David Taylor v. George M. Hill

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

David Taylor,

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner FILED

November 21, 2014

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK

vs) No. 14-0567 (Kanawha County 13-C-1996) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA

George M. Hill,

Defendant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner David Taylor, appearing pro se, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of

Kanawha County, entered May 14, 2014, that dismissed his civil action against Respondent

George M. Hill. Respondent, appearing by counsel John P. Fuller and Andrew R. Herrick, filed a

response.

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections

(“DOC”). Respondent is the superintendent of West Virginia Correctional Industries (“WVCI”),

an agency within the DOC.1 According to petitioner, he had a prison job as an administrative clerk

for respondent and also worked as a replacement worker in the numerous manufacturing shops

WVCI had at Mt. Olive Correctional Complex in Fayette County, West Virginia.

Petitioner filed a civil complaint against respondent in the Circuit Court of Fayette County

on October 21, 2013. Petitioner’s complaint alleged that on a day in July of 2011,2 he injured his

right leg and back in an accident occurring in WVCI’s soap shop at Mt. Olive. It was a trip-and-fall

accident, where petitioner tripped over a skid jack that another inmate worker allegedly carelessly

put in petitioner’s work area. The accident also caused a forty-five pound wooden skid to fall onto

1

See Correctional Industries Act of 2009, W.Va. Code §§ 25-7-1 to -16.

2

According to an August 22, 2013, letter from WVCI’s insurer, the statute of limitations

was waived to the extent that petitioner could file his action any time up to October 21, 2013.

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his lower right leg.3 The complaint also averred that, at the time of the accident, at least twenty

inmate positions were unfilled and that one supervisor’s position was also vacant, although the

complaint does not connect this understaffing to petitioner’s injuries. Petitioner’s complaint

further alleged that respondent was liable for his alleged injuries because:

At all times during the events disclosed and described herein [respondent] was

directly responsible for inmate worker safety, to include safety training, at the

various shops, plants, and centers that [WVCI] operated at [Mt. Olive] and was

further responsible for . . . inmate hiring at [WVCI] and through [respondent’s]

negligence alone, [petitioner] was working in an unsafe environment on the day in

question. [Petitioner] further asserts that [respondent] is responsible for the incident

in which [petitioner’s] leg and back were injured[.]

(Footnote omitted.) Finally, petitioner sought unspecified compensatory and punitive damages.

Because respondent is a state official, the Circuit Court of Fayette County transferred

petitioner’s action to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.4 On February 25, 2014, respondent

filed a motion to dismiss the action. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County held a hearing on the

motion on May 2, 2014.5 On May 14, 2014, the circuit court dismissed petitioner’s action. In its

order the circuit court first noted that, in his complaint, petitioner indicated that he was suing

respondent individually, but found that all of petitioner’s allegations arose from respondent’s

performance of his duties as superintendent of WVCI. The circuit court further determined that

while petitioner sought monetary damages, he expected those damages to be paid by the DOC, and

not respondent individually. Thus, the circuit court found that petitioner sued respondent only in

his official capacity.

Second, the circuit court found that respondent had qualified immunity from petitioner’s

action because (1) all of respondent’s alleged actions or non-actions were within the scope of his

employment; (2) all of respondent’s acts, as petitioner acknowledged in his complaint, were (a)

discretionary in nature; and (b) constituted decisions that respondent was authorized to make with

regard to staffing and training, to the best of respondent’s judgment; and (3) none of respondent’s

discretionary decisions were violative of any clearly established law. Therefore, the circuit court

dismissed the action.6

3

While petitioner believed that the treatment was inadequate, it is undisputed that he

received treatment for his injuries at Mt. Olive.

4

See Chance v. Hill, 224 W.Va. 626, 629-30, 687 S.E.2d 564, 567-68 (2009) (inmate

plaintiff provided required pre-suit notice to “State agency” and further conceded that respondent

was state employee, making venue proper only in Kanawha County pursuant to West Virginia

Code § 14-2-2(a)(1)).

5

Petitioner appeared by video conference.

6

While it is possible to waive the defense of qualified immunity, the defense is available

2

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s May 14, 2014, order dismissing his action.

“Appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.”

Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 773, 461

S.E.2d 516, 519 (1995).

Whether petitioner sued respondent in his individual capacity

The parties dispute whether petitioner sued respondent in his individual capacity. From our

own reading of the complaint, we find that the circuit court correctly determined that (a) all of

petitioner’s allegations arose from respondent’s performance of his duties as superintendent of

WVCI; and (b) while petitioner sought monetary damages, he expected those damages to be paid

by the DOC, and not respondent individually. The circuit court’s findings are supported by

petitioner’s explanation in his brief as to why he alleged that respondent was “directly responsible”

for his accident. Petitioner explains that he made such allegations so that he could meet the

“deliberate indifference” standard that is required to be satisfied when an inmate alleges that a

prison official has violated constitutional minimum standards with regard to the inmate’s safety

and well-being. See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 5, Nobles v. Duncil, 202 W.Va. 523, 526, 505 S.E.2d 442, 445

(1998) (holding that, to establish prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to inmate’s serious

medical need, treatment, or lack thereof, must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock conscience or be intolerable to fundamental fairness). Thus, we find that petitioner

mistakenly conflated what it means to sue an official in his individual capacity with the type of

allegations necessary to support a claim of “deliberate indifference” on the part of the official.

Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court correctly found that petitioner sued respondent only

in his official capacity.

Whether respondent had qualified immunity from petitioner’s action

The doctrine of qualified immunity affords “immunity to the State and its [public] officer

for discretionary acts negligently committed within the scope of his employment.” Clark v. Dunn,

195 W.Va. 272, 277, 465 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1995). We recently set forth the standard for

determining whether a public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, as follows:

A public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for

performance of discretionary functions where: (1) a trial court finds the alleged

facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, do not

demonstrate that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; or (2) a trial

court finds that the submissions of the parties could establish the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right but further finds that it would be clear to any

reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in the situation confronted.

Whenever the public officer’s conduct appears to infringe on constitutional

so long as the agency’s insurance policy does not waive it. See Syl. Pt. 6, Clark v. Dunn, 195

W.Va. 272, 274, 465 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1995). Petitioner did not allege that WVCI’s insurance

policy waived the qualified immunity defense. See Discussion, infra.

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protections, the lower court must consider both whether the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right as well as whether the officer’s conduct was

unlawful.

Syl. Pt. 6, City of Saint Albans v. Botkins, 228 W.Va. 393, 394-95, 719 S.E.2d 863, 864-65 (2011).

In addition, as a general matter, “[t]he ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory

immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to determine.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Botkins,

228 W.Va. at 394, 719 S.E.2d at 864 (internal citations and omissions omitted).

Petitioner asserts that respondent did not have qualified immunity from suit because

respondent violated various federal and state statutes, rules, and regulations requiring that inmate

workers be adequately trained and that prison workshops be sufficiently staffed. Respondent

counters that nothing in those statutes, rules, and regulations mandates that inmates be

trained—and shops be staffed—in the manner petitioner thinks best. We agree and note that

respondent’s argument is consistent with case law regarding other aspects of inmates’ welfare. See

U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir.1987) (“[Al]though it is plain that an inmate deserves

adequate medical care, he cannot insist that his institutional host provide him with the most

sophisticated care that money can buy.”) (Emphasis in original.) Another factor that weighs in

favor of respondent having qualified immunity is the fact that respondent must manage training

and staffing issues within the volatile prison context. See Nobles, 202 W. Va. at 534, 505 S.E.2d at

453 (“We must be careful not to substitute our judgment for that of prison administrators.”);

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (“[E]valuation of penological objectives is

committed to the considered judgment of prison administrators” because it is prison administrators

who have to “anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable

problems of prison administration.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Given the

deference the law provides respondent in carrying out his duties, we find that the circuit court did

not err in finding the allegations in petitioner’s complaint insufficient to show a violation of a

clearly established law or constitutional provision. We conclude that the circuit court correctly

dismissed the action because respondent enjoyed qualified immunity. See also Clark, 195 W.Va.

at 278-79, 465 S.E.2d at 380-81 (conservation officer and Department of Natural Resources had

qualified immunity from suit alleging that officer was negligent in his “discretionary judgments,

decisions, and actions” with regard to accidental wounding of hunter).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: November 21, 2014

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis

Justice Brent D. Benjamin

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Menis E. Ketchum

Justice Allen H. Loughry II

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