Opinion

Matter of Jones v. New York State Parole Board

  • 127 A.D.3d 1327
  • 6 N.Y.S.3d 774
Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Filed
Apr 2, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Lahtinen, McCarthy, Egan, Rose
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 53.2%

The opinion

State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: April 2, 2015 519826

________________________________

In the Matter of TYRONE JONES,

Appellant,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEW YORK STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: February 24, 2015

Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ.

__________

Tyrone Jones, Beacon, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady

of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Melkonian,

J.), entered September 25, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed

petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR

article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying

petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner is serving an aggregate prison term of 25 years

to life upon his conviction of a multitude of crimes, including

murder, manslaughter, robbery and criminal possession of a

weapon, as the result of incidents that occurred in 1980 and

1982. In April 2013, petitioner made his fourth appearance

before respondent, which denied his request for parole release

and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. Petitioner

filed an administrative appeal and, when it was not decided

within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.

Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.

-2- 519826

We affirm. Petitioner asserts that respondent relied

solely on the instant nature of the offense in denying his

request for parole release, rendering its determination arbitrary

and capricious. However, the record reflects that respondent

also considered relevant statutory factors, including the nature

of the crimes committed, his clean disciplinary record since

2008, notable program accomplishments, postrelease plans, the

available sentencing minutes and the COMPAS Risk and Needs

Assessment instrument. Although respondent placed particular

emphasis on the nature of the offenses, respondent "was not

required to accord equal weight to each factor . . . and we

cannot say that its decision to accord greater weight to

petitioner's extensive criminal history was in any way

irrational" (Matter of Davis v Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354, 1354 [2010];

see Matter of Kalwasinski v Paterson, 80 AD3d 1065, 1065 [2011],

lv denied 16 NY3d 710 [2011]). Upon our review of the record, we

decline to disturb respondent's determination as it is supported

by the record and does not reflect "irrationality bordering on

impropriety" (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000];

Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1367 [2011], lv denied

18 NY3d 810 [2012]).

Furthermore, we have held that there is no merit to

petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to promulgate

written procedures for evaluating parole requests in accordance

with recent amendments to Executive Law § 259-c (4) (see Matter

of Delrosario v Evans, 121 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2014]; Matter of

Thompson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 AD3d 1518, 1519

[2014]). Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed

and found to be without merit.

Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Rose, JJ., concur.

-3- 519826

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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