The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
SHEILA BOWE-CONNOR, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-0752-13-0668-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: January 20, 2015
AFFAIRS,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Sheila Bowe-Connor, Laurel, Maryland, pro se.
Julie Rebecca Zimmer, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when:
the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial
decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings
during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent
with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting
error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal
argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the
petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2 The agency removed the appellant from her position as a Clinical
Pharmacist based upon charges of causing a delay in patients receiving
medications, conduct unbecoming, and disrespectful conduct. Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 6 at 12-17. The appellant appealed the removal, arguing that the
charges were untimely, that the agency failed to properly investigate the charges,
and that the agency failed to consider evidence disproving the charges. IAF,
Tab 1 at 6. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge sustained the
removal and found that the appellant did not establish her affirmative defense of
harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID).
¶3 The appellant has petitioned for review, challenging the administrative
judge’s findings as to the charges, reiterating claims of a disparate penalty,
disagreeing with the administrative judge’s evidentiary determinations, alleging
bias on the part of the administrative judge, and asserting harmful procedural
error. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2, 7-14. She also submits
evidence that she argues is new and material. Id. at 7, 16-28. Finally, the
appellant appears to raise, for the first time on review, affirmative defenses of
3
reprisal based upon prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity and
disability discrimination. Id. at 9, 13-14. The agency responds in opposition.
PFR File, Tab 7. In reply, the appellant submits additional evidence that she
argues is new and material. PFR File, Tab 8 at 5, 9.
¶4 As a preliminary matter, we have considered the evidence that the appellant
submits for the first time on review and find that this evidence is not new and
material. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The Board will not consider evidence
submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it
was unavailable before the record closed despite the party’s due diligence. Davis
v. Department of Commerce, 120 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 16 (2013). Regarding most of
the evidence that the appellant submits, she has not shown that the evidence was
unavailable despite her due diligence and we therefore do not consider this
evidence. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-21. We also do not consider the appellant’s
evidence regarding a charge made by a fellow employee against one of the
appellant’s supervisors, PFR File, Tab 8 at 9, because evidence offered merely to
impeach a witness’s credibility is not generally considered new and material, see
Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 18 (2014). Lastly,
concerning the submitted testimony from the appellant’s EEO case, although the
document itself may not have been available to the appellant until after the
hearing, see PFR File, Tab 7, it merely reflects her past history of filing EEO
cases and her supervisor’s knowledge of this history. It does not contain any new
evidence. 2 See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (to constitute new evidence, the
2
The appellant alleges that the administrative judge denied her submission of evidence
related to disparate treatment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. Although it is unclear from the
Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) to what evidence the appellant refers, we find that any
such denial is harmless error because the appellant has not stated how the evidence
would have affected the merits of her case. See Reeves v. U.S. Postal Service,
117 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 12 (2012), overruled on other grounds by Boucher v. U.S. Postal
Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 20 n.4 (2012) (in order to obtain reversal of an initial
decision on the ground that the administrative judge abused her discretion in excluding
evidence, the petitioning party must show on review that relevant evidence, which
could have affected the outcome, was disallowed).
4
information contained in the documents, not just the documents themselves, must
have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record closed).
¶5 When taking an adverse action against an employee, an agency must
establish that: (1) the charged conduct occurred; (2) a nexus exists between the
conduct and the efficiency of the service; and (3) the particular penalty imposed
is reasonable. Crawford-Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 99 M.S.P.R.
389, ¶ 16 (2005) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(c)(1)(B), 7513(a)). For a charge to be
sustained, an agency must prove all of the elements of the charge by a
preponderance of the evidence. 3 Id., ¶ 17 (citing Burroughs v. Department of the
Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
The administrative judge properly sustained the charges.
¶6 As to the charge of causing a delay in patients receiving medications, the
administrative judge sustained the charge because she found that the appellant did
not deny that her failure to answer the phones in the pharmacy delayed the
dispensing of medications to patients in the surgical intensive care unit (SICU)
(which was the only specification of the charge) and that the record is undisputed
that the appellant caused the delay. ID at 3; see IAF, Tab 6 at 27. The
administrative judge considered the appellant’s explanations that the pharmacy
was extremely busy, that the phones were ringing frequently, and that when the
nursing supervisor observed a phone off the hook, it was because the appellant
had been speaking to a customer. ID at 3; HCD 2; HCD 3. However, the record
is undisputed that the SICU nurses had tried to call the pharmacy for several
hours before the medications they needed were finally dispensed. ID at 3. We
therefore agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved its first
charge.
3
A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2).
5
¶7 We also sustain the charge of conduct unbecoming. 4 To prove a charge of
conduct unbecoming a federal employee, an agency is required to demonstrate
that the appellant engaged in the underlying conduct alleged in support of the
broad label. Scheffler v. Department of Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 4 (2012),
aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In this case, the agency charged that
the appellant responded to a call from another pharmacist regarding the urgent
need for a medication which had been requested an hour earlier for an unstable
critically ill patient in the SICU. When the SICU pharmacist requested the
medication “STAT,” the appellant responded by saying that he should not be
requesting orders “STAT” and continued to argue with him. IAF, Tab 6 at 27-28.
The appellant does not dispute that this interchange occurred, but rather contends
that, regardless, she timely filled the prescription. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3.
However, the SICU pharmacist testified that, rather than continue to argue with
the appellant over the phone, he had to leave the SICU, go to the pharmacy and
prepare the medication himself, and bring it to the patient in the SICU. The
administrative judge found the SICU pharmacist’s testimony more credible than
the appellant’s and sustained the charge of conduct unbecoming. We find no
error in the administrative judge’s credibility determination and thus find that the
agency proved the second charge.
¶8 We also sustain the charge of disrespectful conduct. See IAF, Tab 6 at 28.
In sustaining the charge, the administrative judge considered that the appellant
did not deny the charge in either her written reply to the proposed removal or her
hearing testimony. ID at 6; see IAF, Tab 6 at 23-24; see also HCD 3. She also
credited the testimony of the appellant’s supervisors that the appellant engaged in
the charged conduct. ID at 6. We see no reason to disturb the administrative
judge’s credibility determinations or her finding sustaining the charge. See
4
Although the agency’s proposal notice included four specifications of conduct
unbecoming, IAF, Tab 6 at 27-28, the deciding official only sustained one specification
of the charge, id. at 13.
6
Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (the
Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations
when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor
of witnesses at the hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only
when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).
There is a nexus between the charged conduct and the efficiency of the service.
¶9 The deciding official testified concerning the importance of patient safety
and that the appellant’s return to the pharmacy could cause delays in dispensing
medications. HCD 1. We therefore find that a nexus has been established
because the testimony supports the conclusion that the appellant’s conduct
interfered with the agency’s mission. See Williams v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 65 M.S.P.R. 612, 614-15 (1994) (affirming the administrative judge’s
finding of nexus where the appellant’s negligence in failing to properly install
filters used for surgical instruments could have endangered patient safety and
caused additional delay and cost to the agency), aff’d, 69 F.3d 554 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Table). 5
The administrative judge appropriately sustained the penalty of removal.
¶10 Where, as here, all of the agency’s charges have been sustained, the Board
will review the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency
considered all of the relevant Douglas factors and exercised management
discretion within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. See Woebcke v.
Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 7 (2010). 6 The deciding
5
To the extent that the administrative judge did not clearly address the nexus between
the charged conduct and the efficiency of the service, we find that this error is
harmless. See Bernal v. Department of the Air Force, 21 M.S.P.R. 283, 284 (1984)
(finding that presiding official’s failure to address nexus was not prejudicial error
where the Board found that nexus was established by preponderant evidence).
6
In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
articulated a nonexhaustive list of twelve factors that are relevant in assessing the
penalty to be imposed for an act of misconduct.
7
official’s testimony reflects that he considered all of the Douglas factors and
checked off those factors on the Douglas factors worksheet that he found were
most applicable to the appellant’s case. HCD 1; see IAF, Tab 6 at 16.
Additionally, the deciding official’s testimony reflects that in considering several
of the Douglas factors, he emphasized the necessity of the removal because of the
appellant’s past history of, and potential for interfering with, safely caring for
patients. HCD 1. We therefore see no reason to disturb the administrative
judge’s finding that the removal penalty was warranted in this case.
¶11 The appellant argues that the administrative judge did not consider her
evidence of disparate penalties. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. In sustaining the
removal, the administrative judge found that the appellant claimed that she was
subjected to a disparate penalty but did not identify any “allegedly comparable
employee who had not been disciplined as harshly for similar conduct.” ID at 7.
Contrary to the initial decision, however, the appellant did identify two alleged
comparators who were suspended for 10 days for engaging in physical and verbal
altercations. IAF, Tab 14 at 22-29. The appellant argued that, unlike these
employees, she was not involved in a physical or verbal altercation. Id. at 5. She
also testified that another pharmacist made inappropriate comments but was not
disciplined. HCD 3. Because the administrative judge did not fully address the
appellant’s claim of disparate penalties, we MODIFY the initial decision to
address this issue, nonetheless finding that the appellant has not met her burden
concerning her disparate penalties claim. See McNab v. Department of the
Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 10-11 (2014).
¶12 To establish disparate penalties, the appellant must show that there is
enough similarity between both the nature of the misconduct and the other factors
to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the agency treated similarly-situated
employees differently. Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R.
657, ¶ 15 (2010). An appellant does not demonstrate disparate penalties when an
alleged comparator engaged in similar conduct regarding only some of the
8
charges for which she was disciplined. Reid v. Department of the
Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 22 (2012). In this case, even though two of the
comparators engaged in an altercation and the appellant alleges that another
comparator made inappropriate comments, there is certainly no evidence that they
engaged in conduct consistent with the charge of causing a delay in patient
medications. We find that the appellant has not described any comparators with a
history of similar misconduct as to all of the charges against her. These alleged
comparators therefore do not demonstrate that the appellant was subjected to a
disparate penalty. Id. Additionally, the appellant has not established a similarity
between her history of discipline and that of the other employees. In particular,
we note that the appellant has a history of previous discipline that includes
suspensions for conduct involving altercations and violence. IAF, Tab 6 at 62-71.
There is no evidence that the alleged comparators had such a history. The
appellant has therefore not established that she was subjected to a disparate
penalty. See Lewis, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 15.
The appellant has not established her affirmative defense of harmful procedural
error through violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
¶13 On review, the appellant alleges, as she did below, that the agency
committed harmful procedural error by violating the collective bargaining
agreement when it failed to provide her with supervisory notes and reports of
contact until she received the proposed removal. 7 PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 8
at 5. Concerning the alleged violations of a collective bargaining agreement, the
Board applies the harmful error standard. LeBlanc v. Department of
Transportation, 60 M.S.P.R. 405, 417 (1994), aff’d, 53 F.3d 436 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Table). In order to show harmful error, the appellant must prove that any
procedural error was likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion
7
On review, the appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings on her
assertions below of harmful error due to timeliness of the charges or failure to
investigate. See ID at 7-9. Regardless, we find that the record does not establish
harmful error on these bases. See LeBlanc, 60 M.S.P.R. 405, 417.
9
different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.
Rawls v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 614, ¶ 23 (2003), aff’d, 129 F. App’x
628 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although the appellant vaguely asserted at the hearing that
her ability to view these documents may have changed the result in this case, see
HCD 3, we do not find that this failure by the agency caused it to reach a
different conclusion than it otherwise would have. We therefore find that the
appellant failed to establish harmful procedural error.
The Board does not consider the affirmative defenses of disability discrimination
and reprisal to the extent that the appellant asserts these defenses.
¶14 On review, the appellant appears to raise affirmative defenses of disability
discrimination and reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, 13-14. In particular, she
alleges that the agency has ignored her disability status and recommended
accommodations. See id. at 9. The appellant also testified at the hearing that she
is disabled. HCD 3. With respect to reprisal, the appellant testified that her
supervisor stated that, if she filed any lawsuits, she would be sorry. Id. Here, the
appellant, who was represented by a union steward (who is an attorney), raised
the affirmative defense of harmful procedural error below. IAF, Tab 1 at 6,
Tab 14 at 6-7, Tab 17 at 1. In two hearing orders, the appellant was notified that,
absent good cause, she would be limited to the facts and issues (including
affirmative defenses) identified in her prehearing submissions in presenting
evidence at the hearing. IAF, Tabs 4, 10. The appellant, however, did not raise
the affirmative defenses of disability discrimination or reprisal. The Board will
not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a
showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available
despite the party's due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air
Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The appellant has not offered such evidence
and instead attempts to reframe prior allegations as retaliation and disability
discrimination. Therefore, to the extent that the appellant again raises these as
affirmative defenses, we do not consider them.
10
The appellant has not shown bias.
¶15 The appellant alleges that the administrative judge showed bias against her.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. In making a claim of bias or prejudice, the appellant must
overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies
administrative adjudicators. Asatov v. Agency for International
Development, 119 M.S.P.R. 692, ¶ 13 (2013). Specifically, an administrative
judge’s honest appraisal of the appellant’s case does not constitute bias.
Galloway v. Department of Agriculture, 110 M.S.P.R. 311, ¶ 13 (2008). In
addition to alleging bias on the basis of the administrative judge’s factual
determinations, the appellant states that the administrative judge commented off
the record that the appellant should apply for disability retirement. PFR File, Tab
1 at 11. The appellant also makes a vague allegation of bias based upon her
religious background. PFR File, Tab 8 at 6. We find that the appellant’s
allegations do not meet the legal standard for establishing that the administrative
judge was biased against her or her case.
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
You have the right to request further review of this final decision.
Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review
You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination
claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5
of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you
submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method
requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
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Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, NE
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after
your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your
representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no
later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to
file, be very careful to file on time.
Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action
If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your
discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your
discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States
district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with
the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If
you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order
before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar
days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to
file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to
representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of
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prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.