Ohio v. Clark

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OHIO v. CLARK

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

No. 13–1352. Argued March 2, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015

Respondent Darius Clark sent his girlfriend away to engage in prosti-

tution while he cared for her 3-year-old son L. P. and 18-month-old

daughter A. T. When L. P.’s preschool teachers noticed marks on his

body, he identified Clark as his abuser. Clark was subsequently tried

on multiple counts related to the abuse of both children. At trial, the

State introduced L. P.’s statements to his teachers as evidence of

Clark’s guilt, but L. P. did not testify. The trial court denied Clark’s

motion to exclude the statements under the Sixth Amendment’s Con-

frontation Clause. A jury convicted Clark on all but one count. The

state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause

grounds, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.

Held: The introduction of L. P.’s statements at trial did not violate the

Confrontation Clause. Pp. 4–12.

(a) This Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36,

54, held that the Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the intro-

duction of “testimonial” statements by a nontestifying witness, unless

the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a

prior opportunity for cross-examination.” A statement qualifies as

testimonial if the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to

“creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Michigan v.

Bryant, 562 U. S. 344, 369. In making that “primary purpose” de-

termination, courts must consider “all of the relevant circumstances.”

Ibid. “Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a

statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not

the Confrontation Clause.” Id., at 359. But that does not mean that

the Confrontation Clause bars every statement that satisfies the

“primary purpose” test. The Court has recognized that the Confron-

tation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court

statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the

2 OHIO v. CLARK

Syllabus

time of the founding. See Giles v. California, 554 U. S. 353, 358–359;

Crawford, 541 U. S., at 56, n. 6, 62. Thus, the primary purpose test

is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of

out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause. Pp. 4–7.

(b) Considering all the relevant circumstances, L. P.’s statements

were not testimonial. L. P.’s statements were not made with the

primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution. They

occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected

child abuse. L. P.’s teachers asked questions aimed at identifying

and ending a threat. They did not inform the child that his answers

would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L. P. never hinted that

he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors.

And the conversation was informal and spontaneous. L. P.’s age fur-

ther confirms that the statements in question were not testimonial

because statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, impli-

cate the Confrontation Clause. As a historical matter, moreover,

there is strong evidence that statements made in circumstances like

these were regularly admitted at common law. Finally, although

statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers are not

categorically outside the Sixth Amendment’s reach, the fact that L. P.

was speaking to his teachers is highly relevant. Statements to indi-

viduals who are not principally charged with uncovering and prose-

cuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial

than those given to law enforcement officers. Pp. 7–10.

(c) Clark’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Mandato-

ry reporting obligations do not convert a conversation between a con-

cerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed

at gathering evidence for prosecution. It is irrelevant that the teach-

ers’ questions and their duty to report the matter had the natural

tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution. And this Court’s Confron-

tation Clause decisions do not determine whether a statement is tes-

timonial by examining whether a jury would view the statement as

the equivalent of in-court testimony. Instead, the test is whether a

statement was given with the “primary purpose of creating an out-of-

court substitute for trial testimony.” Bryant, supra, at 358. Here,

the answer is clear: L. P.’s statements to his teachers were not testi-

monial. Pp. 11–12.

137 Ohio St. 3d 346, 2013–Ohio–4731, 999 N. E. 2d 592, reversed and

remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J.,

filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG, J.,

joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1352

_________________

OHIO, PETITIONER v. DARIUS CLARK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

[June 18, 2015]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Darius Clark sent his girlfriend hundreds of miles away

to engage in prostitution and agreed to care for her two

young children while she was out of town. A day later,

teachers discovered red marks on her 3-year-old son, and

the boy identified Clark as his abuser. The question in

this case is whether the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause prohibited prosecutors from introducing those

statements when the child was not available to be cross-

examined. Because neither the child nor his teachers had

the primary purpose of assisting in Clark’s prosecution,

the child’s statements do not implicate the Confrontation

Clause and therefore were admissible at trial.

I

Darius Clark, who went by the nickname “Dee,” lived in

Cleveland, Ohio, with his girlfriend, T. T., and her two

children: L. P., a 3-year-old boy, and A. T., an 18-month-

old girl.1 Clark was also T. T.’s pimp, and he would regu-

larly send her on trips to Washington, D. C., to work as a

prostitute. In March 2010, T. T. went on one such trip,

——————

1 Like the Ohio courts, we identify Clark’s victims and their mother

by their initials.

2 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

and she left the children in Clark’s care.

The next day, Clark took L. P. to preschool. In the

lunchroom, one of L. P.’s teachers, Ramona Whitley, ob-

served that L. P.’s left eye appeared bloodshot. She asked

him “ ‘[w]hat happened,’ ” and he initially said nothing.

137 Ohio St. 3d 346, 347, 2013–Ohio–4731, 999 N. E. 2d

592, 594. Eventually, however, he told the teacher that he

“ ‘fell.’ ” Ibid. When they moved into the brighter lights of

a classroom, Whitley noticed “ ‘[r]ed marks, like whips of

some sort,’ ” on L. P.’s face. Ibid. She notified the lead

teacher, Debra Jones, who asked L. P., “ ‘Who did this?

What happened to you?’ ” Id., at 348, 999 N. E. 2d, at 595.

According to Jones, L. P. “ ‘seemed kind of bewildered’ ”

and “ ‘said something like, Dee, Dee.’ ” Ibid. Jones asked

L. P. whether Dee is “big or little,” to which L. P. responded

that “Dee is big.” App. 60, 64. Jones then brought L. P.

to her supervisor, who lifted the boy’s shirt, revealing

more injuries. Whitley called a child abuse hotline to alert

authorities about the suspected abuse.

When Clark later arrived at the school, he denied re-

sponsibility for the injuries and quickly left with L. P. The

next day, a social worker found the children at Clark’s

mother’s house and took them to a hospital, where a phy-

sician discovered additional injuries suggesting child

abuse. L. P. had a black eye, belt marks on his back and

stomach, and bruises all over his body. A. T. had two

black eyes, a swollen hand, and a large burn on her cheek,

and two pigtails had been ripped out at the roots of her

hair.

A grand jury indicted Clark on five counts of felonious

assault (four related to A. T. and one related to L. P.), two

counts of endangering children (one for each child), and

two counts of domestic violence (one for each child). At

trial, the State introduced L. P.’s statements to his teach-

ers as evidence of Clark’s guilt, but L. P. did not testify.

Under Ohio law, children younger than 10 years old are

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Opinion of the Court

incompetent to testify if they “appear incapable of receiv-

ing just impressions of the facts and transactions respect-

ing which they are examined, or of relating them truly.”

Ohio Rule Evid. 601(A) (Lexis 2010). After conducting a

hearing, the trial court concluded that L. P. was not com-

petent to testify. But under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807,

which allows the admission of reliable hearsay by child

abuse victims, the court ruled that L. P.’s statements to

his teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness

to be admitted as evidence.

Clark moved to exclude testimony about L. P.’s out-of-

court statements under the Confrontation Clause. The

trial court denied the motion, ruling that L. P.’s responses

were not testimonial statements covered by the Sixth

Amendment. The jury found Clark guilty on all counts

except for one assault count related to A. T., and it sen-

tenced him to 28 years’ imprisonment. Clark appealed his

conviction, and a state appellate court reversed on the

ground that the introduction of L. P.’s out-of-court state-

ments violated the Confrontation Clause.

In a 4-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio af-

firmed. It held that, under this Court’s Confrontation

Clause decisions, L. P.’s statements qualified as testimo-

nial because the primary purpose of the teachers’ ques-

tioning “was not to deal with an existing emergency but

rather to gather evidence potentially relevant to a subse-

quent criminal prosecution.” 137 Ohio St. 3d, at 350, 999

N. E. 2d, at 597. The court noted that Ohio has a “manda-

tory reporting” law that requires certain professionals,

including preschool teachers, to report suspected child

abuse to government authorities. See id., at 349–350, 999

N. E. 2d, at 596–597. In the court’s view, the teachers

acted as agents of the State under the mandatory report-

ing law and “sought facts concerning past criminal activity

to identify the person responsible, eliciting statements

that ‘are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,

4 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

doing precisely what a witness does on direct examina-

tion.’ ” Id., at 355, 999 N. E. 2d, at 600 (quoting Melendez-

Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305, 310–311 (2009);

some internal quotation marks omitted).

We granted certiorari, 573 U. S. ___ (2014), and we now

reverse.

II

A

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which is

binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-

nesses against him.” In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 66

(1980), we interpreted the Clause to permit the admission

of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness, so

long as the statements bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliabil-

ity.’ ” Such indicia are present, we held, if “the evidence

falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears

“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Ibid.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), we

adopted a different approach. We explained that “wit-

nesses,” under the Confrontation Clause, are those “who

bear testimony,” and we defined “testimony” as “a solemn

declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of estab-

lishing or proving some fact.” Id., at 51 (internal quota-

tion marks and alteration omitted). The Sixth Amend-

ment, we concluded, prohibits the introduction of

testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness, unless

the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant

had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id., at

54. Applying that definition to the facts in Crawford, we

held that statements by a witness during police question-

ing at the station house were testimonial and thus could

not be admitted. But our decision in Crawford did not

offer an exhaustive definition of “testimonial” statements.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

Opinion of the Court

Instead, Crawford stated that the label “applies at a min-

imum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a

grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interroga-

tions.” Id., at 68.

Our more recent cases have labored to flesh out what it

means for a statement to be “testimonial.” In Davis v.

Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U. S. 813

(2006), which we decided together, we dealt with state-

ments given to law enforcement officers by the victims of

domestic abuse. The victim in Davis made statements to a

911 emergency operator during and shortly after her

boyfriend’s violent attack. In Hammon, the victim, after

being isolated from her abusive husband, made state-

ments to police that were memorialized in a “ ‘battery

affidavit.’ ” Id., at 820.

We held that the statements in Hammon were testimo-

nial, while the statements in Davis were not. Announcing

what has come to be known as the “primary purpose” test,

we explained: “Statements are nontestimonial when made

in the course of police interrogation under circumstances

objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the

interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an

ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the cir-

cumstances objectively indicate that there is no such

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the

interrogation is to establish or prove past events poten-

tially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id., at 822.

Because the cases involved statements to law enforcement

officers, we reserved the question whether similar state-

ments to individuals other than law enforcement officers

would raise similar issues under the Confrontation

Clause. See id., at 823, n. 2.

In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U. S. 344 (2011), we further

expounded on the primary purpose test. The inquiry, we

emphasized, must consider “all of the relevant circum-

stances.” Id., at 369. And we reiterated our view in Davis

6 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

that, when “the primary purpose of an interrogation is to

respond to an ‘ongoing emergency,’ its purpose is not to

create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of

the [Confrontation] Clause.” 562 U. S., at 358. At the

same time, we noted that “there may be other circum-

stances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a state-

ment is not procured with a primary purpose of creating

an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Ibid.

“[T]he existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is not

the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.” Id., at 374.

Instead, “whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply

one factor . . . that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding

the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.” Id., at 366.

One additional factor is “the informality of the situation

and the interrogation.” Id., at 377. A “formal station-

house interrogation,” like the questioning in Crawford, is

more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less

formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary pur-

pose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the

accused. Id., at 366, 377. And in determining whether a

statement is testimonial, “standard rules of hearsay,

designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be

relevant.” Id., at 358–359. In the end, the question is

whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objec-

tively, the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to

“creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”

Id., at 358. Applying these principles in Bryant, we held

that the statements made by a dying victim about his

assailant were not testimonial because the circumstances

objectively indicated that the conversation was primarily

aimed at quelling an ongoing emergency, not establishing

evidence for the prosecution. Because the relevant state-

ments were made to law enforcement officers, we again

declined to decide whether the same analysis applies to

statements made to individuals other than the police. See

id., at 357, n. 3.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 7

Opinion of the Court

Thus, under our precedents, a statement cannot fall

within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary pur-

pose was testimonial. “Where no such primary purpose

exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of

state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation

Clause.” Id., at 359. But that does not mean that the

Confrontation Clause bars every statement that satisfies

the “primary purpose” test. We have recognized that the

Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of

out-of-court statements that would have been admissible

in a criminal case at the time of the founding. See Giles v.

California, 554 U. S. 353, 358–359 (2008); Crawford, 541

U. S., at 56, n. 6, 62. Thus, the primary purpose test is a

necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the

exclusion of out-of-court statements under the Confronta-

tion Clause.

B

In this case, we consider statements made to preschool

teachers, not the police. We are therefore presented with

the question we have repeatedly reserved: whether state-

ments to persons other than law enforcement officers are

subject to the Confrontation Clause. Because at least

some statements to individuals who are not law enforce-

ment officers could conceivably raise confrontation con-

cerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding

them from the Sixth Amendment’s reach. Nevertheless,

such statements are much less likely to be testimonial

than statements to law enforcement officers. And consid-

ering all the relevant circumstances here, L. P.’s state-

ments clearly were not made with the primary purpose of

creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution. Thus, their

introduction at trial did not violate the Confrontation

Clause.

L. P.’s statements occurred in the context of an ongoing

emergency involving suspected child abuse. When L. P.’s

8 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

teachers noticed his injuries, they rightly became worried

that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious violence.

Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe

to release L. P. to his guardian at the end of the day, they

needed to determine who might be abusing the child.2

Thus, the immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable

child who needed help. Our holding in Bryant is instruc-

tive. As in Bryant, the emergency in this case was ongo-

ing, and the circumstances were not entirely clear. L. P.’s

teachers were not sure who had abused him or how best to

secure his safety. Nor were they sure whether any other

children might be at risk. As a result, their questions and

L. P.’s answers were primarily aimed at identifying and

ending the threat. Though not as harried, the conversa-

tion here was also similar to the 911 call in Davis. The

teachers’ questions were meant to identify the abuser in

order to protect the victim from future attacks. Whether

the teachers thought that this would be done by appre-

hending the abuser or by some other means is irrelevant.

And the circumstances in this case were unlike the inter-

rogation in Hammon, where the police knew the identity

of the assailant and questioned the victim after shielding

her from potential harm.

There is no indication that the primary purpose of the

conversation was to gather evidence for Clark’s prosecu-

tion. On the contrary, it is clear that the first objective

was to protect L. P. At no point did the teachers inform

L. P. that his answers would be used to arrest or punish

his abuser. L. P. never hinted that he intended his state-

ments to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the

——————

2 In fact, the teachers and a social worker who had come to the school

were reluctant to release L. P. into Clark’s care after the boy identified

Clark as his abuser. But after a brief “stare-down” with the social

worker, Clark bolted out the door with L. P., and social services were

not able to locate the children until the next day. App. 92–102, 150–

151.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 9

Opinion of the Court

conversation between L. P. and his teachers was informal

and spontaneous. The teachers asked L. P. about his

injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the infor-

mal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and

they did so precisely as any concerned citizen would talk

to a child who might be the victim of abuse. This was

nothing like the formalized station-house questioning in

Crawford or the police interrogation and battery affidavit

in Hammon.

L. P.’s age fortifies our conclusion that the statements in

question were not testimonial. Statements by very young

children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation

Clause. Few preschool students understand the details of

our criminal justice system. Rather, “[r]esearch on chil-

dren’s understanding of the legal system finds that” young

children “have little understanding of prosecution.” Brief

for American Professional Society on the Abuse of Chil-

dren as Amicus Curiae 7, and n. 5 (collecting sources).

And Clark does not dispute those findings. Thus, it is

extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child in L. P.’s posi-

tion would intend his statements to be a substitute for

trial testimony. On the contrary, a young child in these

circumstances would simply want the abuse to end, would

want to protect other victims, or would have no discernible

purpose at all.

As a historical matter, moreover, there is strong evi-

dence that statements made in circumstances similar to

those facing L. P. and his teachers were admissible at

common law. See Lyon & LaMagna, The History of Chil-

dren’s Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 Ind.

L. J. 1029, 1030 (2007); see also id., at 1041–1044 (exam-

ining child rape cases from 1687 to 1788); J. Langbein,

The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 239 (2003) (“The

Old Bailey” court in 18th-century London “tolerated fla-

grant hearsay in rape prosecutions involving a child victim

who was not competent to testify because she was too

10 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

young to appreciate the significance of her oath”). And

when 18th-century courts excluded statements of this sort,

see, e.g., King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202

(K. B. 1779), they appeared to do so because the child

should have been ruled competent to testify, not because

the statements were otherwise inadmissible. See Lyon &

LaMagna, supra, at 1053–1054. It is thus highly doubtful

that statements like L. P.’s ever would have been under-

stood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns. Neither

Crawford nor any of the cases that it has produced has

mounted evidence that the adoption of the Confrontation

Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence

that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time

of the founding. Certainly, the statements in this case are

nothing like the notorious use of ex parte examination in

Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason, which we have

frequently identified as “the principal evil at which the

Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U. S.,

at 50; see also Bryant, 562 U. S., at 358.

Finally, although we decline to adopt a rule that state-

ments to individuals who are not law enforcement officers

are categorically outside the Sixth Amendment, the fact

that L. P. was speaking to his teachers remains highly

relevant. Courts must evaluate challenged statements in

context, and part of that context is the questioner’s iden-

tity. See id., at 369. Statements made to someone who is

not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting

criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testi-

monial than statements given to law enforcement officers.

See, e.g., Giles, 554 U. S., at 376. It is common sense that

the relationship between a student and his teacher is very

different from that between a citizen and the police. We

do not ignore that reality. In light of these circumstances,

the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit the State from

introducing L. P.’s statements at trial.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 11

Opinion of the Court

III

Clark’s efforts to avoid this conclusion are all off-base.

He emphasizes Ohio’s mandatory reporting obligations, in

an attempt to equate L. P.’s teachers with the police and

their caring questions with official interrogations. But the

comparison is inapt. The teachers’ pressing concern was

to protect L. P. and remove him from harm’s way. Like all

good teachers, they undoubtedly would have acted with

the same purpose whether or not they had a state-law

duty to report abuse. And mandatory reporting statutes

alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned

teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission

aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.

It is irrelevant that the teachers’ questions and their

duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to

result in Clark’s prosecution. The statements at issue in

Davis and Bryant supported the defendants’ convictions,

and the police always have an obligation to ask questions

to resolve ongoing emergencies. Yet, we held in those

cases that the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit in-

troduction of the statements because they were not pri-

marily intended to be testimonial. Thus, Clark is also

wrong to suggest that admitting L. P.’s statements would

be fundamentally unfair given that Ohio law does not

allow incompetent children to testify. In any Confronta-

tion Clause case, the individual who provided the out-of-

court statement is not available as an in-court witness,

but the testimony is admissible under an exception to the

hearsay rules and is probative of the defendant’s guilt.

The fact that the witness is unavailable because of a dif-

ferent rule of evidence does not change our analysis.

Finally, Clark asks us to shift our focus from the context

of L. P.’s conversation with his teachers to the jury’s per-

ception of those statements. Because, in his view, the

“jury treated L. P.’s accusation as the functional equiva-

lent of testimony,” Clark argues that we must prohibit its

12 OHIO v. CLARK

Opinion of the Court

introduction. Brief for Respondent 42. Our Confrontation

Clause decisions, however, do not determine whether a

statement is testimonial by examining whether a jury

would view the statement as the equivalent of in-court

testimony. The logic of this argument, moreover, would

lead to the conclusion that virtually all out-of-court state-

ments offered by the prosecution are testimonial. The

prosecution is unlikely to offer out-of-court statements

unless they tend to support the defendant’s guilt, and all

such statements could be viewed as a substitute for in-

court testimony. We have never suggested, however, that

the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction of all out-

of-court statements that support the prosecution’s case.

Instead, we ask whether a statement was given with the

“primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute

for trial testimony.” Bryant, supra, at 358. Here, the an-

swer is clear: L. P.’s statements to his teachers were not

testimonial.

IV

We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio

and remand the case for further proceedings not incon-

sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1352

_________________

OHIO, PETITIONER v. DARIUS CLARK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

[June 18, 2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,

concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court’s holding, and with its refusal to

decide two questions quite unnecessary to that holding:

what effect Ohio’s mandatory-reporting law has in trans­

forming a private party into a state actor for Confronta­

tion Clause purposes, and whether a more permissive

Confrontation Clause test—one less likely to hold the

statements testimonial—should apply to interrogations by

private actors. The statements here would not be testi­

monial under the usual test applicable to informal police

interrogation.

L. P.’s primary purpose here was certainly not to invoke

the coercive machinery of the State against Clark. His age

refutes the notion that he is capable of forming such a

purpose. At common law, young children were generally

considered incompetent to take oaths, and were therefore

unavailable as witnesses unless the court determined the

individual child to be competent. Lyon & LaManga, The

History of Children’s Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-

Davis, 82 Ind. L. J. 1029, 1030-1031 (2007). The incon­

sistency of L. P.’s answers—making him incompetent to

testify here—is hardly unusual for a child of his age. And

2 OHIO v. CLARK

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

the circumstances of L. P.’s statements objectively indicate

that even if he could, as an abstract matter, form such a

purpose, he did not. Nor did the teachers have the pri­

mary purpose of establishing facts for later prosecution.

Instead, they sought to ensure that they did not deliver an

abused child back into imminent harm. Nor did the con­

versation have the requisite solemnity necessary for tes­

timonial statements. A 3-year-old was asked questions by

his teachers at school. That is far from the surroundings

adequate to impress upon a declarant the importance of

what he is testifying to.

That is all that is necessary to decide the case, and all

that today’s judgment holds.

I write separately, however, to protest the Court’s shov­

eling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Craw-

ford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004). For several dec­

ades before that case, we had been allowing hearsay

statements to be admitted against a criminal defendant if

they bore “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448

U. S. 56, 66 (1980). Prosecutors, past and present, love

that flabby test. Crawford sought to bring our application

of the Confrontation Clause back to its original meaning,

which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by

witnesses—i.e., statements that were testimonial. 541

U. S., at 51. We defined testimony as a “ ‘solemn declara­

tion or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or

proving some fact,’ ” ibid.—in the context of the Confronta­

tion Clause, a fact “potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 822

(2006).

Crawford remains the law. But when else has the

categorical overruling, the thorough repudiation, of an

earlier line of cases been described as nothing more than

“adopt[ing] a different approach,” ante, at 4—as though

Crawford is only a matter of twiddle-dum twiddle-dee

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

preference, and the old, pre-Crawford “approach” remains

available? The author unabashedly displays his hostility

to Crawford and its progeny, perhaps aggravated by in-

ability to muster the votes to overrule them. Crawford

“does not rank on the [author of the opinion’s] top-ten list

of favorite precedents—and . . . the [author] could not

restrain [himself] from saying (and saying and saying) so.”

Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (KAGAN, J.,

dissenting) (slip op., at 15).

But snide detractions do no harm; they are just indica­

tions of motive. Dicta on legal points, however, can do

harm, because though they are not binding they can mis­

lead. Take, for example, the opinion’s statement that the

primary-purpose test is merely one of several heretofore

unmentioned conditions (“necessary, but not always suffi­

cient”) that must be satisfied before the Clause’s protec­

tions apply. Ante, at 7. That is absolutely false, and has

no support in our opinions. The Confrontation Clause

categorically entitles a defendant to be confronted with the

witnesses against him; and the primary-purpose test sorts

out, among the many people who interact with the police

informally, who is acting as a witness and who is not.

Those who fall into the former category bear testimony,

and are therefore acting as “witnesses,” subject to the

right of confrontation. There are no other mysterious

requirements that the Court declines to name.

The opinion asserts that future defendants, and future

Confrontation Clause majorities, must provide “evidence

that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was under­

stood to require the exclusion of evidence that was regu­

larly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the found­

ing.” Ante, at 10. This dictum gets the burden precisely

backwards—which is of course precisely the idea. Defend­

ants may invoke their Confrontation Clause rights once

they have established that the state seeks to introduce

testimonial evidence against them in a criminal case

4 OHIO v. CLARK

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

without unavailability of the witness and a previous op­

portunity to cross-examine. The burden is upon the prose­

cutor who seeks to introduce evidence over this bar to

prove a long-established practice of introducing specific

kinds of evidence, such as dying declarations, see Craw-

ford, supra, at 56, n. 6, for which cross-examination was

not typically necessary. A suspicious mind (or even one

that is merely not naïve) might regard this distortion as

the first step in an attempt to smuggle longstanding hear­

say exceptions back into the Confrontation Clause—in

other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts.

But the good news is that there are evidently not the

votes to return to that halcyon era for prosecutors; and

that dicta, even calculated dicta, are nothing but dicta.

They are enough, however, combined with the peculiar

phenomenon of a Supreme Court opinion’s aggressive

hostility to precedent that it purports to be applying, to

prevent my joining the writing for the Court. I concur

only in the judgment.

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1352

_________________

OHIO, PETITIONER v. DARIUS CLARK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

[June 18, 2015]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that Ohio mandatory reporters

are not agents of law enforcement, that statements made

to private persons or by very young children will rarely

implicate the Confrontation Clause, and that the admis-

sion of the statements at issue here did not implicate that

constitutional provision. I nonetheless cannot join the

majority’s analysis. In the decade since we first sought to

return to the original meaning of the Confrontation

Clause, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004),

we have carefully reserved consideration of that Clause’s

application to statements made to private persons for a

case in which it was squarely presented. See, e.g., Michi-

gan v. Bryant, 562 U. S. 344, 357, n. 3 (2011).

This is that case; yet the majority does not offer clear

guidance on the subject, declaring only that “the primary

purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient,

condition” for a statement to fall within the scope of the

Confrontation Clause. Ante, at 7. The primary purpose

test, however, is just as much “an exercise in fiction . . .

disconnected from history” for statements made to private

persons as it is for statements made to agents of law en-

forcement, if not more so. See Bryant, supra, at 379

(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation

marks omitted). I would not apply it here. Nor would I

leave the resolution of this important question in doubt.

Instead, I would use the same test for statements to

2 OHIO v. CLARK

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

private persons that I have employed for statements to

agents of law enforcement, assessing whether those

statements bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify

as testimonial. See Crawford, supra, at 51; Davis v.

Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 836–837 (2006) (THOMAS, J.,

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

This test is grounded in the history of the common-law

right to confrontation, which “developed to target particu-

lar practices that occurred under the English bail and

committal statutes passed during the reign of Queen

Mary, namely, the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,

and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evi-

dence against the accused.” Id., at 835 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Reading the Confrontation Clause in

light of this history, we have interpreted the accused’s

right to confront “the witnesses against him,” U. S. Const.,

Amdt. 6, as the right to confront those who “bear testi-

mony” against him, Crawford, 541 U. S., at 51 (relying on the

ordinary meaning of “witness”). And because “[t]estimony

. . . is . . . a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the

purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” ibid. (inter-

nal quotation marks and brackets omitted), an analysis of

statements under the Clause must turn in part on their

solemnity, Davis, supra, at 836 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

I have identified several categories of extrajudicial

statements that bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to fall

within the original meaning of testimony. Statements

“contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as

affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”

easily qualify. White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365 (1992)

(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-

ment). And statements not contained in such materials

may still qualify if they were obtained in “a formalized

dialogue”; after the issuance of the warnings required by

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); while in police

custody; or in an attempt to evade confrontation. Davis,

Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

supra, at 840 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Bryant, 562

U. S., at 379 (same) (summarizing and applying test).

That several of these factors seem inherently inapplicable

to statements made to private persons does not mean that

the test is unsuitable for analyzing such statements. All it

means is that statements made to private persons rarely

resemble the historical abuses that the common-law right

to confrontation developed to address, and it is those

practices that the test is designed to identify.

Here, L. P.’s statements do not bear sufficient indicia of

solemnity to qualify as testimonial. They were neither

contained in formalized testimonial materials nor obtained

as the result of a formalized dialogue initiated by police.

Instead, they were elicited during questioning by L. P.’s

teachers at his preschool. Nor is there any indication that

L. P.’s statements were offered at trial to evade confronta-

tion. To the contrary, the record suggests that the prose-

cution would have produced L. P. to testify had he been

deemed competent to do so. His statements bear no “re-

semblance to the historical practices that the Confronta-

tion Clause aimed to eliminate.” Ibid. The admission of

L. P.’s extrajudicial statements thus does not implicate the

Confrontation Clause.

I respectfully concur in the judgment.