Opinion

McClellan v. United States

  • 119 Fed. Cl. 494
  • 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 44
  • 2015 WL 453945
Court
United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed
Jan 27, 2015
Status
Published
Author
Horn
On the bench
Marian Blank Horn
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.9%

“When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”

How later courts described this case

  • “When a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.”
  • While the court does not “serve as a ‘super correction board[,]’ Skinner v. United States, [219 Ct. Cl. at 331, 694 F.2d 824] .,, correction boards must examine relevant data and articulate satisfactory explanations for their decisions.”
  • “[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court ‘does not excuse [a com plaint’s] failures.’ ” (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed.Cir.1995))
  • “Board decisions are subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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No. 12-253C FILED

Fifed: January 27,20'15

JAN 2 7 20t5

****t**** U.S. COURT OF

BRODYJ. MCCLELLAN, * FEDERAL CISIMS

Plaintiff,

v. * Pro g Plaintiff; Military Pay; Motion for

* Judgment on the Administrative

UNITED STATES, * Record.

Defendant.

********t*******

Brody J. McClellan, Lansing, Ml, pp se.

.. scott R. Damelin, Trial Attorney, commercial Litigation Branch, civil Division,

united states Department of Justice, washington, DC, for lhe defendant. with him were

scott D. Austin, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, commercial

Litigation Branch, and Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, civil

D.ivision, washington, DC. of counsel, Major chriJtopher c. cox, united States

Army

Litigation Division, Fort Belvoir. VA.

OPINION

HORN. J,

.

Plaintiff, Brody J. Mccreilan, fired a compraint, foilowed by an amended

complaint, in the United states court of Federal claims, alleging that ihe Army Board

for.co-rreciion of Military Records (ABCMR) erred in multiple-wa-ys. Among hii'ctaims,

plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process when the niititary coictuded

that

plaintiff had a duty to attend training sessions, that the government did

not adhere to its

own regulations when plaintiff was denied his transfer request, and when the defendant

ignored an Article 138 complaint, as well as an alleged conflict of interest on the part

of

the Board of Inquiry. Plaintiff seeks back pay and-benefits from his alleged wrongful

discharge "from the date of discharge to the date of judgment," -as well as

"reinstatement into the Army Individual Ready Reserye," ,,promoti'on

to ihe-jraol o-2,"

"upgrade of characterization of discharge to fully Honorable,"

and the rem6val of "all

derogatory records pertaining to" the events leading up to his ,,other than Honorable',

discharge.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff enlisted the United States Army Reserve on November 8, 2004, and was

honorably discharged from active duty on August 31,2005, to accept a commission in

the United States Army Reserve.t Plaintiff was commissioned as a second lieutenant in

the United StatesArmy Reserve, effective September 1,2005. Plaintiff joined the 301st

Military Intelligence Battalion, 500th Military lntelligence Brigade, stationed in Phoenix,

Arizona, although at the time plaintiff lived in Tucson, Arizona, which is more than 50

miles away from the unit. On September 25,2006, plaintiff was subsequently assigned

to the Military Intelligence Augmentation Detachment (MIAD).

Two months after his assignment to MIAD, on November 28, 2006 and

November 29, 2006, plaintiff and his commanding officer, Captain Sandra Orlandella,

exchanged multiple e-mails. Based on the record before the court, the first e-mail from

plaintiff on November 28,2006 informed captain orlandella that "[flor the December BA

[Battle Assembly] | will be in DC & then home to Michigan for Christmas, I request an

excused absence for the month. I will do extra days after my classes are finished in

May." Captain Orlandella responded the same day, explaining that .[w]e have

mandatory briefings in DEC and would like to see everyone present. your place of duty

is here during BA unless properly excused. You should never make arrangements for

travel until RST [Rescheduled rraining] request forms are signed and approved by me.'

On November 28, 2006, plaintiff replied that Captain Orlandella's response was

[k]ind of a curt message, I'm not sure why. When I was transferred to A

company, I was not aware of this policy. I have no problem, never have, of

recognizing my "place of duty during BA." I do not appreciate the

implication that I do have a problem. lf this was not your intent in your last

message, please be precise with your writing when addressing another

officer, subordinate or otherwise. Also keep in mind, until BA -or Active

duty periods, you are speaking to a civilian . . . . After coming upon a

situation, it is imperative that as officers in the Reserves, we conceptualize

a situation as best possible, and if necessary, obtain more information

before making comments or decisions. As an example, in this situation to

make a proper judgment, I would of [sic] found out: Attendance record of

soldier in past. Information symmetry levels (time in reserves vs. active -

has solider been made aware of policies - when transferring companies,

are different policies in effect & enforced, etc [sic]).,,

on November 29, 2006, captain orlandella answered, "[b]e advised this email is

out of line and disrespectful. You are denied excusal for DEC BA and will report to mv

office to discuss further action immediately after formation on 16 DEC od." ptaintifr

responded the same day, November29,2006, and stated:

' In his amended complaint, plaintiff claims he was "honorably released from Active

Duty to the reserve component September 2,2005."

I disagree. views [sic] and your email are disrespectful. When outside of

drill or active duty, I am not subject to UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military

Justicel. I expect to be addressed with respect and understanding. I do not

understand your perspective and why you even sent the last two emails. I

do not understand your decision making process. I will appeal this higher

and conduct futher [sic] research just as soon as I'm done writing reports

on Pandemic Flu response policies by the National Security Council. I

really appreciate the added stress your [sicJ giving me, without cause in

the final weeks of this semester. l'll make sure to repay in kind.

During the email exchange, plaintiff received Order Number 011942, dated

November 29, 2006, instructing him to aftend the annual training from Decembe r 1s-12 ,

2006. on November 30, 2006, plaintiff again contacted captain orlandella, this time by

letter and again requested to be excused from the December 2006 annual training,

citing to Army Regulation 140-1, chapter 3, 1J 3-12(eX1), but he did not explain why hi

specifically qualified to be excused.t In the November 30, 2006 letter, plaintiff stated

that Captain Orlandella had 'failed to provide me with the initial counseling & orientation

to company qolicy regarding your requirement for arranging RSTs," and that ,,[i]n the

event above RST is denied, this letter is to serve as offitiai request for reassignment

within the usAR [United States Army Reserve] and/or the MIAD.'; plaintiff also siated in

his lefter to captain orlandella that the physical location for the training did not meet

standards of Army regulations, which states, "[t]he maximum distance R-nruous

lRrmy

National Guard of the United Statesl and USAR soldiers may travel involuntarily

between their residence and the inactive dug training (lDT) training site must be within

- a. A 5O-mile radrus of the inactive duty training (lDT) site. it will noI exceed 1 1/2 hours

of have^l_time_o1e-way by car under average traffic, weather, and road conditions.', Army

Reg. 135-91 1[ 5-5 (2005) (emphasis in originat).

Plaintiff did not attend the annual training scheduled for Decemoer

15-17,2006. Following plaintiffs absences, captain orlandella sent him a ,,Failure to

Report for Annual Training" notification on December 19, 2006, which stated:

1' Aftendance records for this unit show that you were absent from the

scheduled Battle Assembly under AT [Annuar rraining] order #011942,

dated 29 November 2006, for the foltowing period(s):-i5 DEc 2006, 1d

DEC 2006, and 17 DEC 2006.

'Army Regulation 140-1 fl 3-12(e)(1) (2005) states that rescheduled training ,,will not

be

granted for the following. situations: (1) convenience of the soldiei. However,

employment conflicts, overtime, schooling, loss of income, verified medical problems or

personal emergencies, may in the judgment of the unit commander, justify

RST

authorization." Plaintiff later argued to the Board of Inquiry and the Army Board tor

correclion of Military Records, and now claims to this 6ourt, that he misseo tne

December 15-17,2006 annual training 'in order to care for famiiy with severe medical

emergency."

2. Under AR [Army Regulation] 135-91, you are required to attend all

scheduled Battle Assemblies and annual training periods.

3. Unless the absences indicated in paragraph 1 are excused, you will

have accumulated 4 unexcused absences within a 1 year period. The 1

year period begins on the date you incur your first unexcused absence.

4. As you are aware, if you accumulate g unexcused absences within a

1-year period, you become an unsatisfactory participant and you will be

processed for separation from the Selected Reserve either by

reassignment or discharge.

(emphasis in the original).

.. Il"t same day, December 19, 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Francis

Nadolski, plaintiffs Battalion commander, sent plaintiff a "Letter of ileprimand,

re-garding the e-mails Captain Orlandella had received from plaintiff between Novemoer

28 and November 30, 2006. The "Letter of Reprimand" explained that Lieutenant

colonel Nadolski found plaintiffs e-mails "very disrespeitful," ,disturbing,,, and

"threatening." Accordingly, Lieutenant colonel Nadobki informed plaintiff

that'ne was

transferring him to "the Individual Ready Reserve to be noted as an unfavorable action.,'

Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski warned plaintiff that if Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski was

"made aware of any information concerning this type of behavior between

now and your

transfer into the IRR [lndividual Ready Reserve], I wiil take swift action,

resulting in your punishment . . . and/or your involuntary separation from tirefosiiuty

united

States Army Reserves."

on December 20,2006, plaintiff received order Number 01647s, which noted

that due to his absence from the December 'ls-17, 2006 annual training, ,,he missed

movement, therefore he is considered AWoL [Absent without Leave].,,-ihe following

day, December 21,2006, captain orlandella slgned a "Report to suipend Favorable

f9111nel Action,"3 see Army Reg. 600-8-2 (zo-oa;, as a resurt of the December 19,

2006 "Letter of Reprimand." on February 28,2ool', the Military Intelligence Re"din"",

command sent plaintiff order Number o7-0s9-oo0o1, reassigning

it"intir irom nis

current assignment to the control Group Reinforcement, whichls pirt of the lndividual

Ready Reserve,

Fg Army Reg. 140-10 11 4-2(b)(2) (200s), due io misconduct. Later

thal same day, February 28, 2001, the Military Inielligence Readiness command

pv9leq plaintiffs reassignment with order Number 07-05-9-00003. The ABCMR stated

that Order Number 07-059-00001 was ,,apparenfly issued in error.,,a

].n.

"n"ryl to Favorable personner Action" is arso known as a ,,Frag.,, see

-suspend

Halg v. united states, 107 Fed. c-r. 339, 341 n.2, affd, 497 F. App'x 43 (Fed. cirl zol4,

reh's en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2013).

a

There are several date discrepancies in the Administrative Record and the parties,

pleadings regarding exacfly when plaintiff was reassigned to the MIAD

afier tne

On March 8,2007, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski sent Mr. McClellan a counseling

statement informing plaintiff that he remained a member of the Military Intelligence

Augmentation Detachment because his transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve had

not been approved. Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski further informed plaintiff of annual

training that would take place on April 21-22,2007. That same day, March g,2OO7,

plaintiff e-mailed Lieutenant colonel Nadolski. plaintiffls email stated, in part, ',1 regret

the nature of the situation that has occured [sic] between myself and the command,-but

stand by my actions that occured [sic] subsequent to my initial mistake of sending an

email in response to an email from CPT. Orlandella that I considered disrespectful to

myself.' Plaintiff also stated that he "received a letter at my HoME . . . accusing me of a

serious crime that the command was fully aware was a false accusation . . .-. I made

several requests to various members of the command after initial possible

misunderstands [sic] by email for a direct meeting, only to be ignored." (capitalization in

original). Regarding the March 8,2007 counseling statement, ptaintiff indiiated ,\rvhile I

am in citizen status, as I am now, you can mind your own business on how I choose to

address anyone. lf you don't like it, you can write your congressman and request the

Iaw be changed . . . . You have no authority to request any American citizen be subject

to military custom, courtesy and law." Therefore, plaintiff informed Lieutenant colonel

Nadolski "l will not be signing anything or attending anything until after further

consultation with legal representation. . upon furthe; co;sultation with legal

representation, I will contact you directly. I request all further communication from the

unit or affiliated personnel cease."

On April 16,2007, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski sent plaintiff another counseling

statement, denying plaintiffs request to be excused from thi April 2l-22,2007 annuar

training.

fla]ntiff subsequently taite!. t9 attend the Aprit 2l-22,2b07 annuat training. on

May 31, 2007, Lieutenant qog19! Nadotski sent ptaintiff a thiid counselinj siaiement

in

which he reiterated to plaintiff that plaintiff remained a part of ttre uiRo, and that

Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski would not consider transferring plaintiff untit ne iuttilleo

nis

obligations, including attending batfle assemblies. The-May 31, zooz counseting

statement recognized plaintiffs assertion that he had moved irom iucson, Arizona

to

Michigan' Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski reminded plaintiff that plaintiffs tr"vet

exp"n""s

to and from battle assemblies were reimbuisable. on June 6, zooz, 'plaintffr

acknowledged receipt of the May 31, 2007 counseling statement by e-mail to Lieutenant

C.olonel Nadolski's personnel officer, Lieutenant Miihael padilla. plaintiff exftaineo

to

Lieutenant Padilla that "[t]he statements on the counselig

[sic] statement interring t am

February 28,2007 orders, apparenily issued in error, transfened him to the Individual

Ready Reserve. Upon review of Administrative Record, it appears that after

the

February 28,2007 orders transferring plaintiff to the Individual neioy Reserve,

anotner

order was issued, arso dated February 29,2007, revoking the transfer. Arftrougn

tne

ABCMR found that "orders were published in June 2007 -reassigning him

the. MfAD." A copy of orders 07-122-oooo8, dated May 2,2oo7,Inclu-ded

lpiai,ititfj to

in'ihe recoro

indicates that plaintiff was assigned to the Miliiary Inteiligence nug;entation

Detachment, but that the effective date of the orders was tisted as beptemueizs,

zooo.

not meeting my obligations or 'duty'. . [sic] and reasons for being 'flagged' are counter-

factual, full of circular logic and are generally deragatory [sic]." Plaintiff asserted that he

was employed with the Michigan state legislature "with a set schedule," and, thus, could

not meet his duties in Phoenix anymore, but suggested that he could "meet [his]

requirements with a local unit or a closer commute MIAD unit or other reserve Ml

[Military Intelligence] unit, such as DC . . . ." Plaintiff also stated that he could ',best

serve the needs of the army in another unit."

On June 15,2007, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski recommended that a ,,board of

officers" be convened to determine whether plaintiff should "remain a commissioned

officer in the United states Army Reserve.' plaintiffs officer Evaluation Report for the

period August 3, 2006 to August 2,2007 rated him with "unsatisfactory performance."

The officer Evaluation Report stated that plaintiff only "aftended 3 of 12 Battle

assemblies . . . failed to report to duty as ordered during the rest of the rating period.

From December 2006 onward, 2LT [second Lieutenant] Mcclellan was disrespictful on

several emails to his chain of command and failed to comply with numerous direct

orders."

on August 12,2007, plaintiff was notified that an involuntary separation action

was being initiated against him due to "acts of personal misconduci and conduct

unbecoming [ofJ an officer." Plaintiff was told that he had "failed to obey fragmentary

Annual rraining orders," and that he had shown "severe disrespect for superioiofficers,

as demonstrated in several e-mails sent by you." plaintiff was advised of his rights,

including: (1) his right to be furnished copies'of the records which would be submitted

to

the Board of .lnquiry;s (2) the right to be present at the Board of Inquiry ii n,t o*n

expense and have a reasonable lime to prepare his case (at least thirty d'ays between

the notification and the Board of Inq-uiry hearing); (3) the rilrrt to ue ,epi.sented at any

hearing by appointed counsel, military counlel of his -own choiie ,,if reasonably

available," or by civilian counsel at his own expense; (4) the right to submit statements

on his own behalf; and, (5) the right, if plaintiff is a minority officer, to request in writing

that the Board include a minority officer. Additionalty, phi;tiff was advised that he had

fifteen days to respond to the notice and that the Bbard of Inquiry would still act upon

the case even if plaintiff failed to respond.

" see Army Reg. 600-8-24 lJ 4-6 (2006) ("The Board of Inquiry's purpose is to give the

officer a fair and impartial hearing determining if the officer wili be reiained in thE Army.

Through a formal administrative investigation conducted under AR 15-6 and this

regulation, the Board of Inquiry establishes and records the facts of the Respondent's

alleged misconduct, substandard performance of duty, or conduct incompatible with

military service. Based upon. the flndings of fact esta-blished by its investijation ano

recorded in its report, the board then makes a recommendation for th'e officer's

disposition, consistent with this regulation."). The Board of Inquiry in plaintiffs case

also

is refened to in the Administrative Record as the "separation board'; and the .board of

officers."

6

Plaintiff began e-mail communications with attorney Joseph Giblin, in the office of

the Judge Advocate General (JAG) on August 13, 2007, regarding the pending

separation action. JAG attorney Giblin recommended to plaintiff that he explore military

and civilian counsel. The Army initially assigned a military attorney, Major D.

christopher Russell, to plaintiff to defend him in preparation for and during the

upcoming Board of Inquiry s::paration hearing. Major Russell ceased representing

plaintiff on september 8,2007.4 on october 20-21,20or, the MIAD had anotherkainino

session, which plaintiff also did not attend.

on october 25,2007, plaintiff tried to contact JAG attorney Giblin, indicating that

(1) the Army had not established jurisdiction "to apply regulation ind ucMJ;" (2) that he

had exhausted military remedies including lnspector General requests; ano

is) tnat, it

the Board of Inquiry were to recommend separation, his preferences would be to

transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve or be honorably discharged. on october 29,

2007, plaintiff received a "Letter of Instruction" informing him thai he was required to

attend all scheduled unit training assemblies, and that unless the october 2oi1,2oo7

assemblies were excused, plaintiff would have accrued twenty unexcused absences

within a one year period. Plaintiff was told that absences for tiaining assemblies may

only be excused for reasons of injury, sickness, emergency, or other circumstances

beyond his control, and that plaintiff should furnish an affiOavit or certification with any

request for excusal, which may or may not be approved within ten days of receipt

ot

request.

November 14,2007, praintiff received formar notification in the form of a

"Letter of Instruction," that his.Board of Inquiry hearing would occur

on December 12,

2007, to determine whether he should be dischargJd, and if so, to oetermine

tne

characterization of his service. on December g,2ooi, plaintiff acrnowboleJ i"""ipt

ot

the ''Lefter of Instruction," and responded with, among'other statements,:'1a1tteno"n".

at formal training with unit is inappropriate until luch time as any review ano

investigation is complete," that '[a]ll subsequent absences were also posiJormal

request to transfer and post receiving false documents falsely accusing me

of a crime,,,

and that the "Letter of Instruction" was inappropriate in general. rrombecemoer g_10,

6.The-_December

17,2007 transcript from the Board of Inquiry hearing stated that

plainliffs counsel was "discharged. by Respondent

[plaintiffl.; rr,ra.ior iuJs"ris e-mair,

in.cluded with plaintiffs pleadings, however,' indicateJ that lriajor Russell reluested

to

withdraw due to plaintiffs desire to pursue injunctive relief in civilian court];*ni.n

outside the scope of rDS flrial Defense Service] representation.,' The Regional

i.

Defense counsel for the 22nd Legal support organization west Region

- approveo

Major Russell's withdrawal as counsel foi plaintiff,-and stated that ,,the o-m."iipr"intiq

must retain civilian counsel at his own expense or proceed pro se." The Fiegionai

Defense Counsel also stated that "[t]he officer client

tpl;intiffJ shoutd be advised in"t tn"

22d LSo [Legal support organization] will not suppiy new-defense counsel when

the

client decides not to follow the advise [sic] of his couniel or elects to pursue

a course of

action that is not authorized by the militiry defense,s counsel,s ettiicat outigaiions

or

military regulation."

2007, plaintiff sent materials to JAG attorney Giblin for consideration by the Board of

Inquiry, for which JAG attorney Giblin confirmed receipt. JAG attorney Giblin also

attempted to confirm, based on plaintiffls e-mails, that neither plaintiff, nor any

representative on behalf of plaintiff intended to appear before the Board of Inquiry to

present material.

On December 17,2007, the Board of lnquiry held plaintiff's separation hearing,

which plaintiff did not attend.'All written materials plaintiff forwarded for consideration

were submitted as evidence to the Board of Inquiry on plaintiffs behalf by JAG aftorney

Giblin. After the separation hearing, the Board of Inquiry discharged plaintiff from the

Army with a characterization of "Other than Honorable" due to:

sufficient evidence to support the finding that 2LT Brody McClellan failed

to obey fragmentary AT orders IAW lln Accordance With] Orders

# 011942 dated 29 November 2006. Soldier failed to report for

Fragmentary Annual Training commencing on 15 December 2006 for

three days. In addition, by 29 October 2007 the Soldier had accumulated a

total of 20 unexcused absences within a one year period as documented

in a Letter of lnstructions Unexcused Absences dated 2g October 2007

from the A/301st Ml BN Commander. Clearly, 2LT McClellan has not

performed his assigned duties as directed.

shows severe disrespect for superior officers as demonstrated in emairs

commencing on 28 November 2006 addressed to cpr sandra orlandelra.

Furthermore, in an email dated 8 March 2007 and a letter dated g

December 2007, from 2LT McClellan to LTC Joe Nadolski, 2LT McClellan

continued to show severe disrespect to superior officers. Examples of the

disrespect include failure to recognize command authority and failure to

display any remorse or desire to correct his behavior.

. on January 10, 2008, plaintiff notified JAG aftorney Giblin that plaintiff had not

received any documentation from the Board of Inquiry's reiults, and thai he woulo neecl

such documents in order. to proceed. on January 14, 2oog, JAG aftorney Giblin

responded that the materials from the Board of Inquiry were being ,,compiied and

prepared for fonrvarding to. higher headquarters," and that the Board of Inquiry,s

recommendation "will not become final unless/until acted upon by Headquarteis,

Department of the Army." The Military Intelligence Readiness iomr"nd approved the

Board of Inquiry's decision to discharge plaintiff on september 30, 2oog, and'requested

final approval of the Board of Inquiry's findings by the United states Army i"r"r"

' one member of the JAG office, who reviewed the Board of Inquiry's proceedings,

concluded that plaintiffs "request for a new attorney was denied 6y the negioiai

Defense counsel. Respondent did not retain private counsel, nor did he appear at the

Board. The right to counsel and the right to appear are important, uut wairiJute, rignts.

Respondenfs failure to appear a-t the board to object or provide any written objection for

the denial of a second counsel effectively waive [sic] his right to repiesentation.,,

Command. On October 1,2008, Headquarters, Military Intelligence Reserve Command,

published Order Number 08-275-0001 1 discharging plaintiff from the Army Reserve. On

october 23, 2008, however, the Military Intelligence Reserve command revoked the

October 1,20OB order, because, according to Army personnel, e-mail correspondence

contained in plaintiffs official Military Personnel File, the Military Intelligence Reserve

-

Command did not have the authority to discharge plaintiff from service.

On March 6, 2009, the Commander of the United States Army Reserve

forwarded plaintiffs Board of Inquiry separation results to the commander of the United

states Army Human Resources command requesting final action. on october g, 2009,

the united States Army Human Resources command approved the Board of Inquiry's

recommendation to discharge plaintiff. one week later, on october 16, 2009, the'Army

officially discharged plaintiff from service under "other than Honorable;' conditions, with

an effective date of November 16, 2009

On September 17,2010, plaintiff submitted an application to the ABCMR,

requesting that "the board of officers [sic] decision be overturned and that Ibe

reinstated as a Commissioned Reserve Officer. lf the board does not wish to reinstate

me. I ask that.my discharge be upgraded to Honorable." plaintiff also alleged various

claims regarding his alleged unlawful separation from the Army, such-ai .Board

proceedings tainted due to Violation of Regulation & Federal iaw.,, The

ABCMR

identified 19 contentions from plaintiffs eleven assertions of legal error. The ABcMR's

characterized plaintiffs numerous and lengthy claims raised to the ABCMR as

tottows:r

a. he was first notified of the board's decision at the end of 200g despite a

regulatory requirement to be informed immediatery after the odiro's

decision:

b. he believes that denial of the report of proceedings and fairure to inform

him of the outcome viorated murtipie regurations as weil as federal raw:

c. the board of officers did not discuss and refused to admit crear

information that the orders they believed he disobeyed *ere ittelai

and he had a right and duty to disobey unlawful orders; "te"dy

d. he had been legally transfened to the IRR and a command mav not

laMully complete a transfer to the IRR and then arbitrarily revoke the

lransfer;

e' he was never provided any varid activation or transfer orders out of the

IRR nor was he provided subsequent activation orders for active Ouiy

training until the date on the activation orders had already passed;

f. the assertion that he was disrespectful was invalid;

8

Plaintiff does not raise ctaims (e), (k), (m), (p), and (s) in this court.

g. U.S. Reservists are not subject to the UCMJ when not in an active

status, hence how could it be considered disrespectful or conduct

unbecoming a commissioned officer to say this at anytime [sic] to anyone;

h. he formally submitted a request for transfer to a local Reserve unit

within commuting distance pursuant to Army Regulation;

i. he resided well over 100 miles from Phoenix at the time and Army

regulations command that Reservists will drill at local units;

j. he was flagged only because he requested to be transferred to another

unit;

k. he abruptly received a letter warning him that he was considered AWOL

and missing movement because he missed one inactive training batfle

assembly and this constituted a felony because it was on Army letterhead;

l. the board of officers refused to entertain evidence of violations of law

and regulations;

m. he was never offered the opportunity to review the evidence submifted

to the board of officers and to demonstrate why the evidence may have

supported his arguments and defense;

n. his command refused to respond to his Article 13g complaint

submission;

o. his command refused to provide him with adequate opportunity to

appear at the board hearing, which was in violation of Army regulations

and in violation of due process;

p. except for a few truly exceptional circumstances, the president of the

United States and therefore his subordinate military representatives have

no authority whatsoever to issue orders under military law to civilians;

q. Reservists who are off duty live in a very different cultural and legal

conte)d than active duty personnel;

r. permifting. the arbitrary application to inactive personnel of regulations

meant clearly for lhe active-duty military would create clear conflicts of

interest, separation of powers issues, and is not compatible with the

Citizen-Soldier concept; ano

10

s. since his separation from military service, he has continued to actively

serve his community by advancing his education, working, and

volunteering his services.

The ABCMR denied plaintiffs application in full on August 16,2011 because

plaintiff had "provided insufficient evidence to substantiate the contentions he has made

in his appeal." The ABCMR found, in part:

4. There is no evidence in the available record, nor has he [plaintiffl

submitted any evidence, showing that his request to be excused from

battle assembly was approved.

5. Although orders were published reassigning him to the USAR Control

Group (Reinforcement) on 28 February 2007, he was notified in March

2007 that his request was denied and that he was still a member of the

MIAD and expected to attend training. The records show he continued to

show disrespect to members in his chain of command. His records were

flagged and he should not have been reassigned. Orders were published

in June 2007 reassigning him to the MIAD. His contention that he never

received the orders is not supported by the evidence of record'

6. His transportation to and from training was reimbursed. He has failed to

provide evidence showing that any of the actions taken against him was

ihe result of his desire to be reassigned to another unit or that the board of

officers failed to comply with applicable regulations' He was told that the

flag would be lifted once he started fulfilling his service obligation and

although he contends that he had every intention of doing so, it does not

appear that he did.

7. Additionally, unexcused absences are considered to be AWOL

incidents. He has not shown error or injustice in the action taken by the

board of officers that recommended he be discharged under other than

honorable conditions. The fact that he disagrees is not a basis for

reinstating him in the USAR or upgrading his discharge.

8. There is no evidence of any violation of the applicant's rights' He was

an officer in the USAR and was subject to laws and regulations pertaining

to USAR officers. He had an obligation to conduct himself as a USAR

officer.

(capitalization and emphasis in original).

Plaintiff filed suit in this court, claiming that the ABCMR erroneously denied his

application because:

(1) Defendant "failed to obey regulations and the statutes governing the involuntary

activation of IRR [lndividual Ready Reserve] members," on the grounds that the

11

government "failed to demonstrate [that] the plaintiff had a duty to attend battle

assembly periods that were scheduled subsequent to the plaintiff being

discharged out of the US Army Ready Reserve into the individual ready reserve

(lRR);"

(2) Defendant "had no lawful authority to affect an involuntary activation of the

plaintiff by 'revoking' the orders placing plaintiff into the IRR;"

(3) Defendant "failed to adhere to Army Regulation 140-10, 1-10, par' (1) which

states that reserve assignments 'MUST BE' within 50 miles of an Officers [sic]

residence," and the defendant "failed to redress injustice" regarding Army

Regulation 140-1 0 by denying his transfer request because "the administrative

record demonshates that Lieutenant-colonel Nadolski acknowledged under oath

this demand to transfer to a local unit was submitted in writing prior to any

'flagging' action, even though the'flagging' action for 'misconduct' was used by

him [Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski] as a premise to deny the transfer request;"

(4) Defendant "failed to comply with Army regulations commanding that personnel

' 'should

be afforded an opportunity to transfer to another unit in order to

'rehabilitate' where a problem exists;"

(5) The

,,Board of Inquiry legal officer permitted the submission of a telephone

wiretap/recording to the board of separation through the commission of a felony

under state laws barring the recording and transmission to third parties of

telephone conversations without authorization of all parties; the recording was

never provided to the plaintiff prior to the Board of Inquiry hearing in

contravention of regulations governing the separation of officers ;"

(6) Defendant "refused to produce any documentation whatsoever elucidating either

the conduct of, or the outcome of the Board of Inquiry for case 07-0050 [plaintiffls

casel for approximately one year after the hearing in contravention of regulations

goveining ihe separation of Officers which command that the board decision and

iocumentation from the hearing should be made available to the respondent

immediately," and that the ABCMR 'Tailed to consider the substantial harm

caused to plaintiffs [sic] ability to seek redress due to this delay [in furnishing

Board of Inquiry decision documents,l including hindering the ability to challenge

procedures, submit appeals prior to the finalization of separation, or to locate or

identify and question witnesses under oath;"

(7) Defendant "refused to process plaintiffs [ucMJ] Article '138 complaint which was

submitted prior to the board hearing;"

(8) Plaintiff was "denied due process of law by ineffective assistance of counsel;"

(9) Plaintiff was "denied due process of law by the refusal of the Defendant to

provide for expenses for transport to the board of separation hearing;"

12

(10) The "board of inquiry president had a substantial conflict of interest and should

have recused herself but did not;"

(1 1)The Board of Inquiry "failed to obey regulations pertaining to the separation of

officers due to board composition as plaintiff is a member of a federally

recognized Native American tribe;" and

(12) The ABCMR "failed to consider complex questions and precedent" regarding

various alleged military customs and 'Jurisdictional questions" that plaintiff claims

support his argument of a

pretextual discharge regarding the ABCMR's

'disrespect" findings.

(footnote omitted; capitalization in original).

In this court, plaintiff seeks the following forms of relief:

(a) For all pay and allowances together with all benefits plaintiff may

have been deprived of as a result of his discharge, from the date of

discharge to the date of judgment, including but not limited to

reimbursement for medical insurance necessitated by cessation of

coverage of him and his family; COLA allowance; accumulated leave

pay; and PX and commissary privileges;

(b) Promotion to the grade 0-2 and reinstatement into the Army

Individual ReadY Reserve;

(c) For the removal of all derogatory records pertaining to improprieties

as the court may find to be just and proper;

(d) For upgrade of characterization of discharge to fully Honorable;

(e) For such other and further relief as the court may find to be just and

proper.

After plaintiff filed his amended complaint, defendant moved for Judgment on the

Administrative Record pursuant to Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of

Federal Claims (RCFC). Defendant argues that the ABCMR properly upheld plaintiffs

discharge after reviewing and assessing plaintiffs record and applying the appropriate

Army regulations. Furthermore, defendant contends that plaintiff inappropriately raised

four-new claims in this court which were not presented to the ABCMR, namely: (1)

failure to comply with regulations permitting transfer "To Rehabilitate Where A Problem

Exists;" (Z) vi6tition of due process by ineffective counsel; (3) conflict of interest within

the Board of lnquiry; and (4) failure of the Board of Inquiry to provide plaintiff with ethnic

minority representative. Defendant argues that plaintiff waived these claims when he did

not raise them before the ABCMR.

13

Plaintiff filed a Response and a Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative

Record, arguing that the defendant's own "Statement of the Facts" supports the first four

claims in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's also argues that the defendant's remaining

arguments "Lack Sound Reasoning and Are Not Supported By the Administrative

Record." Plaintiff, therefore, requests judgment upon the Administrative Record, or in

the alternative for remand of his case to the ABCMR. Furthermore, plaintiff requests that

if this court "finds a claim has not been stated for which relief can be granted by the

Court, or if this honorable Court finds no subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff respectfully

requests the case be transferred to the Federal District Court for the District of

Columbia."

DISCUSSION

Pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction and judged

by "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v.

Kerner,4O4 U.S. 519,520-21, reh'q denied,405 U.S.948 (1972); see also Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S.89,94 (2007): Huqhes v. Rowe,449 U.S' 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'q denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v'

United States, T5O F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.2014); Diamond v' United States' 115

rea ct. 516, 524 (2014). "The purpose of this relaxed standard is to ensure that the pro

se plaintiffs case is evaluated on the merits and is not dismissed on the basis of

technicalities." Ebert v. United States, 66 Fed. C\.287,289 (2005) (citing Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). {llt has long been the role of this court to examine

tfre record 'to see if [a pro se] plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed."'

Avres v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 551, 558 (alteration in Avres v' Unitqd.States)

Guoting Ruderer v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 456, 468, 412 F.2d 1285 (1969)' cert.

denied,398 U.S.914 (1970), recons. denied in part,67 Fed. C|.776(2005)' "However,

is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiffl has

nbi spelled out in his pleading.""'Lenqen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011)

(alterations in Lenqen v. united states) (quoting Scoqin v. Unite{Qtates, 33 Fed. Cl.

-1t1trere

iAS,z1s (199S) Guoting Clarkv. Nat'l Travelers Life lns. Co',518F.2d 1167' 1169 (6th

Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89' 94, affd' 443 F. App'x

542(Fed.cfi.2o11); Shelkofskvv. united states, No. 13-1016C,2014WL 5648973, at

.4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 4, 2014) ("[Wlhile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se

plaintiffs complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures,"' (quoling Henke

v. United Staies,60 F.3d 795,799 (Fed. Cir. 1995))); Goodman v. United States, 100

Fed. C|. 289, 301 (2011).

Pursuant to RCFC 52.1(c\, which governs motions for judgment on the

administrative record, the court's inquiry is directed to "whether, given all the disputed

and undisputed facts, a party has met its burden of proof based on the evidence in the

record.', Mqmt. and Traininq Corp. v. United States, 'l 15 Fed. Cl.26,40 (2014) (quoting

A & D Fire ProtJnc. v. United states ,72 Fed. cl. 126, 131 (2006) (citing Bannum. lnc.

vunited states, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see ql99 V9!!ed!-v--U!itcs!

*7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 9, 2015) (quoting Sierra

StatCC N"l3t218C,2015WL 129027, at

l'Gvada Corp. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 735, 751 (2012)) ('RCFC 52.1 governs

motions fo+tdgment on the administrative record. . . . Unlike summary judgment, for

14

instance, 'a genuine dispute of material fact does not preclude a judgment on the

administrative record. "').

Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction of this court based on 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a)(1), 37

U.S.C. S 206(a)(2), and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While

the court addresses each of plaintiffs twelve claims below, it first addresses the claims

defendant agrees are properly before this court, opinion in the order which plaintiff

presents them in his amended complaint, claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. The court

then addresses plaintiffs claims not raised beforetheABCMR, claims4,8, 10, and 11.

For counts 1 , 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12, the court reviews the 201 1 ABCMR's decision "to

determine whether it is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or

contrary to law." Lewis v. United States, 458 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Martinez

v. United States,333 F.3d 1295, 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir.2003), cert. denied,540 U.S.

1177 (2004)), reh'o en bancdenied (Fed. Cir.2006), cert. denied,552 U.S. 810 (2007);

see also Ghappell v. Wallace. 462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983) ("Board decisions are subject to

judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on

substantial evidence."); Burnick v. United States, 541 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010);

Barnes v. United States , 473 F .3d 1356, 1 361 (Fed. Cir.) ("We apply the same standard

of review as the United States Court of Federal Claims, which means 'we will not disturb

the decision of the corrections board unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or

unsupported by substantial evidence."'(quoting Chambers v. United States,417 F.3d

1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 813 (2007); Metz v. United States.

466 F.3d 991, 998 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2006); Porter v. United

States. 163 F.3d 1304, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh'q denied, en banc suqqestion

declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied.528 U.S.809 (1999); Heisiq v. United States.719

F.2d1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Skinnerv. United States.219 Ct. Cl.322,331,594

F.2d824,830 (1979);Spellissvv. United States, 103 Fed. Cl.274,283(2012) ("ffihen

a service member chooses to seek relief from a military corrections board, the court'will

not disturb the decision of [a] corrections board unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary

to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence."' (quoting Chambers v. United States,

417 F.3d at'1227) (second modification in original)). In Riser v. United States, the

United States Court of Federal Claims noted that plaintiff must show that the decision by

the ABCMR was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial

evidence, and that, in accordance with this deferential standard of review, the court

does not reweigh the evidence, "but rather considers whether the conclusion being

reviewed is supported by substantial evidence. So long as the Board considered the

relevant evidence and came to a reasonable conclusion, this court will not disturb the

Board's decision." Riser v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl.679, 683-84 (201 1) (quoting

Heisiq v. United States ,719 F .2d al 1157) (emphasis in original; other citations omitted);

see also Holmes v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl.767,780-81 (2011) ("'The Board's

decision will comply with the substantial evidence standard so long as a 'reasonable

mind might accept" [the] particular evidentiary record as "adequate to support [the

contestedl conclusion.""' (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 15O, 162 (1999) (quoting

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938))) (modifications in

original)).

15

This standard of review is narrow. The court does not sit as "a super correction

board." Skinner v. United States. 219 Ct. Cl. at 331, 594 F.2d at 830; see also Voqe v.

United States, 844 F.2d776,782 (Fed. Cir.) (The "court does not function as 'a sort of

super Correction Board."'(quoting Reale v. United States,208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1013, 529

F.2d 533, cert. denied,429 U.S.854 (1976))), cert. denied,4SB U.S.941 (1988).

Moreover, "military administrators are presumed to act lawfully and in good faith like

other public officers, and the military is entitled to substantial deference in the

governan@ of its affairs." Dodson v. United States. 988 F.2d 1199, 1204 (Fed. Cir.),

reh'q denied (Fed. Cir. 1993). "'[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army."'

Antonellis v. United States,723 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Orloff v.

Willouqhbv,345 U.S.83,93 (1953)). The United States Supreme Court, however, has

also stated:

Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency

has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the

agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in

view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not

attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a

reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given.

SEC v. Chenery Corp.. 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) treh'q denied and reh's

denied sub nom. SEC v. Fed. Water & Gas Corp. (1947)1. We will,

however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path

may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp.. lnc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freiqht Svstem, Inc., 419 U.S. 1281,1286, 95 S. Ct. 438, 42 L. Ed. 2d 447

[(1974)]. See also Camp v. Pitts. 411 U.S. 138, 142-143,93 S. Ct. 1241,

36 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1973) (per curiam).

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 463 U.S. 29'

43-44 (1983) (other citations omitted); see also SKF USA lnc. v. United States, 630

F.3d 1365, 1373 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 201 1)). In sum, as a Judge of the United States Court of

Federal Claims explained in Verbeck v. United States:

The court's review in these matters is thus limited in scope and deferential

in nature. Ms. Verbeck must show that the Board's decision was arbitrary

and capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

See Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir.2005)

tcert. denied, 546 U.S. 1066 (2005)l; Godwin v. United States, 338 F.3d

1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir.2003); Heisiq [v. United States],719 F.2d [1153'

'1 156 (Fed. Cir. 1983)1. . . . The Board's decision will comply with the

substantial evidence standard so long as a "'reasonable mind might

accept' [the] particular evidentiary record as 'adequate to support [the

contestedl conclusion."' Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162, 119 S. Ct'

1816, 144 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1999) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y'

v. NLRB. 305 U.S. 197, 229,59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)).

Similarly, the arbitrary and capricious standard "requires a reviewing court

16

to sustain an action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of

relevant factors." Advanced Data Conceots. lnc. v. United States. 2't6

F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir.[), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir. 2000)1.

In sum, the court must satisfy itself that the Board considered all of the

relevant evidence and provided a reasoned opinion that reflects a

contemplation of the facts and circumstances pertinent to the case before

it. See Heisio. 719 F.2d at 1157 ("Under the substantial evidence rule, all

of the competent evidence must be considered, whether original or

supplemental, and whether or not it supports the challenged conclusion.");

Van Cleave v. United States. 70 Fed. Cl.674, 678-79 (2006) (While the

court does not "serve as a 'super correction board[,]' Skinner v. United

States. [219 Ct. Cl. at 3311 . . . correction boards must examine relevant

data and articulate satisfactory explanations for their decisions.") (citations

omitted). lf the Board "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the [Board], or is so implausible that it could not be

ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise[,]" its

decision runs afoul of even this lenient standard of review. Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. lns. Co.. 463 U.S. 29,

43, 103 S. Ct.2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).

Verbeck v. United States, 97 Fed. CL443,451 (2011) (second omission in original); see

also PAI Coro. v. United States,614 F.3d 1347,1351 (Fed. Cir.2010) (citing Advanced

Data Concepts. lnc. v. United States, 216 F.3d at 1058).

Plaintiff alleges that the ABCMR "failed to redress clear injustice" in that the

government 'Tailed to obey regulations and the statutes governing the involuntary

activation of IRR members" because the government "failed to demonstrate the plaintiff

had a duty to attend battle assembly periods . . subsequent to the plaintiff being

discharged out of the US Army Ready Reserve into the lRR." The ABCMR concluded

that plaintiff had a duty to attend battle assembly periods after being transferred to the

Individual Ready Reserve. The ABCMR found plaintiff

received a Failure to Report for Annual Training notification from his

commanding officer dated 19 December 2006. The notification states he

failed to attend battle assembly on 15, 16, and 17 December 2006' in

accordance with Annual Training Order Number 011942, dated 29

November 2006. He was told that under the provisions of Army Regulation

135-91, he was required to attend all scheduled battle assemblies and

annual training periods. He was also told thal unless the absences were

excused, he would have accumulated 4 unexcused absences with a 1

year period and if he accumulated 9 unexcused absences within 1 year'

he would become an unsatisfactory participant and be processed for

separation from the Selected Reserve either by reassignment or

discharge.

17

The record supports the ABCMR's conclusions about plaintiffs duty to attend

battle assembly perioOi after plaintiff was transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve.e

The ABCMR cited to the May 31, 2007 counseling statement Lieutenant Colonel

Nadolski sent to plaintiff. Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski made clear that plaintiff remained

a part of the Military Intelligence Augmentation Detachment, and that Lieutenant

Colonel Nadolski would not consider transferring plaintiff until he fulfilled his obligations,

including attending battle assemblies. The May 31, 2007 counseling statement

recognized plaintiffs representation that he had moved from Tucson, Arizona to

Michigan. The ABCMR, however, noted plaintiff 'was told thal under the provisions of

Army Regulation 135-9'1, he was required to attend all scheduled baftle assemblies and

annual training periods." Army Regulation 135-91 provides that "[s]oldiers will be

charged with unsatisfactory participation when without proper authority they - (1)

Accrue in any one-year period a total of nine or more unexcused absences from

scheduled inactive duty training (lDT)s." Army Reg' 135-91 lJ 4-12 (2005). The ABCMR

correctly applied Army Regulation 135-91when it considered plaintiff's receipt of a

"Lefter of Instruction" on October 29,2007, directing plaintiff to attend all scheduled unit

training assemblies, and informing plaintiff that he would accrue 20 unexcused

absences within a one year period if he did not submit a proper excuse for his four

october 20-21, 2OO7 training assembly absences. Even assuming plaintiff had been

properly reassigned to the Individual Ready Reserve on February 28, 2007, he still

would have had a duty to attend training subsequent to February 28,2007 under Army

Regulation 135-91. See Army Reg. 135-91 fl 4-6(b) (2005) ('An IRR soldier will be

det,ermined to be an unsatisfactory participant subject to the enforcement provisions of

chapter 6, under the following conditions: (1) When ordered to AT if, without proper

authority, the soldier fails to attend or complete the entire period of AT."). Plaintiff failed

to attend training multiple times, and accumulated over nine unexcused absences

during a one-year Period.

Furthermore, the ABCMR found, in part:

4. There is no evidence in the available record, nor has he [plaintifl

submitted any evidence, showing that his request to be excused from

battle assembly was aPProved.

5. Although orders were published reassigning him to the USAR Control

Group (R-einforcement) on 28 February 2007, he was notified in March

2007 that his request was denied and that he was still a member of the

MIAD and expected to attend training. The records show he continued to

s

As noted above on February 28,2007, the Military Intelligence Readiness Command

sent plaintiff Order Number 07-059-0000'l reassigning plainliff from his_ current

assignment to the Control Group Reinforcement, part of the Individual Ready Reserve,

due-to misconduct. Later that same day, February 28,2007 the Military Intelligence

Readiness command revoked plaintiff's reassignment with order Number 07-059-

00003. because as the ABCMR indicated, order Number 07-059-00001 was

"apparently issued in error."

18

show disrespect to members in his chain of command. His records were

flagged and he should not have been reassigned. Orders were published

in June 2007 reassigning him to the MIAD. His contention that he never

received the orders is not supported by the evidence of record.

Plaintiff also claims that the Army "had no lawful authority to effect an involuntary

activation of the plaintiff by 'revoking' the orders placing plaintiff into the IRR'" In

addition, plaintifi alleges that the ABCMR

did not assert the argument that regulations allowed the "revocation" of

orders transferring plaintiff into the IRR they only stated the orders

appeared to be "issued in error, yet overwhelming evidence in the

Administrative Record indicates the orders were intentionally issued and

fully executed hence the plaintiff was in the IRR; no authority existed to

involuntarily activate an IRR member by way of "revoking" the initial orders

of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff is correct that the ABCMR commented that the February 28, 2007 orders

assigning plaintiff to the Individual Ready Reserve were "apparently issued in enor,"

anO tnai,lalmough orders were published reassigning" Mr. Mcclellan to the- IRR were

issued on ?8 February 28, 2OO7 , he was notified in March 2007 that his transfer request

was denied and that he was still a member of the Military Intelligence Augmentation

Detachment and expected to attend training. The ABCMR noted that "his records were

flagged and he should not have been reassigned." The orders transferring plaintiff into

thJlndividual Ready Reserve were not valid because of plaintiff's flag or suspension of

favorable personnei actions. The transfer orders were revoked for that reason- The

ABCMR's statement that plaintiffs "records were flagged and he should not have been

reassigned'was based on Army Regulation 600-8-2' which provides that

[s]uspension of favorable personnel actions is mandatory when an

investigation (formal or informal) is initiated on a soldier by military or

civilian authorities. Flags are classified into the two categories described

below, depending upon the specific action or investigation a. Non-

transferable. The flag may not be transferred to another unit (except

where consistent with paragraph 1-15).

Army Reg. 600-8-211 1-11(a) (2004).

As previously explained by a Judge of the court of Federal claims, "[i]n military

records, a flag is 'initiated immediately when a soldier's status changes from favorable

to unfavorable,' Army Reg. 600-8-2 1T 1-10a, and results in a '[s]uspension of favorable

personnel actions,' id. fl i-t t, for the soldier subject to the flag." Hale v. U-nited States,

toz r.o. cl. at 341 n2; see also Boone v. United states, 53 Fed. Cl. 731 ("According to

Army Regulation ('AR') 600-8-2, the Army will issue a flag 'when an unfavorable action

or investfuation (formal or informal) is started against a soldier by military or civilian

authoritieJ.' AR 600-8-2 g 1-11 (Nov. 30, 1987) . . . . The purpose of the flagging

19

system is 'to guard against the accidental execution of specified favorable personnel

actions for soldiers not in good standing.'S 1-8.), vacated, 78 F. App'x 108 (Fed. Cir.

2003).

Plaintiff received a flag because he was absent without leave. In the May 31,

2007 counseling statement, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski explained the flag process to

plaintiff, and how to remove the flag. Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski informed plaintiff that

,,[y]our flag can be lifted after you begin to perform to standard." Plaintiff did not claim to

the ABCMR, and does not claim to this court, that any Army Regulation 600-8-2 fl 1-15

exceptions apply to his case.lo Although the ABCMR did not cite Army Regulation 600-

8-2, the Board of Inquiry's finding that plaintiff had a duty to attend baftle assemblies

after the February 28,2007 Individual Ready Reserve transfer orders due to plaintiffs

non{ransferable, pre-existing flag voiding those orders, is supported by Army

Regulation 600-8-2 and substantial evidence. The ABCMR also examined the relevant

evidence as to plaintiffs training responsibilities and failed attendance, and correctly

applied Army Regulation 135-91 and Army Regulation 600-8-2 to determine plaintiff had

a'duty to attend the battle assemblies. The ABCMR's decision was not arbitrary or

capriCious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law, and is supported by

the Administrative Record.

Moreover, according to Army Regulation 140-10, 'MUSARC [Major United states

Army Reserve Command] commanders may reassign or attach soldiers under their

command to . . . [t]he appropriate IRR control group." Army Reg. '140-10 fl 1-5(c) (2005)'

The Military tnteiligence Readiness Command commander is a Major United States

Army Reserve Command. The commander had the authority to transfer plaintiff to the

lndividual Ready Reserve. Under Army Regulation 600-8-105 11 2-21, "[o]nly the

organization thai published the original order may amend, rescind, or revoke the order."

10

Army Regulation 600-8-2 11 1-15(cX5) states that, "Flagged soldiers may be

reassigned ti- (a) fne flag is based on APFT [Army Physica! f]!n":: Testl failure. (b)

The flig is based on entry in the weight control program. (c) The flag case is in the

punishient phase with no restraints on liberty imposed by civil court, court-martial, or

Articte tS. (d) Reassignment is deemed necessary by installation or major overseas

commanders'(within th;ir command) for the maintenanc,e of discipline, morale, and unit

order." Army Reg. 600-8-2 tl 1-15(c)(5) (2004); see also Army Reg. 600-8-2 fl 2-5

(2004) ("NoimalVl sodiers with 'open'flag cases are not reassigned"); Army Reg' 600-

d-Z 1'Z-O (contains Table 2-3, which provides steps required for transferring a flag).

Upon review of the Administrative Record none of the steps identified in Army Re_g. 600-

glZ f-Z-A were followed in plaintiffs case, which may explain why Paragraphs 2-5 and

z-o ot Rrmy Reg. 600-8-2 (2004) are not included in the Administrative Record. For

purposes oi tnis-opinion, the court cites to the Army Regulation in effect at-the time of

ihe' events in question. The court notes, however, a 2012 version of the Army

Regulation provides that Soldiers with a nontransferable flag cannol be re_assigned into

th;individu;t ready reserve. See Army Reg. 600-8-2 11 3-1(bX2) (2012) ("Soldiers with

a nontransferable Flag may not be reassigned into the individual ready reserve or

inactive National Guard.").

20

Therefore, the Military Intelligence Readiness Command, which issued the order, had

authorig to revoke the order. See Army Reg. 600-8-105112-21 (1994). Consequently,

the ABCMR's findings regarding the revoked February 28, 2007 orders assigning

plaintiff to the Individual Ready Reserve were.not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported

by substantial evidence, or contrary to applicable law.'

Plaintiff also asserts that the ABCMR ened in upholding his discharge on the

grounds that the Board of Inquiry did not follow the reasonable commuting distance

provisions of Army Regulation 140-'10 or properly consider "conflicted" testimony or

dates in the Administrative Record regarding plaintiffls request to transfer to a local unit.

Plaintiff alleges that:

AR 140-10, 1-10, par. (1) which states that reserve assignments "MUST

BE" within 50 miles of an Officers [sic] residence; the Board for Correction

failed to redress injustice by ignoring the administrative record in this

regard; plaintiff clearly requested transfer to a local unit by electronic mail

communication and by written correspondence significantly in advance of

missing any battle assembly period; the administrative record

demonstrates that Lieutenant-Colonel Nadolski acknowledged under oath

this demand to transfer to a local unit was submitted in writing prior to any

"flagging" action, even though the "flagging" action for "misconduct" was

used by him as a premise to deny the transfer request; sworn testimony

by LTC Nadolski submitted to the board of inquiry regarding the request to

transfer conflicted with sworn testimony of Captain Orlandella in this

regard and may be evidence of perjury by Captain Orlandella.

(footnote omitted; capitalization in original).

Plaintiff alleges that, with respect to his transfer request, the ABCMR refused to:

consider the date sequences of submitted evidence as relevant (AR 15)

and the findings ofthe board should be set-aside because the defendant's

own statements in conjunction with the administrative record is positive

demonstrative that regulation was summarily violated and that the ABCMR

clearly ignored this disregard for law and regulation by the board of

officers.

11

Although not raised by plaintiff before the ABCMR, plaintiff now alleges the order for

transfer to the IRR was "fully executed" prior to revocation. According to the

Administrative Record, the Military Intelligence Readiness Command, the same orders

issuing authority that published the orders transferring plaintiff to the lRR, subsequently

revoked those orders the same day. As defendant correctly notes, "[b]oth orders were

issued by the same authority, addressed to the same individuals, on the same date, and

issued within two transactions of each other." Therefore, plaintiff's contention that the

order was "fully executed" is not supported by the record.

21

Plaintiff argues that the ABCMR "did not challenge the premise that a transfer

request was made, nor did the immediate Reserve commander of Plaintiff deny

receiving a request to transfer." (internal citations omitted). The ABCMR examined

plaintiffs November 30, 2006 e-mail to Captain Orlandella and found that, "[o]n 30

November 2006, the applicant [plaintiff] submitted a request to be excused from battle

assembly on 15, 16, and 17 December 2006, which he [plaintiffl contends was also a

formal request for reassignment. On 21 December 2006, he was flagged as a result of

receiving the LOR [Letter of Reprimand]." Plaintiffs immediate Reserve Commander,

Captain Orlandella, indicated that "[w]hat I received was not a request. 2LT McClellan

informed me that he would not be present." The November 28,2OO6 and November 29,

2006 emails between plaintiff and Captain Orlandella are consistent with Captain

Orlandella's statement. Plaintiffls initial Novembet 28, 2006 email stated, "[flor the

December BA [Battle Assembly] | will be in DC & then home to Michigan for Christmas,

I request an excused absence for the month. I will do extra days after my classes are

finished in May." Captain Orlandella responded the same day, explaining that "[w]e

have mandatory briefings in DEC and would like to see everyone present. Your place of

duty is here during BA unless properly excused. You should never make arrangements

for travel until RST [Rescheduled Training] request forms are signed and approved by

me."

In the November 30, 2006 letter to Captain Orlandella, plaintiff also stated "[i]n

the event above RST is denied, this letter is to serve as official request for reassignment

within the USAR and/or the MIAD." The ABCMR found that plaintiffs

transportation to and from training was reimbursed. He has failed to

provide evidence showing that any of the actions taken against him was

the result of his desire to be reassigned to another unit or that the board of

officers failed to comply with applicable regulations. He was told that the

flag would be lifted once he started fulfilling his service obligation and

although he contends that he had every intention of doing so, it does not

appear that he did.

The ABCMR's analysis is supported by substantial evidence in the Administrative

Record and by Army Regulation 140-10. Army Regulation '140-10 fl 1-10(a) (2005)

provides that a "reasonable cpmmuting distance is defined as the longest distance a

USAR soldier can be expected to travel involuntarily between his or her residence and a

site where inactive duty training (lDT) will be conducted. (1) For officers . . . and enlisted

soldiers, it is a distance within a SO-mile radius of the IDT site. lt will not exceed 1 1/2

hours of travel time one-way by car under average traffic, weather, and road

conditions." Defendant argues that Army Regulation 140-10 1T 1-8 demonstrates that the

ABCMR did not en by failing to conclude that the Army violated Army Regulation 140-

10, Under Army Regulation 140-10 !J 1-8(a) and fl 2-6, a solider may.request transfer or

aftachment to another Army Reserve unit in four different ways. '' Plaintiff has not

12

See Army Reg. 140-10 fl 2-6(a) (2005) ('A soldier may request assignment to a

USAR unit by doing one of the following: (1) Applying personally to the unit of choice.

22

shown that he used any of the four ways. Although plaintiff alleges that he "clearly

requested transfer to a local unit by electronic mail communication and by written

correspondence," there is no evidence that plaintiff signed the proper transfer request

form, which the regulation requires. See Army Reg. 140-10 11 1-8(a) (2005). As

defendant correctly notes, "[n]one of the available options include written lefter or email

correspondence.' Plaintiffs request was not in the proper format, nor does plaintiff

contend he signed the required transfer request form. See Army Reg. 140-10 fl 1-8(a).

Furthermore, at no point does plaintiff allege that a commander, Captain Orlandella or

otherwise, approved his request for transfer.

Even if plaintiff had properly requested a transfer, the ABCMR found that at the

time plaintiff alleges he requested a transfer, his "records were flagged and he should

not have been reassigned." Plaintiffls allegations that the ABCMR failed to properly

consider conflicting testimony regarding plaintiffs "demand to transfer to a local unit"

and the date sequences of flagging also are unsupported in the record. With respect to

the date sequences of flagging, the ABCMR considered: (1) plaintiffs November 30,

2006 e-mail requesting to be excused from battle assemblies; (2) plaintiffs December

21,2006 flag; (3) Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski's May 31, 2007 counseling statement

reminding plaintiff that the fact that plaintiff had moved from Tucson, Arizona lo

Michigan was irrelevant because he was still assigned to the MIAD unit and his traveling

expenses were reimbursable; and (4) plaintiffls June 6, 2007 e-mail to Lieutenant

Padilla asking for a transfer to a closer-commute unit due to plaintiffs move to Michigan.

The Administrative Record demonstrates that plaintiffs request to transfer to a local

Michigan unit, whether or not proper, was not received until after his flag was imposed.

At the time his flag was imposed, plaintiff lived in Tucson, Arizona. Therefore, the

ABCMR did not ignore or the date sequences of flagging, nor did the ABCMR fail to

consider the testimony regarding plaintiffs demand to transfer to a local unit.

Plaintiff asserts that his assignment to the MIAD unit was never voluntary, but

that if it was, he revoked his consent by requesting a transfer, thus, triggering immediate

approval under Army Regulation 140-10. Plaintiff is incorrect in both respects. The

Administrative Record indicates that plaintiff volunteered to join the MIAD unit in

Phoenix, Arizona when he lived in Tucson, Arizona. lf plaintiff traveled that distance

voluntarily, there was no misapplication of Army Regulation 140-10 fl 1-10 because that

regulation defines a "reasonable commuting distance" as "the longest distance a USAR

soldier can be expected to travel involuntarily between his or her residence and a site

where inactive duty training . . . will be conducted." Army Reg. 140-10 fl 1-10(a).

(2) Sending a written request for assignment orders by following the procedures

described in paragraph 1-8a(1). (3) Contacting a recruiter at the local U.S. Army

recruiting office . . . Ior] (4) Accepting an assignment on release from AD (Active Army

or USAR AGR [Active Guard and Reserve] status) via the Reserve Component

Transition or Reenlistment noncommissioned officer (NCO) located at most active

military installations."); Army Reg. 140-10 fl 1-8(a)(1) (2005) (providing that Department

of the Army Form 4651 (Request for Reserve Component Assignment or Attachmenl)

should be used for requesting transfer, assignment, or attachment orders in writing).

23

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the Administrative Record or Army

Regulation 140-10 that a request to transfer to a closer geographical unit "should have

been granted immediately." The ABCMR considered plaintiffs November 30, 2006 letter

to Captain Orlandella requesting that he be excused from the December 15-17,2000

battle assemblies. In this letter, although plaintiff partially quotes the relevant regulation

for rescheduling haining, Army Regulation 140-1, plaintiff leaves out a portion of the

regulation which gives the unit commander the discretion to approve an absence and

reschedule soldier training. See Army Reg. 140-1 fl 3-12(eX1) (2004) ("[E]mployment

conflicts, overtime, schooling, loss of income, verified medical problems or personal

emergencies, may in the judgment of the unit commander, justify RST authorization.").

Plaintiffs commander, Captain Orlandella, repeatedly denied plaintiffs request to be

excused from training. For example, the May 31,2OO7 counseling statement makes

clear that no transfer request would even be considered until after plaintiff fulfilled his

obligations to the unit. Additionally, the October 29,2007 "Letter of Instruction" warning

plaintiff about unexcused absences and explaining proper excused absence request

procedures. There is no evidence in the Administrative Record that plaintiff provided

any evidence to the ABCMR that any request by plaintiff to transfer or request to be

excused from any battle assemblies was ever approved, or that the flag on his file was

removed. Nor does plaintiff provide any such evidence to this court. As noted above,

plaintiff never alleges that his commander approved any request for transfer. Therefore,

the ABCMR's determination that plaintiff missed scheduled training events was not

arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to applicable

law.

Plaintiff also asserts that the Board of Inquiry unlawfully "permitted the

submission of a telephone wiretap/recording to the board of separation that appears to

be obtained through the commission of a felony under state laws barring the recording

and transmission to third parties of telephone conversations without authorization of all

parties." (footnote omitted). The ABCMR generally found that plaintiff "failed to provide

evidence showing that any of the actions taken against him was the result of his desire

to be reassigned to another unit that the board of officers failed to comply with

applicable regulations." Defendant notes that "Mr. McClellan cites to no evidence to

support this allegation and the evidence of record is completely devoid of any

supportive evidence."

The summary transcript from the Board of Inquiry hearing indicates that a

memorandum outlining a telephone conversation plaintiff had with an officer was

submitted into evidence. The transcript references a "[t]elephone conversation with 2LT

McClellan" contained in "Government Exhibit 9." Government Exhibit 9 submitted to the

Board of Inquiry is a written memorandum by Major G. Lawrence Lamb lll summarizing

his recollection of a phone conversation he had with plaintiff. As defendant notes the

exhibit is not a telephonic recording or wiretap. As there was no wiretap or commission

of a felony, the ABCMR's decision that the Board of Inquiry did not commit error or

injustice or violate plaintiffs rights was not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by

substantial evidence, or contrary to law.

24

Plaintiff further alleges that the Army "refused to produce any documentation

whatsoever, elucidating either the conduct of, or the outcome of the Board of

Inquiry . . . for approximately one year after the hearing." He also contends that the

ABCMR's decision to uphold his discharge under "Other than Honorable" conditions is

arbitrary since "the Board for Correction [ABCMR] failed to consider the substantial

harm caused to plaintiffs [sic] ability to seek redress due to this delay including

hindering the ability to challenge procedures, submit appeals prior to the finalization of

separation, or to locate or identify and question witnesses under oath." Defendant

alleges that the ABCMR did not err by finding "'no evidence of any violation

of . . . [plaintiffs] rights"' and that plaintiff "'provided insufficient evidence to substantiate

the contentions made within his appeal."

In plaintiffs case, the Board of Inquiry was appointed by the Military Intelligence

Readiness Command. The Board of Inquiry commenced on December 17, 2007, and

the Military Intelligence Readiness Command approved the Board of lnquiry's

recommendation to discharge plaintiff on September 30, 2008. Plaintiff appears to

allege that he received the documentation in December 2008, as plaintiff claims he

received the documents "approximately one year after the hearing." Defendant asserts

that "Mr. McClellan received the [Board of lnquiry] documents no more than 10 weeks

after approval. This delivery timetable comports with the applicable Army regulation."

The Administrative Record reflects that the Army authorities compiled the

documentation of the Board of Inquiry decision between the date of appointing authority

approval of plaintiffs Board of Inquiry decision in September 2008 and the general time

when plaintiff alleges he received the Board of Inquiry decision documentation in

December 2008.

The ABCMR explained the involuntary separation process and paraphrased

Army Regulation 135-175, stating,

[w]hen a board recommends the involuntary separation of an officer,

Headquarters, Department of the Army (Commander, U.S. Army Human

Resources Command (HRC) St. Louis) will, as appropriate, approve the

recommendations of the board and advise the commander concerned to

take necessary action to separate the officer. The president of the board

will ensure that the respondent is granted such time as is reasonably

necessary to prepare and present his case. Undue delay will not be

permitted and the case will be conducted as expeditiously as possible.

Army Regulation 135-175 provides that the president of the Board of Inquiry shall

"[e]nsure that the respondent is granted such time as is reasonably necessary to

prepare and present his case. Undue delay will not be permitted and the case will be

\

conducted as expeditiously as possible." Army Reg. 135-175 2-21(a) (1987). Army

Regulation 15-6, the applicable regulation governing the requirement to furnish a report

of Board of Inquiry proceedings to plaintiff, provides that:

25

[u]pon approval or other action on the report of proceedings by the

appointing authority, the respondent or counsel will be provided a copy of

the report, including all exhibits and enclosures that pertain to the

respondent. Portions of the report, exhibits, and enclosures may be

withheld from a respondent only as required by security classification or

for other good cause determined by the appointing authority and explained

to the respondent in writing.

Army Reg. 15-6 !J 5-10 (2006).13

Army Regulation 15-6 fl 5-10 does not contain a specific timeline for furnishing

documentation to the subject of a Board of Inquiry, nor does the Army Regulation

mandate, as plaintiff claims, that the documentation "be made available to respondent

immediately." Plaintiff does not cite to any other Army Regulation which compels

documentation be made immediately. The ABCMR noted that "cases will be conducted

as expeditiously as possible." Plaintiff asserts that "approximately one year" after the

Board of Inquiry commenced on December 17, 2007, plaintiff received the

documentation from the Army. Although plaintiff claims his ability to "seek redress due

to this delay including hindering the ability to challenge procedures, submit appeals prior

to the finalization of separation, or to locate or identify and question witnesses under

oath," was hampered by what he alleged was delay in receiving the documentation, he

raised these allegations with the ABCMR. Furthermore, plaintiffs appeal rights were not

harmed as plaintiff claims. Under Army Regulation 135-175,

[a]n officer has the right to appeal an unfavorable action under this

regulation which affects his military status An appeal will be

submitted in writing by the individual concerned within 15 days of

notification of adverse action. The application will state the reason for the

appeal and explain the facts pertinent to his case that he feels were not

fully considered, including any additional evidence he may wish to

present. The appeal will be submitted for reconsideration, through

channels, to the authority who originally took the final unfavorable action.

lf that authority does not grant the appeal, it will be forwarded as follows:

(1) lf the original final authority was the area commander, the appeal will

be forwarded to the commander, U.S. Army Human Resources Command

(HRC).

Army Res. 135-175 11 1-12(b) (1987).

As noted above, on March 6, 2009, the Commander of the United States Army

Reserve forwarded plaintiffs Board of Inquiry separation results to the commander of

the United States Army Human Resources Command requesting final action, and on

13

Although defendant incorrectly asserts twice that "[t]he ABCMR referenced the

applicable Army regulation (Army Reg. 156)." The ABCMR did not reference Army

Regulation 15-6 in its decision.

26

October 9, 2009, the United States Army Human Resources Command approved the

Board of Inquiry's recommendation to discharge plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, had fifteen

days from the October 9, 2009 date to file a notice of appeal. His ability lo appeal was

not hampered, as plaintiff indicated that, in December 2008, he received materials from

the Board, apparently one year after the Board met, and could have spent from

December 2008 until October 24, 2009, to prepare for any appeal relating to his

separation board proceedings. The ABCMR properly determined that Mr. McOlellan

"provided insufficient evidence to substantiate the contentions made within his appeal."

Moreover, the ABCMR concluded that '[t]here is no evidence of any violation of the

applicant's rights." In the record before the court, there is no evidence that ABCMR

decision was made arbitrarily or capriciously, unsupported by substantial evidence, or

contrary to law.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was "denied due process of law by the refusal of

the Defendant to provide for expenses for transport to the board of separation hearing."

The ABCMR determined that plaintiff did not demonstrate "that the board of officers

failed to comply with applicable regulations." The ABCMR determined that plaintiff "has

not shown error or injustice in the action taken by the board of officers." Therefore, the

ABCMR concluded that '[t]here is no evidence of any violation of the applicant's rights."

Defendant argues that "Mr. McClellan was not denied due process of law because the

Army did not agree to pay his expenses to attend the board of separation hearing,"

because the Army Regulations permit plaintiff to bring his case at his own expense and

the 'ABCMR record of proceedings and the evidence of record establish that Mr.

McClellan was advised of these rights at the initiation of his separation action and then

again by the Judge Advocate prior to the separation board hearing."

Army Regulation 135-175 11 2-'17(a) states in part, "[t]he area commander

convening the board of officers will notify the officer of his right to . . . (3) Present his

case before a board of officers at personal expense." Army Reg. 135-175 tl 2-17(a). As

is reflected multiple times in the record before the court, plaintiff was advised of this

right to present evidence at his own expense. For example, in the August 2007

"Notification of Pending Involuntary Separation Action" addressed to plaintiff, the

notification specifically refers to Army Regulation 135-175 and states that plaintiff has

the right to "[b]e present at the board of officers, at your own expense, and be allowed a

reasonable period of time for preparing your case." (emphasis added). Plaintiff was

aware he would have to travel at his own expense as a December 2007 email to JAG

attorney Giblin makes clear. Plaintiff wrote to JAG attorney Giblin, in part: "lf the

government cannot, or refuses to provide transportation, I have no means of attending,

despite my sincere wish to attend indeed." Although plaintiff claimed before the ABCMR

that his former counsel wrote a letter to Arizona State Bar that "he has never before

seen a unit refuse to pay for transport of a defendant to an administrative hearing,"

plaintiff cites to no Army Regulation or any other source for support. As Army

Regulation 135-175 ll 2-17(a) provides for plaintiff to present his case as his own

expense, there is no evidence that ABCMR's determination that plaintiffs due process

rights were not violated was made arbitrarily or capriciously, unsupported by substantial

evidence, or contrary to law

27

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff bases his due process claim on the claims

arising under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution this court does not possess jurisdiction to consider such claims. The only

reference to the Fifth Amendment in plaintiffs submissions to this court is in the first

paragraph of plaintiffs amended complaint, which states: "The jurisdiction of the court is

predicated on 28 U.S.C. S 1491(aXl) and 37 U.S.C. S 206 (a) (2) and the 5th

Amendment of the United States Constitution." The United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit has consistently held that this court does not possess jurisdiction to

consider claims arising under the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. See Crocker v. United States,125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997)

(citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (finding no

jurisdiction over a due process violation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);

see also Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.) ("The law is well

settled that the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do

not mandate the payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the

TuckerAct." (citing LeBlancv. United States,50 F.3d at 1028), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.

259 (2013); In re United States,463 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (Fed. Cir.) ("[B]ecause the

Due Process Clause is not money-mandating, it may not provide the basis for

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act."), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2006),

cert. denied sub nom. Scholl v. United States, 552 U.S. 940 (2007); Acadia Tech.. Inc.

& Global Win Tech.. Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Collins

v. United States, 67 F.3d 284, 288 (Fed. Cir.) ("[T]he due process clause does not

obligate the government to pay money damages."), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir. 1995);

Mullenbero v. United States, 857 F.2d 770,773 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the Due

Process clauses "do not trigger Tucker Act jurisdiction in the courts"); Murrav v. United

States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due

Process clause does not include language mandating the payment of money damages);

Harperv. United States, 104 Fed. Cl.287,291 n.5 (2012); Hampel v. United States, 97

Fed. Cl. 235,238, aff d,429 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cn.2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1105

(2012); McCullouqh v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1,4 (2006) ("[N]either the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause . . . nor the Privileges and lmmunities Clause provides

a basis for jurisdiction in this court because the Fifth Amendment is not a source that

mandates the payment of money to plaintiff."), appeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615

(Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 552 (2007). Due process

claims "must be heard in District Court." Kam-Almaz v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 84,

89 (2011) (citing Acadia Tech., lnc. & Global Win Tech.. Ltd. v. United States,458 F.3d

at 1334), attd,682 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012);see also Hampel v. United States,97

Fed. Cl. at 238. To the extent plaintiff relies on the Fifth Amendment for his due process

claims, this court lacks jurisdiction.

Plaintiff also claims that the ABCMR erroneously upheld his discharge because

the ABCMR "failed to consider clear evidence that Article 138 complaint was ignored in

violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice," and that the ABCMR misapplied

various alleged military customs and regulations when it upheld plaintiffs discharge on

"disrespect" grounds. Plaintiff alleges that the ABCMR "failed to consider complex

questions and precedent" regarding whether military regulations can be applied "'at all

28

times' to all inactive reservists" and did not consider "allowable definitions of duty for

Military Reservists." Plaintiff also alleges that the Army asserted that military regulations

applied to inactive reservists "as a justification for convening the separation action."

Plaintiff claims

the DOD has historically held the view that inactive reservists and guard

personnel are in fact "civilians first"; because of this historical view of the

DOD itself, it seems the board totally failed to consider an important

aspect of the problem and failed to address the objection of the plaintift

regarding jurisdictional questions and defining "misconduct" as simply

stating facts and opinions in this regard to commanders (while inactive),

and later responding to commanders with the view the commanders were

exceeding authority.

Regarding plaintiffs argument that the Board of Inquiry "failed to consider clear

evidence that an Article 138 complaint was ignored in violation of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice," plaintiff argues that he sent "a formal Article 138 request for redress to

then Captain Sandra Orlandella, LTC Joseph F. Nadolski, and then to [JAG attorney]

LTC Joseph Giblin. In violation of the UCMJ the command refused to process and

respond to this Article 138 complaint submission." Despite plaintiffs claims, nothing in

the Administrative Record demonstrates that plaintiff filed a proper UCMJ Article 138

complaint. Defendant correctly asserts that the only evidence plaintiff provided to the

ABCMR on this issue was a January 30, 2008 e-mail which does not constitute a formal

UCMJ Article 138 complaint. Therefore, the ABCMR did not fail to consider evidence of

plaintiffs alleged UCMJ Article 138 complaint, nor did the ABCMR uphold plaintiffs

discharge arbitrarily or capriciously, or without substantial evidence in the record.

Regarding plaintiffs charge that the ABCMR misapplied various military customs

and regulations when it discharged plaintiff, the ABCMR found:

The evidence of record shows that the emails he [plaintiffl sent to his

company commander commencing on 28 November 2006 were

disrespectful and as a result he was issued an [sic] LOR . . . . lAfterl

orders were published reassigning him [plaintiffl to the . . . IRR on 28

February 2007, he was notified in March 2007 that his request was denied

and that he was still a member of the MIAD [Military Intelligence

Augmentation Detachmentl and expected to attend training. The records

show he continued to show disresoect to members in his chain of

command. . . . There is no evidence of any violation of the applicant's

rights. He was an officer in the USAR [United States Army Reserve] and

was subject to laws and regulations pertaining to USAR officers. He had

an obligation to conduct himself as a USAR officer.

The ABCMR cited Army Regulation 135-175, which prescribes the policies and

procedures governing the separation of Army Reserve officers. The ABCMR found:

29

This regulation [Army Regulation 1 35-175] states no person has an

inherent right to continue service as an officer. The privilege of service is

his only as long as he performs satisfactorily. Responsibility for leadership

and example require effective performance of assigned duties and

exemplary conduct at all times. The Army has no place for officers who

cannot meet these requirements, and their involuntary separation is

essential. In view of the rapidity with which hostilities can now occur and

the attendant likelihood that an officer may be called to active duty on

short notice, the same standards of efficiency and conduct apply to

officers of all Reserve components.

The Administrative Record before the court supports the ABCMR's conclusions

regarding plaintiffs written disrespect to his superior officers. Army Regulation 135-175

provides for administrative jurisdiction over plaintiff when he was an inactive United

States Army Reserve officer. See Army Reg. 135-175 (1987) ("This regulation applies to

all officers of the Army National Guard of the United States and the U.S. Army Reserve,

except for officers serving on active duty or on active duty for training for a period in

excess of 90 days."). Plaintiffs assertion that the Army "framed" his conduct as

"disrespect" for "simply stating facts and opinions" and telling commanders they

"exceed[ed] [their] authority" is not supported in the Administrative Record. The ABCMR

referenced multiple e-mails from plaintiff to his superior and fellow officers evidencing

plaintiffs disrespectful and threatening statements including his November 29, 2006 e-

mail to Captain Orlandella, which contained the line, "l really appreciate the added

stress your [sic] giving me, without cause in the final weeks of this semester. l'll make

sure to repay in kind." The ABCMR also referenced plaintiffs March 8, 2007 e-mail to

Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski, telling him that he "can mind [his] own business on how I

choose to address anyone."

The Administrative Record also reflects the disrespect plaintiff demonstrated to

his superior officers. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Francis Nadolski, plaintiffs Baftalion

Commander, December 19, 2006, "Letter of Reprimand" sent to plaintiff regarding the e-

mail correspondence between plaintiff and Captain Orlandella explained that Lieutenant

Colonel Nadolski found plaintiffs e-mails "very disrespectful," "disturbing," and

"threatening." Accordingly, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski informed plaintiff that he was

transferring him to "the Individual Ready Reserve to be noted as an unfavorable action.'

Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski further warned plaintiff that if Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski

was "made aware of any information concerning this type of behavior between now and

your transfer into the lRR, I will take swifl action, possibly resulting in your punishment

. . . and/or your involuntary separation from the United States Army Reserves."

Subsequently, on March 8,2007, Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski sent plaintiff a

counseling statement informing plaintiff that he remained a member of the Military

Intelligence Augmentation Detachment because his transfer to the lndividual Ready

Reserve had not been approved. Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski further informed plaintiff

of annual training that would take place on April 21-22,2007. That same day, March 8,

2007, plaintiff e-mailed Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski, in which, although plaintiff initially

30

expressed remorse, he again made disrespectful statements. Plaintiffls email stated, in

part, "l regret the nature of the situation that has occured [sic] between myself and the

command, but stand by my actions that occured [sic] subsequent to my initial mistake of

sending an email in response to an email from CPT. Orlandella that I considered

disrespectful to myself." Plaintiff also stated that he "received a letter at my HOME . . .

accusing me of a serious crime that the command was fully aware was a false

accusation . . . . I made several requests to various members of the command after

initial possible misunderstands [sic] by email for a direct meeting, only to be ignored."

(capitalization in original). Regarding the counseling statement, plaintiff indicated "while

I am in citizen status, as I am now, you can mind your own business on how I choose to

address anyone. lf you don't like it, you can write your congressman and request the

law be changed." Plaintiff continued and instructed a superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Nadolski: "You have no authority to request any American citizen be subject to military

custom, courtesy and law." Therefore, plaintiff informed Lieutenant Colonel Nadolski, "l

will not be signing anything or attending anything until after [sic] further consultation with

legal representation . . . . Upon further consultation with legal representation, I will

contact you directly. I request all further communication from the unit or affiliated

personnel cease." Plaintiffs Officer Evaluation Report from August 3, 2006 to August 2,

2007, also noted that plaintiff was "disrespectful on several emails to his chain of

command and failed to comply with numerous direct orders." Given this long pattern of

disrespectful statements, the ABCMR correctly determined that plaintiff engaged in

misconduct.

In addition to the claims addressed, and rejected, on the merits above, defendant

contends that plaintiff also makes several allegations he did not raise before the

ABCMR. These claims include: Count 4 of the complaint, plaintiffs claim that the

ABCMR failed to comply with regulations permitting transfer "To Rehabilitate Where A

Problem Exists," count 8 of the complaint, violation of due process by ineffective

counsel, count 10 of the complaint, plaintiff's claim of a conflict of interest within the

Board of Inquiry, and count 11 of the complaint, plaintiffs allegation that Board of

Inquiry failed to provide plaintiff with an ethnic minority representative. Defendant is

correct that plaintiff did not assert the allegations in counts 4, 8, 10, and 11 before the

ABCMR. When a plaintiff fails to raise arguments before the ABCMR, he or she is

precluded from raising those arguments for the first time before this court. See Walls v.

United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that judicial review of

decisions of military correction boards is review of the Administrative Record conducted

under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States,466 F.3d 991, 999

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front

of the United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the

first instance with the Air Forc,e Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami

v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the Court of

Federal Claims conectly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his

father's constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the

administrative agency); Spellissv v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 274, 283 (2012) ("When

a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of

Federal Claims' review is limited to the administrative record.") (citations omitted);

31

Neutze v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (citing Sanders v. United

States,219 Ct. C|.285, 594F.2d 804,811 (1979) ("ln evaluating a Board decision, the

court may not consider new arguments not raised before the Board."); see also Barnick

v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 545, 560 (2008) ("[t]he court will not consider materials that

were not presented to a review board"), affd, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

(internal citations omitted).

Therefore, Mr. McClellan is precluded from bringing those claims, which were not

raised in the first instance at the administrative level, to this court because "[s]imple

fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants,

requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions

unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made

at the time appropriate under its practice." Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d at 999

(quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines. lnc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)). This

rule "ensures that agencies will have the opportunity to develop their positions and

correct their errors before an appeal." Villaqe of Barrinqton. lll. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,

636 F.3d 650, 655 (Fed. Cir.201 '1) (citing United States v. L.A. TuckerTruck Lines. lnc.,

344 U.S. at 37). Because plaintiff did not assert in the first instanc€ to the ABCMR his

allegations that his discharge was not lawfully based because the ABCMR failed to

comply with regulations permitting transfer, the Board of lnquiry had a conflict of

interest, the Board of Inquiry lacked ethnically representative members, or that plaintiffls

due process was violated by ineffective counsel, plaintiff has waived these claims and

this court does not have jurisdiction to review them.

As noted above, in plaintiffs Response and Cross-Motion for Judgment on the

Administrative Record plaintiff requests that if this court "finds a claim has not been

stated for which relief can be granted by the Court or if this honorable Court finds no

subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff respectfully requests the case be transferred to the

Federal District Court for the District of Columbia." As noted by defendant, "Mr.

McClellan fails to assert any grounds, or offer any explanation for, the transfer of his

claims to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." Although

defendant is correct that plaintiff failed to offer any arguments or explanation for why his

claims should be transferred to District Court, as plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court

addresses the validity of a transfer to Federal District Court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

$ 1631:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this

titlela or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action,

la

Section 610 of Title 28 states:

As used in this chapter the word "courts" includes the courts of appeals

and district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for

the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District

Court of the Virgin lslands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and

the Court of lnternational Trade.

32

is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a

want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer

such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal

could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action

or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to

which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or

noticed for the court from which it is transferred.

28 U.S.C. S 1631; see also Texas Peanut Farmers v. United States,409 F.3d 1370,

1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Therefore, "[t]ransfer is appropriate when three elements are

met (1) The transferring court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the case could have

been filed in the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interests of

justice." Brown v. United States,74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. S 1631);

see also Pleasant-Bev v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 363, 368 (2011), appeal dismissed,

464 F. App'x 879 (Fed. Cr.2012).

As noted by defendant, and as addressed above, the court has jurisdiction over,

and reviewed the merits of, counts 1,2,3,5,6,7, 9, and 12. The defendant confirmed

to this court that "[t]he Government acknowledges that the Court possesses jurisdiction

to entertain Mr. McOlellan's claims under 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a)(1), in conjunction with 37

U.S.C. S 206(a)(2). "Therefore, transfer is inappropriate over those claims. For plaintiffs

remaining counts, counts 4, 8, 10, and 11, transfer is inappropriate because this court

determined plaintiff was precluded from bringing those claims which were not raised in

the first instance at the administrative level to this court. See Metz v. United States, 466

F.3d at 999. Plaintiff would face the same obstacle in the United States District Court for

the Dishict of Columbia, and, therefore, transfer would be futile and not in the interest of

justice. See Potter v. United States, '108 Fed. Cl. 544,548 (2013).

Alternatively plaintiff requests "[r]emand of case to the Army Board for Correction

of Military Records (ABCMR).' Defendant argues that "Mr. McClellan fails to explain or

offer any basis for his request for a remand of his claims to the ABCMR, which fully

addressed and resolved his claims. Mr. McClellan's 'alternative' requests for remand

and transfer should accordingly be rejected." The court agrees with defendant. The

court has ruled against plaintiff on counts '1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. For the remaining

four counts, counts 4, 8, 10, and I 1 , plaintiff failed to raise those claims before the

ABCMR in the first instance. Plaintiff has provided no reason why plaintiff should be

entitled to bring the claims before the ABCMR on remand. Plaintiffs request for remand

is denied. Therefore, the court declines, either to transfer the case to the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia or to remand the case to the ABCMR.

28 U.S.C. S 610 (2012); see also Acceotance lns. Cos. Inc. v. United States, 503 F.3d

1328, 1332 n.4 (Fed. Cir.20O7).

33

CONCLUSION

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record is DENIED.

Plaintiffs requests to transfer his case to the United States Court for the District of

Columbia or to remand his case to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records

are DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this opinion

dismissing plaintiff s complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge

34

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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