The opinion
Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #051
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 15th day of October, 2014, are as follows:
BY JOHNSON, C.J.:
2014-KK-0282 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MAURICE ADDISON HAWLEY (Parish of Bossier)
(Driving While Under the Influence)
For this reason, we find the court of appeal erred in applying
Melendez-Diaz and vacating Mr. Hawley’s conviction. We hereby
reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate
defendant’s conviction.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
10/15/14
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-KK-0282
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
MAURICE ADDISON HAWLEY
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF BOSSIER
JOHNSON, Chief Justice
Maurice Addison Hawley was charged with driving under the influence after
a breath test demonstrated his blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit.
The test was conducted using an Intoxilyzer 5000 breathalyzer. We granted this writ
application to determine whether the state’s introduction into evidence of the
certification form attesting to the inspection and maintenance of the Intoxilyzer 5000
machine, and the certification form attesting to the qualifications of the maintenance
technician who inspected, maintained and certified the machine, without producing
the testimony of the technician, violated Mr. Hawley’s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation. For the following reasons, we hold these forms are nontestimonial,
and thus they are not subject to Confrontation Clause requirements. We therefore
reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate Mr. Hawley’s conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 19, 2012, Mr. Hawley was stopped by a Louisiana State
Trooper for improper lane use and speeding. After initial investigation, he was
arrested for DUI. Mr. Hawley agreed to provide a breath sample for chemical
1
analysis, which was conducted using an Intoxilyzer 5000 breathalyzer machine.
The test showed a blood alcohol concentration of .144, a level above the statutory
presumption of intoxication. Mr. Hawley was charged by Bill of Information with
driving while under the influence, first offense, in violation of La. R.S. 14:98. This
statute defines the crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as operating a
motor vehicle when the operator’s blood alcohol concentration is .08 or more.1 For
purposes of proving Mr. Hawley’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded this
statutory limit, the state intended to introduce three exhibits at Mr. Hawley’s trial:
S-1: Intoxilyzer 5000 “Machine Recertification Form”
S-2: “Maintenance Technician Qualification Form”
S-3: Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test printout
Exhibit S-1, “Certificate of Inspection Machine Recertification Form,” states:
This is to certify that Instrument # 68-012946 Intoxilyzer 5000 is an
approved instrument for use in Breath-alcohol Testing and is certified
to be in proper functioning condition on this 7th day of February,
2012.
This certificate is prima facie evidence of the proper functioning of the
instrument.
The known alcohol standard used in calibration of the instrument was
tested and found to be within the acceptable tolerance range of +
.010g% according to rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
LRS 32:663.
Known value .100
Instrument read .097
The certificate is signed by Cory D. Thompson, Breath Analysis Instructor
Specialist, Louisiana State Police Applied Technology Unit, Certified Permit No.
8. Exhibit S-2 includes the “Intoxilyzer 5000 Certification Card” for Mr. Thompson
under Permit No. 0008, and states that “this individual has met all requirements for
qualification to perform maintenance and inspection on instruments indicated on the
1
La. R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(b).
2
true copy of individual’s permit issued by the Department of Public Safety….”
Exhibit S-3 is the printout from the Intoxilyzer 5000, reflecting that the analysis of
Mr. Hawley’s breath sample showed a blood alcohol concentration of .144.
Prior to trial, Mr. Hawley filed a “Notice”2 objecting to all hearsay evidence,
including “machine certification forms,” “machine recertification forms,” and any
forms or certificates “of any kind which are discussed or identified in LSA-R.S.
15:499 through LSA-R.S. 15:501,” Louisiana’s notice and demand statutes. The
Notice also served to advise that Mr. Hawley would object if the state attempted to
introduce any such evidence if he was not allowed to exercise his constitutional right
to confront and cross examine the person who made the statements contained in
such documents.
On the date of trial, the court treated Mr. Hawley’s Notice as a motion in
limine seeking to exclude the state’s evidence based on a Confrontation Clause
violation. The trial court denied the motion, finding no constitutional violation. Due
to this ruling, Mr. Hawley chose to enter a guilty plea pursuant to State v. Crosby,3
reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling. Mr. Hawley then sought review
in the court of appeal.
The court of appeal granted Mr. Hawley’s writ and vacated his conviction.4
Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,5 the court noted that forensic reports/certificates prepared for trial
qualify as testimonial statements and are subject to the Confrontation Clause, and
2
This pleading is fully entitled: “Defendant’s Notice of Objection to all Hearsay, Including
Hearsay contained in Certificates and Other Documents; Defendant’s Notice that he is not Waiving
his Right to Confront and Cross Examine Witnesses and that he will Assert his Right to Confront and
Cross Examine all Witnesses.”
3
338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976).
4
State v. Hawley, 48,835 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/10/13) (unpublished).
5
557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009).
3
therefore found the trial court erred in admitting the documents without the presence
of the analyst. The court also noted that Mr. Hawley had timely filed a demand for
the analyst’s presence, and that notice and demand statutes are permissible under the
Confrontation Clause.
The state filed the instant writ application, asserting S-1 and S-2 are not
testimonial statements requiring an analyst to testify in order to introduce the forms
into evidence.6 We granted the state’s writ application to decide whether
introduction of the Intoxilyzer 5000 “Machine Recertification Form” (S-1) and the
“Maintenance Technician Qualification Form” (S-2) into evidence, without
requiring the state to produce the testimony of the technician who inspected and
certified the machine and prepared the recertification form, violated Mr. Hawley’s
constitutional right of confrontation.7
DISCUSSION
Because our resolution of this matter requires interpretation of constitutional
issues involving the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, our review is
de novo.8
La. R.S. 14:98 provides a legal presumption of intoxication if the operator’s
blood alcohol concentration is “0.08 percent or more by weight based on grams of
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.”9 For purposes of establishing
this presumption, the state sought to introduce S-1 and S-2 into evidence without
testimony. These documents were formulated pursuant to certain statutory
6
S-3, the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test printout, is not at issue in this case. The state
acknowledges that S-3 cannot be admitted into evidence without the analyst’s testimony. The state
asserts the analyst is the state trooper who conducted the test, and he was subpoenaed and available
to testify at Mr. Hawley’s trial.
7
State v. Hawley, 14-0282 (La. 4/11/14), 138 So. 3d 611.
8
See State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La. 7/1/11), 67 So. 3d 452.
9
La. R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(b).
4
requirements.
In order for a chemical analysis of a person’s breath to be considered valid,
it must have been performed according to methods approved and promulgated by
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“Department”).10 The rules
promulgated by the Department include operator qualifications, instructor
qualifications, maintenance technician qualifications, mandatory maintenance and
repair schedule, approved manufacturers of simulator solutions, and procedures for
using the Intoxilyzer 5000.11
With respect to inspection of the Intozilyzer 5000 and preparation of the
recertification form, the rules provide:
At least once every four months [after initial approval] for the
Intoxilyzer 5000,…each individual instrument shall be inspected,
checked, and certified by the…breath analysis instructor specialist…of
the Applied Technology Unit and a recertification form shall be
maintained in the Applied Technology Unit. A copy of this certificate
may be filed with clerk of the applicable court in the respective parish
in which each device is used for blood/breath testing, and this copy
shall be prima facie evidence as to the proper working order of the
instrument. The inspecting…breath analysis instructor
specialist[’s]…permit number shall also be affixed to this certificate.12
In accordance with La. R.S. 32:663, the Department also issued qualifications
required of individuals to perform maintenance and inspection of the Intoxilyzer
5000.13 After an individual has qualified based on the stated standards, he is certified
to perform maintenance and inspection by the Department and issued a permit
stating such.14 This permit serves as prima facie evidence of the individual’s
10
La. R.S. 32:663(A)(1).
11
See La. Admin. Code Title 55, Part I, §501 et seq.
12
La. Admin. Code, Title 55: Part I, § 501(A).
13
See La. Admin. Code, Title 55: Part I, § 507.
14
La. Admin. Code, Title 55: Part I, § 501(B).
5
qualification to perform such maintenance.15
According to La. R.S. 32:662.1,16 the “Machine Recertification Form” (S-1)
and the “Maintenance Technician Qualification Form” (S-2), both made in
accordance with the provisions of La. R.S. 32:663, are admissible as prima facie
evidence. The issue we must resolve is whether the admission of S-1 and S-2 into
evidence without requiring the state to introduce the testimony of the technician
who inspected and certified the machine, violated Mr. Hawley’s Sixth Amendment
right to confront the technician. After reviewing the record and considering the law
and arguments of the parties, we hold that the “Machine Recertification Form” (S-1)
and the “Maintenance Technician Qualification Form” (S-2) are nontestimonial and
therefore introduction of these documents into evidence without testimony does not
invoke Confrontation Clause requirements.
The defendant makes an argument based on the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution which provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” That portion of the Sixth Amendment is commonly referred to as the
Confrontation Clause.17
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has
continuously evolved. In Ohio v. Roberts,18 the Court held that out-of-court
15
Id.
16
La R.S. § 32:662.1 provides: In all criminal cases where intoxication is an issue, any
certificate or writing made in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 32:663, including but not limited
to intoxilyzer instrument recertification forms, and other certificates or writings made with respect to
the chemical analyses of a person’s blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, shall be admissible
as evidence.
17
We note that the Louisiana Constitution grants defendants a similar right in Article I, § 16
which provides, in part: “An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to present a defense, and to testify in his own behalf.”
18
448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed. 2d 597 (1980).
6
statements by witnesses who are unable to testify can be admitted into evidence if
a court determines that the evidence falls within a hearsay exception or has
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”19 Almost twenty-five years later, the
Court shifted its inquiry from whether the evidence is “reliable” to whether the
evidence is “testimonial.” In Crawford v. Washington,20 the Court held that
prosecutors could not use the “testimonial statements” of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.21 The Court explained:
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus. It applies to
“witnesses” against the accused-in other words, those who “bear
testimony.” “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to
an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.22
The Court described a “core class” of testimonial statements covered by the
Confrontation Clause:
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist:
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.23
But the Court specifically declined to “spell out a comprehensive definition of
19
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
20
541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54
22
Id. at 51. (Internal citations omitted).
23
Id. at 51-52. (Internal citations omitted).
7
‘testimonial.’”24 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have served to further clarify
whether evidence is “testimonial.”
In Davis v. Washington,25 the Court considered when statements made to law
enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are “testimonial.” The
Court focused on the “primary purpose” of the interrogation and held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.26
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court again focused on “purpose” to find “certificates
of analysis” prepared by forensic analysts identifying a substance found in
defendant’s possession as cocaine, and submitted into evidence at defendant’s drug
trafficking trial, to be testimonial.27 The certificates were sworn to before a notary
public by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute, as required under Massachusetts
law.28 The Court explained:
The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law
“certificates,” are quite plainly affidavits: “declaration[s] of facts written
down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to
administer oaths.” They are incontrovertibly a “solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
The fact in question is that the substance found in the possession of
Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed,
cocaine-the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to
provide if called at trial. The “certificates” are functionally identical to
live, in-court testimony, doing “precisely what a witness does on direct
24
Id. at 68.
25
547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed. 2d 224 (2006).
26
547 U.S. at 822. (Emphasis added).
27
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11.
28
Id. at 308.
8
examination.”29
More recently, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,30 the Court reiterated that an
analyst’s certification prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or
prosecution is testimonial and therefore within the compass of the Confrontation
Clause.31 The specific issue considered in Bullcoming was whether such a
certification could be introduced into evidence through the testimony of a scientist
who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the
certification.”32 The Court held that the “surrogate testimony” did not meet the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause.33
Considering this Supreme Court jurisprudence, we start our analysis by
stating that only “testimonial” statements cause a declarant to be a witness within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the crucial question we must
answer is whether the statements contained within S-1 and S-2 are “testimonial” in
nature.
In finding these certification forms to be “testimonial,” the court of appeal
cited Melendez-Diaz for the proposition that “forensic reports/certificates prepared
for trial qualify as testimonial statements and are subject to the Confrontation
Clause.” We find the court’s reliance on Melendez-Diaz to be misplaced. The court
of appeal’s application of Melendez-Diaz to the facts of this case indicates an overly-
broad reading of its holding. We are not bound by the Court’s holding in Melendez-
Diaz because, unlike the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, or those in Bullcoming, S-1
29
Id. at 310-11. (Internal citations omitted).
30
– U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed. 2d 610 (2011).
31
Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2713-14.
32
Id. at 2710.
33
Id.
9
and S-2 were not prepared for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a
criminal case. In Melendez-Diaz, the drug analysis certificates provided direct proof
of an element of the defendant’s drug trafficking offense. Similarly, Bullcoming
involved a DWI case and the forensic laboratory report certified that defendant’s
blood-alcohol concentration was above the legal threshold.34 The information
contained in S-1 and S-2 do not provide any information regarding Mr. Hawley’s
blood alcohol concentration, nor otherwise establish an element of the offense of
driving while under the influence.
S-1 was prepared by Cory Thompson, the technician who inspected and
maintained the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to test Mr. Hawley’s breath sample. S-1
merely certifies the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000 and was prepared on February
7, 2012, twelve days before Mr. Hawley was arrested. The form reflects objective
facts that were observed by the technician at the time of their recording in order to
establish that the Intoxilyzer 5000 would produce accurate results, rather than to
prove that Mr. Hawley was intoxicated. Thus, the machine recertification form does
not directly inculpate Mr. Hawley or prove an essential element of the charges
against him. Similarly, S-2 simply states that Cory Thompson was certified by the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections to perform maintenance and inspect
the Intoxilyzer 5000. Nothing in S-2 proves an element of Mr. Hawley’s DUI
offense.
Louisiana law requires that the Intoxilyzer 5000 be “inspected, checked, and
certified” by a qualified technician at least once every four months and that a
recertification form be maintained.35 Thus, when S-1 was created, its primary
34
Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2709.
35
La. Admin. Code Title 55, Part I, §501.
10
purpose was to establish that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was in compliance with
administrative regulations in effect at the time. S-2 was created to establish the
technician was qualified pursuant to regulations. Thus, the primary purpose of S-1
and S-2 was not to determine Mr. Hawley’s blood alcohol concentration, but rather
to show strict compliance with the promulgated procedures. The certificates served
a purpose at the time they were created, regardless of whether they were utilized in
a future prosecution. To require the testimony of an individual as far removed from
the prosecution as the inspector and calibrator of the Intoxilyzer would dramatically
expand the holding of Melendez-Diaz. The majority in Melendez-Diaz noted this
distinction:
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, ... we do not hold, and it is not
the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing
the… accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of
the prosecution’s case…. Additionally, documents prepared in the
regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as
nontestimonial records.”36
In sum, we hold that the machine recertification form (S-1) and the
maintenance technician qualification form (S-2) do not fall within the “core class”
of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause as described in
Crawford. While certificates of drug analysis were offered as direct proof of an
element of the offense charged in Melendez–Diaz, and reports certifying proof of
defendant’s blood alcohol concentration were offered as proof of an element of the
offense in Bullcoming, S-1 and S-2 do not offer direct proof of Mr. Hawley’s guilt,
and only serve to establish the admissibility or credibility of the evidence of his
guilt, the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test printout (S-3). The state intended to introduce
S-3 through the testimony of the state trooper who conducted Mr. Hawley’s breath
test.
36
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n. 1.
11
Finally, we address Mr. Hawley’s assertion that the admission of the
certificates into evidence without requiring the state to produce the technician’s
testimony violated the protections established in Louisiana’s notice and demand
statutes.37 Through a series of statutes,38 the Louisiana Legislature has provided a
37
The court of appeal also suggested the “notice and demand” statutes were implicated.
38
See La. R.S. 15:499 - 501. Specifically, La. R.S. 15:499 provides in relevant part:
A. All criminalistics laboratories established by laws of this state or by laws of the United
States, and all coroners, forensic pathologists, and other persons, partnerships, corporations,
and other legal entities practicing in fields of knowledge and expertise in the gathering,
examination, and analysis of evidence by scientific means are authorized to make proof of
examination and analysis of physical evidence by the certificate of the person making the
examination or analysis. Such certificate shall list:
(1) The date and time such evidence was delivered to such facility.
(2) The name of the person making such delivery, and the person receiving same.
(3) A brief description of the evidence.
(4) The type of examination or analysis requested.
(5) The name of the person making the examination or analysis.
(6) The date or dates of the examination or analysis.
(7) The results of the examination or analysis.
B. The certificate shall give the name and address of the facility in which the examination or
analysis was made, and shall be signed by the person making the examination or analysis.
C. Criminalistics laboratories are authorized to utilize electronic signatures in order to comply
with the provisions of Subsection B of this Section once final review of the certificate of
analysis is completed. For purposes of this Section, “electronic signature” shall mean an
electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
D. All organizations, entities, or persons issuing certificates as set forth in this Section shall
retain and provide upon written request all of the following:
(1) A description of each analyst’s educational background, training, and experience.
(2) A listing of all accreditations held by the laboratory or individual.
La. R.S. 15:500 provides: “In all criminal cases and in all cases in juvenile or family courts
which are of a criminal nature, and in civil forfeiture proceedings arising from criminal activity, the
courts of this state shall receive as evidence any certificate made in accordance with R.S. 15:499
subject to the conditions contained in this Section and R.S. 15:501. The certificate shall be received
in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts shown thereon, and as prima facie proof of proper custody
of the physical evidence listed thereon from time of delivery of said evidence to the facility until its
removal therefrom.”
La. R.S. 15:501 provides in relevant part:
A. The party seeking to introduce a certificate made in accordance with R. S. 15:499 shall, not
less than forty-five days prior to the commencement of the trial, give written notice of intent
to offer proof by certificate. Such notice shall include a copy of the certificate.
B. The attorney for the defendant, or the defendant acting in his own defense, if not
represented by counsel, may demand that the person making the examination or analysis testify
by filing a written demand and serving it upon the district attorney or attorney general seeking
to introduce the certificate. If such a demand is made timely as set forth below, the certificate
12
procedure for the introduction into evidence of certain certificates prepared by
criminalistics laboratories, and further provided that these certificates shall serve “as
prima facie proof of the facts shown thereon, and as prima facie proof of proper
custody of the physical evidence listed thereon from time of delivery of said
evidence to the facility until its removal therefrom.”39 However, the law also
provides a “notice and demand” procedure allowing a defendant to file a written
demand “that the person making the examination or analysis testify.”40 If such a
demand is filed, the certificate shall not constitute prima facie proof of the facts
thereon.41 Although Mr. Hawley’s pre-trial “Notice” asserted such a demand, it does
not alter our opinion. These statutes clearly refer to certificates from criminalistics
laboratories conducting actual analysis of evidence, such as those considered in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The purpose of such statutes is to require the
defendant to put the state on notice that he is asserting his Confrontation Clause
rights. In reaching its decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court recognized that
many States “have already adopted the constitutional rule” announced in that case,
shall not constitute prima facie proof of the facts thereon as set forth in R.S. 15:500.
C. Demand for the testimony of the person making the examination or analysis shall be filed
and served by counsel for the defendant, or by a defendant acting as his own counsel, within
thirty days of the receipt of the notice provided for in Subsection A of this Section. The trial
court may extend this thirty-day period for good cause shown if such request is made prior to
the expiration of the thirty days.
D. If no request for additional time is made prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period, an
extension of time in which to make such a demand may be made only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances. Any allegation that such circumstances exist shall constitute a
preliminary plea on the defendant’s behalf for the purposes of Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 580. The demand shall be made in writing and notice shall be served on the
district attorney or the attorney general prosecuting the matter. The court shall conduct a
contradictory hearing to determine if the extension is warranted.
E. The filing of a demand by the defendant does not prevent the admission of the certificate
or its contents in any other manner otherwise appropriate pursuant to the Louisiana Code of
Evidence or its ancillaries.
39
La. R.S. 15:500.
40
La. R.S. 15:501(B).
41
Id.
13
“while many others permit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his
Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecution’s intent to use
a forensic analyst’s report.”42 Clearly, notice and demand statutes serve a purpose
only when the Confrontation Clause is invoked. Because we have already
determined that S-1 and S-2 are nontestimonial and Mr. Hawley’s Sixth
Amendment rights were not violated, the state had no duty to produce the testimony
of the person who prepared the machine recertification form. The fact that Mr.
Hawley filed a written demand for the technician to testify is irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
We find that the machine recertification form (S-1) and the technician
qualification form (S-2) are not testimonial statements and therefore are not subject
to Confrontation Clause requirements. Thus, the trial court did not violate Mr.
Hawley’s Sixth Amendment rights by ruling the certificates could be admitted into
evidence without testimony. For this reason, we find the court of appeal erred in
applying Melendez-Diaz and vacating Mr. Hawley’s conviction. We hereby reverse
the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate defendant’s conviction.
DECREE
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
42
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325-26.
14