Falyn Bruce v. Derek Guernsey

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-1352

FALYN BRUCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEREK GUERNSEY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 12-3198 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 26, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Cir-

cuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. After Falyn Bruce’s high-school boy-

friend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill

herself, the official contacted local authorities. A police of-

ficer, Justin Harris, went to the home where Bruce was stay-

ing and detained her until a county sheriff’s deputy, Derek

Guernsey, arrived on the scene. Guernsey then took Bruce

against her will to a local hospital where she was subjected

2 No. 14-1352

to a mental health examination. At the time they took these

steps, Harris and Guernsey had only a report of Bruce’s al-

leged suicidal ideation; they took no account of contradicto-

ry information, including her father’s statements and her

calm demeanor. Bruce filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that Harris and Guernsey’s actions constitut-

ed an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, as applied to the states. The district court held

that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face

of Bruce’s complaint. It also found that Guernsey had argua-

ble probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified im-

munity. Bruce has appealed; we now affirm the district

court’s judgment in favor of Harris but reverse and remand

for further proceedings as to Guernsey.

I

Our account of the facts follows Bruce’s First Amended

Complaint. Because the district court dismissed for failure to

state a claim, we proceed on the assumption that these facts

are true (without making any finding to that effect). See San-

tana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir.

2012). On September 5, 2011, Bruce was with her boyfriend,

B.S., at B.S.’s home. At the time, Bruce was 17 years old.

Bruce and B.S. had an argument, and Bruce wanted to leave.

Initially B.S. attempted to stop her, but Bruce eventually

managed to get away. She contacted her friend, D.F., and

wound up spending the night at D.F.’s home. Around 8:00

the next morning, Bruce spoke on the phone with James

Bruce, her father and custodial guardian. She explained to

him that she was fine but did not want to go to school. Mr.

Bruce told her that he would inform her school, Riverton

High School, that she would be absent.

No. 14-1352 3

Sometime on the morning of September 6, B.S. told some

of Bruce’s friends that Bruce had attempted suicide the night

before by tightening a belt around her neck. (Bruce swears

that this is a lie and that she never has been suicidal.) But she

was not around to refute the assertion, and so some of her

friends told the Riverton High School guidance counselor

about B.S.’s claim. The counselor contacted the Riverton Po-

lice Department. The Department dispatched police officer

Andrew Landgrebe to the school. Mr. Bruce—who later ar-

rived at the school—told Landgrebe that he had spoken to

Bruce and that she was fine. Landgrebe, however, disre-

garded the father’s statement, contacted the Sangamon

County dispatch service, told the dispatcher that Bruce was

possibly suicidal, and suggested that they send someone to

check on her.

At 10:17 a.m., a dispatcher for Sangamon County con-

tacted Rochester Police Department officer Justin Harris and

told him that Bruce was possibly suicidal. Harris went to

D.F.’s house and spoke to Bruce. During this encounter,

Bruce was “perfectly fine and showed absolutely no signs of

physical, mental or emotional distress.” Harris evidently

thought so: he advised the Sangamon County dispatch that

Bruce was “o.k.” and that emergency medical services were

not needed. Nevertheless, Harris entered D.F.’s home and

told Bruce to come outside of the house because “Sangamon

County was coming to get her.” In response to Bruce’s ques-

tion why she had to leave the house, Harris said, “if you

want to ask questions I can just handcuff you and take you

out myself.” Feeling that she had no choice, Bruce went out-

side to the driveway. There were other people at D.F.’s home

with Bruce, but Harris did not ask any of them whether they

had any concerns about Bruce’s mental state. He never asked

4 No. 14-1352

Bruce about her mental wellbeing, nor did he observe any

physical injuries.

At 10:26 a.m., a Sangamon County dispatcher contacted

Mr. Bruce and gave him the address of D.F’s home. The dis-

patcher told him that Bruce was fine and that he should go

to the home to pick her up. At 10:54 a.m., Sangamon County

Sheriff’s Deputy Derek Guernsey arrived at D.F.’s house;

Mr. Bruce arrived at the same time. Two minutes later, Har-

ris left the scene. That was the last Harris saw of Bruce; this

means that Harris was present for less than 37 minutes (he

was contacted at 10:17, presumably took a few minutes to

travel to the house, and then left at 10:54).

When Guernsey arrived, he directed Bruce to get into his

police car. Both Bruce and her father objected, telling Guern-

sey that Bruce was fine and that they wanted Bruce to go

with Mr. Bruce. Guernsey insisted, however, that Bruce

come with him to St. John’s Hospital. At this time, Guernsey

had been told only that Bruce was possibly suicidal; he had

not been informed that she allegedly had threatened or at-

tempted suicide. He did not ask Bruce or anyone else pre-

sent about her mental state. In fact, throughout all these

events neither Guernsey nor Harris personally observed any

behavior or actions indicating that Bruce was mentally dis-

turbed or a danger to herself or others.

At 11:05 a.m., Guernsey left D.F.’s home with Bruce in his

police car; the two arrived at St. John’s Hospital shortly

thereafter. (It appears that Mr. Bruce drove there separately,

became upset, and was eventually forced to leave.) At the

hospital, Guernsey and another sheriff’s deputy, Troy

Sweeney, retained custody of Bruce until the hospital briefly

admitted her at 1:55 p.m. Guernsey signed a “petition for in-

No. 14-1352 5

voluntary judicial admission” at 11:30 a.m. In the petition, he

stated that Bruce was likely to harm herself or others if not

treated as an inpatient and that Bruce needed immediate

hospitalization. Guernsey’s petition incorrectly noted that he

was attaching a copy of a doctor’s medical examination; in

fact, none was attached. (There was an option to state that no

certificate was attached because a doctor could not be locat-

ed after a diligent effort, but Guernsey did not select this op-

tion.) He also falsely wrote in the petition that Bruce had

told him that she was thinking of suicide. Bruce did not see a

doctor until 11:53 a.m., after Guernsey completed the form.

A few hours after she was admitted to St. John’s, she was

sent to a nearby behavioral health center for evaluation; she

was released from that institution three days later.

Bruce later initiated this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

She sued Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney, alleging that they

violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing

her. In addition, Bruce alleged a due process violation by

Guernsey related to his filing of a false document, i.e., the

petition for involuntary judicial admission. Bruce also

named Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Depart-

ment as defendants, alleging a failure to train their employ-

ees.

The defendants promptly filed motions to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). The district court granted them, dismissing the

complaint without prejudice. Bruce then filed an amended

complaint containing essentially the same allegations except

for the due process claim against Guernsey. Again the dis-

trict court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. It

found that Harris and Guernsey had probable cause to seize

6 No. 14-1352

Bruce and that Guernsey was entitled to qualified immunity

in any case because he had at least arguable probable cause

when he took Bruce into custody.

Because she had no additional facts to plead, Bruce

moved to modify the district court’s order to a dismissal

with prejudice, so that she could appeal. The district court

obliged with an order stating that it would dismiss the com-

plaint with prejudice if Bruce filed a notice of appeal. After

Bruce did so, the district court entered final judgment. Bruce

then filed an amended notice of appeal to make clear that

she was appealing the district court’s final judgment. (This

was a belt-and-suspenders move. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2).

That is why we eventually dismissed the second appeal.)

Bruce now challenges only the district court’s dismissals of

Harris and Guernsey.

II

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a

claim de novo. See Santana, 679 F.3d at 620. Because both de-

fendants concede that they seized Bruce, the central question

for this appeal is whether each defendant had either proba-

ble cause to do so, or arguable probable cause such that he is

entitled to qualified immunity. (Neither defendant argues

that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), justified his actions.)

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution governs

mental-health seizures. See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725,

732 (7th Cir. 2013). Like ordinary seizures, mental-health sei-

zures comply with the Fourth Amendment if officers have

probable cause, which exists “only if there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to sei-

zure under the governing legal standard.” Id. (quoting Villa-

No. 14-1352 7

nova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)). Generally

speaking, a mental-health seizure is lawful if there is proba-

ble cause to believe that the person seized is a danger to her-

self or others. See, e.g., Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102

(6th Cir. 1997).

Bruce argues that a mental-health seizure of a minor in

Illinois is constitutional only if the officer personally has

observed something that gives him reasonable grounds to

believe that the minor is eligible for admission to a mental

health facility and needs immediate hospitalization to

protect herself or others. She points to the Illinois Mental

Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, which

included that rule at the time of the events here. See 405 ILL.

COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-504(b), amended by 2014 Ill. Legis.

Serv. 98-975 (West) (modifying this provision to exclude the

personal observation requirement). Because Harris and

Guernsey did not personally observe any behavior

indicating mental disturbances, Bruce claims that the seizure

was unconstitutional.

As we have noted repeatedly, however, the constitution-

ality of a seizure does not depend on the particularities of

state law. We noted in Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980 (7th Cir.

1989), that for federal constitutional purposes “[a] police of-

ficer need not personally witness the behavior giving rise to

the probable cause—even if there must be personal observa-

tion according to a state statute.” Id. at 987. And in McKinney

v. George, 726 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1984), we upheld a similar

seizure that did not meet the Illinois requirement of personal

observation, remarking that the Fourth Amendment reason-

ableness standard is federal. Id. at 1188–89 (noting that if an

officer has probable cause for an arrest, “it is immaterial to

8 No. 14-1352

the constitutionality of their conduct that the arrest may

have violated state law”). The present case fits that pattern,

and we come to the same conclusion: the constitutionality of

a mental-health seizure does not depend on whether the of-

ficer met each requirement spelled out by Illinois state law.

Whether or not an officer complied with these state law con-

ditions may have some evidentiary value when determining

whether that officer’s conduct was reasonable, but a viola-

tion of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disa-

bilities Code does not constitute a per se violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Our task instead is to see whether Har-

ris and Guernsey had probable cause to believe that Bruce

needed immediate hospitalization because she was a danger

to herself or others. In making that determination, we bear in

mind the collective knowledge doctrine, under which a law

enforcement officer may rely on information conveyed to

him by another law enforcement officer or the agency for

which he works. See United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247,

252–53 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221 (1985) (one police department could rely on an-

other’s “wanted” flyer to support a stop).

Justin Harris

Harris was summoned to D.F.’s home by the Sangamon

County dispatch service at 10:17 a.m.; he arrived a few

minutes later. After knocking on the door and speaking with

Bruce, he ordered Bruce to come out of the house and re-

main with him in the driveway. Bruce was in Harris’s custo-

dy until 10:54 a.m., when Guernsey arrived and took control

of the scene. Harris left the scene two minutes later. The dis-

patcher had told Harris that Bruce was possibly suicidal, but

No. 14-1352 9

Harris had no other information regarding Bruce’s mental

state.

Even giving Bruce the benefit of the doubt, we agree with

the district court that she has not described a situation in

which Harris violated her constitutional rights. Knowing

that Bruce was possibly suicidal, Harris merely ordered her

out of the home in which she was staying and kept her with-

in his custody for a relatively short time (less than 37

minutes). He did not remove Bruce from the general vicinity

in which he found her; he kept an eye on her until Guernsey

arrived. Harris was the first officer to arrive on the scene, but

the little information he had been given about the possible

fragility of Bruce’s mental state supported his decision to

maintain custody over Bruce for this brief time. Even if he

acted in an overly brusque manner, as Bruce alleges, his sei-

zure of her did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Derek Guernsey

Guernsey’s participation in these events was more pro-

longed and involved. After arriving at D.F.’s home and tak-

ing over from Harris, he ordered Bruce into his police car

over the protests of both Bruce and her father. At that point

he whisked Bruce off to the hospital against both her will

and that of her father (and recall, she was still a minor at this

time). Once at the hospital, Guernsey signed a petition for

involuntary judicial admission that included several material

falsehoods. In particular, Guernsey said that he was attach-

ing a copy of a physician’s medical examination, but no doc-

tor had examined Bruce, and Guernsey wrote that Bruce told

him that she was thinking of suicide, but Bruce denies saying

such a thing (and for present purposes we must credit her

account).

10 No. 14-1352

Even if the initial act of taking control over Bruce at

D.F.’s home was permissible, and that is not clear given the

simultaneous appearance of Mr. Bruce, we cannot say on

this limited record that Guernsey’s transportation of Bruce

to the hospital and his actions while there were objectively

reasonable. By that time, much more information was avail-

able than the initial imprecise and potentially unreliable tip

from the ex-boyfriend. See Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731,

739–41 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that officers did not have

probable cause to seize the plaintiff and take him to the hos-

pital where their visit to the plaintiff’s home was prompted

by a 911 call from a neighbor and when upon arrival the

plaintiff was alone eating lunch and was not visibly dis-

traught). Guernsey’s actions went well beyond a temporary

seizure by an officer facing an unknown situation. On

Bruce’s version of the facts, Guernsey forced a perfectly calm

and rational minor, surrounded by several friends and her

father, to get in his police car so that she could be taken to

the hospital, over the objections of the father, based solely on

a report that she was possibly suicidal.

Once at the hospital, Guernsey’s lies helped ensure that

Bruce remained in custody against her will for an even long-

er period. Bruce suggests that Guernsey’s checking of the

box indicating that he had attached a copy of a medical ex-

amination is a lie because it implies that Bruce already had

been examined by a physician when she had not. Maybe it

was a mistake, but we cannot make an assumption favorable

to Guernsey at this stage of the case. It is fair to infer that the

misrepresentation made the hospital more likely to admit

her, as it gave credence to the idea that Bruce needed medi-

cal attention. Of even more concern is the alleged statement

No. 14-1352 11

that Bruce told Guernsey that she was thinking of suicide,

which certainly increased the probability that Bruce would

be kept against her will in an institution for observation. Cf.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978) (false state-

ment made in a sworn statement used to procure a search

warrant could be violation of Fourth Amendment if state-

ment was necessary to finding of probable cause).

Guernsey argues that the seizure was constitutional be-

cause, in addition to the information that Bruce was possibly

suicidal, he knew that Bruce had not attended school that

day and was staying with a male friend 15 miles away from

her home. The latter two facts, however, shed little if any

light on Bruce’s mental state. Teenagers have been known to

skip school on more than a few occasions and without a hint

of mental instability. It is common for a parent to call the

school and alert it to a sick day or a late arrival, and that is

just what Mr. Bruce did. The fact that Bruce was staying

with a male friend on a school night—and that her father

had not known exactly where she was—might have indicat-

ed to Guernsey that something was amiss, but he had no

way of knowing whether this behavior was caused by a

mental disturbance or ordinary teenage rebellion and free-

spiritedness. Factual development may reveal that the latter

is the case, considering the fact that Bruce was found ac-

companied by several other people at D.F.’s home, and that

she had no hesitation in calling her father that morning be-

fore any of these events erupted. Finally, as Bruce emphasiz-

es, she was calm at all times and exhibited no signs of being

suicidal.

Guernsey also argues that the fact that Bruce was ulti-

mately admitted to the hospital and later involuntarily

12 No. 14-1352

committed to a behavioral health center for three days

demonstrates that he had probable cause to seize her. But

the Fourth Amendment requires an ex ante, not an ex post,

analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (explain-

ing that most issues under the Fourth Amendment “are

evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the in-

formation the officers had when the conduct occurred”);

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[A]lmost

without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the

Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objec-

tive assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and

circumstances then known to him.”); Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (probable cause must be

based on facts and circumstances within officers’ knowledge

and “of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-

mation”). In fact, this ex ante approach is beneficial to police

officers because it allows them to act quickly based on the

information at their fingertips, without worrying that evi-

dence discovered at a later time will ultimately demonstrate

that they acted unreasonably. Here, when Guernsey seized

Bruce, he did not know that she would ultimately be admit-

ted for care; he knew only that she was possibly suicidal.

And, as we discussed above, this knowledge was insufficient

to provide probable cause for Guernsey’s prolonged seizure.

(We note, however, that the hospital’s decision to commit

her may shed some light on what Guernsey was observing

during his encounter with her. This too needs further factual

development.)

Finally, Guernsey asserts that even if his actions violated

the Fourth Amendment, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is available when a defendant’s conduct

“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-

No. 14-1352 13

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When

the constitutionality of an action depends on the existence of

probable cause, the officer must have had “arguable proba-

ble cause” for qualified immunity to attach. Humphrey v.

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, even when an

officer lacks probable cause, he is still entitled to qualified

immunity when a reasonable officer “could have reasonably

believed that probable cause existed in light of well-

established law.” Id. (citing Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d

1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)).

While arguable probable cause is a relatively flexible

standard, it does not bend so far as to encompass Guernsey’s

actions at this early stage in the case. Recall that for mental-

health seizures, the question is whether there is probable

cause to believe that the subject of the seizure is a danger to

herself or others. This record does not establish as a matter

of law that Guernsey, whose only indication that Bruce

might commit suicide was the knowledge that someone had

said Bruce was potentially suicidal, reasonably believed that

he had probable cause to continue to seize her. When deter-

mining whether arguable probable cause exists, we must

take into consideration the particular circumstances facing

the officer. Guernsey faced a calm and undisturbed high

school student who was at a friend’s house with several oth-

er companions and whose father was present and objecting

to Guernsey’s actions. Not only did Guernsey take Bruce

from D.F.’s home to the hospital against both her will and

that of her father, but he also made misrepresentations on

the petition for involuntary judicial admission and thus

made it more likely that Bruce’s confinement would contin-

14 No. 14-1352

ue. On this view of the facts, Guernsey is not entitled to

qualified immunity.

We stress, however, that this is an early stage of the case.

It is possible that after further discovery, Guernsey may de-

cide to move again for qualified immunity or for summary

judgment. See Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th

Cir. 2000). We note as well that Bruce is pursuing an action

in state court in Sangamon County against St. John’s Hospi-

tal and its personnel. See Bruce v. St. John’s Hosp., et al., No.

2013-L-000055 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) That case may shed further light

on Bruce’s mental state on the day of the events, her father’s

behavior and statements while at the hospital, and, ultimate-

ly, the reasonableness of Guernsey’s actions. While medical

evidence related to Bruce’s admission to the hospital cannot

by itself exonerate Guernsey, given the ex ante perspective

that applies, such evidence may still be relevant. For exam-

ple, if Guernsey argues that Bruce was not perfectly calm

and rational but rather was exhibiting signs of mental insta-

bility, medical records could corroborate (or refute) his ac-

count of the facts. In the interest of both efficiency and comi-

ty, the district court should consider staying this case until

the pending state litigation is complete.

III

While Harris had indisputable probable cause to detain

Bruce briefly, Bruce’s case against Guernsey cannot be re-

solved so readily. Taking the facts favorably to Bruce,

Guernsey overstepped the boundaries of the Fourth

Amendment in taking her to the hospital and making false

statements that resulted in a more prolonged seizure. We

therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to

Count I of the complaint but REVERSE as to Count II. We

No. 14-1352 15

REMAND the case for further proceedings as to Count II but

invite the court to consider staying the case until Bruce’s

state court proceedings have terminated.