affirming denial 13 of habeas relief because “there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent dictating when a 14 trial in state court must be severed”
How later courts described this case
- affirming denial 13 of habeas relief because “there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent dictating when a 14 trial in state court must be severed”
- “[W]e have 19 held that this footnote in Lane does not qualify as clearly established federal law under federal 20 habeas law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY JOE MARTINEZ, No. 13-16154
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02077-TJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES A. YATES, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Joe Martinez appeals from a judgment of the district court denying
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it
here.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
I
The district court properly concluded that Martinez is not entitled to habeas
relief on his claim that his federal due process rights were violated by the trial
court’s failure to sever for trial the criminal charges relating to two separate
incidents.
A federal court may grant a habeas petition if the state court’s adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). There is no clearly established
Supreme Court precedent dictating when a trial in state court must be severed.
Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no clearly
established federal law requiring severance of criminal trials in state court even
when the defendants assert mutually antagonistic defenses.”).
The Supreme Court noted in a footnote in United States v. Lane that
“misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in
prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). However, we have held that this footnote in Lane
does not qualify as clearly established federal law under federal habeas law.
Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The footnote upon
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which Collins relies did not set forth the governing legal principle in Lane. It was
merely a comment.”).
Further, the record discloses that there was no due process violation. The
evidence as to the two incidents was cross-admissible under California Evidence
Code § 1101(b) (uncharged misconduct may be used to prove identity). The
evidence presented was distinct, and the jury was given instructions to consider the
two crimes separately. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that “prejudice generally does not arise from joinder when the
evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even in the absence of cross-
admissibility”). There is no indication in the record that the jury failed to
distinguish between the evidence presented in the two cases. Nor was there a
significant disparity in the relative strength of the two cases. In both incidents,
eyewitnesses identified Martinez as the perpetrator. The district court properly
denied relief.
II
The district court also properly concluded that the state court’s decision
denying Martinez relief on his prosecutorial misconduct claim was not contrary to
and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The prosecutor’s comments on the reasonable
3
doubt standard did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153
(2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Nor did Martinez demonstrate
that statements made by the prosecutor introduced facts not in evidence.
Martinez’s claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses and
referenced facts outside the record are procedurally barred. Martinez did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore this procedural bar is not
circumvented by a showing of prejudice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750 (1991).
III
Given the lack of constitutional error, the district court also properly rejected
Martinez’s argument that he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error.
AFFIRMED.
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