Taylor v. Barkes

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STANLEY TAYLOR, ET AL. v. KAREN BARKES, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 14–939. Decided June 1, 2015

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Barkes, “a troubled man with a long history

of mental health and substance abuse problems,” was

arrested on November 13, 2004, for violating his proba-

tion. Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F. 3d

307, 310–311 (CA3 2014). Barkes was taken to the How-

ard R. Young Correctional Institution in Wilmington,

Delaware. As part of Barkes’s intake, a nurse who worked

for the contractor providing healthcare at the Institution

conducted a medical evaluation. Id., at 311.

The evaluation included a mental health screening

designed in part to assess whether an inmate was suicidal.

The nurse employed a suicide screening form based on a

model form developed by the National Commission on

Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) in 1997. The form

listed 17 suicide risk factors. If the inmate’s responses

and nurse’s observations indicated that at least eight were

present, or if certain serious risk factors were present, the

nurse would notify a physician and initiate suicide preven-

tion measures. Id., at 311, 313.

Barkes disclosed that he had a history of psychiatric

treatment and was on medication. He also disclosed that

he had attempted suicide in 2003, though not—as far as

the record indicates—that he had also done so on three

other occasions. And he indicated that he was not cur-

rently thinking about killing himself. Because only two risk

factors were apparent, the nurse gave Barkes a “routine”

referral to mental health services and did not initiate any

special suicide prevention measures. Id., at 311.

2 TAYLOR v. BARKES

Per Curiam

Barkes was placed in a cell by himself. Despite what he

had told the nurse, that evening he called his wife and told

her that he “can’t live this way anymore” and was going to

kill himself. Barkes’s wife did not inform anyone at the

Institution of this call. The next morning, correctional

officers observed Barkes awake and behaving normally at

10:45, 10:50, and 11:00 a.m. At 11:35 a.m., however, an

officer arrived to deliver lunch and discovered that Barkes

had hanged himself with a sheet. Id., at 311–312.

Barkes’s wife and children, respondents here, brought

suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against

various entities and individuals connected with the Insti-

tution, who they claimed had violated Barkes’s civil rights

in failing to prevent his suicide. At issue here is a claim

against petitioners Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the

Delaware Department of Correction (DOC), and Raphael

Williams, the Institution’s warden. Although it is undis-

puted that neither petitioner had personally interacted

with Barkes or knew of his condition before his death,

respondents alleged that Taylor and Williams had violated

Barkes’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment. Barkes v. First Correctional Medi-

cal, Inc., 2008 WL 523216, *7 (D Del., Feb. 27, 2008).

They did so, according to respondents, by failing to super-

vise and monitor the private contractor that provided the

medical treatment—including the intake screening—at

the Institution. Petitioners moved for summary judgment

on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immu-

nity, but the District Court denied the motion. Barkes v.

First Correctional Medical, Inc., 2012 WL 2914915, *8–*12

(D Del., July 17, 2012).

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit affirmed. The majority first determined that

respondents had alleged a cognizable theory of supervisory

liability (a decision upon which we express no view). 766

F. 3d, at 316–325. The majority then turned to the two-

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Per Curiam

step qualified immunity inquiry, asking “first, whether the

plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a constitutional or stat-

utory right; and second, if so, whether that right was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.”

Id., at 326.

Taking these questions in reverse order, the Third

Circuit held that it was clearly established at the time of

Barkes’s death that an incarcerated individual had an

Eighth Amendment “right to the proper implementation of

adequate suicide prevention protocols.” Id., at 327. The

panel majority then concluded there were material factual

disputes about whether petitioners had violated this right

by failing to adequately supervise the contractor providing

medical services at the prison. There was evidence, the

majority noted, that the medical contractor’s suicide

screening process did not comply with NCCHC’s latest

standards, as required by the contract. Those standards

allegedly called for a revised screening form and for

screening by a qualified mental health professional, not a

nurse. There was also evidence that the contractor did not

have access to Barkes’s probation records (which would

have shed light on his mental health history), and that the

contractor had been short-staffing to increase profits. Id.,

at 330–331.

Judge Hardiman dissented. As relevant here, he con-

cluded that petitioners were entitled to qualified immu-

nity because the right on which the majority relied was “a

departure from Eighth Amendment case law that had

never been established before today.” Id., at 345.

Taylor and Williams petitioned for certiorari. We grant

the petition and reverse on the ground that there was no

violation of clearly established law.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from

civil damages liability unless the official violated a statu-

tory or constitutional right that was clearly established at

the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards,

4 TAYLOR v. BARKES

Per Curiam

566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5). “To be clearly

established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is

doing violates that right.” Ibid. (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted). “When properly applied, [quali-

fied immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on

point, but existing precedent must have placed the statu-

tory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id., at ___

(slip op., at 9).

The Third Circuit concluded that the right at issue was

best defined as “an incarcerated person’s right to the

proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention

protocols.” 766 F. 3d, at 327. This purported right, how-

ever, was not clearly established in November 2004 in a

way that placed beyond debate the unconstitutionality of

the Institution’s procedures, as implemented by the medi-

cal contractor.

No decision of this Court establishes a right to the

proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention pro-

tocols. No decision of this Court even discusses suicide

screening or prevention protocols. And “to the extent that

a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ ” in

the Courts of Appeals “could itself clearly establish the

federal right respondent alleges,” City and County of San

Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at

16), the weight of that authority at the time of Barkes’s

death suggested that such a right did not exist. See, e.g.,

Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F. 3d 693, 702 (CA6 2001) (“the

right to medical care for serious medical needs does not

encompass the right to be screened correctly for suicidal

tendencies” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tittle v.

Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 10 F. 3d 1535, 1540 (CA11 1994)

(alleged “weaknesses in the [suicide] screening process,

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

Per Curiam

the training of deputies[,] and the supervision of prison-

ers” did not “amount to a showing of deliberate indiffer-

ence toward the rights of prisoners”); Burns v. Galveston,

905 F. 2d 100, 104 (CA5 1990) (rejecting the proposition

that “the right of detainees to adequate medical care

includes an absolute right to psychological screening”);

Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F. 2d 32, 34–35 (CA4 1990) (“The

general right of pretrial detainees to receive basic medical

care does not place upon jail officials the responsibility to

screen every detainee for suicidal tendencies.”).

The Third Circuit nonetheless found this right clearly

established by two of its own decisions, both stemming

from the same case. Assuming for the sake of argument

that a right can be “clearly established” by circuit prece-

dent despite disagreement in the courts of appeals, neither

of the Third Circuit decisions relied upon clearly estab-

lished the right at issue. The first, Colburn I, said that if

officials “know or should know of the particular vulner-

ability to suicide of an inmate,” they have an obligation “not

to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.”

Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F. 2d 663, 669 (1988).

The decision did not say, however, that detention facilities

must implement procedures to identify such vulnerable

inmates, let alone specify what procedures would suffice.

And the Third Circuit later acknowledged that Colburn I ’s

use of the phrase “or should know”—which might seem to

nod toward a screening requirement of some kind—was

erroneous in light of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825

(1994), which held that Eighth Amendment liability re-

quires actual awareness of risk. See Serafin v. Johnstown,

53 Fed. Appx. 211, 213 (CA3 2002).

Nor would Colburn II have put petitioners on notice of

any possible constitutional violation. Colburn II reiter-

ated that officials who know of an inmate’s particular vul-

nerability to suicide must not be recklessly indifferent to

that vulnerability. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946

6 TAYLOR v. BARKES

Per Curiam

F. 2d 1017, 1023 (1991). But it did not identify any mini-

mum screening procedures or prevention protocols that

facilities must use. In fact, Colburn II revealed that the

booking process of the jail at issue “include[d] no formal

physical or mental health screening,” ibid., and yet the

Third Circuit ruled for the defendants on all claims, see

id., at 1025–1031.

In short, even if the Institution’s suicide screening and

prevention measures contained the shortcomings that

respondents allege, no precedent on the books in Novem-

ber 2004 would have made clear to petitioners that they

were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution.

Because, at the very least, petitioners were not contraven-

ing clearly established law, they are entitled to qualified

immunity. The judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.