Opinion

Uche Mordi v. Todd Zeigler

  • 770 F.3d 1161
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20744
  • 2014 WL 5463952
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Oct 29, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Wood
On the bench
Wood, Easterbrook, Tinder
Nature of suit
prisoner
Cited by
40 cases
Authority
More cited than 85.5%

“The court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact when it addresses [whether the facts alleged describe a violation of a protected right in the context of a qualified immunity analysis] because the ordinary rules governing summary judgment apply in that situation.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact when it addresses [whether the facts alleged describe a violation of a protected right in the context of a qualified immunity analysis] because the ordinary rules governing summary judgment apply in that situation.”
  • “[t]he court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact when it addresses [whether the facts alleged describe a violation of a protected right] because the ordinary rules governing summary judgment apply in that situation”
  • “The court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact when it addresses [whether a constitutional violation occurred] because the ordinary rules governing summary judgment apply in that situation.”
  • discussing the qualified immunity doctrine

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 13-3188

UCHE P. MORDI,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TODD ZEIGLER, GREG CHANCE, and

GREGG HEALEY,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11-cv-0193-MJR-SCW— Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 29, 2014

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and TINDER,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. Although the United States has been a

party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Con-

vention) since December 24, 1969, see Treaties in Force, U.S.

DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.state.gov/

s/l/treaty/tif/index.htm (all websites last accessed Oct. 29,

2014), questions about its obligations under the Convention

2 No. 13-3188

continue to arise. The Convention comprehensively regu-

lates consular activities. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548

U.S. 331, 337 (2006). For the most part, it operates at the dip-

lomatic level, but Article 36 of the Convention refers to the

rights of a person from one State (the “sending” State) who

finds himself arrested or detained in another State (the “re-

ceiving” State). In particular, the Convention requires the

authorities of the receiving State to inform the foreign na-

tional of his right under Article 36 to have his own consular

officials alerted to his arrest or detention. See Vienna Con-

vention on Consular Relations, art. 36.1(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21

U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

In the case before us, plaintiff Uche Phillip Mordi asserts that

three Illinois state police officers (the Officers) failed to com-

ply with this obligation, and he has sued them for damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the district court denied the Of-

ficers’ motion for summary judgment, based in part on an

assertion that they were entitled to qualified immunity, they

brought this interlocutory appeal. We reject the Officers’

broader arguments on appeal, but we agree with them that

the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not

clearly established, and so we reverse.

I

At approximately 1:30 in the afternoon on March 12,

2009, Officer Todd Zeigler of the Illinois state police pulled

over the vehicle that Mordi was driving. After a trained dog

discovered drugs in the car, Zeigler arrested Mordi, took

him to a police station, and left him in an interrogation

room. Later that day, around 4:45 p.m., Officers Greg Chance

and Gregg Healey interviewed Mordi. That evening, after

8:00 p.m., Zeigler took Mordi to the Effingham (Illinois)

No. 13-3188 3

County Jail, where other officers booked him. Mordi eventu-

ally pleaded guilty to charges of unlawful possession of a

controlled substance, and he is currently in the Northeast

Ohio Correctional Center, serving a sentence on that charge.

Mordi is a Nigerian national, and Nigeria has been a par-

ty to the Convention since 1968. See Vienna Convention on

Consular Relations, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.

un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLiNE&tabid=2

&mtdsg_no=iii-6&chapter=3&lang=en. At the time Zeigler

pulled him over, Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nige-

rian, but Mordi does not recall whether he also mentioned

that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler did list Mordi’s

place of birth as Nigeria in a form he filled out the next day,

but he asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship.

(That is quite possible: as of 2010, the U.S. Census estimated

that nearly 40 million foreign-born people, 17.5 million of

whom are naturalized citizens, live in the United States. See

The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010, U.S.

DEP’T OF COMMERCE (May 2012), www.census.gov/prod/

2012pubs/acs-19.pdf.) Chance and Healey, however, did

know about his citizenship because Mordi told them during

the interview. Chance recorded on a form that Mordi was of

Nigerian nationality and thus not a U.S. citizen.

After Mordi’s arrest and detention at the jail, the De-

partment of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) filed a detainer notice with the sheriff. At

the same time, the state began criminal proceedings in which

it charged him with intent to distribute cocaine. Later, feder-

al authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was repre-

sented there by a federal public defender, who was aware of

his nationality. He eventually pleaded guilty to possession of

4 No. 13-3188

a controlled substance with intent to distribute and was sen-

tenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. At no point during ei-

ther the state or the federal criminal proceedings was he in-

formed about his right under the Convention to have the

Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not

learn about the Convention until a year or so later, when an-

other inmate at the Pennsylvania facility where he was incar-

cerated told him about it. At that point he wrote to the Nige-

rian consulate in Atlanta; it advised him to contact the New

York office, but for unexplained reasons he did not follow

through.

Mordi then briefly instituted habeas corpus proceedings,

in which he argued that he had received ineffective assis-

tance of counsel because his lawyer failed to inform him that

after he served his federal sentence he would be removed to

Nigeria and charged there for the same violation. He dis-

missed that petition, however. In 2011 he filed the present

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although he initially named

quite a few defendants, the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of most of them. Only Zeigler, Chance,

and Healey had their summary judgment motions denied.

They have filed an interlocutory appeal in which they assert

that they were entitled to qualified immunity. See Behrens v.

Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305–308 (1996) (collateral order juris-

diction supports immediate appeal from denial of qualified

immunity where no issues of fact are involved). That ques-

tion is properly before us, and so we turn now to it.

II

In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme

Court described the scope and purpose of the doctrine of

qualified immunity in the following way:

No. 13-3188 5

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-

late clearly established statutory or constitu-

tional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known. Qualified immunity bal-

ances two important interests—the need to

hold public officials accountable when they ex-

ercise power irresponsibly and the need to

shield officials from harassment, distraction,

and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably. The protection of qualified immun-

ity applies regardless of whether the govern-

ment official’s error is a mistake of law, a mis-

take of fact, or a mistake based on mixed ques-

tions of law and fact.

Id. at 231 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) (“Qualified

immunity ‘gives government officials breathing room to

make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal

questions.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085

(2011). Once a public official has raised a defense of qualified

immunity, the plaintiff must establish two things in order to

defeat the defense: first, that the facts alleged describe a vio-

lation of a protected right; and second, that this right was

clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged mis-

conduct. Id. at 232.

The court cannot resolve disputed issues of fact when it

addresses the first question because the ordinary rules gov-

erning summary judgment apply in that situation. See Plum-

hoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014); Johnson v. Jones,

6 No. 13-3188

515 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1995). With respect to the second ques-

tion, the most important constraint relates to the appropriate

level of generality. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635

(1987), the Supreme Court observed that “if the test of ‘clear-

ly established law’ were to be applied at [a very high] level

of generality, it would bear no relationship to the ‘objective

legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow [v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)].” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. In-

stead, it wrote, “the right the official is alleged to have vio-

lated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particu-

larized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the

right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Id. at 640. The Court reiterated the need to avoid over-

generality in Plumhoff, noting that the “crucial question” is

“whether the official acted reasonably in the particular cir-

cumstances that he or she faced.” 134 S. Ct. at 2023. See also

Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).

The Officers devote a great deal of attention in their brief

to the first of the two questions identified in Pearson: wheth-

er they violated any cognizable right that Mordi is entitled to

assert. They concede that this court’s opinion in Jogi v. Voges,

480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (Jogi II), squarely supports an af-

firmative answer to that question (taking the alleged facts in

Mordi’s favor, as we must at this stage in order to have ap-

pellate jurisdiction). But, they urge, some of our sister cir-

cuits disagree with our conclusions in Jogi that Article 36 of

the Convention is self-executing, see id. at 830, that it creates

individually enforceable rights (though not a right to the

remedy of suppression in a criminal case), see id. at 834, and

that it may be enforced through an action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See id. at 836. Cf., e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183

No. 13-3188 7

(2d Cir. 2008) (Article 36.1(b) does not provide for individual

rights that can be vindicated in an action under section

1983); Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008) (same);

Cornejo v. Cnty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2007)

(same).

These courts relied on arguments that we considered and

rejected in Jogi II. We are not inclined to revisit our decision,

which has not led to any parade of horribles in any of the

three states in this circuit. It is notable that the Officers make

no argument that the state in general is not required by Arti-

cle 36 to provide the specified notification. That is under-

standable, in light of the U.S. Department of State’s pamphlet

entitled “Consular Notification and Access,” which contains

“[i]nstructions for Federal, State, and Local Law Enforce-

ment and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the

United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist

Them.” Consular Notification and Access, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE

(MAR. 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNA

trainingresources/CNAManual_Feb2014.pdf [hereinafter

Consular Notification and Access]. (The Appendix to this opin-

ion reproduces the summary page from the pamphlet that

informs arresting officers what they must do to comply with

Article 36.) The disagreement before us has to do with who

bears that obligation and how that person (or those persons)

must discharge it.

Another reason to decline the Officers’ invitation to delve

into the issues discussed in Jogi II is the fact that in this case

it is unnecessary for us to do so. There was a time when low-

er courts were required to follow a prescribed sequence

when they considered the two questions pertinent to quali-

fied immunity, always deciding first if the alleged facts de-

8 No. 13-3188

scribed a legal violation, and only if they did, moving on to

the question whether the law was clearly established. See

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The Court thought better

of this requirement in Pearson, however, and it is now per-

missible to reach the second question first, if that is more ef-

ficient. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227. The present case, we con-

clude, is one that benefits from the flexibility afforded in

Pearson. We thus move directly to the question whether Of-

ficers Zeigler, Chance, and Healey should have realized that,

by failing to inform Mordi of his Article 36 rights, they were

violating his rights.

The relevant part of Article 36 reads as follows:

(b) if he so requests, the competent authori-

ties of the receiving State shall, without delay,

inform the consular post of the sending State if,

within its consular district, a national of that

State is arrested or committed to prison or to

custody pending trial or is detained in any oth-

er manner. Any communication addressed to

the consular post by the person arrested, in

prison, custody or detention shall also be for-

warded by the said authorities without delay.

The said authorities shall inform the person con-

cerned without delay of his rights under this sub-

paragraph ... .

21 U.S.T. at 101–02 (emphasis added). It is enough for pre-

sent purposes to focus on the italicized language. The third

sentence of Article 36.1(b) anticipates the possibility that the

arrested foreign national will not request consular notifica-

tion for the simple reason that he does not know about his

rights. The final sentence, using the mandatory word “shall,”

No. 13-3188 9

addresses that problem by placing a duty on the receiving

State’s authorities to inform the arrestee “without delay” of

his Article 36 rights.

At a high level of generality, one might think that federal,

state, and local officials all should know the laws of the

United States, including its treaties, and thus all should be

held accountable if they fail to discharge “known” duties

like this one. But the Supreme Court has told us that this is

not the correct perspective. Instead, for purposes of the pre-

sent case, we must ask at least the following more specific

questions: (1) does Article 36 impose a duty on an arresting

officer like Zeigler to ascertain nationality at the moment of

arrest; (2) does it require an arresting officer like Zeigler to

notify the arrestee of possible Convention rights before it is

necessary to give Miranda warnings, or before he knows

whether the arrestee is from a Convention country; (3) does

the treaty require an Article 36 notification prior to booking,

by any and all officers who have contact with the arrestee;

and (4) does the treaty require notification before an inter-

view can take place? A common theme runs through these

questions: what does it mean to inform someone “without

delay”? A second general issue relates to personal responsi-

bility. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that section

1983 “will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior

theory of liability.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325

(1981); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675–76 (2009) (ap-

plying same principle to actions against the federal govern-

ment under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu-

reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). Do Convention respon-

sibilities attach to persons like the Officers here, who simply

arrested, transported, and briefly interrogated the suspect? If

so, then liability is at least possible; but if not, then these de-

10 No. 13-3188

fendants cannot be held vicariously responsible for the fail-

ure of another party (perhaps the booking officer or the ar-

raigning magistrate) to convey the required information.

Existing opinions do not offer much guidance on the an-

swers to the questions we just posed. It appears, however,

that “without delay” does not mean “instantly.” In Medellín

v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (Medellín I), the Supreme Court

observed that the International Court of Justice has found

that the obligation to notify “without delay” is satisfied

where notice is provided within three working days. Id. at

502 n.1 (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Na-

tionals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 52 ¶ 97 (Judgment of

Mar. 31)). The Court had no need in Medellín I to adopt that

rule, but neither did the Court disapprove it. The Virginia

Supreme Court also has held that lack of notification 36

hours after an arrest does not violate the Convention. Bell v.

Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 706 (Va. 2002); see also

Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)

(Convention does not require officials “to contact the consu-

lar post instantly”); United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 887

(8th Cir. 2002) (Convention does not require that interroga-

tion cease until consular contact is made). The State Depart-

ment’s consular notification and access pamphlet states that

notification should occur “by or at the time the foreign na-

tional is booked,” Consular Notification and Access, at 21,

while a directive from the Illinois State Police says that offic-

ers must notify foreign nationals “promptly” of their right to

consular notification. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, DIRECTIVE ENF-

031 FOREIGN NATIONALS 2 (Jan. 15, 2007).

It is impossible, in light of all this, to say that the law that

Officer Zeigler faced was “clearly established” such that he

No. 13-3188 11

should have known that he had a personal duty to ascertain

Mordi’s citizenship and then to notify Mordi about his right

to consular notification under Article 36 of the Convention at

the moment of arrest, or at least by the time he delivered

Mordi to the police station and left him in the interrogation

room. At most, three hours and fifteen minutes elapsed be-

tween the arrest (1:30 p.m.) and the beginning of interroga-

tion (4:45 p.m.). Later, some time after 8:00 p.m., Zeigler

drove Mordi to the jail, where other officers booked him.

Once again, there is no clearly established law that should

have alerted Zeigler to the existence of a personal responsi-

bility to notify Mordi at that stage about his Article 36 rights.

(Indeed, we leave open the question whether an officer in

Zeigler’s position, whose involvement was limited to arrest

and transportation, ever had any duty under Article 36; it is

unnecessary for us to resolve that issue today.)

Officers Chance and Healey’s role was different, but the

bottom line is the same. They interviewed Mordi at the po-

lice station, before Zeigler moved him to the Effingham

County Jail. Mordi told them that he was a Nigerian citizen,

but that was all. If they began interviewing Mordi at 4:45

p.m. and Mordi left the jail around 8:00 p.m., their encounter

was a little more than three hours (if they talked the whole

time), and they were finished with him less than eight hours

after the arrest. They were not responsible for booking him.

As far as they knew, he was no longer their responsibility the

minute Zeigler took over and drove him to the Jail. No clear-

ly established rule that we can find should have made it

clear to them that they were the officers charged with consu-

lar notifications.

12 No. 13-3188

Perhaps, as the materials from the State Department in-

cluded in the Appendix to this opinion might suggest, it

would be desirable to impose a duty to notify on every law

enforcement officer who encounters a possible non-U.S. citi-

zen. But it is possible that such a rule would lead to substan-

tial duplication of effort and confusion in the consular ser-

vices. One officer might call the Chicago office of a particular

country; another might call the St. Louis office; a third might

call Washington, D.C. If Mordi had sued the booking offic-

ers, we might need to consider this question in greater detail,

but they are no longer in the case. The interpretation and

implementation of the Convention touch on the diplomatic

relations of the United States, and so we think it prudent to

tread carefully here. All we need to say to resolve this case is

that the details of how to implement the Article 36 duty to

inform the arrestee of his rights without delay have yet to be

fixed. There is no clearly established law that the three Offic-

ers before us violated, and thus they are entitled to qualified

immunity from suit.

We therefore REVERSE the order of the district court deny-

ing qualified immunity and REMAND with instructions to

dismiss the action.

No. 13-3188 13

Appendix

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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