trial court erred in failing to

allow evidence of the parents‘ alleged abuse of Ashton, Makenzie‘s younger brother, to

support the termination of their rights to Makenzie.

The trial court ruled on several occasions throughout the trial that ―the abuse of

Ashton is not relevant to this proceeding.‖ For example, during the testimony of Dr.

Dundon, Makenzie‘s and Ashton‘s treating pediatrician, the court disallowed evidence of

Dr. Dundon‘s observation of Ashton at a physical exam. The court also sustained an

objection to the introduction of a photograph of Ashton‘s injurires. Next, Ms. Melton

attempted to discuss injuries to Ashton, and following an objection by the parents‘

counsel, she was directed not to testify regarding his injuries. Again, during the

testimony of Patricia Sparks, the court sustained an objection to Ms. Sparks‘s testimony

regarding Ashton‘s injuries.

We disagree with the trial court‘s position that the abuse of Ashton is ―not

relevant‖ to the proceeding involving Makenzie. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-

1-113(g)(4) states that parental rights may be terminated based on a finding by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent has ―committed severe child abuse against the child

who is the subject of the petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or

any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent or

guardian[.]‖ (Emphasis added). Therefore, evidence regarding the injuries Ashton

allegedly sustained at the hands of his parents is properly considered in an analysis of

whether Mother‘s and Father‘s parental rights as to Makenzie should be terminated

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). See In re Eric J.P., No. M2012-02082-

COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 1788547, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding

grounds of severe abuse existed where the parents were found to have committed severe

abuse of a sibling or half-sibling). The trial court cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(4) in a footnote and stated, ―any evidence heard by the Court regarding Ashton

was not sufficient to find that he was subjected to severe abuse as defined in § 102, nor is

there any order in the record making such a finding.‖ However, the trial court refused to

hear much of the evidence that was proffered regarding the abuse of Ashton; thus, the

trial court did not get the full picture of the extent of abuse, if any, that transpired with

respect to Makenzie‘s sibling.7

It was error for the trial court to refuse to allow witnesses to testify regarding

abuse Ashton allegedly endured because such evidence was relevant to the question of

whether the parents‘ rights to Makenzie could be terminated under Tenn. Code Ann. §

36-1-113(g)(4). Therefore, we must remand the case for a determination of whether the

ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), applies in this

case.

C. Grounds for Termination: Abandonment

A parent‘s rights may be terminated upon proof by clear and convincing evidence

that the parent ―abandoned‖ the child. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c)(1), (g)(1).

―Abandonment,‖ for purposes of terminating a parent‘s rights, is defined to include the

following:

For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the

filing of a proceeding or pleading to terminate the parental rights of the

parent or parents. . . , that the parent or parents. . . either have willfully

The parents have appended to their brief, an order allegedly signed by the trial court on July 1, 2014,

which disposes of a dependency and neglect petition filed by DCS regarding Ashton. This order is not

part of the official technical record on appeal; therefore, we cannot consider it. See State v. Smotherman,

201 S.W.3d 657, 660 (Tenn. 2006) (―The appellate record provides the boundaries of an appellate court‘s

review. . . . An appellate court may consider only evidence contained in the appellate record.‖).

failed to visit or have willfully failed to support or have willfully failed to

make reasonable payments toward the support of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Willfulness is a critical element of the definition

of abandonment. Willful, in this context, means that ―a parent who failed to visit or

support had the capacity to do so, made no attempt to do so, and had no justifiable excuse

for not doing so.‖ In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d at 640 (citing In re Audrey S.,

182 S.W.3d at 864); see In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 863-64 (an individual acts

willfully if he or she knows what he is doing and has the intention to do what he or she is

doing). The ―[w]illfulness of a parent‘s conduct depends on the parent‘s intent, and

intent is seldom capable of direct proof.‖ In re Alysia S., 2014 WL 7204406, at *22

(citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 864). Thus, the trier-of-fact must infer intent from

circumstantial evidence, such as the parents‘ conduct. Id. ―Because testimony may be

critical to the determination of whether a parent‘s conduct was willful, trial courts are

best situated to make a determination of willfulness.‖ Id.

―Whether a parent failed to visit or support a child is a question of fact. Whether a

parent‘s failure to visit or support constitutes willful abandonment, however, is a question

of law.‖ In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d at 640 (citing In re Adoption of

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn. 2007)). A court will not find a parent has

abandoned his or her child if his or her failure to support or to visit the child is outside

his or her control. Id.

The trial court ruled that the parents‘ failure to visit or support Makenzie within

the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition was not willful. The petition at

issue was filed on April 11, 2013; thus, the relevant time period is December 10, 2012 to

April 10, 2013. It is undisputed that neither Mother nor Father visited or financially

supported Makenzie during this time.

i. Willful failure to visit

In support of its determination that the parents‘ failure to visit Makenzie was not

willful, the trial court noted that the Meltons did not comply with the juvenile court‘s

order to reunite the family because ―they were told by DCS that the order restricting

visits with the [parents‘] son applied to Makenzie.‖ The court also cited In re Adoption

of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007), to support its holding.

In In re Adoption of A.M.H., this Court was presented with a situation where the

parents of A.M.H. ―actively pursued legal proceedings to regain custody of A.M.H.

during the ‗abandonment‘ period but failed to visit for a period of four consecutive

months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights.‖

In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810. The Court held that where ―the parents‘

visits with their child have resulted in enmity between the parties and where the parents

redirect their efforts at maintaining a parent-child relationship to the courts the evidence

does not support a ‗willful failure to visit‘ as a ground for abandonment.‖ Id.

In this case, the parents and the Meltons testified that a DCS caseworker notified

them in August 2012 that visitation between Makenzie and the parents should cease. On

February 11, 2013, the Meltons filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and for

Adoption of Minor Children in the Robertson County Chancery Court. On March 14,

2013, the parents filed an Answer and Counterclaim for Paternity and Custody in which

they asserted they were ―entitled to immediate custody‖ of Makenzie. The Meltons

voluntarily dismissed the petition in Robertson County and filed a petition for termination

of parental rights on April 11, 2013, in Davidson County Juvenile Court. On April 12,

2013, Mother and Father filed a Motion to Enforce Visitation Order, seeking to

recommence visitation with Makenzie.

While the parents‘ efforts to reconnect with Makenzie were not as extensive as

those of the parents in In re A.M.H., the record does show that Mother and Father turned

to the court in an effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with Makenzie by filing a

counter-petition for custody in March 2013. Cf. id. at 810-11. Moreover, like the parties

in In re Adoption of A.M.H., testimony in this case was replete with examples of

―enmity‖ between the parents and the Meltons, and on March 12, 2013, the parents‘

attorney sent a letter to the Meltons attempting to reinstate visitation with Makenzie in

accordance with the February 2012 order. Thus, the parents were seeking to enforce the

February 2012 order during the last month of the relevant four-month time period. In

addition, and most importantly, both parties testified that they were asked by DCS to

discontinue visitation in August 2012. In light of DCS‘s request that the parties

discontinue visitation, the hostility between the parties, and the fact that Mother and

Father re-directed their efforts at maintaining a parent-child relationship to the Robertson

County Chancery Court by filing a counter-petition for custody within the four months

preceding the filing of the petition to terminate, we uphold the trial court‘s determination

that the parents‘ failure to visit was not willful.

ii. Willful failure to support

In determining that the parents‘ failure to support Makenzie was not willful, the

trial court stated:

The failure to pay anything toward support is another matter. The E[.]s‘