Illinois State Treausrer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

2015 IL 117418

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 117418)

ILLINOIS STATE TREASURER, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS’

COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed April 16, 2015.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This appeal presents a single question of law: when acting in his capacity as

custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund (Fund), is the Illinois State

Treasurer (the Treasurer) required to file an appeal bond pursuant to section

19(f)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West

2012)) in order to obtain judicial review of a decision by the Illinois Workers’

Compensation Commission affirming an arbitrator’s award of benefits to an injured

worker? The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative and

concluded that because the Treasurer had not filed the requisite appeal bond, the

court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Treasurer’s appeal. 2013 IL App (1st)

120549WC. We granted the Treasurer’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.

315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Janina Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider, caregiver, and

companion to Joseph Meuse, an elderly man who was legally blind. Her job

responsibilities included retrieving Meuse’s mail and answering his front door.

These duties required Zakarzecka to walk down a flight of stairs at Meuse’s home.

¶4 On May 10, 2007, a deliveryman brought a package to the house for Mr.

Meuse. For sanitary reasons, Mr. Meuse required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes

while working inside the house and to change into her street shoes when answering

the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard the deliveryman on May 10, she

hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell so she could get

to the front door before the deliveryman left. In the process, she fell down the stairs,

breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands.

¶5 Zakarzecka subsequently filed an application for adjustment of claim under the

Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2012)) to obtain

benefits for her injuries. Zakarzecka’s application named Meuse as the employer/

respondent. While her claim was pending, Meuse passed away, so Zakarzecka

amended the claim to add as respondents Meuse’s estate and the individual who

owned and operated the employment agency that had placed Zakarzecka with

Meuse. Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance at the time of her

injury, Zakarzecka also looked to the Fund for relief.

¶6 The Fund is governed by section 4(d) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/4(d) (West

2012)) and serves as a source of payment for injured employees when the employer

has failed to provide the coverage required by law and has failed to pay the benefits

due to the injured employee. The money in the Fund comes from penalties and fines

collected from employers, service or adjustment companies and insurance carriers

pursuant to section 4(d) of the Act. The custodian of the Fund is the Illinois State

Treasurer, who serves in that capacity ex officio. As required by section 4(d),

Zakarzecka joined the Treasurer, in his role as the Fund’s custodian, as an

additional party respondent in the case. See 820 ILCS 305/4(d) (West 2012).

¶7 The matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitrator for the Illinois Workers’

Compensation Commission. The arbitrator found that Zakarzecka’s accident arose

out of and in the course of her employment with Meuse and awarded her temporary

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total disability benefits, medical expenses, and compensation for the permanent and

partial loss of both of her hands. Under the terms of the decision, an award was

made to Zakarzecka and against the Fund “to the extent permitted and allowed

under §4(d) of the Act, in the event of the failure of Respondent-Employer to pay

the benefits due and owing [her].”

¶8 The Treasurer, as the Fund’s custodian, appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the

Commission. The Commission unanimously affirmed and adopted the decision

rendered by the arbitrator. Acting again as custodian of the Fund, the Treasurer then

sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of Cook

County pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2012)).

¶9 The circuit court confirmed the Commission’s ruling. The Treasurer

subsequently sought further review of the Commission’s decision in the appellate

court. Initially the appellate court reversed the Commission’s award of benefits

based on its determination that Zakarzecka had failed to present evidence

supporting a reasonable inference that her injuries arose out of a risk associated

with her employment. Following that ruling, however, Zakarzecka filed a timely

petition for rehearing arguing, for the first time, that the courts lacked jurisdiction

to consider the Treasurer’s appeal.

¶ 10 Zakarzecka’s jurisdictional challenge was premised on two alternative grounds.

First, she contended that her claim under the Fund was actually against the State of

Illinois and the award in her favor was therefore not subject to any judicial review

pursuant to section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2012)).

Alternatively, Zakarzecka argued that judicial review was barred by section

19(f)(2) of the Act because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory

prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction. See 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2)

(West 2012). Believing that both of these arguments raised issues of first

impression, the appellate court ordered the State to respond to Zakarzecka’s

petition and allowed Zakarzecka to file a reply.

¶ 11 Following the additional briefing, the appellate court rejected the argument that

Zakarzecka’s claim was against the State and therefore not subject to judicial

review under section 19(f)(1) of the Act. The appellate court concluded, however,

that under the plain terms of section 19(f)(2), the Treasurer was required to post a

bond if he wished to seek judicial review, that the statutory bond requirement was

jurisdictional, and that because no appeal bond had been filed in this case, the

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courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Treasurer’s appeal. The

appellate court therefore withdrew its prior ruling in the case and dismissed the

Treasurer’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2013 IL App (1st) 120549WC, ¶¶ 22-32.

The Treasurer now challenges that judgment, arguing that it should be exempt from

the normal bond requirement of section 19(f)(2) and that the appellate court’s

dismissal of its appeal for lack of jurisdiction should therefore be reversed.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Whether a court has jurisdiction to review an administrative decision presents a

question of law. We review such questions de novo. Board of Education of Roxana

Community School District No. 1 v. Pollution Control Board, 2013 IL 115473,

¶ 17. De novo review is also appropriate in this case because resolution of the

jurisdictional question turns solely on the construction of section 19(f) of the Act

(820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012)), and statutory construction is likewise a

question of law. People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416,

423 (2005).

¶ 14 Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of

subject matter jurisdiction. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation

Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 13. That presumption is inapplicable, however, where

administrative proceedings are involved. Illinois courts are empowered to review

administrative actions only “as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6

(appellate court), § 9 (circuit court). When the legislature has, through law,

prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision, a

court is said to exercise “special statutory jurisdiction” when it reviews an

administrative decision pursuant to that statutory scheme. People ex rel. Madigan

v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 10. Special statutory jurisdiction

is limited by the language of the act conferring it. A court has no powers from any

other source. A party seeking to invoke a court’s special statutory jurisdiction must

therefore comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute. If the mode

of procedure set forth in the statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is

conferred on the court. Id.

¶ 15 It is well established that these principles are fully applicable to proceedings

seeking judicial review of decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Commission.

In such proceedings, the jurisdiction of the courts is never presumed. Arrington v.

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Industrial Comm’n, 96 Ill. 2d 505, 508 (1983). To the contrary, in order to vest the

courts with jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, strict compliance with the

provisions of the Act is necessary and must affirmatively appear in the record. Id.;

Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 13;

Daugherty v. Industrial Comm’n, 99 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1983). Accordingly, our analysis

in the case before us must focus on determining precisely what the Act requires in

order to invoke the courts’ jurisdiction and then evaluating whether those

requirements have been satisfied. Jones v. Industrial Comm’n, 188 Ill. 2d 314, 320

(1999).

¶ 16 Judicial review of decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Commission is

governed by section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2012)). Subsection

19(f)(1) provides that except in certain circumstances not relevant here, decisions

of the Commission in cases involving claims against the State of Illinois are not

subject to judicial review at all. Subsection 19(f)(2) specifies that to initiate an

appeal in those cases where review is available, a party against whom the

Commission has rendered an award for the payment of money must “file with the

clerk of the court a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the

review, he will pay the award and the costs of the proceedings in the courts.” 820

ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012).

¶ 17 In the case before us, the Treasurer agrees with the appellate court’s holding

that Zakarzecka’s claim does not constitute a claim against the State. He must agree

with that determination because otherwise there would be no dispute that his efforts

to obtain judicial review of the Commission’s award of benefits would be

precluded by section 19(f)(1) of the Act. The sole contention advanced by the

Treasurer is that the appellate court erred when it concluded that his failure to file

the appeal bond specified by section 19(f)(2) was a jurisdictional barrier which

precluded the courts from entertaining his appeal.

¶ 18 The basic principles applicable to this dispute are straightforward. Consistent

with the principles of special statutory jurisdiction applicable to these proceedings,

filing a bond as set forth in section 19(f)(2) of the Act is a prerequisite to invoking

the reviewing court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of a bond which

conforms to the statute’s requirements, the court has no jurisdiction to review the

Commission’s decision (Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 74 Ill.

2d 269, 272 (1979); see Freedom Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 345

Ill. App. 3d 716, 719 (2003); Kavonius v. Industrial Comm’n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 166,

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169 (2000)) and the appeal must be dismissed (Coultas v. Industrial Comm’n, 31

Ill. 2d 527, 528 (1964); Securitas, Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,

395 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 1104 (2009)).

¶ 19 The Treasurer does not contest these principles as a general proposition. His

position is simply that they should not apply to him. In the Treasurer’s view,

construing the statute to subject him to the normal bond requirements others must

meet is not supported by the language, purpose or history of the statute and will

result in consequences which the legislature could not have intended.

¶ 20 The appellate court rejected the Treasurer’s position and so must we. When

construing the provisions of section 19(f)(2), we are bound to follow the same

cardinal rule that governs our inquiry whenever we are called upon to interpret a

statute. That rule, to which all other rules and canons are subordinate, is to ascertain

and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Director of

Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416, 423 (2005).

¶ 21 While the Treasurer offers various theories as to what the legislature may or

may not have been thinking when it enacted section 19(f)(2) of the Act, it is well

established that the best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the

statute itself. That language must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly

understood meaning. Id. If the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect

without resort to other aids for construction. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’

Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12. Courts are not at liberty to depart

from the plain language and meaning of a statute by reading into it exceptions,

limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express. Solich v. George &

Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).

¶ 22 Judicial review of decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Commission is

commenced by the issuance of summons by the circuit court to the Commission.

820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2012). Section 19(f)(2) of the Act clearly and

unequivocally states that:

“[n]o such summons shall issue unless the one against whom the Commission

shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of

his written request for such summons file with the clerk of the court a bond

conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay

the award and the costs of the proceedings in the courts.” 820 ILCS

305/19(f)(2) (West 2012).

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¶ 23 There is no dispute that the Commission rendered an award against the Fund,

nor is there any dispute that neither the Fund nor the Fund’s custodian, i.e., the

Treasurer, filed the requisite bond when the Treasurer requested that the clerk of

the circuit court issue summons to the Commission. While the statute does go on to

enumerate various entities which are exempt from the bond requirement, that list

includes only counties, cities, towns, townships, incorporated villages, school

districts, bodies politic or municipal corporations against whom the Commission

shall have rendered an award for the payment of money. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2)

(West 2012). Neither the Treasurer, in his capacity as ex officio custodian of the

Fund, nor the Fund itself, is mentioned.

¶ 24 Because the filing of a bond is clearly required in order to invoke the court’s

jurisdiction and initiate judicial review, because no such bond was filed here, and

because neither the Fund nor the Fund’s custodian are among the entities expressly

exempted from the bond requirement, we agree with the appellate court that this

proceeding for judicial review must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. To hold

otherwise would require us to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the

statute and read into it an exception or limitation which the legislature did not

express. As previously indicated, that is something we are not permitted to do.

Skokie Castings, Inc. v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 2013 IL 113873, ¶ 38.

¶ 25 While this would seem to settle the matter, the Treasurer takes a different view.

He contends that the law is not as straightforward as we would have it and that,

contrary to our reading, the language of section 19(f)(2) is actually ambiguous. It is

ambiguous according to him because “the plain language of section 19(f)(2)

supports another interpretation of the bond requirement: that it is specifically

directed toward employers and insurers,” and there is nothing in the statute which

reflects an intent to include the Treasurer.

¶ 26 We reject the Treasurer’s argument because it is incompatible with the

principles of statutory interpretation which must guide our analysis and improperly

attempts to inject ambiguity into the statute where none exists. A statute is

considered to be ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably

well-informed persons in two or more different senses. Sangamon County Sheriff’s

Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2009). That

situation is not before us here.

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¶ 27 The terms employer and insurer are used throughout the Act, including section

19. Had the legislature intended to confine the bond requirement in section 19(f)(2)

to those two specific groups, it could easily have done so by using those same

terms. But that is not the language it chose. Instead, it drafted the law more broadly

to specify that, except for the particular government entities enumerated in the law,

bond must be posted by “the one against whom the Commission shall have

rendered an award for the payment of money” as a prerequisite to issuance of

summons and invocation of the court’s jurisdiction. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West

2012).

¶ 28 Where, as here, the legislature uses certain language in some instances and

wholly different language in another, settled rules of statutory construction require

us to assume different meanings or results were intended. Nelson v. Union Wire

Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 100 (1964). Moreover, no rule of construction authorizes

us to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute

imports (Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1978)), nor may we

rewrite a statute to add provisions or limitations the legislature did not include (Relf

v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 29). That is particularly true in cases such as this

involving statutory jurisdiction, the provisions of which must be strictly adhered to

and which may not be extended by implication. Graham v. People, 135 Ill. 442,

443-44 (1890). Because the Fund was unquestionably “one against whom the

Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money” within the

plain language of terms of section 19(f)(2), as written and was not listed among the

entities exempt from the bond requirement, and because the Fund can only act

through its custodian, the Treasurer, we must therefore conclude that the Treasurer,

as custodian of the Fund, was obligated to post a bond on the Fund’s behalf in order

to initiate an appeal.

¶ 29 The Treasurer thinks it anomalous that the legislature would exempt from the

bond requirement cities and the various other governmental entities set forth in

section 19(f)(2) of the Act, yet require him to post a bond. The Treasurer is

mistaken on this score as well. The Treasurer is treated differently because, in this

context, he is different. The entities enumerated in the statute will qualify as “one

against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of

money” only when they are the actual employer. If the Treasurer were in this case

by virtue of being Zakarzecka’s employer, he would not be subject to the bond

requirement either. He could not be, because a workers’ compensation claim

asserted by an employee of the Treasurer would constitute a claim against the State

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itself. Under the law, workers’ compensation claims against the State are not even

subject to review by the courts except in the case of claims by current and former

employees and appointees of the Commission, a circumstance not present here. 820

ILCS 305/18.1 (West 2012). But in this case, the Treasurer is not an employer, and

the award was not made against him in any such capacity. It was not made against

him at all. The “one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award

for the payment of money” in this case was the Fund. The Treasurer is involved in

the litigation solely by virtue of his responsibility as the Fund’s custodian. See 820

ILCS 305/4(d) (West 2012). That is a function for which there is no analog among

the entities exempted by section 19(f)(2).

¶ 30 We also reject the notion that the failure to exempt the Fund or the Treasurer, as

custodian of the Fund, from the bond requirement was simply an oversight by the

legislature. That argument might have some validity if the Treasurer could point to

other instances in which the General Assembly did specifically exempt special

funds, or the Treasurer, as custodian of such funds, from jurisdictional appeal bond

requirements of the type before us here. The Treasurer, however, has not done so.

Based on the materials before us, we have no basis for concluding that the

exemption was “palpably omitted,” nor is there any sense in which it could be fairly

claimed that adding an exemption for the Fund or the Treasurer as custodian of the

Fund, “is necessary to prevent the legislative purpose from failing in one of its

material aspects.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Continental Illinois National

Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm’n, 42 Ill. 2d 385,

402 (1969). Under these circumstances, we will not attribute the absence of an

exemption to legislative oversight.

¶ 31 We likewise reject the Treasurer’s attempt to find support for his position in

cases which excused the State from having to pay court costs and analogous

litigation-related expenses. That is so for numerous reasons. As an initial matter,

the authorities upon which the Treasurer relies, including Department of Revenue v.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, 67 Ill. 2d 392 (1977), City of Springfield

v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571 (1980), and In re Special Education of Walker, 131 Ill. 2d

300 (1989), involved proceedings in which the State itself was a party. In this case,

as we have repeatedly pointed out, the Treasurer’s appeal presupposes that the

claim at issue is not against the State. Indeed, it is only because the claim is against

the Fund rather than the State itself that the Treasurer, in his capacity as custodian

of the Fund, can seek judicial review at all.

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¶ 32 We further note that those decisions which have excused the State from the

obligation to pay court costs or to post bonds to secure the payment of court costs

have been based on considerations of sovereign immunity. See Department of

Revenue v. Appellate Court, 67 Ill. 2d at 394-96. Sovereign immunity cannot come

into play here, however, for the State has expressly elected to subject itself to the

provisions of the Act (see 820 ILCS 305/1(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)), thus waiving its

immunity with regard to workers’ compensation matters.

¶ 33 This waiver of immunity is not absolute, but in those limited instances where

the legislature wished to preserve its immunity and exempt the State from the

normal requirements of the workers’ compensation law, it did so specifically. See

820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1), (g) (West 2012). No exemption was created for the State or

for the Treasurer of the State when acting as custodian of the Fund, with respect to

the requirement that a bond be posted in order to appeal. Accordingly, even if the

interests of the State were implicated in proceeding before us, sovereign immunity

principles would offer no shield for the Treasurer with respect to his obligation, as

custodian of the Fund, to comply with section 19(f)(2)’s statutory bond

requirements. See Martin v. Giordano, 115 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370 (1983) (cited with

approval in In re Special Education of Walker, 131 Ill. 2d 300, 305 (1989)).

¶ 34 In addition, court costs are qualitatively different than the bond requirement

imposed by section 19(f)(2). Court costs are taxed by the court and pertain to the

expense of operating and utilizing the judicial system. Accordingly, when one taxes

costs against the State, taxpayers are in effect being charged for a system they are

already paying to support. Section 19(f)’s bond requirement, by contrast, serves a

much broader purpose. It goes beyond insuring payment of costs and provides

something more substantial: security to the injured employee that the party seeking

review will pay the amounts due under the Commission’s award if the appeal is

unsuccessful. See Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. Kennedy, 377 Ill. App. 3d 499, 504

(2007). That protection raises no concerns regarding double charging taxpayers for

support of the judicial system.

¶ 35 Furthermore, where the legislature wishes to excuse the State or other

governmental entities from filing and other fees imposed by the circuit court in

connection with litigation, it knows how to do so and has done so expressly. See

705 ILCS 105/27.2a(dd), 27.1a(dd), 27.2(dd) (West 2012). There is no

corresponding provision in the Act which excuses the Treasurer, in his capacity as

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custodian of the Fund, from having to post the appeal bond required by section

19(f)(2).

¶ 36 Section 19(f)’s bond requirement is distinguishable in another way as well. The

law permits waiver of costs in some cases (see, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/5-105 (West

2012); Ill. S. Ct. R. 298 (eff. Sept. 25, 2014)), and in civil matters where an appeal

is prosecuted by public entities or public officers acting in their official capacity for

the benefit of the public, the judgment under appeal may be stayed without

requiring that bond or security be given (Ill. S. Ct. R. 305(i) (eff. July 1, 2004)).

Proceedings for judicial review under the Act, however, are possible only by virtue

of the court’s special statutory jurisdiction. Under the clear line of authority set

forth earlier in this opinion regarding such jurisdiction, strict compliance with the

statute’s terms is therefore required before the courthouse doors will even open.

Those terms require posting of an appeal bond. No principle of law permits us,

through judicial fiat, to loosen, alter or waive the clear and unambiguous

jurisdictional requirements imposed by the legislature. If the law is to be changed in

this regard, it is up to the General Assembly to change it.

¶ 37 Another set of arguments advanced by the Treasurer pertains to practical

aspects of the bond requirement. He complains, for example, of difficulty in

ascertaining how much the bond should be and how it should be paid for, i.e., is the

money for the bond to come from the appropriation for his office or from the Fund

itself? He asserts that the bond requirement does not provide the same benefits for

claimants receiving awards against the Fund as it does where a private employer is

involved and that such claimants can be and are protected in other ways. He also

argues that the bond requirement is actually unfair—even irrational—because,

depending on the circumstances, it may afford greater protection to claimants

whose awards are appealed than claimants whose awards are not challenged.

Zakarzecka, for her part, responds that the Treasurer’s concerns are unfounded and

that requiring him to comply with the statutory bond requirement, in his capacity as

custodian of the Fund, will serve the purposes for which the bond requirement was

created and will not result in any consequences the legislature did not intend.

¶ 38 We shall not address the specifics of the parties’ respective arguments

regarding these aspects of the bond requirement, because doing so is unnecessary to

our disposition. Even if we agreed, for the sake of argument, that the bond

requirement presented technical challenges for the Treasurer, that it might not be as

efficacious as appeal bonds are in normal civil cases, and that it could even yield

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unfair or irrational results under particular circumstances, that would not be

sufficient justification for us to excuse the Treasurer from complying with the clear

and unambiguous statutory requirements established by the legislature in the case

before us today.

¶ 39 To be sure, courts do have an obligation to construe statutes in a way that will

avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results (Township of Jubilee v. State of

Illinois, 2011 IL 111447, ¶ 36), and should avoid interpretations that render statutes

“ ‘insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.’ ” Matsuda v. Cook County

Employees’ & Officers’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360, 366 (1997)

(quoting Pliakos v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 11 Ill. 2d 456, 460 (1957)). At

the same time, however, we must not forget that:

“[t]o maintain the separation of the legislative and judicial branches and avoid

compromising our fidelity to the text, we should be extremely reluctant to

second-guess the clear language of legislation ***. [Citation.] Whenever a

court disregards the clear language of legislation in the name of ‘avoiding

absurdity,’ it runs the risk of implementing its own notions of optimal public

policy and effectively becoming a legislature. Interpreting legislation to mean

something other than what it clearly says is a measure of last resort, to avoid

‘great injustice’ or an outcome that could be characterized, without

exaggeration, as an absurdity and an utter frustration of the apparent purpose of

the legislation. [Citation.]” Dusthimer v. Board of Trustees of the University of

Illinois, 368 Ill. App. 3d 159, 168-69 (2006).

¶ 40 None of the problems perceived by the Treasurer in this case rise to this level.

There are other instances where the General Assembly has required the Treasurer

to secure a bond in connection with the responsibilities it has imposed on him and

his office (see 5 ILCS 365/7 (West 2012); 15 ILCS 505/1 (West 2012)), including

service as ex officio custodian of particular funds (see 605 ILCS 10/24 (West

2012)). There is no reason he cannot likewise secure a bond on behalf of the Fund,

as section 19(f)(2) mandates, when he elects to seek the aid of the judiciary to

obtain review under the Act on the Fund’s behalf. It cannot fairly be claimed that

excusing him from compliance with the provisions of section 19(f)(2), as written,

when acting in his capacity as the Fund’s custodian, is necessary to avoid some

“grave injustice.” And while the Treasurer may dispute the practical benefits of

holding him to the statute’s bond requirement, there is no meaningful way the law’s

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purposes will be frustrated simply by requiring him to follow its plain and

unambiguous terms.

¶ 41 The main purpose of the Act is to provide financial protection for injured

workers, and its provisions must be interpreted liberally to effectuate that purpose.

Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (2006).

Our decision today is fully consistent with these principles. If the legislature

disagrees and believes that our construction of law is one which it did not foresee or

intend, it has every right to amend the law with respect to future cases. For now, we

must apply the law as written, and as written, the appeal bond requirement applies

to the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund.

¶ 42 CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court was correct when it concluded

that the Treasurer, as custodian of the Fund, is required to post to an appeal bond

pursuant to section 19(f)(2) in order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the

courts to review a decision entered by the Workers’ Compensation Commission

against the Fund. Because the Treasurer failed to post the requisite bond when he

sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision affirming the arbitrator’s

award of benefits to Zakarzecka in this case, the courts had no jurisdiction to

entertain the Treasurer’s appeal. The judgment of the appellate court, which

vacated the circuit court’s judgment and dismissed the Treasurer’s appeal for lack

of jurisdiction, is therefore affirmed.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

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