The opinion
J-S08040-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEITH BROWN
Appellant No. 2406 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 26, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007458-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2015
Keith Brown (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered following his bench trial conviction for delivery or possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”)1 and possession of a
controlled substance.2 We affirm.
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Appellant refers to this conviction as being for
PWID; the trial court refers to it as being for “delivery or possession with
intent to deliver controlled substances”; the Docket refers to it as being for
“manufacture, delivery, or possession of a controlled substance with intent
to manufacture or deliver.” See generally Appellant’s Brief; see also Trial
Court 1925(a) Opinion, p. 1; Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
Docket No. CP-51-CR-0007458-2013, p. 3. While the facts of this matter
comport more with a delivery of a controlled substance conviction than a
PWID conviction, the distinction is immaterial as Section 780-113(a)(30)
covers both crimes and the evidence presented was sufficient to convict
Appellant of either, as discussed infra.
2
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
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In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion, September 23, 2014 (“1925(a) Opinion”), pp. 1-4. Therefore, we
have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient as a matter
of law to support the convictions for PWID and simple possession
of a controlled substance?[3]
Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence?
Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
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3
This statement of the question involved mirrors Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, which stated this issue as follows:
The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict
[Appellant] of possession of a controlled substance and
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.
1925(b) statement, p. 1. Ordinarily, an appellant waives a sufficiency of the
evidence claim that fails to indicate with specificity which element of a crime
the Commonwealth failed to prove. See Commonwealth v. Garland, 63
A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super.2013) (“In order to preserve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the appellant
alleges that the evidence was insufficient.”). However, because both the
trial court and the Commonwealth fully addressed Appellant’s sufficiency of
the evidence claim on the merits, and because it is easily disposed of as
meritless, we will review the claim.
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the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa.2011).
This Court’s review of weight of the evidence claims is governed by the
following standard:
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must
do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege
that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a
juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth
juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that
notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice.
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Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa.2000) (internal
citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).
Stated differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence only when the verdict is so contrary to
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice, 4 “such that right must be
given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692
A.2d 233, 236 (Pa.Super.1997). Moreover, appellate review of a weight
claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a
review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. When reviewing the
trial court’s determination, this Court gives the gravest deference to the
findings of the court below. We review the court’s actions for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Giovanni O.
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4
This Court has explained the notion of “shocking to one’s sense of justice”
as follows:
When the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or when the
jury's verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge
to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall
from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial
conscience.
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa.Super.2004)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Campbell, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court
opinion discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. See
1925(a) Opinion, pp. 4-7 (finding: evidence Appellant engaged in three
hand-to-hand transactions over the course of 15 minutes in which Appellant
was seen to engage in brief conversations with individuals in the street and
then receive United States currency in exchange for objects (unidentified in
the first two exchanges, identified as crack cocaine in the third exchange)
from the individuals, sufficient to support convictions for delivery or
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of
a controlled substance; and verdict was not against the weight of evidence
presented). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/23/2015
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