The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1663
JORGE MARIO GALEAN-PRUDENTE, a/k/a Jorge Mario Galeana
Prudente,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-2343
JORGE MARIO GALEAN-PRUDENTE, a/k/a Jorge Mario Galeana
Prudente,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 1, 2015 Decided: June 18, 2015
Before KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petitions denied in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Buxton Reed Bailey, BUXTON R. BAILEY, P.C., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Claire L. Workman, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Rachel Browning, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Jorge Mario Galean-Prudente,
a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his
appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his application
for cancellation of removal (No. 14-1663) and for review of the
Board’s order denying his motion to reconsider (No. 14-2343).
We review legal issues de novo, “affording appropriate
deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the [Immigration
and Nationality Act] and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang
Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008).
Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). We defer to the
Board’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
rule. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).
Upon review, we find that the agency properly concluded
that Galean-Prudente knowingly engaged in alien smuggling under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) (2012), which statutorily precluded him
from establishing the requisite good moral character necessary
for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3)
(2012); Ramos v. Holder, 660 F.3d 200, 203-06 (4th Cir. 2011).
We further conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion
in denying Galean-Prudente’s motion to reconsider the denial of
3
his application for cancellation of removal. We therefore deny
the petitions for review in part for the reasons stated by the
Board. See In re: Galean-Prudente (B.I.A. June 26 & Nov. 12,
2014).
We lack jurisdiction * to review Galean-Prudente’s challenges
to the Board’s refusal to reinstate his grant of voluntary
departure, and therefore dismiss the petitions for review in
part. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (2012); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182,
193 (4th Cir. 2004). In any event, the issue is now moot.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i) (2014), a grant of voluntary
departure automatically terminates upon the filing of a petition
for review.
We dispense with oral argument and deny Galean-Prudente’s
motion to participate in oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITIONS DENIED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART
*
Galean-Prudente does not raise any questions of law or
constitutional issues that would fall within the exception set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2012).
4