Opinion

Han Kim and Yong Seok Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

  • 774 F.3d 1044
  • 413 U.S. App. D.C. 356
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24255
  • 2014 WL 7269560
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Dec 23, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Tatel
On the bench
Tatel, Wilkins, Edwards
Cited by
138 cases
Authority
More cited than 89.2%

finding that requiring FSIA plaintiffs to “prove exactly what happened to” an absent hostage “would defeat the Act’s very purpose . . . ‘to punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts and deter them from doing so in the future.’” (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 , 88–89 (D.C. Cir. 2002))

How later courts described this case

  • finding that requiring FSIA plaintiffs to “prove exactly what happened to” an absent hostage “would defeat the Act’s very purpose . . . ‘to punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts and deter them from doing so in the future.’” (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 , 88–89 (D.C. Cir. 2002))
  • holding that plaintiffs had “met their burden of producing evidence ‘satisfactory to the court’” to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, where the only evidence linking North Korea to the victim’s disappearance was a South Korean court’s conviction of a North Korean agent, of which the district court had taken judicial notice
  • finding that plaintiffs had “met their burden of producing evidence ‘satisfactory to the court’” to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, where the only evidence linking North Korea to the victim’s disappearance was a South Korean court’s conviction of a North Korean agent, of which the district court had taken judicial notice
  • finding that the plaintiff met his burden of proving torture under the FSIA where he introduced “evidence that the regime ab- ducted the [victim], that it invariably tortures and kills prisoners like him, and that it uses terror and intimidation to prevent witnesses from testifying”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2014 Decided December 23, 2014

No. 13-7147

HAN KIM AND YONG SEOK KIM,

APPELLANTS

v.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ALSO KNOWN AS

NORTH KOREA AND JOHN DOES 1-10,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00648)

Asher Perlin argued the cause for appellants. With him on

the brief was Robert J. Tolchin. Meir Katz entered an

appearance.

Robert P. LoBue argued the cause for amicus curiae

Human Rights First. With him on the brief was Gabor Rona.

Before: TATEL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

2

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Relying on the “terrorism exception”

to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the family of

Reverend Dong Shik Kim sued the North Korean government

alleging that it abducted him, confined him to a kwan-li-so—a

political penal-labor colony—tortured him, and, ultimately,

killed him. When North Korea failed to appear, the Kims asked

the district court for a default judgment pursuant to the provision

of the Act that authorizes a court to enter judgment if the

plaintiff “establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that

is satisfactory to the Court.” The district court denied that

motion because the Kims had failed to produce “first-hand

evidence” of what happened to the Reverend. We reverse.

Admissible record evidence demonstrates that North Korea

abducted Reverend Kim, that it invariably tortures and kills

political prisoners, and that through terror and intimidation it

prevents any information about those crimes from escaping to

the outside world. Requiring a plaintiff to produce direct, first-

hand evidence of the victim’s torture and murder would thus

thwart the purpose of the terrorism exception: holding state

sponsors of terrorism accountable for torture and extrajudicial

killing. In these circumstances, we find the Kims’ evidence

sufficiently “satisfactory” to require a default judgment.

I.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally

immunizes foreign governments from suit in the United States.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Truly heinous acts, however, can negate

that immunity. Under the statute’s “terrorism exception,” state

sponsors of terrorism may be liable in federal court for torture

and extrajudicial killing. See id. § 1605A(a). The FSIA defines

those substantive offenses by reference to the Torture Victims

Protection Act (TVPA). See id. § 1605A(h)(7) (citing id. § 1350

note). That Act defines torture as “any act, directed against an

individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by

3

which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on

that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that

individual or a third person information or a confession,

punishing that individual . . . intimidating or coercing that

individual or a third person, or for any reason based on

discrimination of any kind.” TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106

Stat. 73, 73 (1992). An extrajudicial killing is “a deliberated

killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a

regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees

which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or

“North Korea”), long a mainstay on the State Department’s list

of terror sponsors—in fact, one of a small handful of bad actors

that spurred Congress to adopt the terrorism exception in the

first place, see H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995)—has never

shied away from torturing and killing its political enemies. See

generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed

Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc.

A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (Feb. 7, 2014). That much is clear. Equally

clear, the Reverend Dong Shik Kim, the alleged victim in this

case, spent nearly a decade providing humanitarian and religious

services to North Korean defectors and refugees who fled to

China seeking asylum. And there is no question that North

Korean operatives abducted Reverend Kim in 2000 after the

government found out about his activities. In fact, a South

Korean court convicted a DPRK agent for that very kidnapping.

See Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 950 F.

Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Decl. of J.D. Kim).

Beyond that, though, we have no direct evidence of the

Reverend’s fate. After his family, invoking the terrorism

exception, sued the North Korean government, they presented

numerous witnesses, including several experts on the regime’s

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brutal tactics, who claim to have heard second- or third-hand

that the Reverend died as a result of torture soon after he

disappeared. But no one—not the Kims, not the witnesses who

submitted declarations on their behalf, and not the district

court—knows for certain what happened.

Still, when the DPRK failed to show up to answer the

charges, the Kims asked the district court for a default judgment

holding the regime liable for torturing and killing the Reverend.

The FSIA provides that “[n]o judgment by default shall be

entered . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to

relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).

Precisely what that standard entails—that is, how much and

what kind of evidence the default provision requires—is unclear.

That question is especially vexing where, as here, the

defendant State prevents any evidence from leaving its borders.

Recognizing as much, the district court observed that since

North Korea “has not participated in the proceedings,” since

“there has been no opportunity for discovery,” and since the

“widely feared . . . repression” in the country “obscures the

precise details of Reverend Kim’s treatment,” the plaintiffs

“cannot be expected to meet a typical standard for judgment as a

matter of law.” Kim, 950 F. Supp. at 35, 42. Nonetheless, the

district court concluded that the “evidence must be rigorous

enough to support the facts necessary for jurisdiction.” Id.

Relying on Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002), in which this Court rejected an

FSIA plaintiff’s allegations because he had not recounted the

precise nature of his mistreatment, the district court determined

that the Kims had failed to carry their evidentiary burden.

Specifically, it observed that their witnesses could “not establish

the severity of the treatment of Reverend Kim in particular, or

that his treatment amounts to torture under the rigorous

definition of that term adopted in the FSIA,” and instead

5

engaged only in “discussion about the abuses generally in [North

Korean forced-labor] camps to show that” the DPRK “probably”

mistreated the Reverend. Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42.

The Kims appeal. We review the district court’s application

of the law—in this case, its articulation of the FSIA’s

evidentiary requirements—de novo. See Brayton v. Office of the

United States Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C.

Cir. 2011).

II.

The Torture Victims Protection Act—and, by reference to

that Act, the FSIA—describes torture and extrajudicial killing in

some detail. An act is torture only if the perpetrator intends to

and actually does inflict severe pain in order to punish or to

extract information. A killing runs afoul of the statute only if it

occurs outside the normal legal process. The statute thus

imposes tight constraints on courts required to decide whether an

act satisfies the terrorism exception’s substantive elements. But

when the defendant State fails to appear and the plaintiff seeks a

default judgment, the FSIA leaves it to the court to determine

precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff

must provide, requiring only that it be “satisfactory to the court.”

28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).

Our case law provides little help. Indeed, the single case on

which the district court relied—Price—differs significantly from

this one. In that case, we were considering Libya’s motion to

dismiss under a “standard . . . similar to that of Rule 12(b)(6),”

and we granted that motion because the plaintiff’s allegations

were too general, observing that he “offer[ed] no useful details

about the nature” or “purpose of the alleged torture.” Price, 294

F.3d at 93–94. Absent more specific allegations, we explained,

we were unable to distinguish between “actual torture” and

“mere police brutality.” Id. at 93. Here, by contrast, the issue is

6

whether the Kims are entitled to a default judgment—a question

that turns on whether the evidence is “satisfactory to the court.”

Of course, the Kims alleged plenty in their complaint, asserting,

for example, that “[w]hen Reverend Kim refused to adopt the

[official political] ideology [of North Korea,] he was punished

by being deprived of all food” and that he “died as the result of

[that] starvation and [] torture.” Compl., ¶¶ 24–25. If proven

with admissible evidence, that treatment would clearly constitute

torture within the TVPA’s meaning. But while accepting the

Kims’ allegations as true, the district court concluded that their

evidence was too weak to support their claims. Specifically, it

emphasized repeatedly that the plaintiffs had failed to “provide

any first-hand accounts of Reverend Kim’s treatment” that

“address[ed] the nature or severity of any torture Reverend Kim

suffered, or specif[ied] the frequency or duration of the acts of

torture or the parts of the body at which they were aimed or any

weapons used to carry them out.” Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 37

(emphasis added). Properly understood, then, the question before

us is not whether the Kims’ allegations were specific enough to

implicate the terrorism exception and withstand a motion to

dismiss, but rather whether the amount and types of evidence

they proffered were “satisfactory.” On that question, Price has

nothing to say.

Another important distinction separates this case from

Price. Having escaped their captors, the Price plaintiffs were

alive, present, and capable of describing their treatment in more

detail. In those circumstances, we could realistically expect more

from them. By contrast, Reverend Kim is missing and presumed

dead, so his family will almost certainly be unable to offer the

court any more than they already have.

This second observation is key to the Kims’ case. Congress

enacted the terrorism exception expressly to bring state sponsors

of terrorism—including, at the time, the DPRK—to account for

7

their repressive practices. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 62.

Concerned with victims’ inability to obtain redress in terrorism

cases, Congress later amended the statute to make it easier to

attach a foreign State’s property during litigation and to seize

those assets to satisfy a judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A(g),

1610. And the statute has always authorized the courts to enter

default judgments against defendants who refuse to appear. Id. §

1608(e). With these provisions, Congress aimed to prevent state

sponsors of terrorism—entities particularly unlikely to submit to

this country’s laws—from escaping liability for their sins.

Here, North Korea seeks to do exactly that. The regime has

made Reverend Kim unavailable to testify on his own behalf,

refused to appear in court and subject itself to discovery, and is

known to intimidate defectors and potential witnesses. Indeed,

the district court concluded, the regime is so feared that “those

individuals who may know details about Reverend Kim’s

whereabouts and treatment . . . convey such information

sparingly and anonymously,” if at all. Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at

42; see also Decl. of Do Hee-Youn ¶ 2 (explaining that the

identities of “individuals that have supplied . . . information

concerning North Korean matters . . . are kept confidential to

ensure their safety from potential retribution against them by the

North Korean government”).

In these circumstances, requiring that the Kims prove

exactly what happened to the Reverend and when would defeat

the Act’s very purpose: to “give American citizens an important

economic and financial weapon,” H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 62,

to “compensat[e] the victims of terrorism, and in so doing to

punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such

acts and deter them from doing so in the future.” Price, 294 F.3d

at 88–89. This is especially true in cases of forced

disappearance, like this one, where direct evidence of

subsequent torture and execution will, by definition, almost

8

always be unavailable, even though indirect evidence may be

overwhelming. Were we to demand more of plaintiffs like the

Kims, few suits like this could ever proceed, and state sponsors

of terrorism could effectively immunize themselves by killing

their victims, intimidating witnesses, and refusing to appear in

court.

Fortunately for the Kims and for Congress’s objective, the

Supreme Court has “recognize[d] very realistically” that courts

have the authority—indeed, we think, the obligation—to “adjust

[evidentiary requirements] to . . . differing situations.” Bundy v.

Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Consider,

for instance, the long-established, common-law rule of res ipsa

loquitur, or, literally, “the thing speaks for itself.” Under that

doctrine, the courts have, without direct proof, inferred

negligence from the very nature of events—say, from the fact

that a surgery patient awoke from anesthesia to discover that a

sponge had been left in her gut. That sort of inference is justified

in part on the ground that “the court does not know, and cannot

find out, what actually happened in the individual case,” often

because the facts are known only to the defendant.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 17 cmt. A, at 184 (2005). This approach allows the

court to “encourag[e] the defendant to disclose relevant

evidence,” id. at 193, and, if the defendant is unable to do so, to

reach the common-sense conclusion “that it was probably the

defendant’s negligence which caused the accident.” 2A STUART

M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, & ALFRED W. GANS, THE

AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 508 n.30 (2009).

Or take the well-known McDonnell Douglas formula for

making out a Title VII claim. Because a plaintiff faces

“difficulty . . . in proving the motives behind an employer’s

actions” in a race-discrimination case, the Supreme Court has

9

held that, in order to make out a prima facie case, he need only

show that he is a member of a protected class and that he was

denied an open position for which he was qualified and that

remains open. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 950 (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). This inference makes sense, as

“common experience tells us” that such facts are normally

evidence of a “discriminatory motive.” Id. at 951.

Similarly, plaintiffs like the Kims will find it difficult to

prove what happened behind the walls of a North Korean labor

camp because the government has made all but certain that that

evidence does not exist. But “common experience tells us” that

where a plaintiff has produced compelling, admissible evidence

that the regime abducted the victim and that it routinely tortures

and kills the people it abducts, the courts can assume that the

defendant probably tortured and killed the victim. Given

Congress’s purpose—holding state sponsors of terrorism

responsible for their crimes—such evidence is sufficient to

“satisf[y] the court.”

International tribunals with experience in these kinds of

cases have taken the same approach. For instance, the Inter-

American Court of Human Rights—the United States is a

signatory to the Court’s underlying treaty, though not a state

party—has recognized that circumstantial evidence is

“especially important” in cases of forced disappearance, Radilla-

Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits,

Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)

No. 209, ¶ 222 (Nov. 23, 2009), because “this type of repression

is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about

the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.”

Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am.

Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 131 (July 29, 1988). So where “it has

not been directly shown that [the victim] was physically

tortured, his kidnapping and imprisonment by governmental

10

authorities, who have been shown to subject detainees to

indignities, cruelty and torture, [may] constitute” proof of that

treatment. Id. ¶ 187.

III.

We thus turn to the question of whether the Kims have met

their burden of producing evidence “satisfactory to the court.”

Mindful that we must draw our “findings of fact and conclusions

of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal

Rules of Evidence,” Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp.

2d 19, 21 n.1 (D.D.C. 2001), we begin with what we know for

sure: that North Korean agents abducted Reverend Kim. A

South Korean court convicted a DPRK intelligence agent for

planning and executing that kidnapping, see supra p. 3, and the

district court took judicial notice of that decision under Rule

201. See Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Two experts, moreover—

just the kind of experts whose testimony we have credited in

FSIA default actions, see Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and

whose testimony is doubtless admissible, see Fed. R. Evid.

702—reported that victims of forced disappearance in North

Korea usually suffer torture and that Reverend Kim’s political

and religious activities made him an especially likely target.

Recall that maltreatment is actionable under the FSIA only

if purposeful and particularly harsh and that killings are

prohibited only if they occur outside the limits of the normal

legal process. The Kims’ experts make a compelling case that

North Korea violated both provisions.

Professor David Hawk, an expert on human rights in North

Korea who has interviewed dozens of former kwan-li-so

prisoners, reports that such prisoners regularly endure harsh

treatment, including starvation, brutal beatings, rape, and forced

abortion. Decl. of Professor David Hawk ¶¶ 14–19. Although

11

acknowledging that he lacks “firsthand knowledge about

Reverend Kim’s case specifically,” Professor Hawk believes it

“likely that [Reverend Kim] would have been . . . transferred to

a kwan-li-so” and that, once there, the Reverend—a “valuable

target of the DPRK”—would have suffered “additional

brutality” even beyond that typical of Korean labor camps. Id. ¶

20. That treatment, he reports, would probably mean twelve

hours of physical labor per day, seven days a week, and “long-

term solitary confinement in punishment cells which do not have

enough space for a person to completely lie down or stand up,

causing inmates to experience a loss of circulation and atrophy

of legs, and often leading to death within several weeks.” Id.¶

15.

Ernest Downs, a former senior Defense Department official

and member of the board of the U.S. Committee for Human

Rights in North Korea, testifies with even more certainty: of the

one thousand former prisoners with whose testimony he is

familiar, he “do[es] not know of any case in which the former

prisoner was not subjected to torture while in the prison camp.”

Supplemental Decl. of Ernest C. Downs ¶ 10. That treatment

includes “kneeling motionless” for hours on end, “water

torture,” “‘pigeon torture’ with . . . arms pinned behind [the]

back and attached to cell bars in ways that made it impossible

either to stand up or sit down,” and other typical torture that is,

regrettably, too commonplace to require detailed description

here. Id., Ex. 1, at 149.

Of course, suffering alone is insufficient to establish a claim

under the FSIA’s terrorism exception. To qualify as torture, the

mistreatment must be purposeful—that is, the defendant must

have targeted the victim, for instance, to punish him for his

religious or political beliefs. Along these lines, Professor Hawk

testifies that North Korea’s policy is to imprison “political

prisoners and others deemed to be opponents of the DPRK

12

regime” to “deter dissent in the larger population.” Hawk Decl.

¶¶ 9–10. According to Professor Hawk, moreover, North Korea

targeted Reverend Kim not only because of his “humanitarian

activities,” but also because he was a Christian missionary who

proselytized to defectors. Id. ¶ 21. For his part, Downs is

“virtually certain” that Reverend Kim, “a foreigner abducted by

the DPRK for political purposes,” would have been singled out

for “exceptionally painful, brutal, and outrageous treatment” and

is probably dead “as a result of his torture and malnutrition.”

Decl. of Ernest C. Downs ¶ 34; Downs Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6(i), 7, 8.

This expert testimony is more than sufficient to “satisf[y]” us

that North Korea purposefully tortured Reverend Kim.

With respect to extrajudicial killing, the Kims need

demonstrate only that the DPRK killed the Reverend without

due process. Professor Hawk “believe[s] that” the Reverend

suffered an “untimely death” due to starvation. Hawk Decl. ¶ 20.

Going even further, Downs believes that the Reverend’s “death

resulted from torture and malnutrition” and was “deliberately

caused by his North Korean captors.” Downs Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13.

Given these uncontroverted expert statements, we have no

trouble concluding that the Kims presented sufficient evidence

to “satisf[y] the court” that the North Korean government killed

Reverend Kim outside the formal legal process.

Finally, an observation about our decision’s reach. Our

conclusion would no doubt differ if we lacked confirmed

evidence that the DPRK was involved in Reverend Kim’s

disappearance. In that case, finding that the regime tortured and

killed him would arguably require too many logical leaps. But

that is not this case. Here, the Kims’ evidence that the regime

abducted the Reverend, that it invariably tortures and kills

prisoners like him, and that it uses terror and intimidation to

prevent witnesses from testifying allows us to reach the logical

13

conclusion that the regime tortured and killed the Reverend. In

other words, the Kims’ evidence is “satisfactory to the court.”

For all of these reasons, we reverse and remand with

instructions to the district court to enter a default judgment on

the Kims’ behalf. If the DPRK is unhappy with that outcome and

has evidence that it has not tortured and killed Reverend Kim, it,

like any defendant in default, may ask the district court to vacate

that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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