State of Tennessee v. Kayln Marie Polochak

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 29, 2014

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KAYLN MARIE POLOCHAK

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Overton County

No. 2011-CR-45 David A. Patterson, Judge

No. M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 16, 2015

The Defendant, Kayln Marie Polochak, was convicted by an Overton County Criminal Court

jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit

first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and

theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-103, 39-13-403, 39-14-103 (2014).

The trial court merged the first degree and felony murder convictions and imposed a life

sentence. The court also imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years at 30% service for

conspiracy to commit first degree murder, fifteen years at 100% service for especially

aggravated robbery, and two years at 30% service for theft. On appeal, she contends that (1)

the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying her

motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress

her pretrial statements, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to exclude the video recording of

the crime scene depicting the victim’s body at the scene and a photograph taken during the

victim’s autopsy, (5) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s fear of the

codefendant, (6) the trial court erred by excluding witness testimony related to the

Defendant’s mother’s consenting to police questioning of the Defendant, (7) the trial court

erred by failing to provide an intoxication jury instruction, (8) the trial court erred by failing

to provide a duress jury instruction, (9) the mandatory life imprisonment sentence violates

the federal and Tennessee constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment,

and (10) the juvenile court erred by transferring her case to the criminal court. We affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

R OBERT H. M ONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERETT

W ILLIAMS and R OGER A. P AGE, JJ., joined.

Michael Savage, Livingston, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kayln Marie Polochak.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney

General; Randall York, District Attorney General; and Mark E. Gore, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case relates to the strangulation death of seventy-two-year-old Hassie Pearl

Breeding on December 10, 2010. At the trial, Teresa Breeding, the victim’s daughter,

testified that she unsuccessfully attempted to telephone the victim on December 11. Her

nephew, Brandon, told her that he and his girlfriend were going to stop by the victim’s house

for a visit. She told Brandon that she had been unable to reach the victim all day and asked

him to text Benjamin Bowers, also her nephew and the codefendant in this case, inquiring

about the victim’s whereabouts. She explained that the Defendant was Mr. Bowers’s

girlfriend and that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers had been living with the victim. She met

the Defendant at Thanksgiving dinner the previous month.

Ms. Breeding testified that at 10:00 p.m. on December 11, 2010, she and her

eight-year-old daughter drove to the victim’s house. Her daughter remained in the car while

Ms. Breeding entered the house. She noticed the lights were off, and the victim’s 2006 silver

Toyota Scion was gone. She said that when she entered one of the bedrooms, she saw a

cover over something on the floor. When she removed the cover, she saw a pillow over the

victim’s face. She said the victim was cold and her skin was discolored. At the time she

found the victim, Ms. Breeding was on the telephone with her niece, Jennifer Bolo. They

each called 9-1-1. While Ms. Breeding was on the telephone with 9-1-1, she saw a cord

around the victim’s neck.

Ms. Breeding identified a diagram of the victim’s house and explained the layout. She

identified a photograph of the victim lying on the bedroom floor and identified the pillow she

removed from the victim’s face. She identified photographs of the victim’s car. She last saw

the victim two or three days previously.

On cross-examination, Ms. Breeding testified that she was on the telephone with Ms.

Bolo when she pulled into the driveway and noticed the lights were off and the victim’s car

was gone and that she asked her niece to stay on the telephone with her. She denied being

afraid. She did not recall finding broken glass near the victim. She agreed she looked in Mr.

Bowers’s room and saw many holes in the walls. Although she never saw Mr. Bowers create

the holes, to her knowledge, Mr. Bowers was responsible for them.

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Ms. Breeding testified that the victim pinned money to the inside of her sock. She

said she was looking for Mr. Bowers when she first entered the house because she wanted

to ask him if he knew the victim’s whereabouts. She spoke to the victim several times per

week.

Billy Breeding, the victim’s son, testified that he was a lienholder on the victim’s car

and that its value at the time of the victim’s death was about $8000. On cross-examination,

Mr. Breeding testified that he saw the victim as often as possible and that he interacted with

Mr. Bowers very little. He denied knowing Mr. Bowers had a reputation for violence. He

recalled, though, an incident when Mr. Bowers was a teenager during which Mr. Bowers

shoved the victim. The police were called to the scene and talked to Mr. Bowers, but Mr.

Breeding heard nothing else about the incident. Mr. Breeding talked to the victim about the

incident.

Mr. Breeding testified that he knew holes existed in the walls of Mr. Bowers’s

bedroom but denied knowing who caused them. He did not recall telling a deputy

investigating the victim’s death that Mr. Bowers had a bad temper and was known for

breaking things when he was angry.

Patricia Bilbrey, the victim’s daughter, testified that she learned about the victim’s

death from her niece. She identified Mr. Bowers as her nephew and said he lived with the

victim. She said the Defendant was Mr. Bowers’s girlfriend, who also lived at the victim’s

house. She said Mr. Bowers was about twenty or twenty-one years old at the time of the

victim’s death. She said the victim was about 5'4", weighed about ninety-eight pounds, and

was in poor health with “crippling arthritis,” a bad knee, and heart problems.

On cross-examination, Ms. Bilbrey testified that the victim had placed her money in

her sock to prevent anyone from knowing where she kept it. She agreed Mr. Bowers had

previously taken some of the victim’s medication. She said the victim generally dreaded

going home because the Defendant and Mr. Bowers left dirty dishes in the kitchen and

clothes on the floor and because the Defendant yelled at the victim. She denied that the

victim claimed Mr. Bowers was violent toward the victim. She admitted, though, the victim

claimed Mr. Bowers had pushed the victim. She denied seeing Mr. Bowers act violently or

yell at anyone. She was not surprised Mr. Bowers and the Defendant were suspects in the

victim’s death. She acknowledged she had not told the police that she was not surprised at

the Defendant’s involvement.

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Overton County Sheriff’s Deputy Tim Porter testified that he responded to the scene

and that he found the victim lying on the floor with a cover over her legs and a red cord

around her neck. A pillow was just above her head. She did not have a pulse, and

paramedics declared her deceased.

On cross-examination, Deputy Porter testified that Deputy Steve Flowers began the

crime scene log. He said a dog was on the back porch and did not know if the dog had been

inside the house after the killing. He did not recall seeing a cat. He said the two paramedics

were escorted inside the house to the victim’s location, and two others came to the bedroom

in which the victim was found. He denied those who entered the house wore protective

coverings on their shoes. He did not recall Fire Chief Rocky Dial being at the scene. On

redirect examination, he denied seeing Chief Dial inside the victim’s house.

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Special Agent Steve Huntley testified that

he arrived at the scene around 12:35 a.m. He said that Mr. Bowers and the Defendant were

considered suspects early in the investigation and noted that they were missing, along with

the victim’s car. He entered the house after a search warrant was obtained, and the outside

of the house was photographed and video recorded.

A recording of the crime scene was played for the jury while Agent Huntley narrated.

The recording showed no broken windows or doors and no signs of forced entry. A cat was

seen walking around inside the house. Agent Huntley noted that the victim was found inside

Mr. Bowers and the Defendant’s bedroom and that the victim was still wearing her jewelry.

A red “dog cord” was found around the victim’s neck. He noted the recording showed holes

in the bedroom door and walls. Items were marked with evidence placards, including two

hats, a black t-shirt, and a red-brownish spot on the floor. Inside the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers’s bedroom, evidence placards identified the dog cord and wire cutters. In the

entryway to the adjoining bathroom, a black ski mask with the eyes cut out and two black

gloves were found. A lens from a pair of eyeglasses was found, and the respective broken

eyeglasses were found in the bedroom with the victim. The blanket and the pillow that

covered the victim were also identified. Outside the victim’s house, a Chevy Blazer was

parked in the driveway, and Agent Huntley noted the passenger-side window was broken and

a screwdriver was lying nearby on the ground. Inside the Blazer, the victim’s TennCare card

was found.

Agent Huntley testified that the dog cord found around the victim’s neck, the pillow

and pillowcase, and the wire cutters were submitted to the TBI Crime Laboratory for

analysis. He identified photographs of the victim after the blanket was removed, which

showed a $20 bill protruding from the victim’s left sock. He learned during the course of his

investigation that the victim kept money in the socks she wore.

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Agent Huntley testified that he and TBI agents traveled to Indiana where Mr. Bowers

and the Defendant were found. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers had the victim’s car, which

Agent Huntley searched upon arriving in Indiana. The victim’s utility bill was found inside

the car. Also inside the car was a black purse containing keys, a pink cell phone, and a gold

watch. In the front passenger seat, he found a handwritten note signed by the Defendant.

The letter stated,

Ben is the only person who has . . . ever had my heart like this[.] I love him

so much. If you have found this you obviously know what has happened. I

want his last name on my grave & I want to be cremated w[ith] him. Kim

Coffel would be my mother. She made me go this way. She’s ignored all my

signs for years. She isn’t a mom & will never be one now.

The letter identified a telephone number for the reader to call and said Natalie “should know

I love her & everyone else.” The Defendant wrote she loved “Benjamin to[o] much. P/z

d[o]n’t break us apart.” Agent Huntley stated that a black backpack was also found inside

the victim’s car.

Agent Huntley testified that the victim’s car was taken to the local police department,

and Mr. Breeding returned the car to Tennessee. Agent Huntley searched the car again after

it was returned to Tennessee and found a Food Lion receipt dated December 10, 2010, at

9:13 p.m. and two toboggans. He said the toboggans were seen inside the car when it was

searched in Indiana. He did not realize they were connected to the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers until he saw video footage of them wearing the toboggans in Overton County. He

said, “[T]ake right, go through Glasgow, take 65” was written on the back of the receipt.

Agent Huntley testified that he obtained video recordings from various places in

Overton County, including a convenience store and Food Lion. He obtained warrants for the

Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA, and the samples were submitted to the crime laboratory

for analysis. He said the black gloves and ski mask found inside the victim’s house were also

submitted to the crime laboratory for analysis. He identified a photograph of a Kentucky

Fried Chicken box found on the kitchen counter inside the victim’s house and said the

purchase receipt was dated December 10, 2010, at 5:07 p.m.

On cross-examination, Agent Huntley testified that he reviewed the log identifying

who was allowed to enter the crime scene. He agreed several emergency workers were

allowed inside the house after the victim was declared dead, and no legitimate reason existed

for their entry. He also agreed the log did “not document[]” each time someone left the crime

scene area. He did not know if everyone inside the crime scene wore gloves and protective

coverings over their shoes.

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Agent Huntley testified that the medical examiner gave him the victim’s clothes and

jewelry. Regarding the reddish-brown spot on the floor of the victim’s house, he agreed that

the property inventory stated that it was blood, that the substance was not analyzed, and that

he did not know what it was. Regarding the red substance found on a door, he said the

substance was not analyzed. Although he did not know the cause of death, he said the victim

was clearly strangled.

Agent Huntley testified that his theory of the case was Mr. Bowers placed his foot on

the victim’s back and pulled the dog cord tight around the victim’s neck. He said the

Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s statements supported the theory. Wire cutters were collected

from the Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s bedroom and analyzed to determine if the cutters were

used to cut the dog cord. He noted one piece of the dog cord was found around the victim’s

neck and another piece was found inside the Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s bedroom. He

agreed no evidence showed the Defendant touched the wire cutters, however, Mr. Bowers

admitted to using the wire cutters to cut the dog cord.

Agent Huntley testified that he found a broken eyeglass lens on the floor near the

victim and that the frames were lying on a pile of clothes in the same room. He did not know

how the frames came to be on the pile of clothes. No fingerprints were found on the frames,

and the frames were not analyzed for the presence of DNA or fibers. He agreed he did not

obtain the Defendant’s fingerprints, although he obtained Mr. Bowers’s fingerprints. He

denied the blanket found covering the victim was analyzed but said the pillow found on the

victim’s face showed the presence of the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA profiles. He

said he did not know if the Defendant’s living in the victim’s house might explain the

presence of her DNA on the pillow. He agreed the crime laboratory and the medical

examiner were told the police suspected the victim was strangled and smothered. He

considered the dog cord and the pillow as “instruments of death.”

Agent Huntley testified that the Defendant was a suspect even before she gave her

confession. He learned during the investigation that the Defendant was in the bedroom when

Mr. Bowers began choking the victim with the dog cord. He said the Defendant came out

of the bedroom, placed a pillow over the victim’s face, and smothered the victim. The

Defendant stated that she was not asleep when Mr. Bowers began strangling the victim.

Agent Huntley testified that he believed the scene was staged to look like a “bad

burglary” based on the ski mask and gloves found inside the house and the broken car

window and screwdriver found outside the house. He denied the screwdriver was analyzed

because Mr. Bowers admitted to breaking the car window with the screwdriver and agreed

no evidence suggested the Defendant was involved with breaking the window. He did not

see signs of a struggle inside the house and did not recall any abrasions to the victim’s body.

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The victim’s clothes were not analyzed because the police knew who killed the victim based

on the investigation, the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s confessions, and the presence of their

DNA on the pillow. He noted that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers fled to Indiana in the

victim’s car and that the Defendant told two paramedics that she and Mr. Bowers killed the

victim.

Agent Huntley testified that scrapings from under the victim’s fingernails were

analyzed for DNA but that none was found. He noted the victim was a frail, elderly woman

who, according to the Defendant, could not fight back. Mr. Bowers was 5'9" to 5'10" tall and

weighed about 160 pounds.

Agent Huntley testified that the video recording of the scene showed that a cat was

inside the victim’s house. He placed the cat in the master bathroom after he arrived. He did

not know if the gloves found inside the house were for a man, but after examining them, he

said they appeared to be for a “small” person. He could not identify an object on the

victim’s forefinger, but he said the object did not appear to be a fiber. He said the object

could have been on the victim all day. He did not know if the ring on her forefinger was

backward. He agreed that if the victim’s ring was backward, it could have become “turned

around” during a struggle or when her body was dragged. He denied having the victim’s ring

analyzed for DNA.

Agent Huntley testified that two of the holes in the door were created when Mr.

Bowers became angry due to the Defendant’s mother’s threatening to report Mr. Bowers and

the Defendant to the police. He identified holes in the wall of the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers’s bedroom. He said Mr. Bowers possessed the wire cutters before the victim came

home.

Agent Huntley testified that the crime scene log failed to show when Detective Steve

Hritz left the scene. He said, though, the log correctly reflected who entered the scene. He

agreed his request to the crime laboratory stated that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers choked

the victim with a dog cord and used a pillow to prevent her from breathing.

On redirect examination, Agent Huntley testified that he provided the statement of

facts for the crime laboratory request after investigating the scene, collecting evidence from

the medical examiner, and interviewing the Defendant and Mr. Bowers. He said Detective

Hritz assisted him at the scene.

Agent Huntley testified that he attempted to corroborate the Defendant’s confession

with the physical evidence from the scene and Mr. Bowers’s confession. The Defendant’s

confession was consistent with the evidence found at the scene, and Agent Huntley said the

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Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s confessions “pretty much matched.” He agreed the

Defendant’s statement that she and Mr. Bowers attempted suicide corroborated her statement

to the police that they wanted to go out with a bang.

Agent Huntley read to the jury the written statement Mr. Bowers provided to the

police. In the statement, Mr. Bowers stated that his grandmother allowed him and the

Defendant to live with her and that the victim treated them well. They used the bedroom

across from the bathroom, which had the holes in the walls. He admitted stealing from the

victim previously and knew the victim kept her money in a black pouch tucked in her sock.

Mr. Bowers’s only concerns in life, though, were his drug addiction and the Defendant.

On the day of the killing, Mr. Bowers said he and the Defendant stayed home, and

they talked about how they “could be together.” He said, “We figured we would kill my

Grandmother and take her money.” They packed their belongings before the victim arrived

home, and he said the Defendant thought of choking the victim with a dog leash. He said the

plan was for Mr. Bowers to approach the victim from behind and place the leash around her

neck. He said he practiced on the Defendant to determine how best to do it. He cut the leash

with the wire cutters and left them in their bedroom. He stated, “I guess . . . me and [the

Defendant] planned this out even premeditated what we did.” When the victim arrived home

at 5:30 p.m., Mr. Bowers approached her from behind, placed the leash around her neck, and

choked her. He said he wore the black gloves during the attack. He yelled for the

Defendant’s assistance. The Defendant came from their bedroom with a pillow and placed

it over the victim’s face. The victim fell to the floor as Mr. Bowers applied pressure. As he

pulled the leash as tight as possible, the Defendant held the pillow over the victim’s face.

The victim attempted to fight, and Mr. Bowers heard “a little sigh and gurgle.” The

Defendant laid her entire body on the victim and applied pressure on the pillow. After the

victim was dead, Mr. Bowers took money from the victim’s purse. He removed $420 from

the victim’s right sock. Mr. Bowers and the Defendant placed their belongings in the

victim’s car and left. Mr. Bowers and the Defendant bought gas, drove to Sparta to buy

$200 worth of drugs, and drove to Indiana.

Mr. Bowers noted the Defendant spoke with her mother earlier that day. The

Defendant’s mother threatened to call the police “to get Kalyn home.” Mr. Bowers threw the

wire cutters into the bedroom door. He admitted breaking the window in the Blazer when

he attempted to remove the window to unlock the door and take the battery. He wanted to

put the battery in his car, which would not start. He concluded his statement by saying “this

was the only way me and Kalyn could think of being together.” He claimed he would have

done anything for the Defendant.

-8-

Agent Huntley testified that he considered the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s

statements to be consistent. He said the statements each referenced the same date and time

of the killing, Mr. Bowers’s placing the dog cord around the victim’s neck, the Defendant’s

placing a pillow over the victim’s face, and the motive for obtaining money and a car to get

out of town. He said each statement also claimed that the killing occurred because the

Defendant’s mother threatened to report Mr. Bowers to the police. He agreed the evidence

he submitted for analysis to the crime laboratory was based, in part, on the two confessions.

On recross-examination, he stated that the Defendant admitted to attempting suicide three

times within the twenty-four-hour period before her arrest.

TBI Special Agent Darrin Shockey testified that he assisted in the collection of

evidence. He previously worked as a latent fingerprint examiner at the crime laboratory and

said he and Agent Huntley discussed which items, if any, at the scene should have been

examined for fingerprints. Agent Huntley asked his opinion regarding which items should

have been analyzed. Agent Shockey said none of the items needed analysis, and his

conclusion was based on the fact that the people involved in the killing most likely lived in

the victim’s house.

On cross-examination, Agent Shockey testified that he was not surprised that the

eyeglasses were not analyzed for fingerprints. He agreed the agent in charge decided which

items to analyze.

Overton County Sheriff’s Detective Steve Hritz testified that emergency personnel and

four deputies were at the scene when he arrived. He marked the evidence at the scene with

placards and assisted in the collection of evidence. He said that on January 19, 2011, he and

Agent Huntley searched the victim’s car and collected the Food Lion receipt. He also

assisted in the collection of surveillance videos from the Raceway Market in Livingston. On

cross-examination, he stated that about ten people were inside the victim’s house when he

arrived and that many of them were in the bedroom where the victim was found.

Raceway Market Store Manager Ashley Ogletree testified that on December 10, 2010,

she worked from 2:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Although she did not know Mr. Bowers personally,

she knew who he was and recognized him when he entered the store on December 10.

Although she said Mr. Bowers was with a woman, she could not identify the woman in the

courtroom. She said later, though, that she identified the Defendant as the woman at the

juvenile court transfer hearing. She said Mr. Bowers entered the restroom, and the woman

asked a few customers for directions to Indiana, asked to look at a map, and wrote down

directions. The woman mentioned she was pregnant and was going to name her son

Maverick.

-9-

Ms. Ogletree testified that the police obtained a video recording from the store, which

was played for the jury. Ms. Ogletree narrated as the recording was played. She identified

the Defendant, who reached for a map. The Defendant wore a pink and black toboggan. The

Defendant realized she was looking at the wrong map and grabbed the correct map. Ms.

Ogletree gave the Defendant paper and pen to write directions. Ms. Ogletree’s son was

behind the counter, and the Defendant mentioned she was pregnant. The Defendant acted

“just normal” and was happy she was traveling to Indiana to visit relatives. Mr. Bowers

walked into the store wearing a black toboggan. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers discussed

paying for gas and whether Mr. Bowers wanted food or drink. Mr. Bowers left to pump gas,

and the Defendant paid for it and left. Ms. Ogletree saw them leaving in a “silver

hatchback.”

Livingston Food Lion Store Manager Nathaniel Kennard testified that he was

responsible for maintaining the store surveillance system. He described the locations of the

cameras and said he retrieved the recording from December 10, 2010, which was played for

the jury. Mr. Kennard stated that the recording was time stamped at 9:05 p.m. and showed

a person leaving the store. He said the recording also showed a couple checking out at

register three at 9:12 p.m. Mr Kennard maintained an electronic journal of customer

transactions and identified a $25.26 entry from the 9:12 p.m. transaction. He identified the

Food Lion receipt previously entered into evidence and said it corresponded to the journal

entry.

Rebecca Kinder testified that she was a paramedic in Grant County, Indiana and that

she was working with fellow paramedics Yolande Bailey and Justin Black on December 12,

2012. She, Ms. Bailey, and Mr. Black responded to a possible drug overdose call at the Gas

City Police Department. She learned that the Defendant “shot up . . . nicotine water in a

syringe.” She examined the Defendant, and Ms. Bailey and Mr. Black examined Mr.

Bowers. Ms. Kinder said the Defendant was upset and was wearing soaking wet clothes.

The Defendant’s vital signs were normal. She asked about the Defendant’s clothes, and the

Defendant told her that she had been in the bathtub at her grandparents’ house with her

boyfriend and that the “stuff on TV you see doesn’t work.” When Ms. Kinder asked the

Defendant what she meant, the Defendant said “we” put electronic devices in the bathtub

attempting to electrocute “ourselves.”

Ms. Kinder testified that the Defendant claimed she felt nauseous and might have been

pregnant. She said one of the officers asked the Defendant for her mother’s contact

information, but the Defendant refused and claimed her mother was a drunk who did not care

about her. Ms. Kinder convinced the Defendant to provide the contact information, and she

began to talk about the killing. The Defendant stated that she lived at her boyfriend’s

grandmother’s house with her mother’s consent but that her mother was going to force her

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to return home because her mother stopped receiving “finances of some type.” The

Defendant claimed her mother threatened to have her boyfriend arrested for statutory rape

if the Defendant did not return home.

Ms. Kinder testified that the Defendant continued to cry and stated, “[I]t’s never going

to be okay, I shouldn’t have done it, I shouldn’t have hurt her, I just wish I hadn’t done it.”

Ms. Kinder asked if someone needed medical assistance, and the Defendant said nobody

could help because “she” was in Tennessee. The Defendant said, “[Y]ou can’t help her, we

killed her, oh my God, I wish I hadn’t done that, oh my God, I wish I hadn’t done that.” The

Defendant told Ms. Kinder that her boyfriend “got behind her, took a dog leash and strangled

her and I put a pillow on her face and smothered her, oh my God, oh my God, I just wish I

hadn’t done it.”

Ms. Kinder testified that although the Defendant was upset, her vital signs were

normal, and Ms. Kinder found no medical problems to warrant treatment. The Defendant

complained of an upset stomach, lay on the floor, and slept.

On cross-examination, Ms. Kinder testified that Mr. Bowers was in an adjacent room

while she talked to the Defendant and that Mr. Bowers stared at the two of them while they

talked. She agreed Mr. Bowers watched them closely. She also agreed the Defendant

admitted to using drugs and to attempting suicide because “they . . . wanted to be together

forever.” She said the Defendant looked liked she had not slept.

Ms. Kinder testified that the Defendant definitely said “we” killed the victim, not “he”

killed her. She was positive the Defendant said she put the pillow on the victim’s face and

smothered the victim.

Yolande Bailey testified that on December 12, 2010, she worked as a part-time

paramedic in Grant County, Indiana. She received an attempted suicide call and responded

to the police department with Ms. Kinder and Mr. Black. She said the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers were examined but not transported to the hospital. She said the Defendant did not

receive medical treatment. She heard the Defendant tell Ms. Kinder about attempting suicide

and killing Mr. Bowers’s grandmother in Tennessee. The Defendant said Mr. Bowers “got

behind the grandmother . . . with a leash and then [the Defendant] got on top of her with a

pillow.” The Defendant said they killed the grandmother for money. On cross-examination,

Ms. Bailey stated that the Defendant’s clothes were soaking wet.

Indiana State Police (ISP) Sergeant Matthew Collins testified that on December 12,

2010, he was asked to help locate the Defendant and Mr. Bowers, who were wanted for

questioning relative to a homicide in Overton County, Tennessee. He was provided

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information about the victim’s vehicle because it was believed the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers were traveling in the car. Overton County Sheriff’s Deputy John Mackie asked him

to investigate a house owned by Charles and Helen Vaunce,1 the Defendant’s grandparents.

He said the victim’s car was found at the Vaunce’s house. He said that Gas City Police took

the Defendant and Mr. Bowers into custody and that they were at the police station when he

arrived. He was advised that the Defendant stated she was involved in the murder of Mr.

Bowers’s grandmother. Sergeant Collins drove to the Vaunce home to examine the victim’s

car, which was secured and towed to the Fort Wayne ISP Post. He spoke to Mrs. Vaunce and

returned to the Gas City Police Department to interview the Defendant.

Sergeant Collins testified that he read the Defendant her Miranda rights, that the

Defendant read the form herself, that the Defendant said she understood her rights, and that

she did not have any questions. The Defendant signed the waiver of rights form and

provided a statement.

The Defendant’s recorded statement was played for the jury. When asked for

identifying information, the Defendant said she had “been [giving] it all day long.” She

asked if her mother knew what was happening. Sergeant Collins told the Defendant that her

mother had been told it was important for the authorities to speak to the Defendant. The

Defendant had been living with Mr. Bowers at his grandmother’s house. On December 10,

2010, her mother called and was upset after receiving a notification she would not receive

food stamp benefits if the Defendant did not live with her. The Defendant’s mother said that

she would have Mr. Bowers arrested for statutory rape and that the Defendant would be in

trouble with the authorities. The Defendant might have been pregnant. After the call, the

Defendant and Mr. Bowers got high by injecting Dilaudid. They discussed going “out with

a bang.” Mr. Bowers mentioned killing his grandmother. The Defendant did not want to see

blood and recommended they use a dog leash as a weapon. When the victim came home

from work, Mr. Bowers choked her with the leash, and the Defendant pushed a pillow on the

victim’s face. The victim made unusual noises and died after about two minutes. They

dragged the victim’s body into a bedroom and covered it with bed linens and a pillow. Mr.

Bowers took $200 from the victim’s body, and they took the victim’s car to Indiana to visit

the Defendant’s relatives. The Defendant said she was sorry she had damaged the lives of

Mr. Bowers, herself, and her unborn child. On the day she was taken into custody, she had

tried to commit suicide three times. She and Mr. Bowers sat in a bathtub and put appliances

in the water. They also tried to kill themselves in a car through carbon monoxide inhalation

and by injecting nicotine water. She wished she were dead. Near the end of the interview,

she asked if she could still have a lawyer.

1

The record reflects that the witness referred to the Defendant’s grandparents as Vaunce and that

the prosecutor referred to Faunce. We use Vaunce for consistency.

-12-

On cross-examination, Sergeant Collins testified that the Defendant was taken into

custody around 11:20 a.m. and that he did not recall if her clothes were wet. His interview

of the Defendant began at 7:13 p.m. He did not know if the Defendant had eaten, had

anything to drink, or used the restroom between her arrest and the interview. The Defendant

did not appear sleepy or disoriented, and Sergeant Collins did not recall if she wore

handcuffs during the interview. He agreed he thought it was important to talk to her when

he did because she was a person of interest in a homicide.

TBI Special Agent Chuck Hardy, an expert in DNA analysis, testified that he analyzed

various items found at the crime scene for the presence of DNA, including the ski mask, a

pair of gloves, the pillow and pillowcase, the dog cord found around the victim’s neck, and

nail clippings from the victim. He was provided samples of the victim’s blood and the

Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA. Relative to the right glove, Agent Hardy found the

presence of the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA. He said the probability of randomly

selecting an unrelated individual who would have been a contributor to the DNA found on

the glove was approximately one in 1.9 million for the African-American population, one in

38.5 million for the Caucasian population, one in 78.2 million for the Southeastern Hispanic

population, and one in 40.6 million for the Southwestern Hispanic population. He concluded

that the victim’s DNA was not on the glove.

Agent Hardy testified that he found the presence of Mr. Bowers’s and the Defendant’s

DNA on the ski mask. Regarding the Defendant’s DNA, he concluded that the probability

of an unrelated individual having the same DNA profile was approximately one in 946 for

the African-American population, one in 231 for the Caucasian population, one in 327 for

the Southeastern Hispanic population, and one in 352 for the Southwestern Hispanic

population. Relative to the left glove, he found the presence of the Defendant’s and Mr.

Bowers’s DNA.

Agent Hardy testified that he did not examine the pillow but that he examined the

pillowcase. He found a stain on the pillowcase, and his testing failed to show the presence

of blood. He found the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA on the pillowcase. Regarding

the Defendant’s DNA, he concluded that the probability of an unrelated individual having

the same DNA profile was the same as the statistics regarding the right glove. He said that

he swabbed the outer perimeter of the pillowcase and that he excluded the presence of the

victim’s DNA. Regarding the dog cord, an insufficient amount of DNA was found,

preventing his excluding the presence of the Defendant’s, Mr. Bowers’s, and the victim’s

DNA profiles. His findings were inconclusive.

-13-

On cross-examination, Agent Hardy testified that if a cat had walked on the evidence,

it were possible but unlikely that the analyses could have been affected. He said that if a cat

walked through the scene multiple times, it would increase the chances of contamination but

that casual walking from one place to another would not be enough to be detected in the

analyses.

Agent Hardy testified that he found a mixture of DNA on the edges of the pillowcase

and that based on his analysis, the mixture included DNA from the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers. He excluded the victim as a contributor to the DNA mixture. He agreed that if

someone had a bleeding cut or wound, it would increase the likelihood of transferring DNA

onto a foreign object. He said, too, that the likelihood of transfer increased when the foreign

object had a rough surface.

Agent Hardy testified that he analyzed the ski mask at the eye and mouth openings

because that was the most likely location of DNA. He agreed that if someone were gasping

for breath or trying to scream for help, the likelihood of transferring DNA from the mouth

would increase. Relative to the pillowcase, he said he analyzed the edges because of the

State’s theory that the victim was strangled and smothered with a pillowcase. He agreed he

did not find the victim’s DNA on the areas analyzed. Regarding his decision not to analyze

the center of the pillowcase, he said the probative evidence was not the location of the

victim’s DNA because the pillow was found on the victim. He said the probative evidence

was identifying the DNA of who might have held the pillow over the victim’s face.

Agent Hardy testified that the presence of the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA

on the pillowcase might be explained by their living in the house. When asked if his analyses

proved the Defendant used the pillow to smother the victim, he said that his analyses only

showed the presence of the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s DNA and that he could not

determine how the DNA was deposited on the pillowcase.

On redirect examination, Agent Hardy testified that his examination of the pillowcase

probably would not have changed had he known the Defendant stated she had smothered the

victim with the pillow. He agreed the Defendant’s confession might explain why the

Defendant’s DNA was on the pillowcase.

Dr. Adele Lewis, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that she performed the

victim’s autopsy. She said generally, medical examiners needed investigative information

from the police in order to determine a cause and manner of death. She said that certain

causes of death could not be determined by an autopsy and that the only way to make a

diagnosis was to use the history provided by law enforcement. Regarding strangulation, she

said ligature marks in the muscles of the neck and breaking of the hyoid bone in the front of

-14-

the neck were findings consistent with strangulation. She said “a fair” amount of force was

needed to break the hyoid bone. Regarding smothering, she said information from

investigating police officers was critical because medical examiners were prohibited from

determining a cause of death if a plastic bag were removed from a person’s head prior to

notifying the police. She said petechial bleeding was also an indication of strangulation and

might indicate smothering.

Dr. Lewis testified that before she performed the autopsy, the police told her the

victim was found on the floor with a red cord around her neck and a pillow on her face. She

concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the cause of death was asphyxia

due to strangulation and smothering and that the manner of death was a homicide. She said

usually no physical evidence of smothering was found but noted the victim had petechial

hemorrhaging in the eyes, which could have been caused by strangulation or smothering.

She identified photographs of the victim’s hyoid bone and of the ligature mark on her neck

caused by a rope-like object. She concluded that the hyoid bone was broken and noted that

she found antemortem bleeding in the bone. She identified a photograph of petechial

hemorrhages in the victim’s right eye and a photograph of the victim’s face, which showed

petechiae of the skin around the eyes and an abrasion to the forehead between the eyes. Dr.

Lewis noted that the victim’s nose was clearly crooked but could not determine whether the

nose was injured at the time of death. The victim was 64.5" tall, weighed 102 pounds, and

was in fairly good health at the time of her death. No drugs were found in the victim’s

system.

On cross-examination, Dr. Lewis testified that she would not have concluded the

victim was smothered had the police not told her about the pillow covering the victim’s face

and that the evidence she found indicated strangulation as the cause of death, including the

ligature marks around the victim’s neck and the broken hyoid bone. She noted the hyoid

bone was broken in two places. She agreed “quite a bit of force” was needed to break the

hyoid bone and said someone with “a little bit of strength or somebody with a rope or a

rope-like object” could have broken the bone.

Dr. Lewis testified that the victim had abrasions on her elbows, shoulder, and hip.

She said that although it was possible a struggle occurred at the time of the victim’s death,

she was unable to date the abrasions. She noted a subgaleal hemorrhage to the top of the

victim’s head and said it could have been caused by blunt injury. No brain swelling was

found, which might indicate the victim died quickly, and no obstructions were found in the

victim’s throat. She did not find fibers in the trachea or lungs. She found fluid in the

victim’s lungs and said although it was common to see fluid in the lungs, fluid alone did not

necessarily mean the victim died quickly.

-15-

On redirect examination, Dr. Lewis testified that her findings were consistent with the

victim’s dying two minutes after the strangulation began. On recross-examination, she stated

that the blood vessels located in the neck flowing to and from the brain were cut off during

the strangulation. She agreed the victim could have been unconscious in a matter of seconds.

In the interest of judicial efficiency, the Defendant was permitted to call a witness

during the State’s proof. Dr. James Walker, an expert in forensic psychology, testified that

he evaluated the Defendant after reviewing mental health and medical treatment records and

information regarding the present case. He said her previous treatment records showed that

she underwent a psychological exam at the Volunteer Behavioral Health Center, underwent

a neurological examination in November 2010, and received psychotherapy and psychiatric

services at the Personal Growth and Learning Center. He was provided the “suicide note”

previously written by the Defendant, her police statement, and the police reports.

Dr. Walker interviewed the Defendant on May 21, 2012, administered several

psychological tests, and obtained a personal history. Mr. Walker concluded that the

Defendant had multiple “serious” mental health disorders. He concluded the Defendant had

major depression in which she experienced frequent “spells of low mood” lasting for more

than two weeks. He said other symptoms included low energy, difficulty sleeping, guilty

thoughts, preoccupations, loss of appetite, and suicidal thoughts.

Dr. Walker also diagnosed the Defendant with post-traumatic stress disorder as a

result of the Defendant’s suffering serious trauma and abuse from her father. She claimed

she was beaten by her father, sexually abused “over the years,” and involved in abusive

romantic relationships. Dr. Walker, likewise, concluded that the Defendant suffered from

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in which she had difficulty controlling her behavior.

He said the symptoms included impulsivity, difficulty paying attention, and being overly

distracted. He noted the Defendant’s neurologist concluded that she had the disorder one

year before the killing. Dr. Walker noted that the Defendant had chemical dependence

disorders associated with pain medication, methamphetamine, benzodiazipine, and alcohol.

He further concluded that the Defendant had dependent personality characteristics. The

Defendant formed very dependent attachments with others who were stronger willed than she

and who she perceived as smarter, brighter, older, and more attractive. He said the

Defendant tended to do what others wanted.

Dr. Walker testified that the Defendant complained of a significant degree of

introversion and expressed difficulty making friends. Based on a suggestibility test, he

concluded that the Defendant was very susceptible to being led or misled and that she had

a propensity for being overly suggestible. He said her relationship with Mr. Bowers was “a

very disturbed . . . sick relationship.” He described the Defendant’s multiple motivations for

-16-

being with Mr. Bowers. He said that the Defendant did not have a good relationship with her

mother and felt like an outcast among her family and that Mr. Bowers provided her a place

to live. Dr. Walker believed the Defendant developed a very strong emotional attachment

to Mr. Bowers, although he physically abused, raped, and controlled her.

Dr. Walker testified that although he did not form an opinion about whether the

Defendant was capable of premeditation on the day of the killing, he concluded that her

ability to premeditate was significantly impaired. He said the Defendant was abusing

Dilaudid, which caused “gross intoxication in most people.” The Defendant was also taking

Suboxone, a medication designed to help people stop abusing pain medication. He said these

drugs affected the ability to reason, think, and make good decisions. He concluded to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty that the Defendant was not “in a state where she could

exercise good reasoning or . . . judgment” based on the drug abuse, mental disorders, and

abusive relationship with Mr. Bowers.

Dr. Walker testified regarding the Defendant’s confession that the Defendant’s

emotional state and her willingness to take responsibility for the killing were factors

consistent with her providing a truthful statement. He said, though, that other factors raised

concerns about the truthfulness of her statement. The Defendant told Dr. Walker that she and

Mr. Bowers discussed what they would tell the police if they were caught. The Defendant

claimed that Mr. Bowers said he would not “go[] down” for the killing alone and would

“take her with him.” The Defendant admitted to Dr. Walker that she and Mr. Bowers

conspired about what “they” would admit and what she would admit. He noted the

Defendant feared Mr. Bowers generally. The Defendant told Dr. Walker that Mr. Bowers

would attempt to harm her. The Defendant claimed Mr. Bowers raped her twice and

threatened to kill her after they fled the state.

Dr. Walker testified that the Defendant’s tendency to be very suggestible led him to

question the truthfulness of her police statement. He noted the Defendant’s willingness after

the killing to attempt suicide upon Mr. Bowers’s suggestion. He agreed the Defendant

admitted attempting suicide previously by cutting herself or taking pills, injecting nicotine

into her veins, ingesting carbon monoxide, and placing a hair dryer into a bathtub of water.

Dr. Walker stated that the Defendant’s attempt to take her life after the killing should be

considered in determining the veracity of her confession. He said people in disturbed

relationships, like the Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s relationship, sometimes “project a front

to the world of having it altogether . . . being loving, being affectionate to one another.” He

said this could explain the Defendant’s normal demeanor after the killing.

-17-

On cross-examination, Dr. Walker testified that he did not administer the MMPI test

because the test was inappropriate for a seventeen-year-old girl. He said a subject needed

to be at least eighteen years old.

Dr. Walker testified that the previous records he reviewed showed the Defendant had

met with two physicians once each, a support staff member with a master’s degree once, and

another support staff member several times. He agreed he had copies of the Defendant’s

statements to Yolande Bailey and Rebecca Kinder. Dr. Walker could not say if the

Defendant was truthful and accurate in her statement to him. He agreed the Defendant was

the only person who might benefit from lying to him.

Dr. Walker testified that the Defendant’s psychomotor skills were normal, that she

was alert and oriented, that her speech was fluent and articulate, and that her language

comprehension was intact. He agreed the Defendant did not suffer from preoccupations,

obsessions, or delusions. The Defendant’s affect was normal, her social skills were good,

and she was cooperative. She showed no signs of malingering and had an IQ of 95,

indicating an average range of intellect. He agreed that the Defendant showed no signs of

deficiencies in her ability to reason or to think and showed no signs of dysfunction in her

executive reasoning abilities.

Dr. Walker testified that his post-traumatic stress and attention deficit hyperactivity

diagnoses were based upon the Defendant’s 2010 neurological examination. Regarding the

Defendant’s substance abuse problems, he agreed the Defendant had been drug free for

months before the evaluation but said his “review of the records indicated a different story

was more accurate.” He said that although the Defendant lied, he was required to consider

her statements in light of all the evidence. He said that the Defendant’s statements were the

only evidence of Mr. Bowers’s raping, beating, and controlling her. He said that although

it was possible the Defendant provided false or misleading information during the evaluation,

indications showed that some information was true.

Dr. Walker testified that trial counsel asked him to clarify in a second report whether

the limitations in the Defendant’s mental condition on the day of the killing would have been

due to a mental disorder or defect. After reviewing his original report, he agreed he

concluded that the Defendant’s confession to the police was not the result of duress or

coercion. He agreed that the Defendant complained of a headache on the day of the killing,

denied going to school, said she argued with her mother on the telephone, and said Mr.

Bowers insisted upon listening to her conversation. This statement was consistent with her

police statement, but Dr. Walker acknowledged the remainder of her statement to him was

inconsistent with her police statement. He agreed the Defendant’s telling him that she called

her mother to pick her up and that Mr. Bowers was upset about the Defendant’s relationship

-18-

with her friend Natalie was the first time the Defendant had ever mentioned these topics. He,

likewise, agreed that when he first interviewed the Defendant, she first mentioned her

mother’s not coming to pick her up, Mr. Bowers’s placing the dog cord around her neck and

threatening to kill her, and exchanging punches with Mr. Bowers. He said it would not

surprise him that many of the Defendant’s belongings were not packed and that no ligature

marks were on the Defendant’s neck when she was arrested. He agreed the Defendant’s

telling him that she vomited upon seeing Mr. Bowers strangle the victim and that she played

no role in the killing was inconsistent with her police statement.

Dr. Walker testified that although he thought it was odd the Defendant slept after Mr.

Bowers allegedly threatened to choke her with the dog cord, he said the Defendant was using

Dilaudid, which usually caused the person to sleep. He agreed, though, that the Defendant

never mentioned to him that she was using drugs. He said it was accurate to conclude that

the Defendant used drugs on the date of the crime, whether or not she participated in the

killing. Dr. Walker was unaware the Defendant’s DNA was found on the pillow covering

the victim’s face and said the Defendant denied placing the pillow on the victim. He agreed

it was possible the Defendant lied. He agreed that although the Defendant told the police she

received a portion of the money that was stolen from the victim, she did not tell him that she

received money. The Defendant also did not tell Dr. Walker that they drove to Sparta to buy

drugs after the killing.

Dr. Walker testified that the Defendant’s ability to premeditate was not impaired on

the day he conducted his evaluation. The Defendant told Dr. Sandra Phillips that she did not

use drugs on the day of the killing, and Dr. Walker admitted this conflicted with what the

Defendant told him. He agreed the Defendant lied to him or to Dr. Phillips. He denied the

Defendant told him that she and Mr. Bowers went to different stores to buy items after the

killing, and he admitted this was important information.

Dr. Walker testified that the video recordings from the convenience and grocery stores

indicated that the Defendant did not provide a complete account of what happened on the day

of the killing. He said that he was not surprised that the Defendant looked at a map and

planned how to drive to Indiana just after the killing but that it did not impact his

conclusions. He said he did not have to believe the Defendant was truthful for his

assumptions to be accurate. He believed that the Defendant was honest at times and

misleading at others. He noted Mr. Bowers’s threatening to push her into the lake and said

the statement was probably true given the detail of her statement. He said if the statement

were false, she would have said Mr. Bowers told her that she would drown, not die of

hypothermia. He conceded it was possible the Defendant created this detail after having

more than one year to think about it.

-19-

On redirect examination, Dr. Walker testified that many of the Defendant’s statements

to him were corroborated by previous reports he reviewed and that the reports from the

Defendant’s previous doctors corroborated his diagnoses. He said the Defendant’s behavior

after the killing was “perfectly consistent” with his diagnoses. When told that no evidence

had been presented showing the victim’s DNA was on the pillow, he said that the lack of

DNA was consistent with the Defendant’s statement during his evaluation. On

recross-examination, he agreed the Defendant knew right from wrong and was able to

conform her conduct with that reasoning. On further redirect examination, he stated, though,

that the Defendant’s ability to premeditate might have been impaired on the day of the

killing.

Dr. Sandra Phillips, an expert in the field of clinical psychology, testified that she was

employed with Volunteer Behavioral and that she evaluated the Defendant on February 1,

2011, less than two months before the trial. Based on her evaluation, she concluded that the

Defendant was competent to stand trial and was not mentally ill. She diagnosed the

Defendant with adjustment disorder with a depressed mood. She explained the Defendant

had a relatively low level of depression in response to her legal concerns. She also

provisionally diagnosed the Defendant with post-traumatic stress disorder and with emerging

borderline personality traits.

Dr. Phillips testified that she concluded the Defendant did not have a severe mental

disease or defect at the time of the killing rendering her unable to appreciate the nature or the

wrongfulness of her conduct. She also concluded that the Defendant was capable of

premeditation on the day of the killing. She noted the Defendant reported emptying her

backpack at the victim’s house in order for other people to learn she had been at the house

in the event something happened to her. The Defendant denied using drugs before the

killing, although Dr. Phillips later learned the Defendant told the police she had used drugs.

Dr. Phillips testified that the Defendant denied participating in the killing. The

Defendant told Dr. Phillips that the victim arrived home around 5:30 p.m. and that the

Defendant was in the bedroom packing her belongings. The Defendant was “somewhat

calmer” but worried about what was going to happen because after taking a shower, Mr.

Bowers placed a dog cord around her neck, pulled it, and laughed. The Defendant suspected

Mr. Bowers was going to kill her or the victim because earlier that day Mr. Bowers

threatened to “strangle the b----.” The Defendant denied using drugs and drinking alcohol

for several weeks. The Defendant overheard Mr. Bowers and the victim arguing about a

broken car window and a hole in the bedroom door. The Defendant claimed Mr. Bowers

threw things at her, which caused the hole, and called her a “stupid c---.” The Defendant

wanted to call her mother, but she could not find the house telephone and Mr. Bowers had

-20-

her cell phone. The Defendant reported that after the arguing, she heard nothing. Then, she

heard something falling down. The Defendant said she was “frozen terrified.”

Dr. Phillips testified that the Defendant described the killing. The Defendant saw Mr.

Bowers with his feet against the victim’s back while he choked the victim with the dog cord.

The Defendant dropped to her knees and asked Mr. Bowers, “God, what have you done[?]”

Mr. Bowers struck the Defendant on the head and said, “[N]one of that God s---, it’s hail

Satan, my dark lord master.” The Defendant claimed the victim was lying on the floor in the

hallway. Mr. Bowers walked away and returned with a gun. He pointed it at the Defendant,

told her to get up and to get in the car, and threatened to kill her if she attempted to run or

“do anything stupid.” The Defendant claimed to have emptied her backpack inside the house

so the authorities and her family would know she had been there.

Dr. Phillips testified that the Defendant reported that Mr. Bowers showed her $400

he took from the victim’s body. They drove to Sparta, where Mr. Bowers bought $200 to

$300 worth of Dilaudid. Mr. Bowers told the Defendant that she had two days to live

because he believed the victim would be found by then. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers

stopped at Standing Stone, and the Defendant believed he was going to kill her. They

stopped at a bridge, and Mr. Bowers grabbed her hair, shoved her face over the wall, and

threatened to kill her if she refused to do what he wanted. The Defendant claimed the killing

occurred because she was going to leave Mr. Bowers, who told her that she was supposed

to have loved him and that nobody could have her if he could not.

Dr. Phillips testified that the Defendant said Mr. Bowers drove to Indiana in order for

the Defendant to see her grandmother one last time before he killed her. During the drive,

Mr. Bowers talked about the humorous look on the victim’s face and the victim’s inability

to defend herself. Mr. Bowers told the Defendant that he placed the victim’s body in the

second bedroom, made the victim presentable, and covered her face with a pillow. The

Defendant claimed that she somehow obtained her cell phone when they stopped at the rest

area and wanted to call a friend but realized that the volume was too high and that Mr.

Bowers could hear any conversation. Mr. Bowers saw the Defendant with her phone and

escorted her to the car. Mr. Bowers told her to remove her pants, and when she refused, he

tore off her pants and underwear and raped her.

Dr. Phillips testified that the above version of events was inconsistent with the

Defendant’s statement to the police in Indiana. She noted the Defendant mentioned to her

about going to the convenience store and to Food Lion after the murder. She did not know

if the Defendant was truthful.

-21-

On cross-examination, Dr. Phillips testified that she reviewed the Defendant’s

previous medical records and agreed that the Defendant was raised in an abusive home. She

agreed the Defendant’s father abused the Defendant, the Defendant’s mother, and the

Defendant’s stepmother. She agreed the abuse had a severe adverse effect. She read Dr.

Walker’s report and agreed the Defendant had “severe mental illness.” Although the

Defendant gave three different versions of the events, Dr. Phillips did not think the

Defendant was malingering.

Dr. Phillips testified that the Defendant’s relationship with Mr. Bowers was abusive

based on the Defendant’s statement. She denied administering tests to determine the

Defendant’s level of susceptibility and said that such tests would not show the Defendant’s

mental condition on the day of the offense. She disagreed with Dr. Walker’s conclusion that

the Defendant could have lacked the ability to commit premeditated murder. She agreed,

though, that the Defendant had “less than the average capacity of a normal person.”

On redirect examination, Dr. Phillips testified the Defendant had the ability to form

the required intent of premeditation. On recross-examination, she stated that a clinical

psychologist was not able to determine definitively whether the Defendant had a diminished

capacity at the time of the killing. She agreed, though, with Dr. Walker’s conclusion that the

Defendant “could have been diminished.”

Dr. James Girard testified for the defense as an expert in DNA analysis. He reviewed

Agent Hardy’s report regarding the DNA analyses. He agreed with portions of the Agent’s

conclusions but disagreed with others. Relative to Agent Hardy’s analysis of the pillowcase,

Dr. Girard said Agent Hardy assumed the victim was “not included in the analysis.” Dr.

Girard stated that the DNA sample was a mixture of three contributors, including the victim.

With regard to the statistics of another person matching the DNA profiles found on the

pillowcase, Dr. Girard believed Agent Hardy overstated the data. He concluded that the high

million numbers reported by Agent Hardy were inaccurate.

Dr. Girard testified that he expected the victim’s DNA to be on the pillow if it were

laid on the victim’s face. He agreed with Agent Hardy regarding the number of variables that

played a role in whether DNA would be transferred to the pillow from the abrasion on the

victim’s forehead. He expected that more DNA would be found on the pillow if it were used

to smother the victim.

On cross-examination, Dr. Girard testified that if the victim were smothered with the

pillow, he would expect to find the victim’s DNA on the perimeter of the pillow where Agent

Hardy swabbed it. He said that a small dog was present at the scene and that the dog may

have contaminated the DNA evidence. He agreed the documents he received did not mention

-22-

the dog and said trial counsel told him a small dog was present. He admitted he should have

also considered during his analysis the Defendant’s confessing to using a pillow to smother

the victim.

Dr. Girard testified that he disagreed with Agent Hardy’s conclusions regarding the

right and left gloves and the ski mask because the samples analyzed were of such a low

concentration that the profiles could not be determined confidently. He agreed with Agent

Hardy’s conclusion that the DNA analysis was inconclusive regarding the section of the cord

found around the victim’s neck, although Dr. Girard’s report found the Defendant’s DNA

was not present on the cord. He agreed that the victim’s DNA was the only DNA present in

the nail clippings and said he would not have expected any other DNA to be found based on

evidence that the victim was unable to defend herself and had arthritic hands.

On redirect examination, Dr. Girard testified that he knew the State’s theory was the

victim was smothered with a pillow. He said that based on the State’s theory, he would have

expected to find the victim’s DNA on the pillow and that her DNA was not on it. He said

that had he known a cat was inside the crime scene, rather than a dog, his conclusions would

not have changed.

Dr. Girard testified that he disagreed with Agent Hardy’s conclusions that the victim’s

DNA was not present on the items analyzed and that Agent Hardy’s excluding her DNA

profile “drastically change[d]” the results. He agreed that the results would have been in the

Defendant’s favor had the victim’s DNA not been excluded. He agreed with Agent Hardy’s

conclusion that the DNA analysis was inconclusive regarding the dog cord found around the

victim’s neck and said it was possible the DNA evidence degraded between the time the

evidence was collected and analyzed.

Kimberly Coffel, the Defendant’s mother, testified that her relationship with the

Defendant’s father was abusive and that the Defendant witnessed the abuse. On one

occasion, the Defendant’s father picked up Ms. Coffel by her throat while the Defendant was

present. The Defendant cried and said, “[P]lease stop, please stop.” She said the Defendant

did not understand what was happening when the Defendant’s father became violent.

On cross-examination, Ms. Coffel testified that she talked to the Defendant on the day

of the killing. She denied she told the Defendant to return home because she had stopped

receiving food stamp benefits. She also denied threatening to report the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers to the police for committing crimes. Ms. Coffel said she told the Defendant to come

home and that she did not want to involve the police. When asked if she threatened to have

Mr. Bowers arrested for statutory rape, she said she told the Defendant that she could have

-23-

Mr. Bowers put in jail. The Defendant had been living with Mr. Bowers for one month. Ms.

Coffel admitted she did not know where they were staying.

Insurance Agent Rick Savage testified that he last saw the victim in September or

October before the killing. The victim came to his office. She was upset about something

related to her grandson, and he advised her to contact the sheriff’s department.

Overton County Sheriff D.W. Melton testified that he knew the victim and saw her

on several occasions before her death. The victim spoke to him about her grandson, and he

advised her to throw Mr. Bowers out of her house. He saw bruises on the victim’s arm the

last time she came to the sheriff’s office to talk to him, and he said the victim was upset each

time they talked.

Tina Webb testified that she knew the Defendant and saw her at Food Lion thirty days

before the killing. They exchanged pleasantries, and at the end of their conversation, the

Defendant “clammed up.” Ms. Webb was unsure why the Defendant’s demeanor changed

but noticed Mr. Bowers was approaching at that time. She felt as though the Defendant “cut

her off” and something was wrong.

On cross-examination, Ms. Webb testified that she did not know what occurred after

she saw the Defendant but before the killing. On redirect examination, she stated that the

Defendant was very happy and that it was unusual for the Defendant to clam up.

Chelsea Hanna testified that she had known Mr. Bowers for about ten years. She said

they dated on and off for eight years, lived together twice, and were engaged to be married

twice. They had lived with the victim. She saw the victim and Mr. Bowers argue but denied

witnessing physical violence.

Ms. Hanna testified that in June 2010, Mr. Bowers moved into her apartment after Mr.

Bowers attended a rehabilitation program. Mr. Bowers lived with her until September. She

said that while they lived together, Mr. Bowers took many of her belongings and sold them.

Mr. Bowers was unemployed, and Ms. Hanna expected Mr. Bowers to “take care of things

. . . pick up after himself.” She said they argued when they discussed her expectations. She

said Mr. Bowers yelled, screamed, and punched holes in the walls when he became angry.

She only saw Mr. Bowers punch holes in the walls at the victim’s house. During their last

argument, the Defendant threw her on the floor and punched her.

On cross-examination, Ms. Hanna testified that she never killed anyone during the

time in which she dated and lived with Mr. Bowers. On redirect examination, she stated that

she had never been diagnosed with any severe mental disease.

-24-

Upon this evidence, the jury found the Defendant guilty of first degree murder, felony

murder during the commission of an especially aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit

first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property. The trial court

merged the murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole. The Defendant was later sentenced to concurrent sentences of fifteen

years for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, fifteen years for especially aggravated

robbery, and two years for theft. This appeal followed.

I & II

Sufficiency of the Evidence & Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her first degree

murder conviction. In a related issue, she contends that the trial court erred by denying her

motion for a judgment of acquittal. Regarding each issue, she argues that the evidence failed

to show that the victim’s DNA was on the pillow used to smother the victim, that the

evidence showed overwhelmingly that Mr. Bowers strangled the victim, and that the

evidence showed an antagonistic relationship between Mr. Bowers and the victim. The State

responds that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court properly denied the

Defendant’s motion. We agree with the State.

The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of

acquittal is the “same standard that applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the

evidence[.]” State v. Little, 402 S.W.3d 202, 211 (Tenn. 2013). In determining the

sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007). The State is

“afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences” from

that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate courts do not “reweigh or

reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility of witnesses [and] the

weight and value to be given to the evidence . . . are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v.

Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547

(Tenn. 1984).

“A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see also State

v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).

-25-

Although the Defendant states that the evidence is insufficient to support her

convictions, her argument focuses on her first degree murder conviction because of its

importance to the remaining convictions. Relevant to this case, first degree murder is the

unlawful, intentional, and premeditated killing of another. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-201 (2014), 39-

13-202(a)(1) (2014). In the context of first degree murder, intent is shown if the defendant

has the conscious objective or desire to cause the victim’s death. State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d

781, 790-91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(18) (2010) (amended 2011,

2014) (defining intentional as the “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or

cause the result”). “It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the mind of the

accused for any definite period of time.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d) (2014). “The element of

premeditation is a question for the jury which may be established by proof of the

circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108 (Tenn. 2006).

As a result, the jury “may infer premeditation from the manner and circumstances of the

killing.” State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tenn. 2005); see State v. Vaughn, 279

S.W.3d 584, 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Our supreme court has provided a list of factors

which “tend to support the existence” of premeditation and deliberation. See Bland, 958

S.W.2d at 660. The list includes the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the

particular cruelty of the killing, declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill, evidence

of procurement of a weapon, preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime,

and calmness immediately after the killing. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530,

541-42 (Tenn. 1992); State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1997)).

The record reflects that the Defendant and codefendant Bowers lived at the victim’s

residence. The victim was found in the Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s bedroom with a pillow

over her face and a cord around her neck. A separate portion of the cord was found in the

Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s bedroom. The police found no evidence of forced entry and

noted no windows or doors were broken, and the victim’s car was missing. The Defendant

and Mr. Bowers were found in Indiana the day after the killing and in possession of the

victim’s car. Inside the victim’s car was a handwritten note signed by the Defendant stating

that if the letter was found, the reader knew what happened. She explained she wanted Mr.

Bowers’s last name and wanted to be cremated with him.

Just hours after the killing, the Defendant and Mr. Bowers were seen at a convenience

store. The record reflects that while there, the Defendant engaged in casual conversation

about traveling to Indiana and her need to look at a map. Ms. Ogletree, the Raceway Store

Manager, testified that the Defendant acted normal and was happy to be traveling to Indiana.

After being arrested and taken to the police station in Indiana, the Defendant told Ms.

Kinder, a paramedic, that she and Mr. Bowers unsuccessfully attempted suicide. When Ms.

Kinder asked the Defendant for her mother’s contact information, the Defendant refused.

-26-

The Defendant stated that although she had been living at the victim’s home with Mr.

Bowers and with her mother’s consent, her mother threatened to have Mr. Bowers arrested

for statutory rape if she did not return home. The Defendant believed her mother’s

motivation was linked to her no longer receiving financial assistance in the Defendant’s

absence. While upset and crying, the Defendant told Ms. Kinder that “[I]t’s never going to

be okay, I shouldn’t have done it, I shouldn’t have hurt her, I just wish I hadn’t done it.” Ms.

Kinder asked if someone needed medical assistance, and the Defendant said Ms. Kinder

could not help because “she” was in Tennessee. The Defendant said, “[Y]ou can’t help her,

we killed her, oh my God, I wish I hadn’t done that, oh my God, I wish I hadn’t done that.”

The Defendant told Ms. Kinder that her boyfriend “got behind her, took a dog leash and

strangled her and I put a pillow on her face and smothered her, oh my God, oh my God, I just

wish I hadn’t done it.” Ms. Kinder was adamant that the Defendant said “we” killed the

victim, not “he.” Ms. Bailey, another paramedic, provided similar testimony regarding the

Defendant’s statements about her role in the victim’s killing and added that the Defendant

said they killed the victim for money.

The Defendant told Indiana officers that the plan to kill the victim began with the

Defendant’s mother threatening to have Mr. Bowers arrested for statutory rape. The

Defendant claimed that the mother’s threat was the result of the State’s terminating her

mother’s food stamp benefits because the Defendant was no longer living with her. After

the threat, the Defendant and Mr. Bowers decided they were going to jail together. The

Defendant said a “little comment” was made that they could kill the victim. She noted the

victim always nagged them. She and Mr. Bowers discussed the fact that they would have a

car and money if they killed the victim and that they could spend whatever time they had

together. Mr. Bowers mentioned using a hammer, but the Defendant suggested strangling

the victim with the dog cord because she did not want to see the victim’s blood. She also

admitted she thought of using the dog cord and smothering the victim. She said that after Mr.

Bowers began to strangle the victim, he yelled for her assistance. She left their shared

bedroom with a pillow, walked to where the victim and Mr. Bowers were located, placed the

pillow on the victim’s face, and pressed down on the victim’s face. The Defendant told the

officers not to place all the blame on Mr. Bowers because she helped kill the victim, and she

admitted Mr. Bowers did not tell her to use the pillow. The Defendant also admitted that she

“helped smother” the victim. She said she deserved the death penalty for her role in the

killing.

The Defendant’s confession was corroborated, in part, by Mr. Bowers’s statement to

the police. Mr. Bowers told the police that he and the Defendant discussed how they would

stay together and that “[w]e figured we would kill my Grandmother and take her money.”

He said the Defendant’s mother called earlier that day and threatened to call the police to

bring the Defendant home. Mr. Bowers reported that the Defendant thought of choking the

-27-

victim with the dog cord. He and the Defendant packed their belongings before the victim

arrived home, and he cut the leash with the wire cutters, leaving the cutters in their bedroom.

When the victim arrived home, Mr. Bowers approached from behind, placed the leash around

her neck, and choked her. He called for the Defendant’s assistance. He said the Defendant

left their bedroom with a pillow and placed it over the victim’s face. As Mr. Bowers pulled

the leash tight, the Defendant lay on the victim and applied pressure on the pillow. Mr.

Bowers took money from the victim’s right sock, and they left in the victim’s car. The

Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s confessions each referenced the same date and time of the

killing, the Defendant’s suggesting the dog cord to kill the victim, Mr. Bowers’s placing the

dog cord around the victim’s neck, the Defendant’s placing a pillow over the victim’s face,

and the motive of needing money and a car to leave town. The confessions also referenced

the Defendant’s mother’s threats.

Likewise, the evidence found at the crime scene and during the autopsy corroborated

the Defendant’s and Mr. Bowers’s statements to the police. The video recording of the scene

corroborated the Defendant’s statement that the victim was strangled with the dog cord.

Although an insufficient amount of DNA was found during the analysis, Agent Hardy could

not conclude that Mr. Bowers’s and the Defendant’s DNA was not on the cord. Further, the

pillowcase showed the presence of the Defendant’s DNA around the outer edge, and Agent

Hardy agreed the Defendant’s confession could explain the presence of her DNA on the

pillowcase. Regarding the medical examiner’s findings, Dr. Lewis concluded that the cause

of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and smothering. The victim had petechial

hemorrhaging and ligature marks consistent with strangulation, and Dr. Lewis stated that the

hemorrhaging could have also been caused by smothering. Further, the victim’s hyoid bone

was broken twice and was also indicative of strangulation.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s first degree

murder conviction. Although the Defendant argues that the victim’s DNA was not found on

the pillow found on the victim’s face and cites to Dr. Girard’s testimony regarding the DNA

analysis, Agent Hardy testified that the purpose of his analyses was to identify the presence

of the perpetrators’ DNA, not the victim’s DNA. The Defendant’s DNA was found on the

pillow, and she and Mr. Bowers told the police that she smothered the victim with the pillow.

Mr. Bowers told the police that the Defendant had the initial idea of killing the victim. Any

conflicts in the testimony were resolved by the jury as the trier of fact. See Bland, 958

S.W.2d at 659. The Defendant also argues that the evidence shows the victim was strangled

by Mr. Bowers. However, Dr. Lewis concluded that the victim was also smothered. In any

event, the Defendant was criminally responsible for Mr. Bowers’s conduct when she assisted

Mr. Bowers during the killing and afterward in taking the victim’s money and car in an effort

to be together.

-28-

In addition to first degree premeditated murder, the Defendant was convicted of felony

murder during the commission of an especially aggravated robbery, an alternative theory of

criminal liability for first degree murder. See Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tenn.

1997); T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2), (b) (2014). Although she does not challenge her felony

murder conviction, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient. The record reflects that the

Defendant and Mr. Bowers discussed how they could stay together after the Defendant’s

mother threatened to have Mr. Bowers arrested. Mr. Bowers’s written statement to the police

shows that they discussed killing the victim and taking her money in order to stay together

and “go out with a bang.” They decided to kill the victim with a dog cord and a pillow and

to take the victim’s money she kept in her sock. The Defendant told the police that Mr.

Bowers took $200 from the victim’s body and that they took the victim’s car after the killing

to drive to Indiana. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers were seen making purchases at

convenience and grocery stores after the killing, and the Defendant claimed they drove to

Sparta to purchase drugs after the killing. Ms. Bailey testified that the Defendant said they

killed the victim for money. The record clearly shows that the Defendant participated and

assisted in an intentional or knowing theft of property from the victim by violence with the

use of a deadly weapon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a) (2014), 39-13-403(a)(1)-(2) (2014), 39-

11-402(2) (2014). The record also shows that the Defendant benefitted from taking the

victim’s money. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

III

Motion to Suppress

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress

the evidence of inculpatory statements she made to emergency medical personnel and Indiana

police officers. She contends that the statements were involuntary because they were

improperly obtained through direct or indirect threats, intimidation, coercion, and improper

influence. She also contends that her communications with the paramedics were protected

by Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-207 (2000) (psychiatrist/patient privilege). The

State argues the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. We agree

with the State.

A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal unless

the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996);

State v. Jones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions about the

“credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts

in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom, 928

S.W.2d at 23. The prevailing party is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of the

evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.”

-29-

State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521

(Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings is a question of law

and is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may consider the trial

evidence as well as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See State v. Henning,

975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998); see also State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 473

(Tenn. 2012).

The statements in question were made on December 12, 2010. The proof at the

suppression hearing showed that around 8:05 a.m., Tennessee authorities requested ISP

Sergeant Matthew Collins’s assistance in investigating a car theft and two persons of interest

in a Tennessee homicide. A Gas City Indiana police officer found the stolen car at the

Defendant’s grandparents’ house around 11:13 a.m. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers were

inside the house and were transported to the Gas City Police Department around 11:23 a.m.

At the police station, paramedic Rebecca Kinder evaluated the Defendant, and paramedics

Yolande Bailey and Justin Black evaluated Mr. Bowers. The evaluation was due to a report

that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers had attempted suicide. The Defendant made

incriminating statements to Ms. Kinder, which were overheard by Ms. Bailey. The

Defendant, who was sixteen years old, was later taken to a juvenile detention facility.

Sergeant Collins and Deputy Chad Hammel arrived at the juvenile facility about 6:50 p.m.,

and they began interviewing the Defendant at 7:05 p.m. After being advised of her Miranda

rights, the Defendant signed a written waiver at 7:17 p.m. and inculpated herself and Mr.

Bowers in a recorded statement.

Sergeant Collins testified at the suppression hearing that he was first contacted about

the case by Overton County Sheriff’s Deputy John Mackie, who requested his help finding

the Defendant and Mr. Bowers. He did not recall their discussing whether he would question

the Defendant, if located. The victim’s car was found at the Defendant’s grandparents’

house, and the suspects were found inside the house and taken to the police station. The

grandparents were interviewed, and the car was impounded.

Sergeant Collins testified that when he arrived at the police station, an ambulance was

outside the building. He took statements from Ms. Bailey and Ms. Kinder. He said the

Defendant appeared fine physically. He did not recall her clothes being wet.

Sergeant Collins testified that because the Defendant was a juvenile and her mother

was in Tennessee, he talked to the district attorney’s office in Tennessee about interviewing

her. He faxed a copy of the ISP Advice of Rights and Waiver form to the district attorney

in Tennessee. It was his understanding that Tennessee authorities explained the situation and

the form to the Defendant’s mother and obtained her permission for the Indiana authorities

-30-

to interview the Defendant. He received the form, signed by the Defendant’s mother, by fax.

He said he talked to other Tennessee law enforcement personnel. He did not recall anyone

telling him that the Defendant’s mother did not want the Defendant interviewed or that the

Defendant’s mother initially refused permission before later signing the waiver form.

Regarding the statement Sergeant Collins and Deputy Hammel took from the

Defendant at the juvenile detention facility, Sergeant Collins testified that he advised the

Defendant of her rights. He told the Defendant that her mother had signed a waiver for her

to speak with Indiana authorities and showed her the form. She signed the waiver. The form

the Defendant signed was received as an exhibit and stated in part, “If you are a juvenile, you

have the right to talk with your parent or guardian before any questioning and to have them

with you during such questioning.”

Sergeant Collins testified consistently with his trial testimony regarding the substance

of the Defendant’s statement. A recording of the interview was received as an exhibit. He

stated that the Defendant related the events in narrative form and that he only asked a few

questions to elicit details. He said Deputy Hammel asked some questions. He said the

Defendant was upset and cried at times, although he did not see many tears. He said that her

communication was coherent and that she did not appear intoxicated, injured, or in ill health,

only emotional. He said he never promised leniency. She did not ask to have a parent

present for the statement. He said that in hindsight, they could have taken the Defendant’s

statement the following day.

Rebecca Kinder, who was a volunteer paramedic on December 12, 2010, testified that

she, Yolande Bailey, and Justin Black responded to the police station regarding a possible

overdose. She did not speak with any officers about the reason the Defendant was there. She

assessed the Defendant. Ms. Bailey and Mr. Black assessed Mr. Bowers, who was in a

another room. She said officers asked the Defendant for her mother’s name and contact

information, which the Defendant initially refused. The Defendant stated her mother did not

care and was “nothing but a drunk.” She said that she had been staying with her boyfriend’s

grandmother, that her mother wanted her to come home to prevent her mother from losing

food stamp benefits, and that her mother threatened to have Mr. Bowers prosecuted for

statutory rape if the Defendant did not come home. The Defendant stated that she and Mr.

Bowers injected nicotine water. When Ms. Kinder asked why the Defendant was “soaking

wet,” the Defendant stated she and Mr. Bowers tried to kill themselves in a bathtub with

appliances because they wanted to be together forever. The Defendant said she was sorry

she had hurt a woman in Tennessee and wished she had not. The Defendant said she and her

boyfriend killed the victim when he choked the victim with a dog cord and she put a pillow

on the victim’s face. Ms. Kinder said she did not say anything to elicit the Defendant’s

statements. She said Ms. Bailey came into the room during the Defendant’s admissions and

-31-

heard part of it. Ms. Kinder said she was surprised by the Defendant’s admissions and left

the room.

Ms. Kinder said the Defendant’s vital signs were normal. She said the Defendant

cried and appeared upset. The Defendant reported that she felt slightly nauseous, which Ms.

Kinder thought might be from the nicotine water. The Defendant thought she might be

pregnant. Ms. Kinder said the Defendant was not handcuffed and did not recall if the

Defendant was shackled. She said it never crossed her mind that the Defendant was in

custody. She said she was there to assess a patient who had attempted suicide.

Yolande Bailey testified that she went to the Gas City Police Department on

December 12, 2010, regarding a possible suicide attempt. An officer told her that the

Defendant and Mr. Bowers were there for questioning about a Tennessee homicide. She did

not think she told Ms. Kinder this information. She and Mr. Black assessed Mr. Bowers

while Ms. Kinder assessed the Defendant. Mr. Bowers refused treatment, and Ms. Bailey

went into the room where Ms. Kinder was assessing the Defendant to complete her

paperwork. She heard Ms. Kinder ask the Defendant about who had been hurt, referring to

the victim, and how the authorities could help the person. She did not think about the

propriety of the questioning and continued doing paperwork. She said, though, she was

concerned when she heard the Defendant say they killed the victim. Ms. Kinder went to find

an officer. She said an officer “quickly went into there and advised for it to stop.” She said

the Defendant’s clothes appeared to be “soaking wet,” and she thought Mr. Bowers’s clothes

were wet. She said the Defendant may have had a blanket.

Kimberly Coffel, the Defendant’s mother, testified for the defense. She said that

before December 12, 2010, the Defendant had been living away from home for a month with

“Ben,” whose last name she did not know. She thought they lived next door to the crime

scene. She said she had been by the home but had not visited it to check on her daughter in

the month before the crime. She said she and the Defendant “were having some problems.”

She thought that she would give the Defendant one month away from home to live as an

adult and that the Defendant would decide to return home. She said that although she and

the Defendant were “essentially estranged” and did not speak daily, she talked to the

Defendant’s school counselor daily.

Ms. Coffel testified that she talked to her daughter on the Friday before Sunday,

December 12, 2010. She said she told the Defendant that she had called Child Protective

Services for assistance in getting the Defendant home. She acknowledged saying she could

have Mr. Bowers jailed but did not think she said she could have him prosecuted for statutory

rape. She said she talked to the Defendant about a letter she received notifying her that her

food stamp benefits would decrease because the Defendant was not living with her. She said,

-32-

though, she did not care about the benefits and wanted the Defendant home. She said the call

did not end well.

Ms. Coffel testified that on December 12, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., Sheriff Melton,

Assistant District Attorney General Gore, and District Attorney General’s Investigator

Kendall Hargis came to her house and asked about the Defendant and her possible

whereabouts. She said that despite her repeated inquiries, they would not tell her anything

except that it was serious. After they left, Ms. Coffel spoke with her mother by telephone

and learned the Defendant was at Ms. Coffel’s mother’s house. She called Mr. Hargis and

advised him of the Defendant’s location. Sheriff Melton called her around 10:00 or 10:30

a.m. and said the Defendant had been detained. She said she called the Gas City Police

Department before 11:00 a.m. and told Officer Keith Emmons that she did not want the

Defendant questioned without an attorney present. He told her the Defendant was being

taken to juvenile detention. She called the juvenile detention facility and advised Officer

Tetter that the Defendant was being transported to the facility and that the Defendant should

not be questioned until an attorney or Ms. Coffel was present. She said she told Mr. Hargis

the same thing.

Ms. Coffel testified that around 11:00 a.m., Mr. Gore, an unidentified officer, and

District Attorney General York came to her house with a document they wanted her to sign

allowing the Defendant to be questioned. She said they would not tell her what was going

on other than that it was serious. She said she declined to sign the document, and Mr. York

told her that the matter was serious and that if she did not sign it, he would prosecute the

Defendant to the fullest extent of the law. She said that Mr. York told her that the Defendant

would probably spend the rest of her life in prison, that it would be best for everyone if she

signed the document, and that if she signed it, the Defendant would likely get out of prison

someday. She said she felt pressured and intimidated and was “blatant” in saying “no, no.”

She said Mr. Gore told her it would be better for everyone if she signed the document. She

said her boyfriend was nervous and told her maybe she should sign. She said that although

she told herself the Defendant should not be questioned without an attorney present, she

ultimately signed the document after making telephone calls. She said she did not “really

read” the document and trusted what the State’s representatives told her. She did not think

anyone else came to her house that day.

Ms. Coffel testified that she did not recall the State’s representatives telling her that

the Defendant was a suspect in a murder but acknowledged they said there had been a

homicide. She said the sheriff had advised her earlier that there had been a homicide but did

not identify the victim. She said she wanted to talk to the Defendant, but no one told her that

she could. She said no one told her that she had the right to visit the Defendant daily unless

prohibited by court order or that the Defendant had a right to a detention hearing. She

-33-

claimed she did not remember their saying they did not know whether the Defendant would

be charged because they did not know the facts, but she later admitted that this had been said.

She said that although the waiver document listed times of 2:15 p.m. and 2:25 p.m., the times

were not on the document when she signed it. She said she could not have gone to Indiana

that day because there had been a snow storm.

Investigator Kendall Hargis testified that he, Sheriff Melton, and Mr. Gore went to

Ms. Coffel’s house around 8:30 a.m. on December 12, 2010, in order to determine the

Defendant’s whereabouts. He was certain Ms. Coffel wanted to know why they wanted to

locate the Defendant. He thought they told her that it was urgent but not that it was related

to a homicide. He said they relayed the information they obtained from Ms. Coffel to Indiana

authorities.

Investigator Hargis testified that Agent Huntley requested he contact Ms. Coffel to

obtain permission to interview the Defendant. He was unaware Ms. Coffel told other officers

she did not want the Defendant interviewed. He called Ms. Coffel, who advised him that she

had already spoken with Officer Emmons in Indiana and that she did not want the Defendant

questioned without an attorney. He relayed the information to Agent Huntley but did not

know if he told anyone else. He said it was “likely” he told Agent Huntley that Ms. Coffel

had told other officers she did not want the Defendant questioned. He did not think he told

anyone other than Agent Huntley about his conversation with Ms. Coffel, but he

acknowledged it was possible he had. An audio recording of the telephone call was played.

Gregory Hutte testified that he lived with Ms. Coffel and was home on December 12,

2010. He said he was aware of the problems between Ms. Coffel and the Defendant. He said

Ms. Coffel had been trying to visit the Defendant. He said that when Mr. Hargis, Mr. Gore,

and Sheriff Melton visited on the morning of December 12, they would not answer his and

Ms. Coffel’s questions about why they were looking for the Defendant. He said that after

they left, Ms. Coffel made telephone calls to the ISP, the Gas City Police, and “some other

places” trying to obtain information about the Defendant. He said that based upon what he

heard Ms. Coffel tell Gas City authorities, he was “shocked” the Defendant was questioned.

Mr. Hutte testified that when the State authorities brought the waiver for Ms. Coffel

to sign permitting questioning of the Defendant, Ms. Coffel told them that she did not want

the Defendant questioned without a lawyer or herself present. He said Mr. York advised

them that if she did not sign the document, he would prosecute the Defendant to the fullest

extent of the law and that the Defendant probably would never be released from prison. Mr.

Hutte said that Mr. York stated the Defendant might someday be released if Ms. Coffel

signed the document. He said that Ms. Coffel “went back and forth” and that he told her

maybe she should sign it. He said he was scared. He said that she eventually signed it and

-34-

that she looked scared. Regarding the time the authorities were at the house, he thought it

was later than 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. and said he “suppose[d]” the time of 2:00 or 2:15 p.m.

shown on the document was accurate. He said Mr. York stated during the visit with him that

the crime scene was the worst he had ever seen but was unsure if Mr. York said he was not

yet aware of all the facts.

Mr. Hutte disagreed that the sheriff told them before the second visit from the

authorities that a homicide had occurred. He later said he did not remember if the sheriff

called and said a homicide had occurred and did not remember if Ms. Coffel said the sheriff

had called and mentioned a homicide. He said he drove past the victim’s house and saw

crime scene tape. He said he told Ms. Coffel it looked “pretty bad.”

After receiving the proof, the trial court made the following pertinent findings: The

Defendant was in custody when the paramedics were present. She was questioned by Ms.

Kinder for the purpose of rendering medical aid to a minor. Ms. Kinder was not an agent of

the State when she asked the Defendant questions pertinent to rendering medical aid. Ms.

Kinder had no prior knowledge of the case. Ms. Bailey overheard the Defendant’s

statements about the crime and was not a state agent. As soon as the paramedics understood

that the Defendant was incriminating herself, they stopped her. The police officers present

took appropriate action to ensure the Defendant was not questioned until she was advised of

her rights. The Defendant was given a thorough Miranda warning before she signed the

waiver and gave her recorded statement. When she said she had been “doing this all day,”

she was referring to giving her identifying information. The recording shows that Sergeant

Collins did not overbear the Defendant’s will. She was given the opportunity to state what

she knew, and she wanted to do so. She said she was going to be truthful. She was able to

explain the meaning of “coercion.” The court concluded upon review of the totality of the

circumstances, the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement

was voluntary. The court filed a written order that stated the Defendant’s statement to the

paramedics was admissible in its entirety, and the statement to the police officers before she

asked for a lawyer was admissible.

A. Statement to Paramedics

The Defendant contends, first, that the Defendant’s statement to the paramedics

should have been suppressed because it was the product of a custodial interrogation by a state

actor using medical inquiries as a pretext for obtaining incriminating information. The

Defendant also emphasizes her young age, lack of experience with the police, and multiple

suicide attempts in the hours before she was taken into custody as factors to consider in our

determination.

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As we have noted, the Defendant was under arrest when she encountered the

paramedics. Our supreme court has condemned the use of deceptive police practices after

a defendant has been charged with a crime because they violate the Sixth Amendment right

to counsel. See State v. Berry, 592 S.W.2d 553, 556-61 (Tenn. 1980) (holding that a

homicide defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when questioned by a law

enforcement officer posing as a jail inmate); see also State v. Henry Floyd Sanders, —

S.W.3d —, No. M2011-00962-SC-R11-CD, 2014 WL 5801665, at *14 n.12 (Tenn. Nov. 10,

2014) (“Once the right to counsel attaches to a defendant, law enforcement officers are not

permitted ‘to do by ruse, trickery, deceit and deception that which it is not permitted to do

openly and honestly.’” (quoting Berry, 592 S.W.2d at 561)).

The trial court rejected the argument that the paramedics were state actors. No

evidence shows that the police recruited the paramedics to obtain information from the

Defendant. Ms. Kinder testified that she responded to a call about a possible overdose and

that she did not know why the Defendant was at the police station. Ms. Bailey knew the

Defendant was a suspect in a homicide investigation, but she did not think she told Ms.

Kinder. The Defendant’s admissions were not in response to interrogative questioning by

Ms. Kinder. No evidence shows any attempt by the paramedics to elicit incriminating

information. To the extent Ms. Kinder asked questions, they were focused on getting help

for the victim before Ms. Kinder understood the victim was deceased. Ms. Bailey did not

question the Defendant and was merely completing paperwork during part of the Defendant’s

encounter with Ms. Kinder. The paramedics terminated the encounter when the Defendant

began incriminating herself.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the

paramedics were not state actors. The Defendant’s statements to the paramedics were not

a result of custodial interrogation by the police.

The Defendant also contends that the Defendant’s inculpatory statements to Ms.

Kinder should be suppressed pursuant to the psychiatrist/patient privilege. See T.C.A. §

24-1-207. She reasons that the privilege extends to a psychiatrist or a member of a

psychiatrist’s staff and that the Defendant’s statements about having attempted suicide

referred to mental or emotional problems, placing Ms. Kinder in the role of a psychiatric

nurse. Therefore, the Defendant argues her statements were privileged and should have been

suppressed. The Defendant has not cited any authority for the extension of the statutory

psychiatrist/patient privilege to a patient’s statements to emergency medical personnel. The

State notes the lack of authority for the Defendant’s argument and the lack of evidence that

the paramedics in this case were communicating with the Defendant at the direction of a

psychiatrist or as a member of a psychiatrist’s staff. Because this issue was not raised in the

written motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing, it is waived. See State v. Leach, 148

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S.W.3d 42, 55 (Tenn. 2003) (stating that “[a]s a general rule, a party may not litigate an issue

on one ground, abandon that ground post-trial, and assert a new basis or ground on appeal”);

see also T.R.A.P. 36(a) (“[R]elief may not be granted in contravention of the province of the

trier of fact.”).

B. Statement to Police Officers

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress

her statement to Sergeant Collins and Deputy Hammel. She argues that her waiver of rights

was not voluntary due to her age, state of mind, recent suicide attempts, lack of experience

with law enforcement, and knowledge of a waiver her mother signed allowing the Defendant

to be questioned that was itself a product of coercion.

“The test of voluntariness for confessions under Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee

Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness

under the Fifth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996); see State

v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 763 (Tenn. 2008). To be considered voluntary, a statement

must not be the product of “‘any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or

implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v.

Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168

U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). A defendant’s subjective perception is insufficient to establish the

existence of an involuntary confession. Id. The essential inquiry is “‘whether the behavior

of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to

resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined[.]’” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d

726, 728 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)). A

confession is involuntary if it is the product of coercive state action. See, e.g., Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986).

When the suspect is a juvenile, a waiver is analyzed using a totality of the

circumstances approach that takes the following factors into account:

(1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation including

the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence;

(2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the

consequences of the waiver;

(3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and

write in the language used to give the warnings;

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(4) any intoxication;

(5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and

(6) the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult.

State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 583 (Tenn. 1998). In addition, the Tennessee Rules of

Juvenile Procedure provide:

Intimidative or coercive methods shall never be used in questioning children.

If feasible, a parent or guardian should be present during questioning. In any

event, no child having been placed in and present in a detention facility shall

be interrogated concerning an alleged violation of law unless the child

intelligently waives in writing the right to remain silent.

Tenn. R. Juv. P. 7(d).

We will consider the validity of the Defendant’s waiver in light of the Callahan

factors. Regarding her age, experience, education, and intelligence, we note that the trial

court found that the sixteen-year-old Defendant was intelligent and had life experience. She

stated in the interview that she was in the tenth grade. She had been living independently

from her mother. The court found that Ms. Coffel’s concern for the Defendant’s living

independently was related to Ms. Coffel’s loss of food stamp benefits, not the Defendant’s

living as an adult.

Regarding the Defendant’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the

consequences of the waiver and her familiarity with the warnings, the trial court found that

the Defendant was thoroughly advised of her Miranda rights. Her waiver of those rights was

memorialized in the recording and by her signature on the written waiver. The Defendant

stated that she was going to be truthful. She was able to explain the meaning of “coercion.”

The record does not reflect that the Defendant had any prior involvement with law

enforcement, but the Defendant asked whether her mother was aware of what was happening,

appeared to understand her rights when they were explained to her, and indicated her

willingness to waive her rights. When she was questioned, she readily provided information

in narrative form without extensive or accusatorial questioning. She appeared to understand

what she was doing and wanted to relate the facts to the authorities.

Regarding intoxication, the record reflects that the Defendant stated she and Mr.

Bowers had used drugs on previous occasions. They brought pills with them when they left

Tennessee, but the pills were lost. She said that on the day she was taken into custody, she

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and Mr. Bowers attempted suicide by injecting nicotine water and inhaling carbon monoxide.

The record reflects, though, that she had been in custody for approximately eight hours

before she gave her statement and that she was able to communicate without apparent

impairment. Likewise, Ms. Kinder testified that the Defendant’s vital signs were normal and

that she had no medical problems warranting treatment earlier that day.

Regarding mental health concerns, the Defendant did not exhibit or report any

problems. The recording shows that the Defendant was upset and cried frequently during the

interview but that she was not so overcome by emotion that she had any difficulty relating

the events of the crimes. The officers questioned her calmly. Although she reported multiple

suicide attempts, several hours had passed, and she did not appear to be in acute distress. She

expressed her desire to tell the truth about the crime and her remorse for its effects on the

lives of herself, Mr. Bowers, and her unborn child.

Regarding the presence of a parent, the record reflects that Ms. Coffel initially told

officers she did not want the Defendant to be questioned without herself or an attorney

present, but she changed her mind after she received more information from the sheriff that

a homicide had occurred, talked to the district attorney general and employees of his office,

and made telephone calls. Although the Defendant argues that Ms. Coffel was threatened

with the Defendant’s receiving harsher punishment if Ms. Coffel did not sign the consent

form, the evidence falls short of showing that Ms. Coffel was threatened or coerced into

signing the form. We note, as well, that Ms. Coffel testified that she was unable to go to

Indiana on December 12, 2010, due to inclement weather. The Defendant asked about her

mother’s knowledge of what was happening and was advised that her mother signed the

consent form. The Defendant told Ms. Kinder that she did not want to give out Ms. Coffel’s

contact information because her mother did not care about her and was a drunk.

The record reflects that the trial court considered the relevant factors and concluded

upon review of the totality of the circumstances that the State had proven by a preponderance

of the evidence that the statement was voluntary. Upon review, we conclude that the

evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings and that the findings support the

court’s conclusion. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

IV

Crime Scene Video Recording and Photograph

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the video

recording of the crime scene depicting the victim’s body and a photograph taken during the

victim’s autopsy. She argues the recording and photograph were admitted in violation of

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Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. The State responds that the trial court properly admitted

the evidence. We agree with the State.

Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence, however, “may

be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

The admissibility of a crime scene video recording is “within the sound discretion of

the trial judge, and [a] ruling on the admissibility of such evidence will not be overturned

without a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477

(Tenn. 1993); see State v. McCray, 922 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tenn. 1996). A trial court abuses

its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or reaches a conclusion that is

“illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Ruiz,

204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006).

Photographs of victims “are admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant to

the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying character.” State v. Banks,

564 S.W.2d 947, 950-51 (Tenn. 1978). When determining the admissibility of such

evidence, the trial court should consider

their accuracy and clarity, and whether they were taken before the corpse was

moved, if the position and location of the body when found is material; the

inadequacy of testimonial evidence in relating the facts to the jury; and the

need for evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt or to rebut the

defendant’s contentions.

Id. at 951.

The record reflects that before the trial, the Defendant moved to exclude the video

recording of the crime scene. Trial counsel argued the recording showed the victim at the

scene and was unnecessary given the testimony of the police officers and emergency

personnel who were present at the scene. Counsel, though, did not object to the remaining

portions of the recording and noted the holes in the walls showed Mr. Bowers’s propensity

for violence and were relevant to the defense.

The trial court found that the video recording was relevant because it permitted the

jury to “be in touch with” the scene and to view firsthand where things were located and how

-40-

events unfolded. The court noted trial counsel’s concession that the recording was relevant,

in part, to Mr. Bowers’s propensity for violence. The court found that the recording was not

gruesome, although it showed the victim lying on the floor. The court found that the

completeness of the police investigation was reflected in the recording and that the recording

reflected what the officer saw. The court found that the recording was relevant and permitted

the State to present it to the jury in its entirety.

Regarding admission of the video recording, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion. The recording is neither inflammatory nor gruesome, and it is extremely

probative of the condition and appearance of the victim and the scene. Although the victim

was deceased and lying on the floor, the recording corroborated, in part, the Defendant’s

statements regarding how the victim was killed and showed the placement of the pillow and

dog cord used to kill the victim. The recording also showed the absence of the victim’s car,

the layout of the victim’s house, and the placement of other pieces of evidence.

Relative to the photographs, the Defendant objected to various photographs of the

victim, including photographs taken during the autopsy. Trial counsel argued the

photographs of the victim were too graphic and prejudicial and would inflame the jury. The

trial court excluded several photographs, and the only photograph relevant to this appeal is

a closeup of the victim’s face showing facial petechia indicative of asphyxiation. Counsel

argued the medical examiner’s testimony and the autopsy report sufficiently described the

markings on the victim’s face, which made the photograph unnecessary. The court found

that although the photograph was of the victim’s face, it was not particularly gruesome and

that the photograph clearly showed markings. The court found that the State could present

the photograph as long as it could lay the proper foundation with the medical examiner that

the markings were indicative of asphyxiation.

Regarding the photograph of the victim’s face, the record reflects that trial counsel

objected to its admission on the ground of relevance. The medical examiner testified that the

photograph showed petechia around the victim’s eyes and an abrasion on her forehead. At

that point, counsel withdrew his objection, and the photograph was admitted. Because

counsel withdrew his objection to the photograph, the issue is waived. See T.R.A.P. 36(a);

see also Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). In any event, we note that nothing in the record warrants

a conclusion that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the photograph. See State

v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d

274 (Tenn. 2000). The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

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V

Victim’s Fear of Mr. Bowers

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to admit evidence of the

victim’s fear of Mr. Bowers. She argues witness testimony relative to the victim’s fear was

admissible because it qualified as a state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay. The

State responds that the trial court properly excluded the relevant testimony because the state

of mind exception only applies to material issues. We agree with the State.

Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid.

801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it qualifies as an exception. Id. at 802. Tennessee

Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides:

Hearsay Exceptions. – The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule:

....

(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. – A statement of

the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical

condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily

health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact

remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,

identification, or terms of declarant’s will.

Trial counsel attempted to present evidence that the victim feared Mr. Bowers and that

Mr. Bowers “could have been responsible” for the offenses. During Ms. Breeding’s

cross-examination, she stated that she and the victim had talked about Mr. Bowers. When

counsel asked if the victim told Ms. Breeding that she feared Mr. Bowers, the prosecutor

objected on the basis of hearsay. Counsel argued the statement would qualify as the existing

emotional state of fear and was admissible as a hearsay exception. The trial court sustained

the objection. Upon further questioning, Ms. Breeding testified that she spoke to the victim

several times per week and that they were close. Ms. Breeding stated that the victim spoke

to her when the victim was upset about Mr. Bowers. When counsel asked about the

substance of those conversations, the court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objection. Ms.

Breeding further testified that the victim was usually upset but did not usually cry when they

discussed Mr. Bowers. When asked if the victim told her that Mr. Bowers previously

assaulted her, the court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objection.

-42-

Although the Defendant contends the elicited testimony was not hearsay and cites to

the applicable rule of evidence, she fails to present this court with legal authority supporting

her contention and fails to explain how the testimony qualified as an existing mental or

emotional condition. See T.R.A.P. 27(a)(7)(A) (stating that the appellant’s brief must contain

an argument providing “the contentions . . . with respect to the issues presented, and the

reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with

citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record); see also Tenn. Ct. Crim.

App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or

appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court.”). In any event,

the Defendant states that the purpose of the testimony was to show that Mr. Bowers “could

have been responsible” for the offenses. The State presented ample evidence of Mr.

Bowers’s participation in the killing. The Defendant’s statements to the police identified Mr.

Bowers’s role in the offenses, and Mr. Bowers admitted to strangling the victim. The

defense presented evidence through Mr. Savage and Sheriff Melton about the victim’s being

upset regarding Mr. Bowers and the victim’s receiving advice to contact the sheriff’s office

and to throw Mr. Bowers out of her house. Likewise, Mr. Breeding testified that Mr. Bowers

previously shoved the victim, and Mr. Bowers admitted in his statement to the police that he

previously stole the victim’s money. The jury was free to find implicitly based on this

evidence that the victim was concerned about Mr. Bowers’s behavior toward her. The

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

VI

Witness Testimony

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the

circumstances of Ms. Coffel’s consent for the authorities to question the Defendant. She

contends that the evidence was relevant and admissible after the State was allowed to

introduce her statement, in which Sergeant Collins stated that a Tennessee district attorney

general met with Ms. Coffel and reviewed the consent form and that Ms. Coffel signed it.

She argues that the police “very clearly informed the Defendant that her mother had given

her permission for them to talk to the Defendant” and that “the statement of the officer was

included in an attempt to somehow bootstrap the statement of the Defendant and convince

the jury to give it more weight than it deserved.” The State contends that the Defendant

waived the issue by failing to cite to relevant portions of the record. See T.R.A.P.

27(a)(7)(A); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). In her reply brief, the Defendant provided the

missing citation to the record. We will consider the issue on the merits.

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At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce the testimony of Ms. Coffel, Mr. Hutte, and

Mr. Hargis regarding the circumstances of Ms. Coffel’s signing the consent form. The

Defendant relied on the testimony of these witnesses at the suppression hearing as her offer

of proof. In advocating for the admission of the evidence, trial counsel argued that the State

“opened the door” by offering the evidence. Counsel explained, “We don’t want the jury

to somehow think well, the mother said it was okay, so everything must have been all right.”

The trial court accepted the offer of proof but denied relief.

We fail to see the relevance of the circumstances of the State’s obtaining the

Defendant’s mother’s consent to any fact of consequence in the case. The recorded statement

established the voluntariness of the Defendant’s waiver of her Miranda rights and her role

in the murder. The statement also established that the Defendant and her mother were

estranged and that the Defendant did not regard her mother as having her best interests at

heart. We cannot conclude from the recording that Sergeant Collins’s statement to the

Defendant that he had obtained Ms. Coffel’s consent for the interview was a meaningful

factor in the Defendant’s decisions to waive her rights and to give a statement. The

Defendant has not explained how Ms. Coffel’s consent for the interview might have caused

the jury to confer greater weight on the Defendant’s statement, nor is any such concern

apparent upon our review of the record. The evidence is not relevant. See Tenn. R. Evid.

401. We note, as well, that the evidence had the potential to confuse the issues and mislead

the jury about the significant issues in the case. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403. The Defendant has

failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. She is

not entitled to relief on this basis.

VII

Intoxication Jury Instruction

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide an intoxication

jury instruction. She argues the trial court erroneously found that no evidence was presented

regarding the Defendant’s intoxication on the day of the offenses and the effects of the drugs

she took. The State responds that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s request for

an intoxication instruction. We agree with the State.

A criminal defendant has “a right to a correct and complete charge of the law.”

Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 280 (citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). As

a result, a trial court has a duty “to give proper jury instructions as to the law governing the

issues raised by the nature of the proceeding and the evidence introduced at trial.” State v.

Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 390); see State

v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tenn. 1975). A jury instruction related to general

-44-

defenses is not required to be submitted to the jury “unless it is fairly raised by the proof.”

T.C.A. § 39-11-203(c) (2014). An erroneous jury instruction, though, may deprive the

defendant of the constitutional right to a jury trial. See Garrison, 40 S.W.3d at 433-34.

Our supreme court has concluded that sufficient evidence to fairly raise a general

defense “is less than that required to establish a proposition by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129. A trial court’s determination in this regard “must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and draw all reasonable

inferences in the defendant’s favor.” Id.; see State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2001);

Johnson v. State, 531 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 733

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see also State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1993). If evidence has been presented which reasonable minds could accept as a

defense, “the accused is entitled to appropriate instructions.” Johnson, 531 S.W.2d at 559.

A jury instruction is “prejudicially erroneous only if the . . . charge, when read as a whole,

fails to fairly submit the legal issues or misleads the jury as to the applicable law.” State v.

Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005).

“[I]ntoxication itself is not a defense to prosecution for an offense. However,

intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to

negate a culpable mental state.” T.C.A. § 39-11-503(a) (2014). Voluntary intoxication is

defined as “intoxication caused by a substance that the person knowingly introduced into the

person’s body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication was known or ought to have been

known.” Id. § 39-11-503(d)(3) (2014). This court has stated that

proof of intoxication alone is not a defense to a charge of committing a

specific intent crime nor does it entitle an accused to jury instructions . . . ;

there must be evidence that the intoxication deprived the accused of the mental

capacity to form specific intent. An intoxicated person might have . . . intent

while a sober person might not.

Harrell v. State, 593 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). The key inquiry “is not

whether the accused was intoxicated, but what was [the person’s] mental capacity.” Id.

The record reflects that the Defendant admitted during her police interview that she

and Mr. Bowers became depressed and ingested Dilaudid after her mother threatened to have

Mr. Bowers arrested for statutory rape. However, no evidence shows the amount she

consumed or that she was intoxicated to the extent it deprived her of the ability to form the

required intent to commit the offenses. The Defendant never stated in her police interview

that she was under the influence of the Dilaudid at the time of the killing, and she never

stated that she did not understand what was happening or what she was doing. The

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Defendant told the police that her mother called around 10:30 a.m. on the day of the killing

and that she and Mr. Bowers started getting high afterward. She reported that they began to

discuss killing the victim around 2:00 p.m. and that the victim arrived home around 5:30 p.m.

The Defendant was articulate during the police interview and clearly remembered the

sequence of events leading up to the killing. We note that although Dr. Walker testified that

Dilaudid caused “gross intoxication in most people,” no evidence was presented that the

Defendant was intoxicated by Dilaudid at the time of the killing. In fact, Dr. Walker only

testified that the Defendant’s ability to think and to make good decisions might have been

impaired. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to provide an intoxication

jury instruction. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

VIII

Duress Jury Instruction

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide a duress jury

instruction. She argues that evidence regarding the Defendant’s being threatened and in an

abusive relationship with Mr. Bowers supported the instruction. The State responds that the

trial court properly denied the Defendant’s request for a duress instruction. We agree with

the State.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-504(a) (2014) states, in relevant part, that

duress can be a defense

where the person . . . is threatened with harm that is present, imminent,

impending, and of such a nature to induce a well-grounded apprehension of

death or serious bodily injury if the act is not done. The threatened harm must

be continuous throughout the time the act is being committed, and must be one

from which the person cannot withdraw in safety. Further, the desirability and

urgency of avoiding the harm must clearly outweigh the harm sought to be

prevented by the law proscribing the conduct, according to ordinary standards

of reasonableness.

The trial court noted the proof that the Defendant told witnesses that after the killing,

Mr. Bowers took her to a bridge and threatened to throw her in the water. The court found

that even if true, any threat of harm arose after the killing, not before or during the killing.

The court, likewise, found that no evidence showed that the Defendant had a well-grounded

apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if “the act was not done.” The court found no

evidence showed that Mr. Bowers threatened to kill the Defendant or to inflict serious bodily

-46-

injury upon her if she did not participate in the killing. The record supports the court’s

findings.

The record reflects that the Defendant described an abusive relationship with Mr.

Bowers to Drs. Walker and Phillips. Although the Defendant never mentioned to the police

any alleged abuse or threats made by Mr. Bowers, she told Drs. Walker and Phillips that after

the killing, they drove to Standing Stone, where they stopped at a bridge. According to the

Defendant, Mr. Bowers grabbed her hair, shoved her face over the bridge wall, and

threatened to kill her by throwing her in the water if she refused to do what he wanted. She

claimed she feared for her life. Although their relationship might have been abusive and Mr.

Bowers might have threatened to kill the Defendant while standing on the bridge, no

evidence was presented that Mr. Bowers was going to kill or to seriously injure the

Defendant if she did not participate in the killing. To the contrary, the evidence shows that

the Defendant and Mr. Bowers planned the killing together and that the Defendant suggested

the manner in which they would kill the victim. The video recordings from the convenience

and grocery stores after the killing also fail to show that the Defendant was acting under

duress. She is not entitled to relief on this basis.

XI

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Defendant contends that the mandatory life sentence imposed for first degree

murder violates the federal and Tennessee constitutional prohibitions against cruel and

unusual punishment. She argues that her sentence is in effect a life sentence without the

possibility of parole and that such sentences are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. The

State responds that the sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment. We agree with the

State.

Immediately after the trial, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment as

required by law. At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed to concurrent sentences of

fifteen years for conspiracy to commit murder, fifteen years for especially aggravated

robbery, and two years for theft. The court permitted testimony regarding the presentence

report and the victim impact statements. Trial counsel, however, noted that although the

Defendant was not contesting the State’s request for the minimum sentences, she was not

waiving the right to raise on appeal whether a life sentence was unconstitutional as cruel and

unusual punishment for a juvenile offender.

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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of

the Tennessee Constitution state, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tenn.

Const. art. 1, § 16. In recent years, the Supreme Court has specifically addressed sentencing

juvenile offenders after being convicted in criminal court. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.

48 (2010), a sixteen-year-old defendant was convicted of armed burglary and attempted

armed robbery and was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment for armed burglary and to

fifteen years for attempted robbery. Florida no longer provided parole, giving the defendant

no opportunity for release, except executive clemency. The Court concluded that in

nonhomicide cases, the State is not required to guarantee release to a juvenile offender but

must give such an offender “[a] meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. . . . [W]hile the Eighth Amendment forbids a State

from imposing . . . life without parole . . . on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not

require the State to release that offender during his natural life.” Id. at 74. The Court noted

that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of

nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life.” Id.

In State v. Tavaria Merritt, No. M2012-00829-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6505145

(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2013), no app. filed, this court was charged with determining

whether an effective 225-year sentence to be served at 100% for nonhomicide offenses was

the equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole and whether a such sentence

for a juvenile offender was in violation of Graham and our prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. This court concluded that although the effective sentence was the

equivalent of life imprisonment, “the sentence did not violate Graham’s specific holding

because [the defendant] was not sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole.” Tavaria Merritt, 2013 WL 6505145, at *6. The court concluded that “Graham

applie[d] only to juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

for nonhomicide offenses[.]” Id.

More recently, the Supreme Court extended its rationale in Graham to juvenile

offenders convicted of homicides. In Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. —, —, 132 S. Ct. 2455,

2464 (2012), the Court concluded that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole for juvenile offenders generally violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. There, the juvenile defendants were convicted of murder after being transferred

to adult court and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as required

by state statute. The Court reasoned that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole prevented trial judges from considering in sentencing the juvenile’s age,

immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, the family and

home environment, and the circumstances of the homicide, including the extent of the

juvenile’s participation. Id. at 2468. As a result, the Court concluded that juvenile offenders

-48-

cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in homicide cases.

Id. at 2464.

Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham and Miller, the Defendant now

asks this court to conclude that her life sentence is unconstitutional. We decline to make

such a conclusion. Pursuant to our statutes, life imprisonment permits release eligibility after

serving fifty-one years. See T.C.A. § 40-35-501(h)(1), (i)(1), (i)(2)(a) (2010) (amended

2012, 2013, 2014). Although the Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the murder, she

was given a sentence that provides for release eligibility. Therefore, Graham and Miller do

not apply.

Recently, this court has refused to extend Miller to juvenile offenders convicted of

murder who receive life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In Floyd Lee Perry, Jr.

v. State, No. W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1377579, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.

7, 2014), no app. filed, this court concluded that Miller does not apply to juvenile defendants

who are sentenced to life imprisonment carrying the possibility of release or parole after

serving fifty-one years in confinement. The court stated, “While the next logical step may

be to extend protection to these types of sentences, that is not the precedent which now

exists.” Id. The court stated that it was “not compelled to grant the . . . request to expand the

meaning of the Miller holding.” Id.; see Charles Damien Darden v. State, No.

M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014)

(distinguishing Tennessee’s life imprisonment sentence from the Arkansas and Alabama

sentencing statutes at issue in Miller, which provided for mandatory life sentences without

the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of murder), no app. filed. As a

result, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

X

Transfer from Juvenile Court

The Defendant contends that the juvenile court erred by transferring her case to

criminal court. She argues the juvenile court erroneously relied on her statement to the police

because it was obtained illegally without her mother’s effective consent. The State responds

that the juvenile court properly transferred the case to criminal court. We agree with the

State.

At the transfer hearing, Patricia Bilbrey, the victim’s daughter, testified that the victim

was age seventy-two and had seven children. Mr. Bowers was her nephew and lived with

the victim. She met the Defendant in November 2010, when the Defendant began living with

Mr. Bowers at the victim’s house. She last saw the Defendant at the victim’s house after

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Thanksgiving and said it was a normal day. She said that frequently the Defendant and Mr.

Bowers stayed in their bedroom. Although she and the Defendant spoke, she learned from

the victim that the Defendant was sixteen years old.

Overton County Sheriff’s Detective Steven Ritz testified that he and Detective Greg

Cooper responded to the victim’s house on the night of the killing. They found the victim

lying on her back on the floor with a red cord around her neck. He saw a pillow lying beside

the victim. He identified a photograph of the victim taken by TBI Special Agent Steve

Huntley. The victim’s house was searched after a warrant was obtained. He learned the

victim’s gray Toyota Scion was missing.

Detective Ritz identified a photograph of a portion of the red cord found in the

Defendant and Mr. Bowers’s bedroom near the closet. Wire cutters were found in the same

bedroom, and Detective Ritz considered them evidence because the cord found around the

victim’s neck had been cut. He identified the autopsy report and agreed the cause of death

was asphyxia due to strangulation and to smothering. He agreed the Defendant underwent

a mental health evaluation performed by Dr. Sandra Phillips at Volunteer Behavioral Health.

On cross-examination, Detective Ritz testified that he received the dispatch call

around 9:00 p.m. and arrived at the scene twenty to thirty minutes later. He said that he

entered the house during the investigation, along with Detective Cooper. They waited about

two hours for the search warrant. Detective Ritz stated that he collected the cord, wire

cutters, pillow, pillowcase, and clothes as evidence, although he did not know if any

examinations were performed on the items. He said two TBI agents entered the house after

the warrant was obtained.

Ashley Ogletree testified that she was the store manager at the Raceway convenience

store in Livingston and that on December 10, 2010, she worked from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.

The Defendant entered the store around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. with a man, whom she did not

know personally but recognized. The man walked to the restroom, and the Defendant

approached a group of men talking inside the store. The Defendant asked if the men knew

how to get to Indiana, and they denied knowing directions. The Defendant paid for the gas

they pumped and asked to look at a map. Ms. Ogletree directed the Defendant to the maps

and provided her with pen and paper. She recalled that the Defendant and the man were

traveling in a silver hatchback and that the Defendant mentioned she was about five-months

pregnant and was going to name the child Maverick. She said the Defendant acted normal,

although she appeared to be “high strung.” The Defendant said she was excited because she

was going to visit family. The Defendant was inside the store for five to ten minutes, and

Ms. Ogletree said the security surveillance camera recorded the Defendant inside the store.

-50-

ISP Detective Matt Collins testified that on December 12, 2010, he was contacted by

Tennessee law enforcement, who asked him to help find the victim’s missing vehicle. He

was told that the car was connected to a homicide and that Mr. Bowers and the Defendant

might have been traveling in the victim’s car. He found the victim’s car at the Defendant’s

grandparents’ house in Gas City, Indiana. The Defendant and Mr. Bowers were taken into

custody because Detective Collins received a Tennessee warrant for Mr. Bowers’s arrest for

theft and a Tennessee juvenile petition for the Defendant.

Detective Collins testified that he interviewed the Defendant at the juvenile detention

center and that Deputy Chad Hammel was present. The interview occurred in a large

visitation room with a conference table and chairs. The room also had a desk and office

partition, which is where the interview occurred. The door to the visitation room was closed

but unlocked. The female “confinement” officer who escorted the Defendant into the room

was present during the interview but out of the camera’s view. Detective Collins received

a consent form signed by the Defendant’s mother giving him permission to question the

Defendant. He told the Defendant about her mother’s consent and allowed her to review the

form. The Defendant was advised of her Miranda rights, and the Defendant stated that she

did not need an attorney because she was going to tell the truth. Detective Collins testified

regarding the substance of the Defendant’s statement, which was consistent with the

recording played at the trial and at the suppression hearing.

Detective Collins testified that Indiana law required him to attempt to obtain consent

from the parents of a juvenile suspect. When Tennessee law enforcement mentioned

Detective Collins’s interviewing the Defendant, he mentioned that a parent might need to be

present for the purpose of a “meaningful consultation.” He described meaningful

consultation as a process during which the parent and the juvenile were told why the police

wanted to speak with the juvenile and were advised of their rights. Afterward, the officer left

the room and provided the parent and the juvenile with an opportunity to consult about how

to proceed. Detective Collins consulted his supervisor and the district attorney’s office.

Tennessee law enforcement researched the issue and told Detective Collins to interview the

Defendant after receiving the signed consent form from the Defendant’s mother.

On cross-examination, Detective Collins testified that at the time of the Defendant’s

interview, Indiana law required an interview to be audio or video recorded, but not both. He

said the juvenile detention center was not equipped for audio/video recordings. He recorded

the interview with a hand-held digital recorder. He said that the Defendant was detained at

11:00 a.m. and that the interview began at 7:15 p.m. The Defendant remained at the police

station until the juvenile petition was received and was taken to the juvenile detention

facility. He did not know if the Defendant had been provided food or drink or had been

-51-

permitted to use the restroom during that time. She was handcuffed during the interview.

The Defendant did not appear sleepy or tired but was upset.

Overton County Youth Services Officer Shannon Wilson testified that she was a

liaison with the juvenile court and the community on juvenile-related matters. She was asked

to determine if she could find a place for the Defendant to be detained until her first court

hearing. She investigated and learned that the Defendant had never been arrested before the

killing, and as a result, the Defendant could not be placed in state custody or foster care. She

did not know of any institutions in the county or the state in which the Defendant could be

rehabilitated.

Kimberly Coffel, the Defendant’s mother, testified regarding the circumstances

surrounding her signing the consent form. She said that District Attorney General York and

an assistant district attorney general came to her house. She said she called the Indiana

police department where the Defendant was being detained and told the officers not to

question the Defendant until she and an attorney were present. She said she also called the

Grant County Juvenile Detention Center and provided the same instructions. She said Mr.

York would not provide much information about what was happening, although he told her

that the Defendant was wanted for questioning related to a vehicle theft. She said that the

consent form she signed was regarding the vehicle theft and that Mr. York never mentioned

the killing. She learned about the homicide when Sheriff Melton called her house.

Ms. Coffel testified that Mr. York told her it was in everyone’s best interests for her

to sign the consent form and that he would try the Defendant as an adult and to the fullest

extent of the law if she did not sign the form. She did not recall reading the consent form but

said she was sure she read it. She did not recall anyone telling her that the Defendant had the

right to a detention hearing where a decision would be made regarding the Defendant’s

pretrial confinement. She said that nobody offered her an opportunity to speak with the

Defendant and that nobody told her that she could be present via telephone during the police

interview. She said she was intimidated by Mr. York and did not understand how her

daughter was involved in the worst crime he had ever seen.

On cross-examination, Ms. Coffel testified that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers were

dating and that they were living about one to one and one-half miles from her house. She

learned on November 12, 2010, that the Defendant and Mr. Bowers were living with the

victim. She said she attempted to be patient with the Defendant and said she was going to

“giv[e] it one month.” She said that before November 12, she called “them” three times for

assistance in getting the Defendant home without involving the authorities but that nobody

helped.

-52-

Ms. Coffel testified that she thought Mr. Bowers was about eighteen years old. She

said Greg Hutte, her boyfriend, was home when Mr. York, the assistant district attorney, and

police officers came to her house on December 12. She said that after they left, she learned

the Defendant was involved in a homicide. She requested Mr. Hutte drive by the victim’s

house to determine what was happening, and Mr. Hutte told her the crime scene unit was at

the victim’s house.

On redirect examination, Ms. Coffel testified that Mr. York did not talk about her

parental rights. She denied he advised that she had the right to visit the Defendant, that

specific visiting hours applied, that corporal punishment was not administered in juvenile

detention, that intimidating and coercive methods would not be used during the Defendant’s

interview, and that unauthorized persons would not be permitted to question the Defendant.

Relative to whether the Defendant’s statement was admissible at the transfer hearing,

the juvenile court found that proper procedures were followed in obtaining parental consent

for the Defendant’s interview. The court did not find that there was sufficient intimidation

or coercion to make the Defendant’s statement inadmissible or ineffective. The court found

that valid parental consent was provided. Likewise, the court found that based on Detective

Collins’s testimony, the conditions of the surroundings in which the interview occurred did

not render the statement coerced. The court found that the statement was voluntary and

freely given.

Relying on Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134 and Juvenile Procedure Rule

24, the juvenile court found that the transfer motion was filed by the State on January 5,

2011, and that the Defendant and trial counsel were provided adequate notice of the State’s

intention to transfer the Defendant to criminal court. The court noted that the Defendant, her

mother, and her counsel were present at the hearing. The court, likewise, found that the

Defendant’s statement and the manner in which it was obtained satisfied the statute. The

court found that sufficient evidence existed to corroborate the Defendant’s statement.

The juvenile court found that the Defendant was age sixteen and that the State’s

witnesses were credible. The court stated that it assumed Ms. Coffel’s testimony was

presented to rebut the admissibility of the Defendant’s statement. It stated that although a

credibility finding relative to Ms. Coffel was probably unnecessary, it found Ms. Coffel

credible except to the extent that she claimed she was intimidated into providing her consent.

Relative to the factors the juvenile court was required to consider in determining

whether reasonable grounds existed to transfer the Defendant to criminal court, the court

found that the Defendant had no previous delinquency records based on Ms. Wilson’s

testimony. It found that no proof was presented regarding past rehabilitation efforts. The

-53-

court found that the Defendant was accused of committing an offense against a person and

that it did not know of any offense worse than the one alleged by the State. The court found

the evidence sufficient to show that the offenses were committed in an aggressive and

premeditated manner and that reasonable grounds existed to show that the Defendant

committed the offenses. The court credited Ms. Wilson’s testimony that insufficient

rehabilitation services or facilities existed to serve the Defendant. The court found that the

Defendant was not committable to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally

ill based on Dr. Phillips’s evaluation. Last, the court found that the interest of the community

required the Defendant to continue to be under legal restraint and discipline. The Defendant

was transferred to criminal court.

Once a juvenile petition has been filed alleging delinquent acts on the part of the child

that are designated a crime, a court may transfer the child “to be dealt with as an adult” if:

(1) The child was sixteen (16) years or more at the time of the alleged

conduct[;]

(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity

with §§ 37-1-124, 37-1-126 and 37-1-127;

(3) Reasonable notice in writing of the time, place and purpose of the hearing

is given to the child and the child’s parents . . . at least three (3) days prior to

the hearing; and

(4) The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:

(A) The child committed the delinquent act as alleged;

(B) The child is not committable to an institution for the

developmentally disabled or mentally ill;

(C) The interests of the community require that the child be put under

legal restraint or discipline.

T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a)(1)-(4) (2014). A juvenile court must consider in making its

determination the extent and nature of previous delinquency recor

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