The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6228-12T3
ANDREA N. FRAZIER,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Appellant,
January 22, 2015
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR and CENTER FOR FAMILY
SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted January 6, 2015 – Decided January 22, 2015
Before Judges Koblitz, Haas and Higbee.
On appeal from Board of Review, Department
of Labor, Docket No. 335,488.
South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys
for appellant (Lee Ginsburg, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lewis A.
Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Anthony DiLello, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Respondent Family Services, Inc. has not
filed a brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KOBLITZ, J.A.D.
Claimant Andrea Frazier appeals from the July 12, 2013
final decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, (the Board), affirming the Appeal
Tribunal's decision partially disqualifying her for unemployment
benefits,1 due to claimant's decision to voluntarily leave part-
time weekend employment after being involuntarily terminated
from her full-time job. Because her reasons for leaving her
part-time employment satisfy an exception to the
disqualification for benefits that a voluntary decision to quit
ordinarily carries, we reverse.
Claimant began employment as a full-time mental health
clinician at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
Jersey (UMDNJ) in 2005. In 2009 she also began working part-
time as needed on weekends as a counselor at the Center for
Family Services (CFS). On April 8, 2010, she was laid off from
UMDNJ through no fault of her own. Seven months later she
voluntarily quit her part-time CFS job to take other part-time
weekend work at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital (TPH), which
offered her higher pay and a regular schedule as well as a
possible path to full-time employment. Claimant worked at this
1
Our prior remand to the agency, requested by the agency for
purposes of a recalculation, resulted in a restoration of $7 in
weekly benefits, leaving a reduction of $89 per week due to
claimant's partial disqualification from benefits.
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weekend job for only four months, quitting due to the dangerous
conditions on the job, which made the job unsuitable.2
The only issue before us is whether the Board abused its
discretion in finding that claimant's decision to leave her
part-time CFS job partially disqualified her from receiving
unemployment benefits.
Our review of an administrative agency's final action is
quite limited. "[A]n appellate court will not upset an agency's
ultimate determination unless the agency's decision is shown to
have been arbitrary, capricious, or [] unreasonable, or not
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a
whole." Barrick v. State, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of an
administrative agency carries with it the presumption of
reasonableness. N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 211
N.J. 535, 548 (2012) (citing N.J. Soc'y for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 385
(2008)). We defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations unless "plainly unreasonable." In re Election Law
Enforcement Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262
2
The agency accepted claimant's contention that being required
to work with violent mentally ill patients without adequate
security rendered this job unsafe and therefore unsuitable. She
was, however, held accountable for the prior separation from
CFS, reducing her benefits and leading to this appeal.
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(2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"[W]hen [the] agency's decision is plainly mistaken," however,
it is entitled to no such deference and must be reversed in the
interests of justice. W.T. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health
Servs., 391 N.J. Super. 25, 36 (App. Div. 2007) (citations
omitted).
New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-
1 to -24.30, "provides financial assistance to eligible workers
suffering the distress and dislocation caused by unemployment."
Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 543 (2008) (citation
omitted). N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) disqualifies an individual from
the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits "[f]or the
week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to such work and for each week
thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed." Therefore,
"benefits are available to a worker who voluntarily leaves his
job only if it is for 'good cause attributable to [the] work.'"
Utley, supra, 194 N.J. at 544 (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)).
The phrase "'good cause attributable to such work' means a
reason related directly to the individual's employment, which
was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to
leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). If an employee
leaves a job for personal reasons, the employee is disqualified
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under the statute. Utley, supra, 194 N.J. at 544-45. "The
burden of proof is on the claimant to establish good cause
attributable to such work for leaving." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).
Claimant quit CFS only after being terminated from her
full-time job at UMDNJ. She could not live on the income from
the sporadic hours of weekend work provided by CFS. She argues
that, because of the termination of her full-time employment and
her inability to find comparable full-time work, she was forced
to find better-paying and more dependable part-time work. She
anticipated that the job at TPH would provide a path to full-
time employment.
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2, entitled "Voluntarily leaving secondary
part-time employment[,]" provides:
(a) A worker, who is employed by two or more
employers, one of which is full-time work
and the other(s) part-time work, who is
separated from the full-time employment and
becomes eligible for benefits, and
subsequently voluntarily leaves the part-
time employment, shall be subject to a
partial disqualification for voluntarily
leaving the part-time employment. An
individual may avoid partial
disqualification if he or she can establish
good cause attributable to such work as
defined in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).
. . . .
2. Personal reasons for leaving part-
time employment which arise from the
loss of the full-time employment may
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constitute good cause attributable to
such work.
The Board argues that this provision was intended to apply
only when a part-time job interferes with the search for full-
time employment, as occurred in Goodman v. Board of Review, 245
N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 1991). Goodman held that claimant
was entitled to benefits after quitting her part-time job, which
she obtained after being terminated from full-time employment,
because that job interfered with her search for full-time
employment and was not "suitable employment" in any event, as it
paid substantially less than her full-time job. Id. at 560. In
contrast to the situation in Goodman, a worker who has both a
full- and part-time job at the same time and, after losing the
full-time job, voluntarily leaves the part-time job, is
extremely unlikely to have left the part-time job because it
interfered with seeking a full-time job. Thus, if N.J.A.C.
12:17-9.2(a)(2) is to be applied to individuals who worked part-
time while holding down a full-time job, as is clear from the
plain language of the regulation, other personal reasons
constituting "good cause" must logically be included.
The Tribunal, without explicitly addressing N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.2(a)(2), reasoned that because claimant could search for a
full-time job and still work when needed on weekends, she did
not qualify for the exception to partial disqualification from
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benefits when leaving part-time work for personal reasons due to
the loss of a full-time job. The Board affirmed, adding no
further explanation. We are constrained to reject this
constricted interpretation because it is "plainly unreasonable."
In re Election Law Enforcement Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008,
supra, 201 N.J. at 262 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). If the provision was so narrowly intended, we can
think of no reason why it would not explicitly communicate this
narrow intent.
We note as well that Goodman recognizes the
unreasonableness of disqualifying a claimant on the basis of
quitting a low-paying job that she would not have been required
to accept due to its lack of financial suitability.3 Goodman,
supra, 245 N.J. Super. at 558-60; see also N.J.S.A. 43:21-
5(c)(1) (delineating the factors to be considered in determining
whether work is "suitable"); Wojcik v. Bd. of Review, 58 N.J.
341, 345-46 (1971) (holding that voluntarily quitting brief
full-time employment, which began following termination from
3
We recognize that Goodman, decided prior to the promulgation of
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(a)(2), left open the possibility of partial
disqualification due to quitting a part-time job obtained after
being terminated from full-time employment. Goodman, supra, 245
N.J. Super. at 558-59. The Board, however, argues
inconsistently that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(a)(2) was promulgated to
implement Goodman by avoiding partial disqualification in a
Goodman situation, yet it also argues that Goodman's apparent
allowance of partial disqualification should be applied here.
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long-term full-time employment, does not disqualify an employee
when the brief full-time work was unsuitable due to low pay,
inconsistency with prior training, and a risk to health); Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp. v. Bd. of Review, 122 N.J. Super. 366, 370
(App. Div. 1973) (holding that a substantial reduction in wages
is good cause to leave work and renders the job unsuitable).
We are aware that the provision is written with the
permissive word "may[,]" indicating that all personal reasons
that arise from the loss of full-time employment do not
necessarily provide "good cause attributable to the work" and
thus eligibility for full benefits. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(a). The
Board, however, has not provided any reasons other than its
unreasonably narrow interpretation of the provision to justify
rejecting claimant's compelling reasons. Claimant reasonably
sought to improve her employment situation by accepting a part-
time job with guaranteed hours and better pay, a job that might
lead to full-time employment. She was forced to take on the
inherent risk and unpredictability of a new part-time job only
because she lost her full-time job. The agency's interpretation
is inconsistent with Goodman, Wojcik and Johns-Manville and
contrary to the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as
implemented by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(a)(2). We therefore reverse
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the Board's decision to partially disqualify claimant from
benefits.
Reversed.
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