Opinion

Eric Williams v. Department of the Air Force

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Dec 16, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ERIC WILLIAMS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-3443-06-0118-X-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: December 16, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Eric Williams, North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.

Jonathan Lee Simpson, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the

agency noncompliant with the Board’s October 26, 2012 Final Order in the

underlying appeals, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1 and MSPB Docket

No. AT-3443-06-0118-C-2. For the reasons discussed below, we now find the

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

agency in compliance and DISMISS the petition for enforcement. This is the

final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this compliance

proceeding. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1)

(5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE

¶2 On October 26, 2012, the Board issued a Final Order in MSPB Docket

No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1 and MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-C-2,

requiring the agency to pay the appellant lost wages (with interest), benefits, and

liquidated damages resulting from its willful violation of his Veterans

Employment Opportunities Act rights. Williams v. Department of the Air Force,

MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1, Nonprecedential Final Order at 4-5

(Oct. 26, 2012) (B-1 Final Order). On January 3, 2013, the appellant petitioned

for enforcement, contending that the agency failed to comply with this order.

MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-C-3, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1. The

appellant noted that the agency had failed to pay or explain its position regarding

the following issues: military leave, annual leave, sick leave, overtime pay, back

pay (lost wages), retirement fund, liquidated damages, and the provision of a

Standard Form (SF) 50. 2 See CF, Tab 10, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 2.

The administrative judge granted the appellant’s petition for enforcement, found

that the agency failed to provide proof of compliance on these issues and ordered

it to do so within 20 days of its order. CID at 3-5. The administrative judge also

ordered the agency to provide the name of the agency official responsible for

compliance, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2) and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(5).

CID at 5. The agency did neither.

2

The appellant originally contended that the agency failed to provide an SF-15, but

later stated that he meant to challenge the failure to provide an SF-50. MSPB Docket

No. AT-3443-06-0118-X-2, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 13 at 1.

3

¶3 On July 8, 2014, the Board issued an order to show cause, instructing the

agency to file evidence of compliance. CRF, Tab 8. The agency and the

individual the Board selected as the responsible agency official (in the absence of

any designation by the agency) filed responses on July 29 and 31, 2014,

respectively. CRF, Tabs 11-12. The appellant filed his response on August 5,

2014. CRF, Tab 13. On September 9, 2014, the Board issued an order requiring

the agency to submit additional information. CRF, Tab 15. Both parties filed

timely responses. CRF, Tabs 17-19. As explained below, we now find the

agency compliant on all issues, decline to impose sanctions, and change the

designation of the responsible agency official in accordance with the agency’s

request.

Standard

¶4 When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it

orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would

have been in, had the wrongful personnel action not occurred. House v.

Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 530, ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the

burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. An agency’s assertions of

compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported

by documentary evidence. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R.

319, ¶ 5 (2011). The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by

making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued

noncompliance.” Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶

5 (2010).

Back Pay/Lost Wages

¶5 The Board’s previous orders found the appellant entitled to lost wages, with

interest, from November 14, 2005 (the date of his unlawful nonselection), to

March 11, 2009 (the date he declined the agency’s offer to place him in the

position at issue). MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1, Remand File,

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Tab 20, Initial Decision (B-1 ID) at 3-4, 6; Williams v. Department of the Air

Force, 116 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 17 (2011); B-1 Final Order at 3-4. The agency

submitted evidence that it paid the appellant a gross amount of $107,921.99 in

lost wages for this period, less deductions, and including $13,420.47 in interest.

CRF, Tab 11 at 5, 9, 58. The agency’s calculations included the promotions the

administrative judge found the appellant would have earned. Id. at 6; see B-1 ID

at 4-6. The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations. Accordingly, we

find the agency in compliance with respect to lost wages and interest thereon.

Annual and Sick Leave

¶6 The agency stated that it paid the appellant a lump sum of $12,758.16 for

annual leave he accrued and credited his retirement records to reflect that he

earned 248 hours of sick leave. CRF, Tab 17 at 4. The agency explained its

annual and sick leave calculations in a prior submission. CRF, Tab 11 at 5-6.

The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations nor its statement that it

paid him and updated his records. Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance

as to the appellant’s annual and sick leave.

Liquidated Damages

¶7 The agency stated that it paid the appellant a lump sum of $65,749.91 as

liquidated damages from April 15, 2008 (the date of agency’s willful violation of

the Board’s order to reconstruct the selection process), to March 11, 2009 (the

date the appellant declined placement in the position). CRF, Tab 11 at 6; B-1

Final Order at 4. The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations or its

statement that it had paid him this amount. Accordingly, we find the agency in

compliance regarding the liquidated damages.

Military Leave

¶8 The appellant asserted that the agency owes him military leave pay for the

time he served on active duty between 2005 and 2009. CRF, Tab 19 at 1-2. He

stated that, in each year, he would have taken military leave rather than another

5

type of leave. CRF, Tab 18 at 1. The agency contended that the appellant should

not be paid for military leave because he did not actually use such leave, and

employees are not compensated for unused military leave. CRF, Tab 17 at 5.

¶9 Military leave is intended to permit an employee to serve his military duty

without loss of pay or time at his civilian position, up to 15 work days per

calendar year. See 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1). The appellant has not pointed to any

actual loss of pay or time due to his military service between November 14, 2005,

and March 11, 2009; nor could he, as he did not actually work at the agency

during that time period, and his lost wages and benefits entitlements are based on

a reconstruction of events. 3 The agency reconstructed the relevant time period

without charging him military leave or annual leave in lieu of military leave and

paid him for his unused annual leave. If he were now paid for military leave, he

would receive a windfall because he, in effect, would receive double payment.

Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance on this issue.

Retirement Fund (Thrift Savings Plan)

¶10 The agency stated that it worked with the appellant to process his Thrift

Savings Plan (TSP) elections and catch-up contributions and deposited the

required amounts. CRF, Tab 11 at 5. The appellant did not dispute these

statements. Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance with respect to the

appellant’s TSP account.

Overtime Pay and Awards

¶11 The appellant contended that the agency failed to pay him overtime or

awards during the back pay (lost wages) period. CRF, Tab 13 at 1-2. The agency

3

In an earlier submission, the appellant asserted that he was entitled to military leave

pay because the agency withheld his military pay from his lost wages award. CRF,

Tab 14 at 1. The documents he submitted do not support this claim; however, it is

unclear what part, if any, of the interim earnings withholding derives from his military

pay. See id. at 3-4. The appellant therefore has not made “specific, nonconclusory, and

supported assertions” sufficient to rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance. See

Brown, 113 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶ 5.

6

submitted evidence that employees in the position to which the appellant should

have been appointed did not routinely work overtime; indeed, during the period at

issue, only two employees worked overtime, and each on only one occasion.

CRF, Tab 17 at 4-5. The agency asserted that it was therefore extremely unlikely

that the appellant would have worked overtime. Id. The appellant did not

challenge this assertion but contended that he should have received a notable

achievement award because some employees in the position at issue received such

awards. CRF, Tab 19 at 2; see CRF, Tab 17 at 5.

¶12 We disagree. Notable achievement and performance-based time off awards

(which the agency states were given some employees), unlike overtime or night

work, are highly variable and depend on the individual’s performance. Because

the appellant never actually worked in the position at issue, or in any other

position with the agency, it is purely speculative to assume he would have earned

a notable achievement or time off award. Moreover, even if we required the

agency to grant him the average of the awards given to other employees, as is

commonly done when calculating overtime, he would derive no monetary benefit.

Notable achievement and time off awards are not cash awards, nor can they be

converted to cash. See 5 C.F.R. § 451.104(f) (a time off award “shall not be

converted to a cash payment under any circumstances”). We therefore find the

agency in compliance on this issue.

SF-50

¶13 The appellant stated that the agency failed to provide him an SF-50 showing

that he resigned his employment on March 9, 2011. CRF, Tab 19 at 2. The

agency’s submissions indicate that it generated such an SF-50, although it did not

submit a copy to the Board. See CRF, Tab 11 at 42. Because there is no

indication that the agency failed to create the appropriate paperwork, we find the

agency compliant on this issue. The appellant should be able to obtain a copy of

all of his SF-50s, including the resignation SF-50, through the agency’s Human

7

Resources office and/or from the Employee Personnel Page. See Employee

Personnel Page, https://www.nfc.usda.gov/epps/eplogin.aspx. If the appellant is

unable to obtain the desired SF-50 from these sources and has reason to believe

the agency, in fact, failed to create one, he may file another petition for

enforcement on this issue.

Sanctions

¶14 On July 8, 2014, we ordered the agency to show cause why we should not

impose sanctions, including an order that the responsible agency official not

receive pay, for the agency’s failure to submit any evidence of compliance as of

that date. CRF, Tab 8 at 2. We noted that the agency had failed to respond, not

only to the compliance initial decision, but to a subsequent order expressly

requiring it to submit evidence of compliance. Id.

¶15 In response to the show cause order, the agency submitted the evidence of

compliance discussed above and asserted that it had been substantially compliant

well before the show cause order but had neglected to provide the relevant

information to the Board. CRF, Tab 11 at 4. As explained above, we agree that

the agency is now in compliance on all issues. We therefore decline to impose

sanctions against either the agency or the responsible agency official. See Martin

v. Department of Justice, 99 M.S.P.R. 59, ¶ 16 (2005) (The Board has held that

the purpose of sanctions under 5 U.S.C. § 1204(e)(2)(A) is to obtain compliance

and that, once compliance is achieved, sanctions are inappropriate), aff’d, 188 F.

App’x 994 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Smith v. Department of the

Army, 72 M.S.P.R. 676, 679 (1996) (same).

Responsible Agency Official

¶16 In the absence of any designation of a responsible agency official (despite

multiple orders to submit such person’s name to the Board), the Board identified

John W. Snodgrass, Executive Director, Air Force Personnel Center, as the

responsible agency official pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2) and (e)(2)(A).

8

CRF, Tab 8 at 2. Mr. Snodgrass filed a submission stating that he was not the

appropriate official, CRF, Tab 12, and the agency identified Anthony Baumann,

Director of Contracting, Air Force Sustainment Command, a member of the

Senior Executive Service, as the appropriate official, CRF, Tab 11 at 7. We

accept the agency’s designation and will amend our records to note that

Mr. Baumann, not Mr. Snodgrass, is the responsible agency official in this matter.

For the reasons discussed above, we decline to impose sanctions against

Mr. Baumann.

¶17 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

compliance proceeding.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

9

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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