Opinion

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank

  • 776 F.3d 1343
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Dec 23, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Chen
On the bench
Dyk, Taranto, Chen
Cited by
479 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

holding that, under Alice step two, the asserted patents contained no limitations that transformed the claims into patent-eligible applications because the plaintiff's claims "merely recite the use of [] existing scanning and processing technology to recognize and store data from specific data fields such as amounts, addresses and dates. There is no 'inventive concept' in [the plaintiff's] use of a generic scanner and computer to perform well-understood, routine, and conventional activities commonly used in the industry. At most, [the plaintiff’s] claims attempt to limit the abstract idea of recognizing and storing information from hard copy documents using a scanner and a computer to a particular technological environment. Such limitation has been held insufficient to save a claim in this context.”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that, under Alice step two, the asserted patents contained no limitations that transformed the claims into patent-eligible applications because the plaintiff's claims "merely recite the use of [] existing scanning and processing technology to recognize and store data from specific data fields such as amounts, addresses and dates. There is no 'inventive concept' in [the plaintiff's] use of a generic scanner and computer to perform well-understood, routine, and conventional activities commonly used in the industry. At most, [the plaintiff’s] claims attempt to limit the abstract idea of recognizing and storing information from hard copy documents using a scanner and a computer to a particular technological environment. Such limitation has been held insufficient to save a claim in this context.”
  • finding a method of extracting data from hard copy documents using an automated digitizing unit such as a scanner, recognizing specific information in that data, and storing that information in memory (a method that could be used in an ATM that recognizes information on a scanned check) to be directed to the abstract idea of data collection, recognition, and storage, and holding that the use of admittedly generic scanning and processing technologies to perform these conventional activities did not constitute an inventive concept
  • finding that a detailed assessment of each claim is not always necessary where the asserted claims are “substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea” (quoting Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 12-2501, 2013 WL 3964909 , at *5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107184 , at *16 (D.N.J. July 31, 2013) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 ), aff’d, 776 F.3d 1343 )
  • finding patent directed to "software on an automated teller machine (ATM) that recognizes information written on a scanned check ... [and] stor[es] information ... into memory" to be abstract because "[t]he concept of data collection , recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known" (emphases added)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

CONTENT EXTRACTION AND TRANSMISSION

LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. AND

PNC BANK, N.A.,

Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------------

DIEBOLD, INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Cross Appellant,

v.

CONTENT EXTRACTION AND TRANSMISSION

LLC,

Defendant-Counterplaintiff-Appellant,

AND

MITCHELL MEDINA, CATHERINE ELIAS, AND

JEAN-MARC ZIMMERMAN,

Defendants,

2 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

AND

JOHN DOE COMPANIES 1-100, JOHN DOE

COMPANIES 1-99, TD BANK GROUP, AND TD

BANK, N.A.

Third-Party Defendants.

______________________

2013-1588, -1589,

2014-1112, -1687

______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey in Nos. 12-CV-2501, 12-CV-6960,

and 12-CV-7640, Judge Michael A. Shipp.

______________________

Decided: December 23, 2014

______________________

ANATOLY S. WEISER, Zimmerman & Weiser LLP, of

Westfield, New Jersey, argued for plaintiff-appellant

Content Extraction and Transmission LLC. With him on

the brief was JEAN-MARC ZIMMERMAN.

FREDERICK L. WHITMER, Kilpatrick, Townsend &

Stockton LLP, of New York, New York, argued for de-

fendant-appellee Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.

Of counsel on the brief for defendant-appellees The PNC

Financial Services Group, Inc., et al. was NOAM J.

KRITZER, Bakos & Kritzer of Florham Park, New Jersey.

ROY H. WEPNER, Lerner, David, Littenberg, Krumholz

& Mentlik, LLP, of Westfield, New Jersey, argued for

plaintiff-counterdefendant-cross appellant Diebold, Incor-

porated. With him on the brief were ARNOLD I. RADY and

BRIAN D. HILL.

______________________

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 3

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Content Extraction and Transmission LLC and its

principals (collectively, CET) appeal from the grant of a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), in which the United

States District Court for the District of New Jersey held

that the claims of CET’s asserted patents are invalid as

patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cross-appellant

Diebold, Inc. (Diebold) appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of its tortious interference and Racketeer Influ-

enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims

against CET in a related action. We affirm the district

court’s dismissal of both CET’s and Diebold’s claims.

BACKGROUND

CET owns U.S. Patent Nos. 5,258,855 (’855 patent),

5,369,508 (’508 patent), 5,625,465 (’465 patent), and

5,768,416 (’416 patent) (collectively, the asserted patents).

The ’508, ’465, and ’416 patents are continuations of the

’855 patent, and share substantially the same specifica-

tion. The four patents contain a total of 242 claims. The

claims generally recite a method of 1) extracting data

from hard copy documents using an automated digitizing

unit such as a scanner, 2) recognizing specific information

from the extracted data, and 3) storing that information

in a memory. This method can be performed by software

on an automated teller machine (ATM) that recognizes

information written on a scanned check, such as the

check’s amount, and populates certain data fields with

that information in a computer’s memory.

Claim 1 of the ’855 patent recites:

4 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

A method of processing information from a diver-

sity of types of hard copy documents, said method

comprising the steps of:

(a) receiving output representing a diver-

sity of types of hard copy documents from

an automated digitizing unit and storing

information from said diversity of types of

hard copy documents into a memory, said

information not fixed from one document

to the next, said receiving step not preced-

ed by scanning, via said automated digit-

izing unit, of a separate document

containing format requirements;

(b) recognizing portions of said hard copy

documents corresponding to a first data

field; and

(c) storing information from said portions

of said hard copy documents correspond-

ing to said first data field into memory lo-

cations for said first data field.

’855 patent, 16:19–34.

In April and November 2012 respectively, CET filed

infringement actions against appellees Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. (Wells Fargo) and The PNC Financial Services

Group, Inc. and PNC Bank, N.A. (collectively, PNC),

alleging that they were using ATMs with check deposit

software that infringed its patents. In December 2012,

Diebold, the manufacturer of Wells Fargo’s and PNC’s

ATMs, filed an action against CET seeking 1) a declarato-

ry judgment that its ATMs did not infringe CET’s assert-

ed patents and that CET’s patents were invalid, and 2)

injunctive and monetary relief for tortious interference

and violations of the RICO Act arising from CET’s act of

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 5

filing allegedly baseless infringement suits against Wells

Fargo, PNC, and other Diebold customers. CET counter-

claimed against Diebold by asserting direct and indirect

infringement of its patents. The district court eventually

consolidated the three inter-related actions between CET

and Wells Fargo, PNC, and Diebold for pretrial purposes.

Relevant here, PNC subsequently moved to dismiss

CET’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to FRCP

12(b)(6), on the ground that each claim of the asserted

patents was invalid as patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C.

§ 101. PNC focused its arguments on two claims: claim 1

of the ’855 patent and claim 1 of the ’416 patent. PNC

contended that these two claims were representative, and

that none of the other claims included anything more

than minor changes in format or phrasing. In its opposi-

tion to PNC’s motion, CET did not challenge PNC’s char-

acterization of claim 1 of the ’855 patent or claim 1 of the

’416 patent as representative, instead focusing its argu-

ments on defending those two claims.

The district court agreed that all CET’s asserted

claims were invalid as patent-ineligible under § 101,

granted PNC’s motion, and dismissed CET’s complaints

against both PNC and Wells Fargo. Content Extraction &

Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No.

12-6960, 2013 WL 3964909, at *5, *14 (D.N.J. July 31,

2013) (CET). In light of this holding, the district court

also dismissed Diebold’s request for a declaratory judg-

ment of invalidity and noninfringement as moot. Lastly,

the district court dismissed Diebold’s RICO and tortious

interference claims against CET, concluding that CET’s

act of filing lawsuits against Diebold’s customers—such as

Wells Fargo and PNC—was protected under the Noerr-

Pennington doctrine, as established in E. R.R. Presidents

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127

(1961), and United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,

381 U.S. 657 (1965). CET appealed and Diebold cross-

6 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

appealed the district court’s order dismissing the parties’

complaints. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to

state a claim under the law of the regional circuit. In re

Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent

Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Third

Circuit reviews challenges to a dismissal for failure to

state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) de novo. Sands v.

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). We review

the district court’s determination of patent eligibility

under § 101 de novo. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d

1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and

useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of

matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however,

has long interpreted § 101 and its statutory predecessors

to contain an implicit exception: “laws of nature, natural

phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice

Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct.

2347, 2354 (2014). We focus here on whether the claims

of the asserted patents fall within the excluded category

of abstract ideas.

The Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described

in Mayo and Alice, guides our analysis. Id. at 2355 (citing

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566

U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97 (2012)). We first deter-

mine whether a claim is “directed to” a patent-ineligible

abstract idea. If so, we then consider the elements of the

claim—both individually and as an ordered combination—

to assess whether the additional elements transform the

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 7

nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of

the abstract idea. Id. This is the search for an “inventive

concept”—something sufficient to ensure that the claim

amounts to “significantly more” than the abstract idea

itself. Id.

The Supreme Court has not “delimit[ed] the precise

contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category.” Id. at 2357. We

know, however, that although there is no categorical

business-method exception, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.

593, 606, 608 (2010), claims directed to the mere for-

mation and manipulation of economic relations may

involve an abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57.

We have also applied the Supreme Court’s guidance to

identify claims directed to the performance of certain

financial transactions as involving abstract ideas. See

buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.

Cir. 2014) (creating a transaction performance guaranty

for a commercial transaction on computer networks such

as the Internet); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v.

Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir.

2013) (generating rule-based tasks for processing an

insurance claim); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life

Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed.

Cir. 2012) (managing a stable value protected life insur-

ance policy); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333 (processing

loan information through a clearinghouse).

Applying Mayo/Alice step one, we agree with the dis-

trict court that the claims of the asserted patents are

drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recog-

nizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3)

storing that recognized data in a memory. The concept of

data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly

well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed

these functions. And banks have, for some time, reviewed

checks, recognized relevant data such as the amount,

8 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

account number, and identity of account holder, and

stored that information in their records.

CET attempts to distinguish its claims from those

found to be abstract in Alice and other cases by showing

that its claims require not only a computer but also an

additional machine—a scanner. 1 Appellant’s Br. 31–32.

CET argues that its claims are not drawn to an abstract

idea because human minds are unable to process and

recognize the stream of bits output by a scanner. Id. at

29. However, the claims in Alice also required a computer

that processed streams of bits, but nonetheless were

found to be abstract. See 134 S. Ct. at 2358. Similar to

how the computer-implemented claims in Alice were

directed to “the concept of intermediated settlement,” id.

at 2356, and the claims in Dealertrack were directed to

the concept of “processing information through a clearing-

house,” 674 F.3d at 1333, CET’s claims are drawn to the

basic concept of data recognition and storage.

For the second step of our analysis, we determine

whether the limitations present in the claims represent a

patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Alice, 134

S. Ct. at 2357. For the role of a computer in a computer-

implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the

context of this analysis, it must involve more than per-

formance of “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional

activities previously known to the industry.” Id. at 2359

(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (internal quotation

1 We note that some of CET’s claims do not explicit-

ly require the use of either a computer or scanner, and

refer instead to a generic “application unit” and “auto-

mated digitizing unit.” See, e.g., ’855 patent, 18:52–19:3.

We assume for purposes of PNC’s motion to dismiss,

however, that these claims require the presence of both a

computer and a scanner.

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 9

marks and brackets omitted)). Further, “the mere recita-

tion of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-

ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”

Id. at 2358.

Applying Mayo/Alice step two, we agree with the dis-

trict court that the asserted patents contain no limita-

tions—either individually or as an ordered combination—

that transform the claims into a patent-eligible applica-

tion. CET conceded at oral argument that the use of a

scanner or other digitizing device to extract data from a

document was well-known at the time of filing, as was the

ability of computers to translate the shapes on a physical

page into typeface characters. Oral Arg. at 3:35–3:55;

16:12–16:17, available at http://oralarguments.

cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2013-1588.mp3. CET’s

claims merely recite the use of this existing scanning and

processing technology to recognize and store data from

specific data fields such as amounts, addresses, and dates.

See id. There is no “inventive concept” in CET’s use of a

generic scanner and computer to perform well-understood,

routine, and conventional activities commonly used in

industry. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. At most, CET’s

claims attempt to limit the abstract idea of recognizing

and storing information from hard copy documents using

a scanner and a computer to a particular technological

environment. Such a limitation has been held insufficient

to save a claim in this context. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at

2358; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715–

16 (Fed Cir. 2014); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355.

CET next argues that the failure of PNC or the dis-

trict court to individually address every one of its claims

is inconsistent with the statutory presumption of validity

that requires proving the invalidity of each claim by clear

and convincing evidence. See Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle &

Mfg., Inc., 279 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The

district court, however, correctly determined that address-

10 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

ing each claim of the asserted patents was unnecessary.

After conducting its own analysis, the district court

determined that PNC is correct that claim 1 of the ’855

patent and claim 1 of the ’416 patent are representative,

because all the claims are “substantially similar and

linked to the same abstract idea.” CET, 2013 WL

3964909, at *5 (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612). Moreover,

CET never asserted in its opposition to PNC’s motion that

the district court should have differentiated any claim

from those identified as representative by PNC. Nor did

CET identify any other claims as purportedly containing

an inventive concept. If CET disagreed with PNC’s or the

district court’s assessment, CET could have identified

claims in its opposition brief that it believed would not be

fairly represented by claims 1 of the ’855 and ’416 patents

for purposes of PNC’s § 101 challenge. Regardless, we

have reviewed all the claims of CET’s asserted patents,

and agree with the district court that, for the purposes of

PNC’s § 101 challenge, 1) the claims of the asserted

patents are substantially similar in that they recite little

more than the same abstract idea, and 2) claim 1 of the

’855 patent and claim 1 of the ’416 patent are representa-

tive.

CET argues on appeal that certain dependent claims

recite additional steps, such as extracting and detecting

specific data fields, repeating some steps, and storing data

as images or text, rendering those claims patent-eligible.

Appellant’s Br. 40–41. For instance, CET notes that

dependent claim 44 of the ’416 patent additionally re-

quires: “defining a set of symbols which designate fields of

information required by an application program; and

detecting the presence of a particular one of said defined

set of symbols on a hard copy document and extracting a

field of information required by an application program

based on said detecting.” Id. This limitation merely

describes generic optical character recognition technology,

which CET conceded was a routine function of scanning

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 11

technology at the time the claims were filed. Oral Arg. at

3:35–3:55, 16:12–16:17, available at http://oralarguments.

cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2013-1588.mp3. Indeed,

all of the additional limitations in the claims cited in

CET’s appeal brief recite well-known, routine, and con-

ventional functions of scanners and computers. Thus,

while these claims may have a narrower scope than the

representative claims, no claim contains an “inventive

concept” that transforms the corresponding claim into a

patent-eligible application of the otherwise ineligible

abstract idea.

Finally, CET contends that the district court erred by

declaring its claims patent-ineligible under § 101 at the

pleading stage without first construing the claims or

allowing the parties to conduct fact discovery and submit

opinions from experts supporting their claim construction

positions. Although the determination of patent eligibil-

ity requires a full understanding of the basic character of

the claimed subject matter, claim construction is not an

inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under

§ 101. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714–15; Bancorp,

687 F.3d at 1273–74. The district court construed the

terms identified by CET “in the manner most favorable to

[CET],” necessarily assuming that all of CET’s claims

required a machine, even though several claims do not

expressly recite any hardware structures. See supra note

1; CET, 2013 WL 3964909, at *12. Nonetheless, the

district court determined the claims of the asserted pa-

tents were patent-ineligible. Likewise, we conclude that

even when construed in a manner most favorable to CET,

none of CET’s claims amount to “significantly more” than

the abstract idea of extracting and storing data from hard

copy documents using generic scanning and processing

technology. The district court’s resolution of PNC’s mo-

tion to dismiss at the pleading stage was therefore proper.

12 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

DIEBOLD’S CROSS-APPEAL

We turn next to Diebold’s appeal from the district

court’s dismissal of its tortious interference and RICO

violation claims against CET. Diebold’s claims all arise

from the following predicate act: the filing of allegedly

frivolous infringement suits by CET against Wells Fargo,

PNC, and other Diebold customers in an attempt to

obtain nuisance settlements from them. The district

court, however, concluded that the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine immunized CET from both Diebold’s tortious

interference and RICO violation claims. 2

Under Noerr-Pennington, a person’s act of petitioning

the government is presumptively shielded from liability

by the First Amendment against certain types of claims.

See BE & K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 525

(2002) (quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Un-

limited, 404 U.S. 508, 511, (1972)); Sosa v. DIRECTV,

Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 930, 931 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying

Noerr-Pennington to bar a RICO violation claim); Pers.

Dep’t, Inc. v. Prof’l Staff Leasing Corp., 297 F. App’x 773,

779 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Noerr-Pennington can

provide immunity from liability arising from a tortious

2 We note that other circuits have held that the act

of filing a lawsuit, even one which is frivolous, does not by

itself constitute an act of “extortion” under the Hobbs Act,

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), and therefore cannot constitute a

predicate act under RICO. See, e.g., Deck v. Engineered

Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003); Raney v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004).

Treating meritless litigation as a form of extortion pun-

ishable under RICO would substantially chill even valid

court petitioning, as it could subject almost any unsuc-

cessful lawsuit or set of lawsuits to a colorable claim of a

RICO violation. Deck, 349 F.3d at 1258.

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 13

interference claim). To overcome this presumptive im-

munity, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s

instigation of litigation was merely a “sham.” Prof’l Real

Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,

508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993) (PRE). This two-part test requires

the plaintiff to show not only that the litigation was

objectively baseless, but also that the defendant subjec-

tively intended to harm the plaintiff through the abuse of

a governmental process itself, as opposed to harms flow-

ing from the outcome of that process. See id.

The district court found that Diebold established the

first, but not the second prong of the PRE sham litigation

test. In an oral ruling, the district court held that Diebold

successfully alleged objective baselessness based on the

district court’s own analysis of CET’s patent claims as

ineligible under § 101, and “[Diebold’s] allegations that

[CET]’s litigation conduct was solely designed to engender

settlement” with Diebold’s customers. J.A. 687–89.

However, the district court also determined that Diebold

had not shown CET subjectively intended to harm

Diebold through its instigation of litigation, as required

under prong two of the PRE test. Id. Although we agree

with the district court’s ultimate conclusion regarding

CET’s immunity, we find instead that Diebold’s allegation

fails the first prong of the PRE test, and thus the district

court’s analysis under the second prong was unnecessary.

Under the first prong, a “sham” lawsuit must be ob-

jectively baseless “in the sense that no reasonable litigant

could realistically expect success on the merits.” No-

belpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d

1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting PRE, 508 U.S. at 50).

Given the focus on the act of filing the complaint as the

actionable event, CET’s infringement suits, though un-

successful, were not objectively baseless. This is because

the state of the law of § 101 was deeply uncertain at the

time CET filed its complaints against Wells Fargo and

14 CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK

PNC in 2012. Compare Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,

657 F.3d 1323, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (subsequently

vacated), with Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333–35. See also

CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269,

1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.

734 (2013), and aff’d, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that as a

matter of law, no reasonable litigant in 2012 could have

expected success on at least one of CET’s claims.

The Supreme Court has held that “even unsuccessful

but reasonably based suits advance some First Amend-

ment interests,” and therefore should receive protection

under the First Amendment. BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532.

Although we conclude the claims of CET’s asserted pa-

tents are invalid under § 101, we decline to find CET’s

infringement suits against Wells Fargo and PNC to be

objectively baseless at the time they were filed. There-

fore, since the act of filing its suits was shielded from

liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the district

court correctly dismissed Diebold’s tortious interference

and RICO violation claims against CET.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s grant of PNC’s motion to

dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) on the ground that the

claims of CET’s asserted patents are invalid as patent-

ineligible under § 101. Because CET’s infringement suits

against Wells Fargo and PNC were not objectively base-

less, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Diebold’s tortious interference and RICO violation claims.

Finally, because the claims of CET’s asserted patents are

invalid under § 101, we need not reach the district court’s

dismissal of Diebold’s request for a declaratory judgment

of noninfringement and invalidity.

AFFIRMED

CONTENT EXTRACTION v. WELLS FARGO BANK 15

COSTS

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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