Opinion

Iris Corporation v. Japan Airlines Corporation

  • 769 F.3d 1359
  • 112 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1689
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20142
  • 2014 WL 5335365
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Oct 21, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Hughes
On the bench
Prost, Newman, Hughes
Cited by
21 cases
Authority
More cited than 67.6%

holding that “the [G]overnment. . . clearly provided its authorization or consentl,] because [the contractor] . . . [could 1not comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing activities”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “the [G]overnment. . . clearly provided its authorization or consentl,] because [the contractor] . . . [could 1not comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing activities”
  • holding that “the 1G]overnrnent . . . clearly provided its authorization or consent[,] because [the contractor] . . . cannot comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing activities”
  • holding that "the [G]overnment ... clearly provided its authorization or consent[,] because [the contractor] ... [could ]not comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing activities"
  • holding that “the [Gjovernment . . . clearly provided its authorization or consent[,] because [the contractor] . . . cannot comply with its legal obligations without engaging in the allegedly infringing activities”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

IRIS CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION,

Defendant,

AND

JAPAN AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL COMPANY,

LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________

2010-1051

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York in No. 06-CV-6336, Chief

Judge Carol Bagley Amon.

______________________

Decided: October 21, 2014

______________________

STEPHEN N. WEISS, Law Office of Stephen Norman

Weiss, of New York, New York, argued for plaintiff-

appellant. Of counsel on the brief was EDMUND J.

FERDINAND, III, Ferdinand IP, LLC, of Westport, Connect-

icut.

2 IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION

CHARLES F. SCHILL, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, of Wash-

ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on

the brief were WILLIAM KARAS, CAROL GOSAIN, PAUL D.

LALL, and STEPHANIE L. ROBERTS.

DANA KAERSVANG, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Di-

vision, United States Department of Justice, of Washing-

ton, DC, argued for amicus curiae United States. With her

on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney

General, and SCOTT R. MCINTOSH, Attorney.

DAN L. BAGATELL, Perkins Coie LLP, of Phoenix, Ari-

zona, for amicus curiae Airlines for America.

______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and HUGHES, Circuit

Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

IRIS Corporation brought suit in district court, alleg-

ing that Japan Airlines Corporation committed patent

infringement by examining the electronic passports of its

passengers within the United States. Because the alleg-

edly infringing acts were carried out “for the United

States” under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), we affirm the district

court’s decision to dismiss IRIS’s complaint.

I

IRIS owns U.S. Patent No. 6,111,506 (the ’506 pa-

tent), titled “Method of Making an Improved Security

Identification Document Including Contactless Communi-

cation Insert Unit.” The ’506 patent discloses methods for

making a secure identification document containing an

embedded computer chip that stores biographical or

biometric data. ’506 patent col. 20 ll. 11–64.

Japan Airlines Corporation (JAL) examines passports

according to federal law, including the Enhanced Border

IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION 3

Security Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq., the Visa Entry

Reform Act of 2002, 19 C.F.R. § 122.75a(d), and certain

international treaties. According to IRIS, some of these

passports are made using the methods claimed in the ’506

patent.

IRIS sued JAL for patent infringement in the Eastern

District of New York, alleging that JAL infringed the ’506

patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) by “using . . . electronic

passports in the processing and/or boarding of passen-

gers . . . at . . . JAL services passenger check-in facilities

throughout the United States.” J.A. 74. JAL moved to

dismiss IRIS’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Among other things, JAL argued that federal laws requir-

ing the examination of passports conflict with the patent

laws and therefore exempt JAL from infringement liabil-

ity. It also argued that IRIS’s exclusive remedy is an

action against the United States under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498(a).

The district court granted JAL’s motion to dismiss,

adopting only JAL’s conflict-of-laws rationale. IRIS

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(1).

II

We review dismissal for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under the law of the regional

circuit. Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 643 F.3d 1346,

1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In this case, we apply Second

Circuit law and review the district court’s judgment de

novo. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.

2007).

The parties ask us to decide, among other things,

whether the United States has assumed liability under 28

4 IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION

U.S.C. § 1498(a) for JAL’s allegedly infringing activities. 1

The statute states:

Whenever an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States is used or manu-

factured by or for the United States . . . the owner’s

remedy shall be by action against the United

States in the United States Court of Federal

Claims . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The statute

further clarifies that an accused activity is “for the United

States” if two requirements are met: (1) it is conducted

“for the Government,” and (2) it is conducted “with the

authorization or consent of the Government.” Id.; accord

Advanced Software Design Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St.

Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

The government’s authorization or consent may be ei-

ther express or implied. TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806

F.2d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case, the gov-

ernment has clearly provided its authorization or consent

because—as the parties and the United States agree—

JAL cannot comply with its legal obligations without

engaging in the allegedly infringing activities. See Br. of

1 When the district court ruled on JAL’s motion to

dismiss, the law strongly suggested that alleged acts of

infringement under § 271(g) fell outside the scope of

§ 1498(a). See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.,

418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Zoltek Corp. v.

United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 838 (2002). Relying on

those suggestions, the district court concluded that

§ 1498(a) did not apply in this case. We have subsequent-

ly ruled, however, that § 1498(a) does encompass alleged

acts of infringement under § 271(g). Zoltek Corp. v.

United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en

banc).

IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION 5

United States at 13; Br. of Appellant at 24–26; Br. of

Appellee at 4–5. Under such circumstances, the govern-

ment has expressly authorized or consented to those

activities. See, e.g., Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Shaw

Envtl., Inc., 477 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

But, standing alone, a governmental grant of authori-

zation or consent does not mean that the alleged use or

manufacture is done “for the United States” under

§ 1498(a). To qualify, the alleged use or manufacture

must also be done “for the benefit of the government.”

Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1378; see also Madey v.

Duke Univ., 413 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“A

use is ‘for the Government’ if it is ‘in furtherance and

fulfillment of a stated Government policy’ which serves

the Government’s interests and which is ‘for the Govern-

ment’s benefit.’” (quoting Riles v. Amerada Hess Corp.,

999 F. Supp. 938, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1998))). “[I]ncidental

benefit to the government is insufficient,” but “[i]t is not

necessary [for the Government] to be the sole beneficiary .

. . .” Advanced Software, 583 F.3d at 1378.

In Advanced Software, for example, the United States

Treasury required privately owned and operated Federal

Reserve Banks to use a certain “seal encoding” system to

identify fraudulent bank checks. Id. at 1373. The plain-

tiff then sued three Federal Reserve Banks and the com-

pany that supplied their fraud detection technologies,

alleging that use of the mandatory seal encoding system

constituted infringement of its patented methods. Id. We

determined that the government benefitted from averting

fraud in Treasury checks and in saving Treasury re-

sources through more efficient technology.

Similarly, the government benefits here because

JAL’s examination of passports improves the detection of

fraudulent passports and reduces demands on govern-

ment resources. This, in turn, directly enhances border

security and improves the government’s ability to monitor

6 IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION

the flow of people into and out of the country. When the

government requires private parties to perform quasi-

governmental functions, such as this one, there can be no

question that those actions are undertaken “for the bene-

fit of the government.” See Oral Argument at 16:52–

17:26, IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., No. 2010-1051

(Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2014), available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

10-1051.mp3 (Counsel for the United States as amicus

curiae: “If [JAL] weren’t doing this, [the government]

would have to do it. We have to know who is going in and

out of our country. . . . So this is a uniquely governmental

function that we’re talking about here.”).

We also note that the United States has unequivocally

stated its position that suit under § 1498(a) is appropriate

here. Id. at 14:52–15:37 (“We do submit that here 1498(a)

is the exclusive remedy. This is use ‘for the Government.’

. . . We do think that suit under 1498(a) is appropriate.”).

Although the government’s statement is not dispositive, it

reinforces our conclusion that the United States has

waived sovereign immunity in this case and, therefore,

that IRIS’s exclusive remedy is suit for recovery against

the United States under § 1498(a). See Advanced Soft-

ware, 583 F.3d at 1377–78.

III

Accordingly, because JAL’s allegedly infringing acts

are carried out “for the United States” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498(a), we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss

IRIS’s suit. 2

AFFIRMED

2 Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal on

the basis of § 1498(a) alone, we do not address any of the

alternative grounds for affirmance proposed by JAL or the

district court’s discussion of those issues.

IRIS CORPORATION v. JAPAN AIRLINES CORPORATION 7

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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