People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc.

Illinois Official Reports

Supreme Court

People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 117193

Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Appellee, v. J.T. EINODER,

Court: INC., et al., Appellants.

Docket No. 117193

Filed March 19, 2015

Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that

Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.

Richard J. Billik, Jr., Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Counsel on Richard J. Prendergast, Seamus C. Prendergast, Lionel W. Weaver

Appeal and Brian C. Prendergast, of Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd., of Chicago,

for appellants.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro,

Solicitor General, and Christopher M.R. Turner, Assistant Attorney

General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justices JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 On July 19, 2000, the Attorney General for the State of Illinois1 on his own motion and at

the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), filed a complaint in the

circuit court of Cook County against J.T. Einoder, Inc. (JTE), and Tri-State Industries, Inc.

(Tri-State), alleging that JTE and Tri-State were operating a solid waste disposal site without a

permit, in violation of the Environmental Protection Act (Act). 415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West

2000). Subsequently, in an amended complaint filed on January 31, 2005, John Einoder, the

sole owner and operator of Tri-State, and Janice Einoder, the principal owner and president of

JTE, were added to the suit as party defendants in their individual capacities.

¶2 After several years of litigation, the circuit court ruled in the State’s favor, holding that

defendants had violated the Act by engaging in open dumping and by permitting the deposit of

construction and demolition debris (CDD) waste above grade without a permit. Monetary

penalties were imposed on each defendant. In addition, the court granted the State’s request for

mandatory injunctive relief, ordering defendants to remove any and all material deposited

above grade at the site.

¶3 Defendants appealed and the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, with

one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part. 2013 IL App (1st) 113498.

¶4 We granted defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. For reasons explained below, we

affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court.

¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1993, a 40-acre parcel of land located

near the intersection of Rt. 30 and Rt. 83, in unincorporated Lynwood, Illinois (the Lynwood

site), was purchased by John Einoder and placed in a land trust for the benefit of Tri-State. The

property, which contained a large sand pit, was developed into a construction and demolition

resource recovery facility and landfill using leased equipment and operators provided by JTE,

a closely held corporation owned by Janice Einoder (90%) and John Einoder (10%).

¶7 Sometime in 1995 the site began accepting general construction and demolition debris

(GCDD),2 and clean construction and demolition debris (CCDD).3 Soon thereafter, the IEPA

received a complaint that open dumping was taking place at the site. As a result, Gino Bruni, an

1

The complaint was filed by then-Attorney General James E. Ryan. Illinois’s current Attorney

General Lisa Madigan now represents the People of the State of Illinois in this case.

2

GCDD as defined by the Act means “non-hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the

construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of utilities, structures, and roads, limited to the

following: bricks, concrete, and other masonry materials; soil; rock; wood, including non-hazardous

painted, treated, and coated wood and wood products; wall coverings; plaster; drywall; plumbing

fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; roofing shingles and other roof coverings; reclaimed or other asphalt

pavement; glass; plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste; electrical wiring and

components containing no hazardous substances; and corrugated cardboard, piping or metals incidental

to any of those materials.” 415 ILCS 5/3.160(a) (West 2012).

3

CCDD as defined by the Act means “uncontaminated broken concrete without protruding metal

bars, bricks, rock, stone, reclaimed or other asphalt pavement, or soil generated from construction or

demolition activities.” 415 ILCS 5/3.160(b) (West 2012).

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inspector for the IEPA, visited the site in December 1995. After inspecting the site, Bruni filed

a report indicating that, at the time of inspection, approximately “500,000 cubic yards of wood,

asphalt, brick, concrete and scrap metal” had been deposited at the site. A citation was issued to

Tri-State for open dumping without a permit.

¶8 In 1996, JTE installed an Eagle 1400, which is a large waste processing machine, at the

Lynwood site. Janice Einoder then contacted the Bureau of Land (BOL) at the IEPA to notify

them that the site was now an operational recycling facility for GCDD and CCDD. JTE

submitted a proposal to the IEPA, seeking to have the site designated as a recycling facility. In

response to the proposal, Edwin Bakowski, manager of the permit section at the BOL, sent a

letter to “J.T. Einoder, Attn: Janice T. Einoder.” In the letter Bakowski stated: “Certain

recycling activities do not require a Bureau of Land permit, however, facilities not requiring a

permit may only receive recyclable materials *** which have an established market and are

not mixed with solid waste prior to receipt.” The letter noted that the site could operate as a

recycling facility without a permit only if JTE revised its proposal and agreed to accept solely

CCDD, scrap metal, or harvested or untreated wood. Bakowski noted that, according to JTE’s

proposal, the site was accepting nonrecyclable GCDD materials in addition to recyclable

CCDD materials. According to Bakowski, in this situation—where the recyclable and

nonrecyclable materials are comingled prior to their arrival at the facility—all of the material

is designated as “solid waste” and the facility would require a permit as a “waste transfer

station.”

¶9 The IEPA continued to make inspections of the site and on December 11, 1996, sent a

Violation Notice Letter (VNL-1996-01190) to Tri-State and JTE, pursuant to section 31(a)(1)

of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(a)(1) (West 1996)). In the notice, the IEPA alleged that Tri-State

and JTE were operating an open dump/solid waste disposal site without a permit in violation of

environmental statutes, regulations, or permits. After receiving this notice, John and Janice

Einoder, as well as attorneys representing Tri-State and JTE, engaged in numerous phone

conversations, written correspondence, and personal meetings with several IEPA

representatives in an effort to address the Violation Notice and determine what, if any, permits

needed to be obtained and what action needed to be taken for the site to be in compliance with

IEPA regulations. No consensus was reached.

¶ 10 According to the record, the Lynwood site received 9,763 loads of waste (nearly all

CCDD) during the period of January 1998 to May 1998. All of this waste was deposited at the

sand pit as fill so that, by May 1998, the waste had grown into a “hill” which was 40 feet above

grade.

¶ 11 In April 1998, new Violation Notice Letters were sent to Tri-State and JTE. In response,

John and Janice Einoder again met with IEPA representatives to discuss the alleged violations.

Subsequently, the Einoders submitted a remediation proposal to the Agency. That proposal,

however, was rejected. As a result, on August 20, 1998, the IEPA sent JTE a Notice of Intent to

Pursue Legal Action, pursuant to section 31(b) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(b) (West 1996)),

stating that the IEPA was “providing this notice because it may pursue legal action against J.T.

Einoder for violations of environmental statutes, regulations or permits ***.”

¶ 12 After this notice was sent, the agency agreed to postpone litigation until 10 test pits could

be dug to determine the content of the material being used as fill. These test pits revealed that

the material in the landfill was 99.99% nonhazardous CCDD. Nevertheless, because the pile of

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fill continued to grow above grade, the IEPA asked the Attorney General to file a complaint for

an injunction and civil penalties against Tri-State and JTE for violations of the Act. See 415

ILCS 5/31(b) (West 2000).

¶ 13 On July 19, 2000, an initial, seven-count complaint was filed by the Attorney General

against Tri-State and JTE. The complaint alleged the following violations: (1) open dumping,

as defined in section 3.24 of the Act and in violation of section 21(a) of the Act (415 ILCS

5/21(a) (West 2000)); (2) operating a waste disposal facility without a permit, in violation of

section 21(d) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(d) (West 2000)); (3) developing and operating a solid

waste management site without a permit, in violation of sections 807.201, 807.202(a), and

812.101(a) of the Board Waste Disposal Regulations (35 Ill. Adm. Code 807.201, 807.202(a),

812.101(a) (2000)); (4) disposal of waste at an unpermitted facility, in violation of section

21(e) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(e) (West 2000)); (5) causing or allowing litter, in violation of

section 21(p) (415 ILCS 5/21(p) (West 2000)); (6) failure to properly notify and document the

GCDD accepted at the site and failure to limit the percentage of nonrecyclable GCDD, in

violation of section 22.38(b) (415 ILCS 5/22.38(b) (West 2000)); and (7) failure to perform a

hazardous waste determination, in violation of section 722.111 of the Board Waste Disposal

Regulations (35 Ill. Adm. Code 722.111 (2000)).

¶ 14 After the complaint was filed, the State sought a preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order to halt the continued disposal of CCDD at the site. Although the court granted

the motion in April 2001, the Lynwood site continued to operate until 2003, when the site

finally ceased all operations.

¶ 15 In January 2005, over the defendants’ objection, the circuit court permitted the State to file

a first amended complaint. In this complaint, John and Janice Einoder were added as party

defendants in their individual capacity. Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint as to

the Einoders, arguing that, because the IEPA never sent a statutory “Notice of the Intent to

Pursue Legal Action” letter to them in their individual capacity, they were improperly joined

and the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction as to them. In addition, defendants argued

that Janice Einoder could not be held personally liable for violations of the Act because she had

not been involved in the day-to-day operations of the site. The trial court denied the motion to

dismiss the Einoders in their individual capacity, but granted relief on two of the counts. A

bench trial was then held on a five-count second amended complaint.

¶ 16 After hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court rejected defendants’ arguments and

found that Tri-State and JTE, as well as John and Janice Einoder, were each liable for operating

a waste disposal site and depositing CCDD above grade without a permit in violation of the

Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The circuit court imposed penalties against each of the

defendants as follows: Tri-State, $750,000; JTE, $500,000; John Einoder, $500,000; and

Janice Einoder, $50,000 (later reduced to $27,300).

¶ 17 In addition to the monetary penalties, the State requested a mandatory injunction, requiring

the defendants to remove the above-grade waste pile, which was at that time a 90-foot

grass-covered hill composed of 99.99% CCDD. Whether the court could—or should—grant

the injunction was a hotly contested issue. Defendants argued that the version of section 42(e)

of the Act which was in force at the time of the violations did not allow for mandatory

injunctive relief. The State countered that the 2004 amended version of section 42(e), which

permits courts to issue mandatory injunctions, applied in this case.

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¶ 18 Defendants also argued that, even if the amended statute applied, the trial court should

exercise its discretion to refuse to grant the State’s request for mandatory injunctive relief.

Defendant presented expert testimony showing that removal of the above-grade material from

the site would take years and could cost between $65 and $130 million. There also was

testimony that the diesel exhaust emitted by the trucks during the removal process would be

highly detrimental to the environment and, therefore, removal of the above-grade,

nonhazardous CCDD materials would have a greater negative impact on the environment than

leaving the landfill as is. Although the State disputed defendant’s estimated cost of removal,

IEPA’s expert, Paul Purseglove, conceded that removal of the approximately 750,000 cubic

yards—or 48,000 truckloads—of material could take more than five years and cost

approximately $6.8 million.

¶ 19 The circuit court ruled that, pursuant to amended section 42(e), mandatory injunctive relief

was available and granted the State’s request for a mandatory injunction, ordering defendants

to remove all above-grade waste from the site. Defendants appealed to the appellate court,

arguing: (1) the IEPA failed to provide John and Janice with notice, as required by section

31(a)(1) and (b) of the Act, which deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction; (2)

the circuit court erred in finding that a permit was necessary for the above-grade disposal of

CCDD during the time the Lynwood site was operational; (3) the circuit court erred in finding

sufficient evidence to hold Janice Einoder personally liable for violations of the Act; (4) the

circuit court erred when it retroactively applied amended section 42(e) of the Act to this case

and issued a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove all above-grade CCDD at

the site; and (5) the penalties and fines imposed were unduly harsh.

¶ 20 As noted above, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, with one justice

concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Mason believed that the 2004 amendment to

section 42(e) of the Act (Pub. Act 93-831, § 5 (eff. July 28, 2004)) could not be applied

retroactively to this case and, as a result, would have held that the trial court erred in granting

the State’s motion for mandatory injunctive relief.

¶ 21 Defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court, which we granted.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 In their opening brief before this court, defendants John and Janice Einoder argued that the

circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them because the IEPA failed to provide

them with written notice of intent to pursue legal action, pursuant to section 31(b) of the Act. In

their reply brief, however, defendants concede that, based on this court’s judgment in

Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), noncompliance

with the notice requirement of section 31 is not a jurisdictional bar. Thus, defendants have

withdrawn their argument that the State’s failure to comply with section 31(b) of the Act

provides a basis for reversal. Defendants also have abandoned the argument, which they raised

in the appellate court, that the circuit court erred in finding that a permit was necessary for the

above-grade disposal of CCDD during the time the Lynwood site was operational. As a result,

there are only two remaining issues to be addressed by this court: (1) whether the 2004

amendment to section 42(e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act is applicable in this

case and, therefore, the mandatory injunction was properly granted; and (2) whether the circuit

court’s finding that Janice Einoder’s involvement with site operations was sufficient to hold

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her individually liable for violations of the Act is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, we restrict our analysis to these two issues.

¶ 24 Retroactive Application of Amended Section 42(e) of the Act

¶ 25 During the time that the Lynwood site was operational, from 1995 until 2003, section 42(e)

of the Act (415 ILCS 5/42(e) (West 2002)) provided as follows:

“(e) The State’s Attorney of the county in which the violation occurred, or the

Attorney General, may, at the request of the Agency or on his own motion, institute a

civil action for an injunction to restrain violations of this Act.”

¶ 26 In July 2004, after the Lynwood site had ceased operations and four years after the initial

complaint was brought against defendants, the legislature amended section 42(e) of Act to

provide as follows:

“(e) The State’s Attorney of the county in which the violation occurred, or the

Attorney General, may, at the request of the Agency or on his own motion, institute a

civil action for an injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, to restrain violations of this

Act, any rule or regulation adopted under this Act, any permit or term or condition of a

permit, or any Board order, or to require such other actions as may be necessary to

address violations of this Act, any rule or regulation adopted under this Act, any permit

or term or condition of a permit, or any Board order.” 415 ILCS 5/42(e) (West 2004).

¶ 27 In People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 226-32 (2005), we held that under the

preamended version of section 42(e) the only injunctive relief available was prohibitory, that

is, the restraint of future violations of the Act. The 2004 amendment to section 42(e) changed

the law, however, to permit mandatory injunctive relief “to ‘require such other actions as may

be necessary to address violations of this Act.’ ” Agpro, 214 Ill. 2d at 226 (quoting Pub. Act

93-831, § 5 (eff. July 28, 2004)). Thus, whether it was proper for the circuit court in this case to

impose a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove all above-grade waste from the

Lynwood site depends on whether the 2004 amended section 42(e) applies in this case. The

issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether the legislature intended amended section 42(e) to

apply prospectively or retroactively. This is a question of statutory construction and, as such, is

subject to de novo review. Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318 (2006).

¶ 28 The State argues that we should uphold the judgment of the appellate court majority, which

found that the circuit court’s grant of mandatory injunctive relief was proper because amended

section 42(e) could be applied retroactively to this case. Defendants, however, contend that the

appellate court majority erred in affirming the circuit court. We agree.

¶ 29 When called upon to determine whether an amended statute may be applied retroactively,

Illinois courts are to follow the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). See Allegis Realty Investors, 223 Ill. 2d

at 330 (“In assessing whether a statute applies retroactively, this court has adopted the

approach set forth *** in Landgraf [citation].”); Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 91 (2003)

(“In Commonwealth Edison, this court for the first time adopted the United States Supreme

Court’s retroactivity analysis, as set forth in Landgraf [citation].”); Commonwealth Edison Co.

v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 37-39 (2001). Under the Landgraf approach, if the

legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of the amended statute, that expression of

legislative intent must be given effect, absent a constitutional prohibition. If, however, the

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amended statute contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, the court must go

on to determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact, “keeping in

mind the general principle that prospectivity is the appropriate default rule.” Allegis Realty

Investors, 223 Ill. 2d at 330-31.

¶ 30 An amended statute will be deemed to have retroactive impact if application of the new

statute would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past

conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Allegis Realty

Investors, 223 Ill. 2d at 331; Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 91; Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d

at 38. If the court finds that retrospective application of the new law would have a retroactive

impact or result in inequitable consequences, “the court must presume that the legislature did

not intend that it be so applied.” Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 91 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co.,

196 Ill. 2d at 38); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.

¶ 31 In Caveney, this court held that Illinois courts will rarely, if ever, need to go beyond step

one of the Landgraf analysis. This is because an amendatory act which does not, itself, contain

a clear indication of legislative intent regarding its temporal reach, will be presumed to have

been framed in view of the provisions of section 4 of our Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4

(West 2000)). Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 94. Section 4 provides as follows:

Ҥ 4. No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former

law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or

as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued,

or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such

offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so

incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save

only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in

force at the time of such proceeding.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000).

¶ 32 Construing this statutory language, we held in Caveney that section 4 “represents a clear

legislative directive as to the temporal reach of statutory amendments and repeals: those that

are procedural in nature may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may

not.” Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 92.

¶ 33 In the case at bar, the appellate court recognized that “[t]he amendment to section 42(e)

does not expressly state that it applies to all cases pending on or before its effective date.” 2013

IL App (1st) 113498, ¶ 58. Nonetheless, the court did not consider whether retroactive

application of amended section 42(e) would have a retroactive impact, nor did the appellate

court apply section 4’s presumption of prospective applicability or consider whether the

amendment is procedural in nature. Instead, the court went on to find legislative intent by

looking to section 2 of the Act, which contains a statement of the Act’s purpose and the

directive that the Act should be liberally construed. 415 ILCS 5/2(b), (c) (West 2012). In light

of the provisions contained in section 2, the court concluded that the amendment to section

42(e) was remedial and, therefore, the legislature intended for it to be applied retroactively.

2013 IL App (1st) 113498, ¶ 59. This was error.

¶ 34 When applying the first step of the Landgraf analysis to assess the temporal reach of a

statutory amendment, it is not proper to look to the entire statute for legislative intent. Under

the first step of Landgraf, we are to determine whether the text of the amended provision,

itself, clearly expresses the legislature’s intent that the amendment be given either prospective

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or retrospective application. Allegis Realty Investors, 223 Ill. 2d at 330; Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at

94. If the legislature specifies that the amended statute is to be applied retroactively, that

directive must be honored, unless it would be unconstitutional to do so. Allegis Realty

Investors, 223 Ill. 2d at 330; Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 94. However, where, as here, the

legislature does not expressly indicate its intent with regard to the temporal reach of the

amended statute, a presumption arises that the amended statute is not to be applied

retroactively. The amendatory provision may be applied retroactively, however, if it is merely

procedural in nature.

¶ 35 In the appeal before us, no one contests the appellate court’s finding that the language of

amended section 42(e) requires neither prospective nor retroactive application. The State,

however, argues that even if we reject the appellate court’s analysis—the finding that the

legislature’s intent that the amendment be applied retroactively may be found by looking

elsewhere in the statute—we should still find that retroactive application of amended section

42(e) is appropriate because it affects only remedies and, as such, is procedural in nature. The

State cites Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 291 (1999), in support of its

proposition that amendments affecting remedies are procedural.

¶ 36 We find Dardeen and the other cases cited by the State to be inapposite. Clearly, amended

section 42(e) is not simply procedural. It creates an entirely new type of liability—a mandatory

injunction—which was not available under the prior statute. Applying it retroactively here

would impose a new liability on defendants’ past conduct. For that reason, it is a substantive

change in the law and cannot be applied retroactively. See Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 95

(amendment is a substantive change in the law if it establishes a liability that previously did not

exist).

¶ 37 We find that amended section 42(e) may not be applied retroactively to this case.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred when it granted the State’s request for

mandatory injunctive relief. The mandatory injunction issued by the circuit court is, therefore,

vacated.

¶ 38 Individual Liability of Janice Einoder

¶ 39 As noted above, the circuit court found Janice Einoder, in her individual capacity, liable for

violating the Act by operating a waste disposal facility and depositing CCDD above grade

without a permit. The court imposed a monetary penalty of $50,000 on Janice Einoder, which

was later reduced to $27,300. Defendants contend that the circuit court’s finding that Janice

Einoder could be held responsible in her individual capacity was against the manifest weight of

the evidence and that the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court’s ruling. On this

point, however, we disagree.

¶ 40 There is no dispute that corporate officers may be subject to liability for violations of the

Act. To impose individual liability on a corporate officer, however, it must be shown that the

corporate officer was personally involved and actively participated in the violation of the Act,

not simply that the individual had personal involvement or active participation in the

company’s management. People ex rel. Madigan v. Tang, 346 Ill. App. 3d 277, 283 (2004). A

trial court’s finding as to a corporate officer’s personal liability will be reversed only if it is

manifestly erroneous. People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill. App. 3d 613,

623 (2006). A ruling is manifestly erroneous only “if it contains error that is clearly evident,

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plain, and indisputable.” People v. Hughes, 329 Ill. App. 3d 322, 325 (2002). Moreover,

because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and determine witness

credibility, its determination is afforded great deference. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill. App.

3d at 623.

¶ 41 It is true that, in this case, evidence was presented at trial showing that Janice was not part

of the day-to-day landfill operations at the site. We find this testimony irrelevant, however,

because a corporate officer, to be personally liable, does not have to perform the physical acts

constituting a violation. People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 345 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1028 (2004).

Here, the circuit court found that Janice participated in the violations because she signed over

250 contracts authorizing various companies and individuals to dump CCDD and GCDD at the

site. Moreover, she signed many of these contracts after she was aware that the IEPA had cited

the landfill operation for violating the Act and after she participated in discussions with IEPA

representatives regarding the violation notices. While Janice’s involvement may have been

minimal in relation to the other defendants, this was reflected in the amount of the penalty

imposed.

¶ 42 We find that the circuit court’s ruling that Janice’s involvement in site operations was

sufficiently demonstrated by her authorization of contracts for dumping at the site was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment

regarding Janice’s liability and the penalty imposed.

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment with regard to

Janice’s personal liability. We reverse, however, the appellate court’s finding that section

42(e) of the Act may be applied retroactively in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit

court’s order imposing a mandatory injunction on defendants for the removal of all

above-grade waste from the site.

¶ 45 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

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