The opinion
THE STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel., )
CUSHMAN PROPERTIES, LLC, and, )
CUSHMAN REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, LLC, )
)
Respondents, )
)
vs. ) No. SD33271
)
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE ) FILED: November 19, 2014
CITY OF BRANSON, MISSOURI, )
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TANEY COUNTY
Honorable Mark E. Orr, Judge
AFFIRMED
Citing § 70-17 of the city’s sign code, Branson’s Board of Adjustment denied
Cushman’s request to upgrade a backlit billboard to a digital sign face. Upon judicial
review, the circuit court reversed and ordered the Board to grant the request. The
Board appeals.1 We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in Cushman’s favor.
1
Because we review the decision of the Board, not of the circuit court, Rule 84.05(e) required
Cushman to file the appellant’s brief here. Bd. of Alderman of Cassville v. Bd. of Adjustment of
Cassville, 364 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Mo.App. 2012).
Background
Relevant facts are not in dispute. Branson adopted a sign code (“Code”) that
restricted “off-premise” signs; i.e., those promoting something not offered or sold at
the premises where the sign is located.
Cushman’s off-premise sign predated the Code, which treats such signs as
“legal nonconforming”:
• “nonconforming” – the sign lawfully existed before the Code limited
off-premise signs;2 and
• “legal” – the Code grandfathered nonconforming signs subject to Code
§ 70-17 limitations, including:
o Code § 70-17(a)(1) – no nonconforming sign “may be enlarged or
altered in any way which increases its nonconformity ....”
o Code § 70-17(b)(2) – a legal nonconforming sign loses its status
if its “structure or size … is altered in any way except towards
compliance with this chapter. This does not refer to change of
copy, graphics, or normal maintenance.”
Actions leading to the Board’s involvement, and ultimately to this appeal,
were succinctly summarized in two paragraphs of the Board’s written decision:
[Cushman’s] permit request included provisions to renovate the
existing off-premise sign. The current sign includes a twelve by
eighteen foot (12’ x 18’) backlit billboard and a four by fourteen foot
(4’ x 14’) message board. [Cushman] desired to replace the backlit
portion with a digital face sign, which will require some electrical
modifications because the digital sign requires more electricity than
the current backlit sign.
[Cushman’s] permit request was denied by the Department
Director, Jim Lawson, because the proposed change to replace the
existing backlit sign with a digital display would significantly
2
“Nonconforming use” means a land use lawfully predating a zoning ordinance “and which is
maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use
restrictions.” State ex rel. Dierberg v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 869 S.W.2d 865, 868
(Mo.App. 1994).
2
enhance the sign’s capabilities by allowing for dynamic advertising
through changing copy animation, etc., versus the current stationary
advertising copy. Such an enhancement would increase the sign’s
degree of nonconformity, thus violating Branson's Municipal Code
Section 70-17(a)(1) which states: “No such nonconforming sign may
be enlarged or altered in any way which increases its
nonconformity.”
Cushman appealed to the Board, which held a public hearing, received
documentary evidence, and heard from Cushman representatives and the City’s Mr.
Lawson. Three of five Board members voted in Cushman’s favor, but the Code
required four votes to reverse Mr. Lawson’s decision. The Board’s written decision
stated that Cushman had failed to show that its proposal would meet “the standards
of Section 70-17” for three reasons:
[Cushman’s] sign was not in the spirit of section 70-17, in that it
would change the face of the billboard to allow for multiple
advertisements to be presented, as compared to the current status of
only one advertisement. Also, that the sign would likely require
modernized electronics to be installed in order to support a
modernized electronic billboard. Finally that the requested sign
improvements would extend the life of the non-conforming use.
Cushman sought RSMo § 89.110 judicial review. The circuit court overturned
the Board’s decision as unsupported by law because Code § 70-17 does not prohibit
the requested improvements, and arbitrary and capricious because the City has
allowed others to convert signs from manually changeable to electronically
changeable. The Board now appeals.
Principles of Review
We review the Board’s decision to determine whether it “is supported by
competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record or whether the decision
3
is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of [the Board’s]
jurisdiction.” Bd. of Alderman, 364 S.W.3d at 248.
Our review is de novo because the Board’s decision involved legal
interpretation and the application of law to undisputed facts. BT Residential,
LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 392 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Mo.App. 2012).
Permit issuance is ministerial, not discretionary, and cannot be refused when
applicable requirements are met. Curry Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 399 S.W.3d 106, 109 (Mo.App. 2013).
Analysis
The Board’s Written Decision and Code § 70-17
Two principles of construing zoning ordinances are “(1) the determination
of what uses are permitted must be made on the basis of the wording of the
particular ordinance, and (2) zoning ordinances, being in derogation of
common law property rights, are to be strictly construed in favor of the
property owner against the zoning authority.” Rice v. Bd. of Adjustment, 804
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Mo.App. 1991). See also Coots v. J. A. Tobin Const. Co., 634
S.W.2d 249, 251 (Mo.App. 1982), which describes the latter proposition as “widely
accepted.”
These principles doom the Board’s stated reasons for denying Cushman’s
request, i.e., multiple advertisements, modernized electronics, or a potentially longer
nonconforming use. Code § 70-17, which we quote in full below,3 bars none of these.
3
Sec. 70-17. - Nonconforming signs.
4
Other Board Arguments
Perhaps recognizing this problem, the Board now asserts that its decision
actually was (or could have been) based on sign restrictions in Code § 70-13(c)(5)(d),
a provision never cited in the Board’s decision or mentioned at the hearing. We
reject this argument for several reasons.
First, this section is part of Code § 70-13, which sets out “[s]pecific regulations
for sign overlay zones.” Subsection (c) thereof, which includes § 70-13(c)(5)(d) now
(a) Legal nonconforming signs. Where a lawful sign exists at the effective date of adoption of
the ordinance from which this chapter is derived (July 13, 1998) or amendment of this
chapter that would be illegal under the terms of this chapter, such sign may be continued so
long as it remains otherwise lawful, subject to the following provisions:
(1) No such nonconforming sign may be enlarged or altered in any way which increases
its nonconformity, but any sign or portion thereof may be altered to decrease its
nonconformity.
(2) Should such nonconforming sign or nonconforming portion of sign be destroyed by
any means to any extent of more than 50 percent of its replacement cost at the time of
destruction, it shall not be reconstructed except in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.
(3) Should such sign be moved for any reason for any distance whatever, it shall
thereafter conform to the regulations for the district in which it is located after it is
moved. When a permit has been obtained, temporary removal of any portion of a sign for
repairs and maintenance shall not be considered to be in violation of this stipulation. Any
sign temporarily removed by a public utility company, the city, or any governmental
agency to accommodate repair or maintenance, or expansion operations may be replaced,
provided there is no change in size, height or location of the sign. If any sign is moved as
a direct result of a public street expansion, it may be relocated to a position determined
by the city engineer to be appropriate in relation to the expansion project. No permit shall
be required for such replacement.
(b) Loss of legal nonconforming status. A legal nonconforming sign shall lose this
designation if:
(1) The sign is relocated or replaced; or
(2) The structure or size of the sign is altered in any way except towards compliance with
this chapter. This does not refer to change of copy, graphics, or normal maintenance.
(c) Maintenance and repair of nonconforming signs. The legal nonconforming sign is subject
to all requirements of this Code regarding safety, maintenance and repair.
5
cited by the Board, applies to “sign overlay zone 3.” The Board admits that
Cushman’s sign is not within that zone.
Second, as already noted, the Board admits that this code section was never
mentioned at the hearing or in the Board’s decision.
A third reason relates to an alternative argument by the Board. The Code was
in evidence, including § 70-13(c)(5)(d). Citing this support in the record, the Board
asks us to affirm its decision, even if its stated reasons were flawed. Yet the Board
itself describes § 70-13(c)(5)(d) nonconformity as “a matter for factual
determination by the finder of fact” and admits that it made no such determination.
Under these circumstances, we are not free “to infer that an administrative
agency found facts in accordance with the results reached.” Citizens for Rural
Preservation, Inc., v. Robinett, 648 S.W.2d 117, 126 (Mo.App. 1982).
Administrative review is “unlike appeal from a judgment in a court tried case where
review is de novo and the appellate court may assume that all fact issues on which no
findings were made were found in accordance with the result reached (rule 73.01(b),
V.A.M.R.).” Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc., v. State Tax Comm’n, 499
S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. 1973).
In administrative review, the court is bound by the agency's findings
if supported by competent and substantial evidence and its scope of
review is limited. For a court to infer findings from the ultimate
decision of an administrative agency, defeats this limited review
provision, as it allows the court to find both the law and the facts on
appeal.
Id.; see also Citizens for Rural Preservation, 648 S.W.2d at 126.4
4
Similar reasoning defeats the Board’s argument that Cushman violated Code § 70-6(7) by not
providing adequate information in its application. The City made no such claim in its initial
6
We need not reach other arguments for reversing the Board’s decision, which
is not supported by competent and substantial evidence. We affirm the circuit
court’s judgment in Cushman’s favor.
DANIEL E. SCOTT, J. – OPINION AUTHOR
JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS
ROBERT S. BARNEY, SR. J. – CONCURS
denial letter or at the public hearing, nor did the Board’s decision address this issue or Code
section, so we cannot fact-find this issue under the cases and for the reasons cited above.
7