Opinion

Monkton Ins Services, Limited v. William Ritter

  • 768 F.3d 429
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18480
  • 2014 WL 4799716
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Sep 26, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Elrod
On the bench
Reavley, Elrod, Southwick
Cited by
285 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.3%

explaining that “a defendant does not have minimum contacts with a state when it does not have a physical presence in the state; it did not conduct business in the state; and the contract underlying the business transaction at issue in the lawsuit was not signed in the state and did not call for performance in the state”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “a defendant does not have minimum contacts with a state when it does not have a physical presence in the state; it did not conduct business in the state; and the contract underlying the business transaction at issue in the lawsuit was not signed in the state and did not call for performance in the state”
  • explaining in the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “A plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery when the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion”
  • reasoning that the defendant’s website presence merely indicated that it may have done business with the forum state rather than in the forum state and thus a finding of general jurisdiction was not supported
  • recognizing that after Goodyear and Daimler, “[i]t is ... incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 13-50941 Document: 00512783319 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 26, 2014

No. 13-50941

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

MONKTON INSURANCE SERVICES, LIMITED, Acting by its Joint Official

Liquidators, Gordon I. MacRae and Gwyn Hopkins,

Plaintiff

v.

WILLIAM G. RITTER,

Defendant–Third Party Plaintiff–

Appellant

v.

BUTTERFIELD BANK (CAYMAN) LIMITED,

Third Party Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

William G. Ritter appeals the district court’s order denying his motion

for jurisdictional discovery and granting Butterfield Bank (Cayman) Limited’s

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the following reasons,

we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Case: 13-50941 Document: 00512783319 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/26/2014

No. 13-50941

I

Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, William G. Ritter, is a

resident of Odessa, Texas, and owns Geneva Insurance SPC Ltd. (Geneva).

Geneva is incorporated and does business in the Cayman Islands. Monkton

Insurance Services, Ltd. (Monkton) is an insurance manager incorporated and

doing business in the Cayman Islands and, at all relevant times, managed

Geneva. David Keith Self was the sole director and manager of Monkton.

In March 2008, Self opened a Cayman bank account on behalf of Geneva

with Third Party Defendant-Appellee, Butterfield Bank (Cayman) Limited

(Butterfield), which is a Cayman bank organized and regulated under Cayman

law and located on the island of Grand Cayman. Pursuant to this transaction,

Self faxed several documents to Ritter, in Texas, for his signature (“the

Contracts”). In the Contracts, Self and Ritter are both identified as “Director”

of Geneva. The Contracts expressly provide that “[p]erformance [under the

account] shall be at George Town, in the island of Grand Cayman, one of the

said Cayman Islands.” They further provide that “legal relations and place of

jurisdiction between Bank and customer [Geneva] shall be governed by the

laws of the Cayman Islands.”

For the next three years, Geneva conducted business in the Cayman

Islands, including withdrawing and depositing money in the Butterfield

account. According to Ritter, Geneva sometimes received checks and wire

transfers from its customers in Texas for deposit in the Butterfield account,

and it sometimes transferred funds from its account at Butterfield to those

same clients. These transactions occurred twenty times over a three and one-

half year period. In each instance, it was Geneva—not Butterfield—that

requested the transaction. Ritter also placed eight phone calls while in Texas,

to Butterfield, to arrange wire transfers or take other actions related to

Geneva’s account. These calls were made over a total of four days during a

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No. 13-50941

three and one-half year timeframe and totaled collectively about forty-five

minutes. They were all initiated by Ritter.

During his management of Geneva, Self allegedly withdrew $435,000

from Geneva’s account with Butterfield without Ritter’s consent. When Ritter

found out, he demanded that Self repay him personally. Soon after, Monkton

officials discovered that Self had transferred money from various client

accounts to Ritter. As a result, Monkton sued Ritter in Odessa, Texas. Ritter

then filed a third-party complaint against Butterfield alleging that Butterfield

breached the Contracts with Geneva by failing to detect Self’s forged

signatures on withdrawals from Geneva’s bank account. Butterfield moved to

dismiss Ritter’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ritter then requested

a continuance in order to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The district court

denied Ritter’s request for discovery and granted Butterfield’s motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

II

Ritter appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims against

Butterfield for lack of personal jurisdiction. He argues that Butterfield

established sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for the district court to

exercise both general and specific jurisdiction over it. We review the district

court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. ITL Int’l Inc. v.

Constenla S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff has the burden

to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction is proper. Luv N’

Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006). “We must

accept the plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [his] favor all

conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other

documentation.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). To establish

that personal jurisdiction is proper, the plaintiff must show that the

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No. 13-50941

nonresident defendant “purposefully availed [itself] of the benefits and

protections of the forum state by establishing ‘minimum contacts’ with the

forum state.” Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “Sufficient minimum

contacts will give rise to either specific or general jurisdiction.” Revell, 317

F.3d at 470.

Ritter argues that Butterfield’s contacts with Texas through its website, 1

telephone conversations with Ritter, and wire transfers to Texas banks are

“continuous and systematic” enough to justify the exercise of general

jurisdiction. We disagree.

The Supreme Court recently considered the requirements to establish

general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The

Court observed that the proper consideration when determining general

jurisdiction is whether the defendant’s “‘affiliations with the State are so

continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum

State.’” Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (alteration in original). The Court held that for

a corporation, “the place of incorporation and principal place of business” are

where it is “at home” and are thus paradigm bases for jurisdiction. Id. at 760.

It is, therefore, incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum

other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business. See id.;

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411–12, 418

(1984).

1 Ritter also argues that the district court committed reversible error when it acted as

a fact finder and viewed Butterfield’s website on its own initiative. On appeal, we review the

evidence in the record under a de novo standard and do not rely on the district court’s review

of the website. The website at issue does not appear to be a proper subject for judicial notice,

and in any event, the district court did not notify the parties that it intended to take judicial

notice of the website. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(e).

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No. 13-50941

Here, Butterfield is a Cayman bank incorporated in the Cayman Islands

with its principal place of business in George Town, Grand Cayman.

Butterfield is therefore “at home” in the Cayman Islands. Daimler, 134 S. Ct.

at 760. Ritter’s attempts to show otherwise are unavailing. First, the

communications between Butterfield and Ritter and the wire transfers

Butterfield made to Texas banks were initiated by Ritter and Geneva, and thus

cannot be said to render Butterfield “at home” in Texas. See Hanson v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of those who claim

some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the

requirement of contact with the forum State.”). In addition, Ritter does not

dispute that “performance” under the Contracts, including the wire transfers,

occurred in Cayman.

Ritter points to Butterfield’s interactive website as a “continuous and

systematic” contact. However, Butterfield’s website is insufficient to establish

general jurisdiction in this case. We have used the Zippo sliding scale when a

plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction exists due to a defendant’s website.

Revell, 317 F.3d at 470 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.

Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). However, the sliding scale

[I]s not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because

even repeated contacts with forum residents by a foreign

defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous

and systematic contacts required for a finding of general

jurisdiction—in other words, while it may be doing business with

Texas, it is not doing business in Texas.

Id. at 471. In this case, at most, Butterfield’s website shows that Butterfield

conducts business with Texas, not in Texas. Id. Because Butterfield is neither

incorporated nor has its principal place of business in Texas, and because

Ritter has not pleaded facts showing that Butterfield’s contacts with Texas are

“continuous and systematic” enough to render it “at home” in Texas, general

jurisdiction is improper. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.

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No. 13-50941

Likewise, this court does not have specific jurisdiction over Butterfield.

Specific jurisdiction “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014)

(quotation marks and citations omitted). “For a State to exercise jurisdiction

consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create

a substantial connection with the forum State.” Id. This circuit applies a

three-step analysis for the specific jurisdiction inquiry:

(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the

forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities

toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the

privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the

plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the

defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.

Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted). If Ritter can successfully establish the first two prongs, then

the burden shifts to Butterfield to show that exercising jurisdiction would be

unfair or unreasonable. Id.

We have previously explained that a defendant does not have minimum

contacts with a state when it does not have a physical presence in the state; it

did not conduct business in the state; and the contract underlying the business

transaction at issue in the lawsuit was not signed in the state and did not call

for performance in the state. Id. at 272. Nor can the plaintiff’s own contacts

with the forum be used to demonstrate contacts by the defendant. See Walden,

134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the

defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts

between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.”); World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (determining that the

actions of purchasers in driving automobiles sold by the defendant into the

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No. 13-50941

forum does not create a relationship between the defendant and the forum);

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.

Ritter points to the following contacts to support specific jurisdiction: (1)

Butterfield entered into an account contract with Geneva, through its owner

and director, Ritter; (2) Self sent the account contract to Ritter in Texas; (3)

Butterfield made wire transfers between Geneva’s account in the Cayman

Islands and bank accounts in Texas; and (4) Butterfield communicated with

Ritter over the telephone. However, these facts cannot support a finding that

Butterfield has purposefully directed its activities towards Texas or

purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in Texas.

Butterfield entered into an account contract with Geneva, a Cayman

company, in Cayman, not with Ritter, a Texas resident. Even if Butterfield

had contracted with Ritter, “merely contracting with a resident of the forum

state does not establish minimum contacts.” Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO

Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2007).

The remainder of Ritter’s evidence is insufficient to create specific

jurisdiction as well. First, Self, not Butterfield, sent the Contracts to Ritter,

so Butterfield cannot be said to have sent anything to Texas. Second, the

communications between Ritter and Butterfield and the wire transfers

facilitated by Butterfield were initiated by Ritter or Geneva and are thus

insufficient to confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“[T]he

relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with

the forum state.” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475

(1985))); Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214,

222 (5th Cir. 2012). Because Butterfield has not purposefully availed itself of

the benefits and protections of Texas law through minimum contacts related

to the cause of action, exercising specific jurisdiction over Butterfield would be

improper. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122–23.

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No. 13-50941

III

Finally, Ritter challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for

jurisdictional discovery. We review a district court’s order denying a plaintiff’s

request for jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. Davila v. United

States, 713 F.3d 248, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2013). “As the party opposing dismissal

and requesting discovery, the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the

necessity of discovery.” Id. at 264. A plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional

discovery when “the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to

produce the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.” Freeman v.

United States, 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009).

The district court denied Ritter’s request to conduct jurisdictional

discovery regarding: the nature, quality, and quantity of Butterfield’s contacts

with the forum state; relevant documents and data supporting such contacts;

and Butterfield’s communications relating to information, funds, or other data

exchanged during the last five years between Butterfield and Texas. The

district court determined that it was clear that Ritter had failed to make a

prima facie showing of either specific or general jurisdiction. In addition, the

district court did not believe that the request would add any “significant facts.”

See Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th Cir. 2000).

On appeal, Ritter contends that the evidence before the district court

presented a material fact issue as to Butterfield’s contacts with Texas. Ritter

points to his communications with Butterfield, the twenty wire transfers

Butterfield made to Texas residents, and Butterfield’s website. However, as

Butterfield notes, the facts are not disputed. Here, additional discovery would

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No. 13-50941

only allow Ritter to access more information regarding Butterfield’s other

contacts with Texas. 2

Even if Ritter found further evidence that Butterfield had communicated

with other Texas residents, this would not be enough to show that Butterfield

is “at home” in Texas. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. More evidence of wire

transfers, phone calls, or other Butterfield customers with a tie to Texas will

not establish jurisdiction. Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 231. Moreover,

when questioned at oral argument, Ritter was unable to state how the

discovery he requested would change the jurisdictional determination. The

district court was well within its discretion in denying further discovery.

AFFIRMED.

2 Ritter, as owner of Geneva, would have access to all information regarding

Butterfield’s communications with him and Geneva’s clients in Texas; he would already be

aware of Butterfield’s “suit-related conduct,” which would be the formation and execution of

Geneva’s account contract.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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