Nathan Rice v. Reliastar Life Insurance Co.

Case: 13-30639 Document: 00512815979 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/27/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 27, 2014

No. 13-30639

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

NATHAN RICE; BRANDON RICE; JONATHON RICE; JESSICA RICE;

BRENDA RICE, on behalf of her Minor Daughter, M.R., Individually and on

behalf of their deceased father Gerald Rice,

Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.

RELIASTAR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; JOEL ARNOLD, Individually

and in his Official Capacity as a Livingston Parish Sheriff's Deputy; WILLIE

GRAVES, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Livingston Parish

Sheriff,

Defendants–Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before DENNIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District Judge.

EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs–Appellees Nathan Rice, Brandon Rice, Jonathan Rice, Jessica

Rice, and Brenda Rice 1 (collectively the “Rice Plaintiffs”) brought suit against

Deputy Joel Arnold (“Arnold”) and Sheriff Willie Graves (“Graves”) alleging

various violations of federal and state law after Arnold fatally shot their father,

* District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

1 Brenda Rice brought suit on behalf of her minor daughter, M.R., individually, and

on behalf of the Rice Plaintiffs’ father, Gerald Rice.

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Gerald Rice (“Rice”), while responding to a 911 call. The Rice Plaintiffs also

filed suit against ReliaStar Life Insurance Company (“ReliaStar”) to recover

$179,000 they allege ReliaStar owes them under Rice’s accidental death policy.

Arnold and Graves filed motions for summary judgment, which the district

court granted, dismissing all of the claims against them. The Rice Plaintiffs

and ReliaStar filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the death

benefits issue, and the district court granted ReliaStar’s motion and denied the

Rice Plaintiffs’ motion. On appeal, the Rice Plaintiffs challenge the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Arnold, Graves, and ReliaStar. We

affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Rice’s Death

On January 27, 2010, Ryan Craig (“Craig”), Rice’s nephew, placed a 911

call stating that Rice was sitting in Rice’s truck with a loaded gun to his head

and threatening to commit suicide. Arnold and Deputy Johnson (“Johnson”)

went to Rice’s house in response to the 911 call. Craig told Arnold and Johnson

that Rice was armed, had been drinking, had taken a lot of medication, and

that Rice had a problem with law enforcement.

Arnold and Johnson entered Rice’s home without a warrant, and Arnold

saw Rice sitting in his truck in his garage with a gun to his head. Arnold and

Johnson retreated to the kitchen for cover (a small hallway connected the

kitchen to the garage). While Arnold and Johnson remained in the kitchen,

Arnold repeatedly asked Rice to put his gun down. Rice refused, saying he

wanted to come into the kitchen to get a beer. While Arnold and Johnson were

in Rice’s kitchen, they heard a single gunshot. Arnold and Johnson went to

the garage and determined that Rice had not injured himself; it was later

discovered that Rice had shot a single bullet into the wall in the garage. The

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deputies again asked Rice to relinquish his gun as they retreated to the

kitchen, but Rice refused.

Rice exited his truck and began walking toward the kitchen. 2 Arnold

repeatedly told Rice to put the gun down. While continuing to walk toward the

kitchen, Rice stated, “I want to commit suicide.” Arnold then fired four shots

at Rice, hitting Rice in the chest three times. Johnson, who was also present

in the kitchen at the time, did not fire at Rice. Rice later died from the gunshot

wounds.

2. Rice’s Accidental Death Benefits

Rice was insured through a group life insurance policy issued by

ReliaStar through his employer. The policy provided for basic and

supplemental life insurance, and the Rice Plaintiffs, Rice’s beneficiaries under

the policy, were entitled to receive accidental life benefits if Rice died as the

result of a covered accident. Rice’s policy defined accident as “an unexpected,

external, violent and sudden event.” After Rice’s death, the Rice Plaintiffs filed

a claim for the $179,000 accidental death benefit.

ReliaStar denied the claim, explaining that Rice’s death did not qualify

as an accidental death; he put himself in a position in which he should have

known that serious injury or death could occur as a result of his actions. The

Rice Plaintiffs appealed the denial, and ReliaStar forwarded the appeal to its

ERISA Appeals Committee, composed of three people who were not part of the

original benefit determination. The ERISA Appeals Committee affirmed the

2 The parties dispute whether Rice still had his gun at the time he exited the vehicle.

The deputies claim that Rice still had the gun in his hand while walking toward the kitchen,

while the Rice Plaintiffs claim there is a genuine dispute regarding whether Rice still had

the gun in his hand while walking toward the kitchen. As we discuss in greater detail below,

see infra Part IV(A)(1)(ii), the record demonstrates that any dispute about this fact is not

genuine. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment

will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).

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denial of the claims. After the Rice Plaintiffs complained about the ERISA

appeals process, ReliaStar agreed to provide a second appeal. As part of this

second appeal, the committee interviewed Brandon Rice (“Brandon”), Rice’s

son who was outside the home on the day of his father’s death. Brandon stated

he heard his father ask the deputies to leave. But he also acknowledged that

he was not in the house, did not know what happened, and had not spoken to

his father before or during the incident.

B. Procedural Background

1. The Rice Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Arnold and Graves

The Rice Plaintiffs sued Arnold in federal court, asserting claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the Rice Plaintiffs alleged

excessive and unreasonable use of deadly force, battery, assault,

false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

fright, and outrage, cruel treatment, failing to provide adequate or

timely medical attention, violations of the Constitution and other

laws of the United States and of the State of Louisiana, deliberate

indifference to rights, safety, and dignity of Gerald Rice, [and]

warrantless entry into the home of Gerald Rice. 3

They also asserted claims against Arnold’s supervisor, Graves, under the

doctrine of respondeat superior, arguing that he was vicariously responsible

for Arnold’s actions.

Arnold and Graves immediately moved to strike paragraphs 27–29 of the

Rice Plaintiffs’ complaint. In paragraph 27, the Rice Plaintiffs alleged that

3 First, the Rice Plaintiffs do not press, and therefore abandon, their claim for failure

to provide adequate or timely medical attention on appeal.

Next, the district court construed the Rice Plaintiffs’ claims for “cruel treatment,”

“violation of the Constitution and other laws of the United States,” and deliberate

indifference to the rights, safety, and dignity of Gerald Rice” as derivative of their claim for

the use of excessive force. The Rice Plaintiffs do not challenge this on appeal. In fact, on

appeal, they characterize their claims as ones for 1) warrantless entry, 2) excessive force, 3)

assault and battery, 4) false imprisonment, and 5) intentional infliction of emotional distress,

further suggesting that the district court correctly construed their claims.

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Arnold had a MySpace page featuring a picture of a movie character played by

Clint Eastwood with the caption “How I feel most of the time.” In paragraph

28, the Rice Plaintiffs alleged that Arnold had battered, brutalized, falsely

arrested, and maliciously prosecuted a seventy-year-old man. Finally in

paragraph 29, the Rice Plaintiffs alleged that Rice was “shot and killed . . . by

the deputy with a documented history of unprovoked violence and with the

emotional state - ‘most of the time!!!!’ - of a trigger-happy anti-hero of the 1960s

cinema.”

Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court

struck paragraphs 27 and 29, but denied the motion as to paragraph 28. The

court found that paragraph 28 “could certainly be relevant to [the Rice

Plaintiffs’] contentions that Sheriff Graves was negligent in hiring, retaining,

training, and/or supervising Deputy Arnold.” The court, however, struck

paragraphs 27 and 29 “because they are merely argumentative and prejudicial

. . . and do not add to the substantive allegations of the complaint.” There was

no evidence linking the printed picture from MySpace to Arnold; Arnold’s name

did not appear anywhere on the printout, nor was there any indication that the

image was tied to a MySpace account belonging to Arnold. The court

characterized paragraph 29 as “essentially the equivalent of ‘name-calling.’”

Arnold and Graves then argued that they were entitled to qualified

immunity, and each filed a motion for summary judgment on the federal and

state law claims. The district court found that they were protected by qualified

immunity and granted both motions for summary judgment.

2. The Rice Plaintiffs’ Claims Against ReliaStar

The Rice Plaintiffs sued ReliaStar in Louisiana state court before

ReliaStar completed its second ERISA appeal. After removing the case to

federal court, ReliaStar completed its second ERISA appeal and again denied

the Rice Plaintiffs’ claim for Rice’s accidental death benefits.

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ReliaStar and the Rice Plaintiffs then filed cross-motions for summary

judgment, and the district court granted ReliaStar’s motion. The district court

found ReliaStar’s denial of the accidental death benefits was not arbitrary and

capricious (and therefore not an abuse of discretion) because: (1) the decision

was supported by substantial evidence; (2) there was a rational connection

between the known facts and ReliaStar’s decision; and (3) applying the facts to

the Fifth Circuit’s accidental death test supported granting ReliaStar’s motion.

The Rice Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Arnold, Graves, and Reliastar.

II. JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for the alleged

constitutional violations and the ERISA claim, and supplemental jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for the state law claims. This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This Court views all facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws all reasonable

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113

F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). If the movant shows the absence of any material

fact, the nonmovant “must . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.

1994) (en banc) (per curiam). The nonmovant “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant cannot create

a genuine issue of material fact with “some metaphysical doubt as to the

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material facts,” “conclusory allegations,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.”

Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But,

“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

ERISA preempts all state law claims that relate to an employee benefit

plan, so it governs the Rice Plaintiffs’ claim for accidental death benefits. See

29 U.S.C. § 1444(a). Whether a death is accidental is a question of fact. Todd

v. AIF Life Ins., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995). We review the factual

determination that a worker’s death was not accidental for abuse of discretion.

Pierre v. Ct. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir. 1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Rice Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in several ways.

First, they claim that the district court erred when it found that Arnold was

entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claims and granted summary

judgment for Arnold on the state law claims. Next, the Rice Plaintiffs argue

that the district court erred in finding Graves was not liable under federal or

state law. Finally, the Rice Plaintiffs argue that ReliaStar improperly denied

their claim. We address each issue in turn.

A. The Rice Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Arnold

1. Federal Claims Against Arnold

The Rice Plaintiffs claim that Arnold violated Rice’s constitutional rights

when he entered Rice’s home without a warrant and used excessive force

against Rice. In response, Arnold asserted that he was entitled to qualified

immunity. When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff then

“bears the burden of negating the defense and cannot rest on conclusory

allegations and assertions, but must demonstrate genuine issues of material

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fact regarding the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.” Michalik v.

Hermann, 422 F3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005).

Qualified immunity is a two-prong analysis. First, the court determines

whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and

second, the court asks “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at

the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009) (citation omitted). The court may determine which prong of

the analysis it will address first. Id. at 236. The Supreme Court has explained

that the clearly established standard incorporates an objective reasonableness

inquiry:

To be “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity,

“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

Thus, as this [C]ourt has recognized, in light of the Anderson

definition of “clearly established,” the question “whether the . . .

right was clearly established at the time the defendant acted . . .

requires an assessment of whether the official’s conduct would

have been objectively reasonable at the time of the incident.”

Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery County, 249 F.3d 337, 340

(5th Cir. 2001).

Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (second and

third alterations in original). The Supreme Court has cautioned that

reasonableness is judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490

US 386, 396 (1989). Courts must allow for the “fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary

in a particular situation.” Id. at 397.

a. Warrantless Entry

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“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403

(2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There are, however,

circumstances in which a warrantless entry into a home is not a constitutional

violation. Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement, the Supreme Court has recognized that police officers are not

required to obtain a warrant where “the exigencies of the situation make the

needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is

objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Mincey v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to

render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant

from imminent injury.” Id.

The Rice Plaintiffs argue that the exigent circumstances exception to the

warrant requirement does not apply in this case. They point out that Arnold

entered Rice’s home before Rice ever fired his gun, and so, at the time Arnold

entered, no exigencies excused his warrantless entry. The Rice Plaintiffs also

argue that Arnold violated departmental regulations in entering Rice’s home

and that Arnold and the other deputies should have established a perimeter

and waited for a special response team before engaging with Rice.

This is not the first time we have encountered a tragic factual scenario

like the one present here: a police officer, in an attempt to aid a potentially

suicidal individual, entered without a warrant and killed the person the officer

was trying to help. See Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011); cf.

Velasquez v. Audirsch, No. 13-50029, 2014 WL 2978535 (5th Cir. July 3, 2014)

(unpublished) (per curiam). In these cases, we have resolved the case on the

second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, holding that the officer was

entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the incident, the law was

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not clearly established that it was unreasonable for an officer to enter without

a warrant to address the threat an individual posed to himself. See Velazquez,

2014 WL 2978535, at *6–7 (“[T]he law at the time of the Officers’ entry into the

Velasquezes’ home did not clearly establish that the officers were unreasonable

in believing the threat [Velasquez] posed to himself or others constituted

exigent circumstances.”); Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 996 (“[A]t the time of the

incident in this case, it was not clearly established that it was unreasonable

for the officers to believe that the threat [Rockwell] posed to himself constituted

an exigent circumstance.”). Having only held that the law was not clearly

established, our Court has not yet resolved the constitutional question these

cases present: whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement may allow for a warrantless entry based on the threat an

individual poses to himself.

Today we reach that issue and hold that the threat an individual poses

to himself may create an exigency that makes the needs of law enforcement so

compelling that a warrantless entry is objectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the exigent circumstances

exception to the warrant requirement supports our holding. As the Court has

explained, “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need

to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.

‘The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for

what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’” Stuart,

547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392). This need to protect or

preserve life is not limited to instances where violence is directed to another

person; the need to protect and preserve life can be just as strong when the

violence is directed as one’s self. See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 731

(7th Cir. 2013).

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Our decision is consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits. See

e.g., Fitzgerald, 707 F.3d at 732 (holding that the police officers’ warrantless

entry was constitutional because they had “an objectively reasonable belief

that they needed to enter without a warrant in order to prevent serious injury”

where they had “been told that the woman inside [the home] had called a police

station, that she sounded intoxicated, and that she had threatened suicide”);

Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding

that the police officer’s warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth

Amendment and that he was entitled to qualified immunity where the officer

responded to a reliable report that Roberts was suicidal, opened the doorway

and stood in the entryway of Roberts’s home, stayed long enough to assess the

potential harm, and left the property after determining that the threat had

passed); Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 786 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding

that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry where a police officer

was acting to help a suicidal woman because “[t]o require that an officer who

has received information from a credible source, or sources, that an individual

is a suicidal risk, wait to obtain a warrant before saving that victim, would

likely result in countless preventable deaths”).

Of course, it bears repeating that courts must still determine whether

the actions of the law enforcement officer who entered without a warrant were

objectively reasonable. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (“The

ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment . . . is reasonableness.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403–05 (explaining

that a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must be objectively

reasonable). While avoiding the risk of second-guessing officers’ actions based

on 20/20 hindsight, we must still ensure that, at the time the officer acted,

there was reliable information of an “urgent, ongoing emergency.” See United

States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1180–81 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that

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officers’ warrantless entry was not justified when the case had no “indicia of

an urgent, ongoing emergency” and the officer did not “have any information

that would lead them to suspect that Timmann might be suicidal”).

Turning to the facts of this case, we hold that Arnold did not violate

Rice’s Fourth Amendment rights when he entered Rice’s home without a

warrant because he had an objectively reasonable belief that Rice would

imminently seriously injure himself. After Craig’s 911 call, Arnold knew the

following: Rice was suicidal; Rice had a gun; and Rice had been drinking and

was sitting in his truck holding a gun to his head. Based on these facts, it was

objectively reasonable for Arnold to believe he needed to protect Rice from

imminent injury.

We disagree with the Rice Plaintiffs’ argument that even if exigent

circumstances existed to justify Arnold’s entry, he should have left after Rice

asked him to leave. First, the cases they cite for that proposition do not support

it. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999) (concluding that police

officers can enter without a warrant if they “reasonably believe a person is in

need of immediate aid” but that that exception does not justify a general right

to a warrantless search of a crime scene where there is no immediate danger);

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392–93 (explaining that it is not enough that a murder

occurred to invoke an exception to the Fourth Amendment and that police

officers need “an emergency threatening life or limb” to actually search the

scene). Further, the exigent circumstances that justified Arnold’s entry—

Rice’s suicidal behavior—had not disappeared just because Rice asked them to

leave; he was still intoxicated and pointing a gun to his head. We decline to

second guess Arnold’s decision to remain in Rice’s home with the threat of

suicide still present. See Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 562

(7th Cir. 2014) (“To say, as Sutterfield does, that given the passage of time and

her own assurances to the officers that she was fine, that there was no longer

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any emergency, and that the officers should have heeded her demands that

they leave, is to engage in the very sort of second-guessing that we [have

previously] eschewed . . . . How were the officers to know that Sutterfield was

competent to assess the state of her own mental health or that, regardless of

what she herself said, there was no longer any risk that she might harm

herself?”).

Finally, the fact that Arnold’s entry into Rice’s home may have violated

departmental policies does not deprive him of qualified immunity. Admittedly,

the fact that Arnold allegedly failed to follow departmental policy makes his

actions more questionable, because it is questionable whether it is objectively

reasonable to violate such a departmental rule. But “[o]fficials sued for

constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because

their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.” Davis v.

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984). Violating a departmental regulation, on its

own, is not sufficient to deprive Arnold of qualified immunity. See Gagne v.

City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559–60 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that police

officer was entitled to qualified immunity after he placed a prisoner into a cell

without removing the prisoner’s belt, which violated departmental regulations,

and the prisoner hung himself). Without more, the Rice Plaintiffs have not

met their burden of showing that Arnold is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Thus, we hold the district court did not err in granting Arnold’s motion

for summary judgment on the warrantless entry claim because Arnold is

entitled to qualified immunity.

b. Excessive Force

To maintain a claim for excessive force, the Rice Plaintiffs must prove

(1) Rice sustained an injury, (2) the injury resulted from Deputy Arnold’s use

of force that was excessive to the needs, and (3) the force used was objectively

unreasonable. See Ballard v. Baldwin, 444 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2006).

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Deadly force is considered reasonable when the officer “has probable cause to

believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, “[a]n

officer’s use of deadly force is not excessive, and . . . no constitutional violation

occurs, when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of

serious harm to the officer or to others.” Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 991 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Rice Plaintiffs make three arguments to explain how the district

court erred in granting summary judgment on their excessive force claim.

First, they argue that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

whether Rice actually had a gun in his hand at the time Arnold shot him. They

point to two specific facts: (1) they say that the officers both claimed that Rice

held the gun in his right hand but that Rice’s family claimed he always held

his gun with his left hand; and (2) they also argue that Arnold said he shot

Rice because Rice was entering the kitchen with a gun but that the location of

Rice’s body after the shooting shows he was actually shot in the garage not in

his home. Second, they argue that even if Rice had a gun, Arnold is not entitled

to qualified immunity under circuit precedent. Finally, they claim the district

court erred in failing to admit evidence of Arnold’s “lack of impulse control,”

specifically the page allegedly showing Arnold’s MySpace page with the image

of Clint Eastwood.

We disagree with each of these arguments and hold Arnold is entitled to

qualified immunity from the Rice Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. First, any

dispute about whether Rice had a gun in his hand at the time he was shot is

not genuine. Arnold’s interaction with Rice was audio-recorded, and the

transcript of the recording shows that in the ten seconds before Arnold fired at

Rice, Arnold can be heard shouting at Rice to “put the gun down” at least three

times and warning him not to “come in here.” While the conflicting evidence

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about what hand Rice held his gun in is potentially circumstantial evidence

that Rice did not actually have a gun in his hand when he was shot, the audio

recording of Arnold shouting at Rice to put his gun down seconds before he shot

Rice is evidence such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the

Rice Plaintiffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Rice Plaintiffs have not

questioned or otherwise undermined the authenticity of the recording or

argued that Arnold was lying about Rice having a gun when he was heard

telling Rice to put the gun down on the recording. Thus, any dispute about

whether Rice had a gun could only be resolved in Arnold’s favor.

With that factual dispute resolved, we hold that Arnold did not violate

Rice’s right to be free of excessive force. See, e.g., Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d

767, 770, 772–73 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that police officers had not violated

Harris’s right to be free from the use of excessive force when, after responding

to a 911 call saying that Harris was suicidal, officers shot Harris when he stood

up out of bed with a knife raised over his shoulder in a stabbing position and

refused to drop the knife); Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 2012)

(police officer had not used excessive force when Elizondo “ignored repeated

instructions to put down the knife he was holding,” and at the time the officer

fired, Elizondo “was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to [the

officer], and moving closer”); Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 127, 131 (5th

Cir. 2008) (concluding that a police officer had not violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights after firing at Ramirez where the officer stopped Ramirez

in a traffic stop, knew Ramirez was armed, Ramirez exited the car, refused to

drop his weapon, and put his hands together while standing near the officer).

We encountered a similar situation in Rockwell, when we considered

whether police officers had violated the right to be free from excessive force.

There too officers killed a suicidal young man, Rockwell, they were called to

aid. Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 990. Officers responded to a 911 call reporting that

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Rockwell had become a danger to himself and others; that he was bi-polar and

schizophrenic; off his medication; and that he had locked himself in his

bedroom. Id. at 988. When officers entered Rockwell’s room holding

pepperball guns, Rockwell rushed toward the officers holding two serrated

knives. Id. at 989. Three of the six officers fired shots at Rockwell, and he

eventually died from his wounds. Id. at 990. We held that the officers’ use of

deadly force was objectively reasonable and that Rockwell’s “Fourth

Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force was not violated.”

Id. at 993. The facts are analogous here—Rice was suicidal, Rice had been

drinking heavily, the officers had responded to a 911 call because of Rice’s

behavior, the officers knew Rice mistrusted police officers, Rice was armed, and

Rice was moving towards the officers—and support our holding that Arnold

did not violate Rice’s constitutional rights.

Further, any dispute about whether Rice was in the kitchen or the

garage at the time he was shot is not material. It is undisputed that, at the

time Rice was shot, he had exited his truck, was walking toward the door into

his house, and as discussed above, had a gun in his hand. The material fact

here is that Rice was armed and moving toward the officers. Thus, a potential

discrepancy in Rice’s precise physical location at the time he was shot is

inapposite, given that he was undisputedly approaching the officers with a

loaded weapon which he had recently fired and which he refused to surrender.

Our conclusion would not change even if the district court had not struck

paragraphs 27 and 29 of the complaint and had considered the MySpace page.

Though the Rice Plaintiffs are not entirely clear how they would have asked

the district court to consider this evidence, they appear to argue that the

evidence shows Arnold was prone to bursts of anger and violence, so he is not

entitled to qualified immunity. But the Supreme Court has been clear that the

“question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of

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the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Arnold’s

subjective beliefs are irrelevant here. Taking an objective view of the facts in

this case, we hold that Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity because he did

not violate Rice’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

2. State Law Claims against Arnold

a. Assault and Battery

Under Louisiana law, a battery is a “harmful or offensive contact with a

person, resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer such a

contact.” Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987). Battery does not

require the intent to inflict damage: “[i]t is sufficient if the actor intends to

inflict either a harmful or offensive contact without the other’s consent.” Id. at

391 (citations omitted). “[A]ssault is the imminent threat of a battery.” Bulot

v. Intracoastal Tubular Servs., Inc., 98-2105, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/24/99);

730 So. 2d 1012, 1018, abrogated on other grounds by Bulot v. Intracoastal

Tubular Servs., Inc., 2004-1376 (La App. 4 Cir. 11/3/04); 888 So. 2d 1017.

“Under ordinary circumstances the use of reasonable force to restrain an

arrestee shields a police officer from liability for battery.” Ross v. Sheriff of

Lafourche Parish, 479 So. 2d 506, 511 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1985). But, “[e]xcessive

force transforms ordinarily protected force into an actionable battery.” Penn

v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 2002-0893, p. 7 (La App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03);

843 So. 2d 1157, 1161.

The Rice Plaintiffs only make cursory reference to their assault and

battery claims on appeal, alleging that the district court’s decision is

“unsupported by the facts and contrary to law” and that the district court

“construe[d] the established fact[s] and inferences in Arnold’s favor and

against [the Rice Plaintiffs].” The only specific argument they make is that

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Arnold was not entitled to use reasonable force against Rice because he was

not placing Rice under arrest.

We disagree. “Police officers owe a duty of reasonableness when effecting

an arrest or approaching a subject to disarm him.” Manis v. Zemlik, 11-799,

p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/8/12); 96 So. 3d 509, 513. Here, Arnold was trying to

disarm Rice; he asked Rice repeatedly to put down his weapon. The question

then becomes whether Arnold acted reasonably. Louisiana courts use a

number of factors to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions:

the known character of the arrestee; the risks and dangers faced

by the officer; the nature of the offense or behavior involved; the

chance of escape if the particular means are not employed; the

existence of alternative methods of arrest or subduing the arrestee;

the physical strength, size and weaponry of the officers as

compared to that of the arrestee; and the exigencies of the moment.

See Penn, 2002-0893 at p. 7; 843 So. 2d at 1161 (citing Kyle v. City of New

Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. 1977)). Applying those factors here, Arnold

acted reasonably. Arnold knew that Rice was suicidal and intoxicated, and he

knew that Rice was armed. Arnold had tried other means to subdue Rice,

repeatedly asking him not to harm himself and to put his weapon down and

come into the house. And in the moments right before he was shot, Rice was

approaching Arnold with a loaded weapon.

Thus, we hold the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for Arnold on the assault and battery claims.

b. False Imprisonment

False imprisonment is the “unlawful and total restraint of the liberty of

the person.” Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 664; 48 So. 141, 143 (La. 1908).

To prove their claim for false imprisonment, the Rice Plaintiffs must prove that

(1) Rice was detained and (2) his detention was unlawful. See Kennedy v.

Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 2005-1418, p. 32 (La. 7/10/06); 935 So. 2d 669, 690.

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The Rice Plaintiffs argue that Rice was totally imprisoned because Arnold kept

Rice in the garage by use of force. They also claim that there is no legal excuse

for Arnold’s false imprisonment because Rice had not committed a crime.

Despite these arguments, Rice was not detained. Our review of the

record shows that the officers were not trying to prohibit Rice from entering

the house completely and that Rice was not totally restrained. Instead, the

officers only told Rice not to enter the home with his gun. See Smith v. Knight,

39,781, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05); 907 So. 2d 831, 835 (“Submission to the

mere verbal directions of the employer, unaccompanied by force or threats,

does not constitute false imprisonment.”). So, the Rice Plaintiffs have failed to

prove the first element of false imprisonment.

Moreover, even assuming that Rice was detained, the Rice Plaintiffs

have failed to prove that any detention was unlawful. Arnold could reasonably

have believed that Rice had committed an offense by firing his gun in the

garage. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:94 (“Illegal use of weapons or

dangerous instrumentalities is the intentional or criminally negligent

discharging of any firearm . . . where it is foreseeable that it may result in

death or great bodily harm to a human being.”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:37.2

(“Aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm is an assault

committed upon a peace officer who is acting in the course and scope of his

duties with a firearm.”). Committing either of these crimes would have been

sufficient to subject Rice to lawful arrest and detention.

Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for

Arnold on the false imprisonment claim.

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the

plaintiff to prove three things: “(1) that the conduct of the defendant was

extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the

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plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe

emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or

substantially certain to result from his conduct.” White v. Monsanto, 585 So.

2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). In support of their claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, the Rice Plaintiffs point to the image that they allege is

from Arnold’s MySpace page. They also argue more generally that the district

court failed to construe the evidence in their favor, as the court was required

to do on summary judgment.

We agree with the district court that summary judgment was

appropriate for Arnold on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

To support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Louisiana

law requires that “[t]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” White,

585 So. 2d at 1209. While the facts in this case are tragic, the Rice Plaintiffs

have not alleged anything suggesting Arnold’s actions “go beyond all possible

bounds of decency” or that his behavior is “intolerable in a civilized

community.”

The Rice Plaintiffs also have not presented any facts showing that

Arnold intended to cause severe emotional distress. The only evidence the Rice

Plaintiffs cite to support this claim is the MySpace printout, but that does not

change our decision. As the district court noted, there is nothing on the

MySpace printout in the record to link it to Arnold. This makes it impossible

for us to conclude that the MySpace page shows Arnold intended to inflict

severe emotional distress on the Rice Plaintiffs. And even if there were

evidence linking the printout to Arnold, that image of a movie character still

does not show that Arnold specifically intended to cause the Rice Plaintiffs any

distress.

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Thus, we hold the district court correctly granted Arnold’s motion for

summary judgment on this claim.

B. The Rice Plaintiffs’ Claims against Graves

The Rice Plaintiffs devote only one paragraph of their brief to their

claims against Graves. Essentially they argue that, because the district court

erred in finding Arnold was not liable, the district also erred in finding that

Graves was not liable. Graves argues the inverse: because Arnold was not

found liable for any of the state law claims and Arnold was entitled to qualified

immunity, Graves cannot be held liable.

We hold the district court correctly granted Graves’s motion for summary

judgment. The Rice Plaintiffs offer only one argument for reversing the district

court: because we should reverse the district court on the claims against

Arnold, we should also reverse and remand the claims against Graves. But,

we have already held that the district court was correct in granting summary

judgment for Arnold on all of the federal and state claims asserted against him.

And as the Rice Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal demonstrates, their only theory

for Graves’s liability rests on the impropriety of Arnold’s actions. Thus,

because we affirm the district court’s decision with respect to the claims

against Arnold, we also affirm the district court’s decision with respect to the

claims against Graves.

C. The Rice Plaintiffs’ Claims against ReliaStar

Finally, the Rice Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it

granted summary judgment for ReliaStar on the Rice Plaintiffs’ claim that

ReliaStar improperly denied them accidental death benefits. This Court has

previously held that whether a death is accidental for purposes of an accidental

death benefit policy is a question of fact. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456. The fact

question has both an objective and a subjective component. We consider

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whether (1) the decedent had a subjective expectation of survival and (2) if so,

was the expectation objectively reasonable. Id. at 1456.

The Rice Plaintiffs claim the district court’s decision was wrong for

several reasons. First, they argue that under ERISA, there is a federal

common law presumption in favor of accidental death. Second, they argue that

because ReliaStar both pays death benefits and evaluates claims for those

benefits, there was an inherent conflict of interest that the district court failed

to consider. Finally, the Rice Plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly

deferred to ReliaStar’s factual determinations; the district court should only

have deferred to ReliaStar’s factual determinations if they reflected a

“reasonable and impartial judgment,” and here, they did not. Essentially, they

argue the evidence does not support ReliaStar’s determination that Rice’s

death was not accidental.

We need not decide whether there is a federal common law presumption

in favor of accidental death, because even if there were, we would affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for ReliaStar. Assuming arguendo

that the presumption the Rice Plaintiffs allege exists, based on the facts in this

case, ReliaStar did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rice’s death

was not accidental. ReliaStar relied on an administrative record that

supported finding Rice’s death was not accidental. Rice was suicidal and had

been drinking heavily on the day he was shot. Rice took eleven prescription

pills while drinking, and he told the bartender at the bar where he had been

drinking that he left his pills behind because “it’s over.” Rice was also heard

revving the engine in his truck while the garage was closed, suggesting he may

have been trying to kill himself through carbon monoxide poisoning. Further,

Rice approached police officers with a loaded weapon even after the officers

told him to put his gun down; he told the officers “I want to commit suicide”;

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and after Rice’s death, the sheriff’s investigation committee found a note Rice

left his sister that appeared to be a suicide note.

The Rice Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy of these facts. Instead,

they point to facts that, they claim, show Rice’s expectation of survival was

objectively reasonable: he did not ask the officers to come to his home, and he

asked the police officers to leave. But even taking these facts into

consideration, ReliaStar did not abuse its discretion in finding that either Rice

did not have a subjective expectation of survival or that, if he had that

expectation, it was not objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Holland v. Int’l Paper

Co. Retirement Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Our review of the

administrator’s decision need not be particularly complex or technical; it need

only assure that the administrator’s decision fall somewhere on a continuum

of reasonableness—even if on the low end.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)). Thus, ReliaStar did not abuse its discretion in finding that

Rice’s death was not accidental, that is, not an “unexpected, external, violent

and sudden event.”

Moreover, while the Rice Plaintiffs correctly point out the structural

conflict of interest issue, that is just one factor courts consider in evaluating

ReliaStar’s decision to deny benefits. As this Court explained in Holland,

In addressing how such a conflict must be accounted for under an

abuse of discretion review, the Supreme Court in [Metropolitan

Life Insurance Co. v.] Glenn[, 544 U.S. 105, 128 S.Ct. 2342 (2008)]

eschewed “special burden-of-proof rules, or other special

procedural or evidentiary rules, focused narrowly upon the

evaluator/payor conflict.” 128 S.Ct. at 2351. In particular, the

Court held that weighing a conflict as a factor in the abuse of

discretion analysis does not “impl[y] a change in the standard of

review, say, from deferential to de novo review.” Id. at 2350. Quite

simply, “conflicts are but one factor among many that a reviewing

judge must take into account.” Id. at 2351.

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576 F.3d at 247–48. As discussed above, the administrative record was replete

with factual evidence that ReliaStar relied on in determining that Rice’s death

was not accidental, demonstrating that ReliaStar could have reached its

determination without resorting to the conflict of interest.

Thus, we hold the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for ReliaStar.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

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