Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK, FKA HYDE PARK

SAVINGS BANK

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 14–116. Argued April 1, 2015—Decided May 4, 2015

After filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, petitioner Bullard submitted a

proposed repayment plan to the Bankruptcy Court. Respondent Blue

Hills Bank, Bullard’s mortgage lender, objected to the plan’s treat-

ment of its claim. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the Bank’s objec-

tion and declined to confirm the plan. Bullard appealed to the First

Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP). The BAP concluded that

the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of confirmation was not a final, ap-

pealable order, see 28 U. S. C. §158(a)(1), but heard the appeal under

a provision permitting interlocutory appeals “with leave of the court,”

§158(a)(3), and agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that Bullard’s pro-

posed plan was not allowed. Bullard appealed to the First Circuit,

but it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that its jurisdic-

tion depended on the finality of the BAP’s order, which in turn de-

pended on the finality of the Bankruptcy Court’s order. And it found

that the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying confirmation was not final

so long as Bullard remained free to propose another plan.

Held: A bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a debtor’s

proposed repayment plan is not a final order that the debtor can im-

mediately appeal. Pp. 4–12.

(a) Congress has long treated orders in bankruptcy cases as imme-

diately appealable “if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within

the larger case,” Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American

Ins. Co., 547 U. S. 651, 657, n. 3. This approach is reflected in the

current statute, which provides that bankruptcy appeals as of right

may be taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final

judgments, orders, and decrees . . . in cases and proceedings.” 28

U. S. C. §158(a). Bullard argues that a bankruptcy court conducts a

2 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Syllabus

separate proceeding each time it reviews a proposed plan, and there-

fore a court’s order either confirming or denying a plan terminates

the proceeding and is final and immediately appealable. But the rel-

evant proceeding is the entire process of attempting to arrive at an

approved plan that would allow the bankruptcy case to move for-

ward. Only plan confirmation, or case dismissal, alters the status

quo and fixes the parties’ rights and obligations; denial of confirma-

tion with leave to amend changes little and can hardly be described

as final. Additional considerations—that the statute defining core

bankruptcy proceedings lists “confirmations of plans,” §157(b)(2)(L),

but omits any reference to denials; that immediate appeals from de-

nials would result in delays and inefficiencies that requirements of

finality are designed to constrain; and that a debtor’s inability to im-

mediately appeal a denial encourages the debtor to work with credi-

tors and the trustee to develop a confirmable plan—bolster the con-

clusion that the relevant proceeding is the entire process culminating

in confirmation or dismissal. Pp. 4–8.

(b) The Solicitor General suggests that because bankruptcy dis-

putes are generally classified as either “adversary proceedings” or

“contested matters,” and because an order denying confirmation and

an order granting confirmation both resolve a contested matter, both

should be considered final. This argument simply assumes that con-

firmation is appealable because it resolves a contested matter, and

that therefore anything else that resolves the contested matter must

also be appealable. But one could just as easily contend that confir-

mation is appealable because it resolves the entire plan consideration

process, while denial is not because it does not. Any asymmetry in

denying the debtor an immediate appeal from a denial while allowing

a creditor an immediate appeal from a confirmation simply reflects

the fact that confirmation allows the bankruptcy to go forward and

alters the legal relationships among the parties, while denial lacks

such significant consequences. Nor is it clear that the asymmetry

will always advantage creditors. Finally, Bullard contends that un-

less denial orders are final, a debtor will be required to choose be-

tween two untenable options: either accept dismissal of the case and

then appeal, or propose an amended but unwanted plan and appeal

its confirmation. These options will often be unsatisfying, but our lit-

igation system has long accepted that certain burdensome rulings

will be “only imperfectly reparable” by the appellate process. Digital

Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 872. That

prospect is made tolerable by the Court’s confidence that bankruptcy

courts rule correctly most of the time and by the existence of several

mechanisms for interlocutory review, e.g., §§158(a)(3), (d)(2), which

“serve as useful safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors”

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Syllabus

and resolving legal questions important enough to be addressed im-

mediately. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 111.

Pp. 8–12.

752 F. 3d 483, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–116

_________________

LOUIS B. BULLARD, PETITIONER v. BLUE HILLS

BANK, FKA HYDE PARK SAVINGS BANK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[May 4, 2015]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code affords individuals

receiving regular income an opportunity to obtain some

relief from their debts while retaining their property. To

proceed under Chapter 13, a debtor must propose a plan to

use future income to repay a portion (or in the rare case

all) of his debts over the next three to five years. If the

bankruptcy court confirms the plan and the debtor suc­

cessfully carries it out, he receives a discharge of his debts

according to the plan.

The bankruptcy court may, however, decline to confirm

a proposed repayment plan because it is inconsistent with

the Code. Although the debtor is usually given an oppor­

tunity to submit a revised plan, he may be convinced that

the original plan complied with the Code and that the

bankruptcy court was wrong to deny confirmation. The

question presented is whether such an order denying

confirmation is a “final” order that the debtor can immedi­

ately appeal. We hold that it is not.

2 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

I

In December 2010, Louis Bullard filed a petition for

Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Federal Bankruptcy Court in

Massachusetts. A week later he filed a proposed repay­

ment plan listing the various claims he anticipated credi­

tors would file and the monthly amounts he planned to

pay on each claim over the five-year life of his plan. See

11 U. S. C. §§1321, 1322. Chief among Bullard’s debts

was the roughly $346,000 he owed to Blue Hills Bank,

which held a mortgage on a multifamily house Bullard

owned. Bullard’s plan indicated that the mortgage was

significantly “underwater”: that is, the house was worth

substantially less than the amount Bullard owed the

Bank.

Before submitting his plan for court approval, Bullard

amended it three times over the course of a year to more

accurately reflect the value of the house, the terms of the

mortgage, the amounts of creditors’ claims, and his pro­

posed payments. See §1323 (allowing preconfirmation

modification). Bullard’s third amended plan—the one at

issue here—proposed a “hybrid” treatment of his debt to

the Bank. He proposed splitting the debt into a secured

claim in the amount of the house’s then-current value

(which he estimated at $245,000), and an unsecured claim

for the remainder (roughly $101,000). Under the plan,

Bullard would continue making his regular mortgage

payments toward the secured claim, which he would even­

tually repay in full, long after the conclusion of his bank­

ruptcy case. He would treat the unsecured claim, how­

ever, the same as any other unsecured debt, paying only as

much on it as his income would allow over the course of

his five-year plan. At the end of this period the remaining

balance on the unsecured portion of the loan would be

discharged. In total, Bullard’s plan called for him to pay

only about $5,000 of the $101,000 unsecured claim.

The Bank (no surprise) objected to the plan and, after a

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 3

Opinion of the Court

hearing, the Bankruptcy Court declined to confirm it.

In re Bullard, 475 B. R. 304 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2012). The

court concluded that Chapter 13 did not allow Bullard to

split the Bank’s claim as he proposed unless he paid the

secured portion in full during the plan period. Id., at 314.

The court acknowledged, however, that other Bankruptcy

Courts in the First Circuit had approved such arrange­

ments. Id., at 309. The Bankruptcy Court ordered

Bullard to submit a new plan within 30 days. Id., at 314.

Bullard appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

(BAP) of the First Circuit. The BAP first addressed its

jurisdiction under the bankruptcy appeals statute, noting

that a party can immediately appeal only “final” orders of

a bankruptcy court. In re Bullard, 494 B. R. 92, 95 (2013)

(citing 28 U. S. C. §158(a)(1)). The BAP concluded that

the order denying plan confirmation was not final because

Bullard was “free to propose an alternate plan.” 494 B. R.,

at 95. The BAP nonetheless exercised its discretion to

hear the appeal under a provision that allows interlocu­

tory appeals “with leave of the court.” §158(a)(3). The BAP

granted such leave because the confirmation dispute

involved a “controlling question of law . . . as to which

there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and

“an immediate appeal [would] materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation.” 494 B. R., at 95,

and n. 5. On the merits, the BAP agreed with the Bank­

ruptcy Court that Bullard’s proposed treatment of the

Bank’s claim was not allowed. Id., at 96–101.

Bullard sought review in the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit, but that court dismissed his appeal for lack

of jurisdiction. In re Bullard, 752 F. 3d 483 (2014). The

First Circuit noted that because the BAP had not certified

the appeal under §158(d)(2), the only possible source of

Court of Appeals jurisdiction was §158(d)(1), which al­

lowed appeal of only a final order of the BAP. Id., at 485,

and n. 3. And under First Circuit precedent “an order of

4 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

the BAP cannot be final unless the underlying bankruptcy

court order is final.” Id., at 485. The Court of Appeals

accordingly examined whether a bankruptcy court’s denial

of plan confirmation is a final order, a question that it

recognized had divided the Circuits. Adopting the major­

ity view, the First Circuit concluded that an order denying

confirmation is not final so long as the debtor remains free

to propose another plan. Id., at 486–490.

We granted certiorari. 574 U. S. ___ (2014).

II

In ordinary civil litigation, a case in federal district

court culminates in a “final decisio[n],” 28 U. S. C. §1291,

a ruling “by which a district court disassociates itself from

a case,” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35,

42 (1995). A party can typically appeal as of right only

from that final decision. This rule reflects the conclusion

that “[p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . .

undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and en­

croaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges,

who play a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation.”

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 106

(2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,

449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981)).

The rules are different in bankruptcy. A bankruptcy

case involves “an aggregation of individual controversies,”

many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for

the bankrupt status of the debtor. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy

¶5.08[1][b], p. 5–42 (16th ed. 2014). Accordingly, “Con­

gress has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases

may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of

discrete disputes within the larger case.” Howard Delivery

Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 547 U. S. 651,

657, n. 3 (2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis

omitted). The current bankruptcy appeals statute reflects

this approach: It authorizes appeals as of right not only

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 5

Opinion of the Court

from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments,

orders, and decrees . . . in cases and proceedings.” §158(a).

The present dispute is about how to define the immedi­

ately appealable “proceeding” in the context of the consid­

eration of Chapter 13 plans. Bullard argues for a plan-by­

plan approach. Each time the bankruptcy court reviews a

proposed plan, he says, it conducts a separate proceeding.

On this view, an order denying confirmation and an order

granting confirmation both terminate that proceeding, and

both are therefore final and appealable.

In the Bank’s view Bullard is slicing the case too thin.

The relevant “proceeding,” it argues, is the entire process

of considering plans, which terminates only when a plan is

confirmed or—if the debtor fails to offer any confirmable

plan—when the case is dismissed. An order denying

confirmation is not final, so long as it leaves the debtor

free to propose another plan.

We agree with the Bank: The relevant proceeding is the

process of attempting to arrive at an approved plan that

would allow the bankruptcy to move forward. This is so,

first and foremost, because only plan confirmation—or

case dismissal—alters the status quo and fixes the rights

and obligations of the parties. When the bankruptcy court

confirms a plan, its terms become binding on debtor and

creditor alike. 11 U. S. C. §1327(a). Confirmation has

preclusive effect, foreclosing relitigation of “any issue

actually litigated by the parties and any issue necessarily

determined by the confirmation order.” 8 Collier

¶1327.02[1][c], at 1327–6; see also United Student Aid

Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260, 275 (2010) (finding

a confirmation order “enforceable and binding” on a credi­

tor notwithstanding legal error when the creditor “had

notice of the error and failed to object or timely appeal”).

Subject to certain exceptions, confirmation “vests all of the

property of the [bankruptcy] estate in the debtor,” and

renders that property “free and clear of any claim or inter­

6 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

est of any creditor provided for by the plan.” §§1327(b),

(c). Confirmation also triggers the Chapter 13 trustee’s

duty to distribute to creditors those funds already received

from the debtor. §1326(a)(2).

When confirmation is denied and the case is dismissed

as a result, the consequences are similarly significant.

Dismissal of course dooms the possibility of a discharge

and the other benefits available to a debtor under Chapter

13. Dismissal lifts the automatic stay entered at the start

of bankruptcy, exposing the debtor to creditors’ legal

actions and collection efforts. §362(c)(2). And it can limit

the availability of an automatic stay in a subsequent

bankruptcy case. §362(c)(3).

Denial of confirmation with leave to amend, by contrast,

changes little. The automatic stay persists. The parties’

rights and obligations remain unsettled. The trustee

continues to collect funds from the debtor in anticipation

of a different plan’s eventual confirmation. The possibility

of discharge lives on. “Final” does not describe this state

of affairs. An order denying confirmation does rule out the

specific arrangement of relief embodied in a particular

plan. But that alone does not make the denial final any

more than, say, a car buyer’s declining to pay the sticker

price is viewed as a “final” purchasing decision by either

the buyer or seller. “It ain’t over till it’s over.”

Several additional considerations bolster our conclusion

that the relevant “proceeding” is the entire process culmi­

nating in confirmation or dismissal. First is a textual

clue. Among the list of “core proceedings” statutorily

entrusted to bankruptcy judges are “confirmations of

plans.” 28 U. S. C. §157(b)(2)(L). Although this item

hardly clinches the matter for the Bank—the provision’s

purpose is not to explain appealability—it does cut in the

Bank’s favor. The presence of the phrase “confirmations of

plans,” combined with the absence of any reference to

denials, suggests that Congress viewed the larger confir­

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 7

Opinion of the Court

mation process as the “proceeding,” not the ruling on each

specific plan.

In Bullard’s view the debtor can appeal the denial of the

first plan he submits to the bankruptcy court. If the court

of appeals affirms the denial, the debtor can then revise

the plan. If the new plan is also denied confirmation,

another appeal can ensue. And so on. As Bullard’s case

shows, each climb up the appellate ladder and slide down

the chute can take more than a year. Avoiding such de­

lays and inefficiencies is precisely the reason for a rule of

finality. It does not make much sense to define the perti­

nent proceeding so narrowly that the requirement of

finality would do little work as a meaningful constraint on

the availability of appellate review.

Bullard responds that concerns about frequent piece­

meal appeals are misplaced in this context. Debtors do

not typically have the money or incentives to take appeals

over small beer issues. They will only appeal the rela­

tively rare denials based on significant legal rulings—

precisely the cases that should proceed promptly to the

courts of appeals. Brief for Petitioner 43–46.

Bullard’s assurance notwithstanding, debtors may often

view, in good faith or bad, the prospect of appeals as im­

portant leverage in dealing with creditors. An appeal

extends the automatic stay that comes with bankruptcy,

which can cost creditors money and allow a debtor to

retain property he might lose if the Chapter 13 proceeding

turns out not to be viable. These concerns are heightened

if the same rule applies in Chapter 11, as the parties

assume. Chapter 11 debtors, often business entities, are

more likely to have the resources to appeal and may do so

on narrow issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. But even if

Bullard is correct that such appeals will be rare, that does

not much support his broader point that an appeal of right

should be allowed in every case. It is odd, after all, to

argue in favor of allowing more appeals by emphasizing

8 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

that almost nobody will take them.

We think that in the ordinary case treating only confir­

mation or dismissal as final will not unfairly burden a

debtor. He retains the valuable exclusive right to propose

plans, which he can modify freely. 11 U. S. C. §§1321,

1323. The knowledge that he will have no guaranteed

appeal from a denial should encourage the debtor to work

with creditors and the trustee to develop a confirmable

plan as promptly as possible. And expedition is always an

important consideration in bankruptcy.

III

Bullard and the Solicitor General present several argu­

ments for treating each plan denial as final, but we are not

persuaded.

The Solicitor General notes that disputes in bankruptcy

are generally classified as either “adversary proceedings,”

essentially full civil lawsuits carried out under the um­

brella of the bankruptcy case, or “contested matters,” an

undefined catchall for other issues the parties dispute.

See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7001 (listing ten adversary

proceedings); Rule 9014 (addressing “contested matter[s]

not otherwise governed by these rules”). An objection to a

plan initiates a contested matter. See Rule 3015(f). Ev­

eryone agrees that an order resolving that matter by over­

ruling the objection and confirming the plan is final. As

the Solicitor General sees it, an order denying confirma­

tion would also resolve that contested matter, so such an

order should also be considered final. Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae 19–22.

The scope of the Solicitor General’s argument is unclear.

At points his brief appears to argue that an order resolv­

ing any contested matter is final and immediately appeal-

able. That version of the argument has the virtue of rest­

ing on a general principle—but the vice of being

implausible. As a leading treatise notes, the list of con­

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 9

Opinion of the Court

tested matters is “endless” and covers all sorts of minor

disagreements. 10 Collier ¶9014.01, at 9014–3. The

concept of finality cannot stretch to cover, for example, an

order resolving a disputed request for an extension of

time.

At other points, the Solicitor General appears to argue

that because one possible resolution of this particular

contested matter (confirmation) is final, the other (denial)

must be as well. But this argument begs the question. It

simply assumes that confirmation is appealable because it

resolves a contested matter, and that therefore anything

else that resolves the contested matter must also be ap­

pealable. But one can just as easily contend that confir­

mation is appealable because it resolves the entire plan

consideration process, and that therefore the entire pro­

cess is the “proceeding.” A decision that does not resolve

the entire plan consideration process—denial—is therefore

not appealable.

Perhaps the Solicitor General’s suggestion is that a

separately appealable “proceeding” must coincide precisely

with a particular “adversary proceeding” or “contested

matter” under the Bankruptcy Rules. He does not, how­

ever, provide any support for such a suggestion. More

broadly, it is of course quite common for the finality of a

decision to depend on which way the decision goes. An

order granting a motion for summary judgment is final; an

order denying such a motion is not.

Bullard and the Solicitor General also contend that our

rule creates an unfair asymmetry: If the bankruptcy court

sustains an objection and denies confirmation, the debtor

(always the plan proponent in Chapter 13) must go back to

the drafting table and try again; but if the bankruptcy

court overrules an objection and grants confirmation, a

creditor can appeal without delay. But any asymmetry in

this regard simply reflects the fact that confirmation

allows the bankruptcy to go forward and alters the legal

10 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

relationships among the parties, while denial does not

have such significant consequences.

Moreover, it is not clear that this asymmetry will always

advantage creditors. Consider a creditor who strongly

supports a proposed plan because it treats him well. If

the bankruptcy court sustains an objection from another

creditor—perhaps because the plan treats the first credi­

tor too well—the first creditor might have as keen an

interest in a prompt appeal as the debtor. And yet, under

the rule we adopt, that creditor too would have to await

further developments.

Bullard also raises a more practical objection. If denial

orders are not final, he says, there will be no effective

means of obtaining appellate review of the denied pro­

posal. The debtor’s only two options would be to seek or

accept dismissal of his case and then appeal, or to propose

an amended plan and appeal its confirmation.

The first option is not realistic, Bullard contends, be­

cause dismissal means the end of the automatic stay

against creditors’ collection efforts. Without the stay, the

debtor might lose the very property at issue in the rejected

plan. Even if a bankruptcy court agrees to maintain the

stay pending appeal, the debtor is still risking his entire

bankruptcy case on the appeal.

The second option is no better, says Bullard. An ac­

ceptable, confirmable alternative may not exist. Even if

one does, its confirmation might have immediate and

irreversible effects—such as the sale or transfer of prop­

erty—and a court is unlikely to stay its execution. More­

over, it simply wastes time and money to place the debtor

in the position of seeking approval of a plan he does not

want.

All good points. We do not doubt that in many cases

these options may be, as the court below put it, “unappeal­

ing.” 752 F. 3d, at 487. But our litigation system has long

accepted that certain burdensome rulings will be “only

Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 11

Opinion of the Court

imperfectly reparable” by the appellate process. Digital

Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 872

(1994). This prospect is made tolerable in part by our

confidence that bankruptcy courts, like trial courts in

ordinary litigation, rule correctly most of the time. And

even when they slip, many of their errors—wrongly con­

cluding, say, that a debtor should pay unsecured creditors

$400 a month rather than $300—will not be of a sort that

justifies the costs entailed by a system of universal imme­

diate appeals.

Sometimes, of course, a question will be important

enough that it should be addressed immediately.

Bullard’s case could well fit the bill: The confirmability of

his hybrid plan presented a pure question of law that had

divided bankruptcy courts in the First Circuit and would

make a substantial financial difference to the parties. But

there are several mechanisms for interlocutory review to

address such cases. First, a district court or BAP can (as

the BAP did in this case) grant leave to hear such an

appeal. 28 U. S. C. §158(a)(3). A debtor who appeals to

the district court and loses there can seek certification to

the court of appeals under the general interlocutory ap­

peals statute, §1292(b). See Connecticut Nat. Bank v.

Germain, 503 U. S. 249 (1992).

Another interlocutory mechanism is provided in

§158(d)(2). That provision allows a bankruptcy court,

district court, BAP, or the parties acting jointly to certify a

bankruptcy court’s order to the court of appeals, which

then has discretion to hear the matter. Unlike §1292(b),

which permits certification only when three enumerated

factors suggesting importance are all present, §158(d)(2)

permits certification when any one of several such factors

exists, a distinction that allows a broader range of inter­

locutory decisions to make their way to the courts of ap­

peals. While discretionary review mechanisms such as

these “do not provide relief in every case, they serve as

12 BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Opinion of the Court

useful safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors”

and addressing important legal questions. Mohawk In-

dustries, 558 U. S., at 111 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

Bullard maintains that interlocutory appeals are inef­

fective because lower courts have been too reticent in

granting them. But Bullard did, after all, obtain one layer

of interlocutory review when the BAP granted him leave

to appeal under §158(a)(3). He also sought certification to

the Court of Appeals under §158(d)(2), but the BAP denied

his request for reasons that are not entirely clear. See

App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. The fact that Bullard was not

able to obtain further merits review in the First Circuit in

this particular instance does not undermine our expecta­

tion that lower courts will certify and accept interlocutory

appeals from plan denials in appropriate cases.

* * *

Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that the

order denying confirmation was not final, its judgment is

Affirmed.