The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 23 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER PARENTEAU, No. 13-55580
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02022-H-RBB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RAUL SILVA, an individual; DEREK
SANDERS, an individual; COUNTY OF
SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1-20, inclusive,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 12, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** Senior
District Judge.
Jennifer Parenteau appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Deputy Raul Silva, Deputy Derek Sanders, and the County of San
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
Diego on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful entry in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse
and remand.
I.
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Deputies Silva and Sanders on the question of unlawful entry. For warrantless
entry to be justified under the Fourth Amendment, the Deputies were required to
have probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying immediate entry. United
States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010). The Deputies also must
“show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time, and must demonstrate
specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of . . . exigent circumstances.”
Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 756 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Relying on the 911 operator’s report, the Deputies’ initial interaction with
Eric Johnson, and the presence of an unidentified woman inside the home, the
Deputies assert they had both probable cause to investigate a burglary or attempted
burglary and exigent circumstances justifying immediate entry of the house. We
agree that the Deputies initially had probable cause to believe that a crime was
being committed. As to the existence of exigent circumstances, we conclude that
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there is an issue of fact as to whether such circumstances existed at the time the
Deputies entered the house without a warrant. Because that factual issue cannot be
resolved as a matter of law, the Deputies’ motion for summary judgment was
improperly granted. See Green v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 751 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding “the reasonableness of officer conduct should be decided by a
jury where the inquiry turns on disputed issues of material fact”).
Summary judgment also was not appropriate on qualified immunity grounds
because, construing the facts in favor of Parenteau, Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam), no reasonable officer could have believed the
entry was lawful in light of the clearly established law.
II.
Because the district court determined that the Deputies did not violate the
law, it did not reach the merits of Parenteau’s claims against the County. We
remand that issue to the district court to address in the first instance. K.M. ex rel.
Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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