Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health

2014 IL 116927

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 116927)

MARY SLEPICKA, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

HEALTH et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed September 18, 2014.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) determined that Mary

Slepicka was subject to involuntary transfer or discharge from Holy Family Villa, the

nursing home in which she resided. Slepicka sought administrative review of the

Department’s decision in the circuit court of Sangamon County. Holy Family Villa

moved to dismiss or transfer the action because it had not been filed in the proper

venue, as set forth in section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS

5/3-104 (West 2012)). The circuit court denied Holy Family Villa’s motion and

confirmed the Department’s decision.

¶2 Slepicka appealed, and Holy Family Villa argued, in part, that the appeal should be

dismissed because Slepicka’s failure to file the administrative review action in a proper

forum deprived the circuit court and the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the

Department’s decision. Finding that the circuit court had jurisdiction but that venue

was improper, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded

the cause with the direction that it be transferred to the circuit court of Cook County for

review of the Department’s decision. 2013 IL App (4th) 121103. This court allowed

Slepicka’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2013)), and

Holy Family Villa and the Department seek cross-relief (Ill. S. Ct. R. 318(a) (eff. Feb.

1, 1994)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the

cause to the appellate court for review of the Department’s decision.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Mary Slepicka is a resident of Holy Family Villa, a skilled nursing facility in Palos

Park, Illinois, which is in Cook County. On January 24, 2012, Holy Family Villa sent

Slepicka a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge based on her alleged failure to

pay for her stay at the facility. The notice advised Slepicka of her right to request a

hearing before the Department within 10 days of receiving the notice, and a timely

request for hearing was made on Slepicka’s behalf.

¶5 On May 24, 2012, an administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Department presided

over a hearing, which was conducted at Holy Family Villa. After the hearing, the

Department’s Assistant Director issued a final order approving the involuntary transfer

or discharge of Slepicka unless the sums owed by her were paid in full. 1 The final order

was mailed to the parties and their representatives from a post office in Springfield,

which is in Sangamon County.

¶6 Slepicka timely filed a complaint for administrative review of the Department’s

decision in the circuit court of Sangamon County. Holy Family Villa filed a motion to

dismiss or transfer the action, contending that Cook County was the only proper venue

under section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West

2012)). Slepicka opposed Holy Family Villa’s motion, asserting that Sangamon

County was a proper venue because the Department issued its final order from

Springfield. The circuit court ruled that Sangamon County was a proper venue and

denied Holy Family Villa’s motion, but upheld the Department’s final order allowing

the involuntary discharge.

1

The Director of the Department delegated to the Assistant Director the authority to issue a final

order in the matter. See 210 ILCS 45/1-110 (West 2012) (providing that the Director may act through a

designee); 77 Ill. Adm. Code 100.2 (2010).

-2-

¶7 Slepicka appealed. Holy Family Villa argued that the appeal should be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction because the administrative review action had been filed in an

improper venue. The appellate court held that Sangamon County was not a proper

venue under section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law, but rejected Holy

Family Villa’s argument that filing the action in an improper venue constituted a

jurisdictional defect. 2013 IL App (4th) 121103, ¶¶ 23-26, 29-31. 2 The appellate court

did not decide the merits of the appeal, but vacated the circuit court’s judgment and

remanded with directions to transfer the cause to the circuit court of Cook County for

review of the Department’s decision. Id. ¶ 42. This appeal followed.

¶8 ANALYSIS

¶9 Before this court, Slepicka challenges the appellate court’s judgment that

Sangamon County was not a proper venue in which to file her administrative review

action. Holy Family Villa seeks cross-relief, contending that the appellate court erred

in holding that the circuit court of Sangamon County had jurisdiction to review the

Department’s decision, despite the fact that venue was improper. The Department also

seeks cross-relief, arguing that the appellate court ruled correctly on the issues of venue

and jurisdiction, but erred in vacating the circuit court’s judgment and remanding with

directions that it be transferred to the circuit court of Cook County for review of the

Department’s decision.

¶ 10 Generally, we consider issues relating to jurisdiction first. In this case, the question

of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction is predicated on the assertion that venue

was improper. Accordingly, we initially consider whether Sangamon County was a

proper venue for Slepicka’s action.

2

While the appeal was pending, a third party paid the balance due for services previously rendered

to Slepicka during her stay at the facility. Holy Family Villa asserted that the appeal should be dismissed

for mootness because the basis for the notice of involuntary transfer or discharge had been resolved. The

appellate court determined the appeal was not moot because, if she prevailed, Slepicka could pursue

recovery of the amounts that had been paid under protest. 2013 IL App (4th) 121103, ¶¶ 37-40.

-3-

¶ 11 Proper Venue

¶ 12 The Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 to 3-113 (West 2012)) applies

to and governs every action for judicial review of a final administrative decision where

its provisions are expressly adopted by the statute creating or conferring power on the

agency. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2012). The Nursing Home Care Act provides that

“[a]ll final administrative decisions of the Department under this Act are subject to

judicial review under the Administrative Review Law.” 210 ILCS 45/3-320 (West

2012); see also 210 ILCS 45/3-713(a) (West 2012) (providing that actions to review

final administrative decisions after a hearing are governed by the Administrative

Review Law and must be filed within 15 days after receipt of the final agency

determination). Therefore, an action seeking judicial review of a final decision by the

Department to approve or disapprove an involuntary transfer or discharge is governed

by the Administrative Review Law.

¶ 13 As noted above, the appellate court held that venue was improper because

Sangamon County was not a permissible venue under the terms of section 3-104 of the

Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2012)). Because resolution of

this issue presents a question of law involving statutory construction, our review is

de novo. Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22.

¶ 14 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the legislature. Id. ¶ 23. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language

of the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood

meaning. Id. Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable

construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Chicago Teachers

Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15.

In determining the meaning of a statute, a court will not read language in isolation, but

must consider it in the context of the entire statute. In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d

332, 343 (2003). Clear and unambiguous language will be enforced as written. In re

Karavidas, 2013 IL 115767, ¶ 109. “ ‘Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional

possibilities but of statutory context.’ ” Italia Foods, Inc. v. Sun Tours, Inc., 2011 IL

110350, ¶ 17 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). If a statutory term

has multiple dictionary definitions, each of which would make some sense in the

statute, it is ambiguous and is open to interpretation. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235

Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2009); see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.,

503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992).

-4-

¶ 15 In addition, a court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be

remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute

one way or another. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15.

Moreover, courts will presume that the legislature did not intend to enact a statute that

leads to absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Land v. Board of Education of the City

of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002).

¶ 16 Section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law provides as follows:

Ҥ 3-104. Jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction to review final administrative

decisions is vested in the Circuit Courts, except as to a final order of the Illinois

Educational Labor Relations Board in which case jurisdiction to review a final

order is vested in the Appellate Court of a judicial district in which the Board

maintains an office. If the venue of the action to review a final administrative

decision is expressly prescribed in the particular statute under authority of

which the decision was made, such venue shall control, but if the venue is not so

prescribed, an action to review a final administrative decision may be

commenced in the Circuit Court of any county in which (1) any part of the

hearing or proceeding culminating in the decision of the administrative agency

was held, or (2) any part of the subject matter involved is situated, or (3) any

part of the transaction which gave rise to the proceedings before the agency

occurred. The court first acquiring jurisdiction of any action to review a final

administrative decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of the action until final

disposition of the action.” 735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2012).

¶ 17 The Nursing Home Care Act does not prescribe any venue for an action to review a

final decision relating to an involuntary transfer or discharge. Accordingly, the

three-part test set forth in section 3-104 governs the determination of the appropriate

venue in such actions.

¶ 18 In this case, the factors listed in the second and third prongs of that test indicate that

venue was proper in Cook County. The second prong requires consideration of the

subject matter of the administrative proceeding, which, in this case, was a proposed

involuntary transfer or discharge of Slepicka from a skilled nursing facility located in

Cook County. The third prong mandates examination of the transaction that gave rise

to the proceedings before the agency. Here, the relevant transactions consisted of

Slepicka’s contract to reside in the skilled nursing facility, her stay there, and her

failure to pay the balance due for her stay, all of which took place in Cook County.

-5-

Thus, under these two prongs, venue is proper only in Cook County, and Slepicka does

not contend otherwise.

¶ 19 In arguing that venue was proper in Sangamon County, Slepicka relies on the first

prong of section 3-104’s test, which provides that an action for administrative review

may be brought in the circuit court of any county in which “any part of the hearing or

proceeding culminating in the decision of the administrative agency was held.” Citing

to the various definitions of the word “hold” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Slepicka

claims that the appellate court erred in construing the past tense of that word.

According to Slepicka, the term “held,” as used in section 3-104, should be interpreted

as meaning “to adjudge or decide as a matter of law,” rather than “[t]o conduct or

preside at; to convoke, open, and direct the operations of.” Black’s Law Dictionary 800

(9th ed. 2009). In Slepicka’s view, since the Department’s decision emanated from

Sangamon County, venue was proper in that county. We disagree.

¶ 20 Although there are several definitions of the word “held,” only the definition

relating to “conduct[ing]” or “presid[ing] at” a hearing makes sense within the context

of section 3-104 without rendering other language in that section meaningless. The

phrase “culminating in the decision of the administrative agency” specifically refers to

the agency’s decision. If “held” is interpreted to mean “adjudged” or “decided,” as

Slepicka advocates, that would mean that the legislature referred to the agency’s

decision twice in the same sentence. We cannot perceive any rational reason why the

legislature would have done so, particularly where the repetition does not alter or

enhance the substantive meaning of the provision. The deliberate inclusion of the

“culminating” phrase necessarily reflects that the legislature intended to refer to

something other than the making of the agency’s decision when it inserted the word

“held” in the first prong of section 3-104’s test.

¶ 21 Also, to construe “held” as meaning “adjudge[d] or decide[d]” would require that

we read the word in isolation and ignore the clause that immediately precedes it,

rendering that statutory language meaningless. Such a construction directly conflicts

with the rule requiring that words in a statute be read in context, rather than in isolation,

and without rendering any of the statutory language superfluous. Chicago Teachers

Union, Local No. 1, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15; Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay,

2013 IL 114617, ¶ 26; In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d at 343. Consequently, we

conclude that the word “held,” as used in section 3-104, is not susceptible to two or

more reasonable interpretations and must be construed as relating to the conduct of the

-6-

administrative hearing or proceeding that formed the basis for the administrative

decision.

¶ 22 In a similar vein, Slepicka argues that her choice of venue was proper because the

use of the word “proceeding” in section 3-104 must include the issuance of the

administrative decision, which occurred in Sangamon County. In support, Slepicka

cites a dictionary definition of “proceeding” describing that term as being “ ‘more

comprehensive than the word “action,” [and] it may include in its general sense all the

steps taken *** in the prosecution or defense of an action, including the pleadings and

judgment.’ ” Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting Edwin E. Bryant,

The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3-4 (2d ed. 1899)). While we

agree that this description is accurate in some contexts, our task is to determine whether

the legislature intended the word “proceeding” to include the making and issuance of

the agency’s decision when it adopted the language of section 3-104. We conclude that

the legislature did not intend such a construction.

¶ 23 As explained above, if the term “proceeding” is construed to include the making

and issuance of the agency’s final administrative decision, then there is no logical

reason for the legislature’s insertion of the “culminating” phrase in the first prong of

the test. Slepicka’s interpretation renders that phrase a nullity. Since we will not read

the statute in a way that renders words or clauses meaningless, the term “proceeding”

does not relate to the making and issuance of the administrative decision. Rather, the

phrase “hearing or proceeding” refers to the substantive administrative actions on

which the administrative decision was premised.

¶ 24 When considered in context, the plain language of section 3-104 demonstrates that

neither the word “held” nor the word “proceeding” was intended to refer to the making

of the final administrative decision or to the issuance of such a decision. Consequently,

Slepicka’s assertion that venue was proper in Sangamon County is not supported by the

terms of that provision.

¶ 25 Moreover, we agree with Holy Family Villa and the Department that acceptance of

Slepicka’s position could lead to forum shopping. Under the logic advanced by

Slepicka, the arbitrary and purely ministerial act of mailing a final administrative

decision from a particular county would make that county a permissible venue, even

where it bears no relationship to the matter addressed in the administrative

proceedings. That approach runs counter to the language of section 3-104’s three-part

test, which reflects that venue is proper in a county that has a meaningful connection to

-7-

the substantive administrative proceedings on which the decision was based. We do not

believe the legislature intended such a result.

¶ 26 Lastly, Slepicka claims that Sangamon County must be a proper venue for judicial

review of administrative decisions emanating from Springfield, the seat of Illinois’s

State government, which is located in that county. To support her

“seat-of-government” argument, Slepicka relies on two cases: Webb v. White, 364 Ill.

App. 3d 650 (2006), and Hargett v. Civil Service Comm’n, 49 Ill. App. 3d 856 (1977).

That reliance, however, is misplaced. No issue as to the plaintiff’s choice of venue was

raised in either case, and neither opinion addresses the propriety of that choice. Also, as

Holy Family Villa points out and Slepicka acknowledges, the opinions in Webb and

Hargett do not indicate where the relevant administrative hearings took place. If the

hearings were conducted in Springfield, then Sangamon County was an appropriate

venue under the terms of section 3-104. Moreover, the Webb case involved an action

for administrative review under the Illinois Vehicle Code, which specifies that venue is

proper in Sangamon County. See Webb, 364 Ill. App. 3d 650; 625 ILCS 5/2-118(e)

(West 2002). Thus, neither of the cases cited by Slepicka is dispositive of the issue

presented here or aids her position.

¶ 27 In this case, the hearing on the notice of involuntary transfer or discharge was held

in Cook County, and the record does not reflect that any other part of the administrative

proceeding that formed the basis for the Department’s decision took place in

Sangamon County. Accordingly, the appellate court correctly determined that

Sangamon County was not a permissible venue for the filing of Slepicka’s

administrative review action. Having found that venue was not proper in Sangamon

County, we must decide the consequence of Slepicka’s decision to file her action

challenging the Department’s decision in that county.

¶ 28 Jurisdiction Under Section 3-104

¶ 29 Holy Family Villa argues on cross-appeal that section 3-104’s mandate that an

administrative review action be filed in a permissible venue is a jurisdictional

requirement and that the failure to do so deprives the circuit court of subject matter

jurisdiction. Holy Family Villa claims that, because Sangamon County was not a

permissible venue for Slepicka’s administrative review action, the circuit court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to address her challenge of the Department’s decision and

should have dismissed her complaint.

-8-

¶ 30 An argument challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court presents

a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v.

Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, ¶ 26; see also Board of Education of Roxana

Community School District No. 1 v. Pollution Control Board, 2013 IL 115473, ¶ 17

(addressing a question of the appellate court’s jurisdiction to review an administrative

decision on direct appeal). Also, because our resolution of this issue involves the

construction of statutory provisions, our review is de novo. Nelson, 2014 IL 116303,

¶ 22.

¶ 31 Again, we look first to the language of the relevant statutory provisions (id. ¶ 23)

and are guided by the principle that statutory language is not to be read in isolation and

should be considered in the context of the entire statute (In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill.

2d at 343). It is presumed that the legislature did not intend to enact a statute that leads

to absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Statutory language

that is clear will be given effect without resort to other aids of construction. Nelson,

2014 IL 116303, ¶ 23.

¶ 32 Under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, circuit courts are granted original jurisdiction

over all justiciable matters, except that circuit courts have the power to review final

administrative decisions only as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. The

Administrative Review Law provides that it “shall apply to and govern every action to

review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating

or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts [its] provisions.” 735

ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2012).

¶ 33 Sections 3-411 and 3-412 of the Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/3-411,

3-412 (West 2012)) authorize the Department to approve or disapprove an involuntary

transfer or discharge following a hearing requested by the resident (210 ILCS 45/3-410

(West 2012)). Section 3-320 of that statute expressly provides that “[a]ll final

administrative decisions of the Department under this Act are subject to judicial review

under the Administrative Review Law.” 210 ILCS 45/3-320 (West 2012). Therefore,

the jurisdiction to review a final administrative decision regarding an involuntary

transfer or discharge from a nursing home is governed by the Administrative Review

Law.

¶ 34 Section 3-102 of the Administrative Review Law provides that “[u]nless review is

sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided,

the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from

-9-

obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.” 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West

2012). Because a circuit court exercises special statutory jurisdiction in reviewing an

administrative decision, a party seeking such review must strictly comply with the

procedures set forth in the Administrative Review Law. Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit

Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). “If the statutorily prescribed procedures are not

strictly followed, ‘no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court.’ ” Id. (quoting

Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210

(1985).

¶ 35 Here, it is undisputed that the complaint was timely filed, the proper defendants

were named, and the summonses were properly served. See 735 ILCS 5/3-103, 3-105,

3-107 (West 2012). Holy Family Villa argues, however, that the circuit court lacked

jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision because the filing of Slepicka’s

administrative review action in an improper venue did not comply with the requirement

that such actions be brought “in the manner” prescribed in the Administrative Review

Law. In support of this argument, Holy Family Villa contends that, because circuit

courts exercise special statutory jurisdiction when reviewing administrative decisions,

the venue requirements set forth in section 3-104 are jurisdictional, and administrative

review actions may not be transferred based on improper venue. According to Holy

Family Villa, unless an administrative review action is timely filed in a permissible

venue, the action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We do not agree.

¶ 36 Section 1-108(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that the

provisions contained in article II of the Code apply to article III proceedings (governing

actions for administrative review), except as otherwise provided in article III. 735

ILCS 5/1-108(a) (West 2012); Rodriguez, 218 Ill. 2d at 354. Section 2-104(a) states

that “[n]o order or judgment is void because rendered in the wrong venue ***. No

action shall abate or be dismissed because commenced in the wrong venue if there is a

proper venue to which the cause may be transferred.” 735 ILCS 5/2-104(a) (West

2012). Section 2-106(a) provides that “[i]f a motion to transfer is allowed on the ground

that the action was commenced in a wrong venue, the cause shall be transferred to the

court in a proper venue, subject to any equitable terms and conditions that may be

prescribed.” 735 ILCS 5/2-106(a) (West 2012). These two provisions, which are

contained in article II of the Code, apply to proceedings under the Administrative

Review Law, unless that statute provides otherwise. 735 ILCS 5/1-108(a) (West 2012).

There is nothing in the Administrative Review Law that explicitly rejects the rules set

forth in sections 2-104(a) and 2-106(a). Accordingly, those provisions apply to actions

seeking review of a final administrative decision, and the filing of an action for

- 10 -

administrative review in an improper venue does not deprive the circuit court of subject

matter jurisdiction.

¶ 37 Indeed, this court recognized almost 50 years ago that administrative review

actions may be transferred based on improper venue. In Merit Chevrolet, Inc. v.

Department of Revenue, 33 Ill. 2d 207 (1965), the plaintiff car dealership filed an

action for administrative review contesting a final tax assessment for retailers’

occupation tax levied by the defendant Department of Revenue. Id. at 208. The plaintiff

filed its complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Du Page County, but

the defendant moved to transfer the cause to the circuit court of Cook County, which

was the county in which the plaintiff’s principal place of business was located and in

which venue was fixed by the governing statute. Id. at 208-09. The circuit court of

Du Page County transferred the cause to the circuit court of Cook County, which

confirmed the final tax assessment. Id. at 209. Thereafter, on the plaintiff’s motion, the

circuit court of Cook County expunged the judgment based on lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because the administrative review action had not been timely filed in the

proper venue. Id.

¶ 38 This court reversed and expressly rejected the argument that the failure to file an

administrative review action in a permissible venue deprives the circuit court of

jurisdiction. Id. at 212-13. Relying on the statutory precursors to sections 2-104(a),

2-106(a), 3-102, 3-104, and 1-108(a) (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 110, ¶¶ 8, 10, 265,

268, 277), the court held that the venue provisions in the Code are applicable to actions

for review of administrative decisions. Merit Chevrolet, 33 Ill. 2d at 211-13. The court

noted that “[j]urisdiction of the subject matter does not mean simply jurisdiction of the

particular case then occupying the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of

cases to which the particular case belongs. [Citations.]” Id. at 212. Observing that the

circuit court of Du Page County had jurisdiction to hear actions seeking administrative

review in sales tax cases, the Merit Chevrolet court concluded that the motion to

transfer to the circuit court of Cook County was properly made under the predecessors

to sections 2-104(a) and 2-106(a) of the Code. Id. at 213. The court further held that,

because the action had been commenced in a court that had jurisdiction, the subsequent

transfer of the cause did not abate the action. Id. Accordingly, the court reversed the

order of the circuit court of Cook County expunging its judgment based on lack of

jurisdiction and reinstated the judgment confirming the decision of the Department of

Revenue. Id. at 214.

- 11 -

¶ 39 Holy Family Villa’s attempt to distinguish Merit Chevrolet is unpersuasive.

Although that case involved a specific venue provision in the Retailers’ Occupation

Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 120, ¶ 451 (now codified at 35 ILCS 120/12)), this

factual difference is immaterial because section 3-104 specifically contemplates such a

circumstance. We also note that Holy Family Villa acknowledged the applicability of

sections 2-104(a) and 2-106(a) when it filed its motion requesting that Slepicka’s

action be dismissed or transferred to the circuit court of Cook County. Yet, Holy

Family Villa now argues those sections do not allow the transfer of administrative

review actions. In support of this contention, Holy Family Villa relies on the last

sentence in section 3-104, which provides that “[t]he court first acquiring jurisdiction

of any action to review a final administrative decision shall have and retain jurisdiction

of the action until final disposition of the action.” 735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2012).

According to Holy Family Villa, this sentence precludes the transfer of an

administrative review action based on improper venue. This argument is refuted by our

decision in Merit Chevrolet, which expressly held that administrative review actions

may be transferred to a proper venue, in accordance with the terms of the provisions

that are now contained in sections 2-104(a) and 2-106(a). Merit Chevrolet, 33 Ill. 2d at

212-13. 3

¶ 40 In addition, we find no support for Holy Family Villa’s contention that

administrative review actions may not be transferred based on improper venue. The

cases cited by Holy Family Villa for this proposition, In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31

(2005), and People v. Grau, 263 Ill. App. 3d 874 (1994), have no relevance here. In re

Austin W. concerned a motion to modify a dispositional order regarding the custody

and guardianship of a minor (In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 33), and Grau concerned the

criminal prosecution of traffic offenses (Grau, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 875). Neither of these

cases was brought as an administrative review action. Also, neither case involved the

question of whether a circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review an agency

decision solely because the case was brought in an improper venue, and the decisions

did not address the applicability of sections 2-104(a) and 2-106(a) of the Code to

actions for administrative review. Rather, In re Austin W. and Grau relate to a circuit

court’s authority to order a particular type of relief. These cases merely hold that a

3

We note that Slepicka and Holy Family Villa have cited appellate court opinions holding that the

last sentence in section 3-104 prohibits the transfer of an administrative review action on the basis of

forum non conveniens. See Midland Coal Co. v. Knox County, 268 Ill. App. 3d 485, 487-88 (1994);

Lefton Iron & Metal Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 799, 802-04 (1986). However,

the issue of forum non conveniens is not involved in this case, and we need not decide whether these

cases correctly ascertained the legislature’s intent in adopting section 3-104’s final sentence.

- 12 -

circuit court does not have the authority to review an administrative decision when no

complaint seeking review of such a decision is pending before the court. In re Austin

W., 214 Ill. 2d at 55-56; Grau, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 877. Although both cases observed

that an administrative review action had been brought in another county, that

circumstance was noted to highlight the fact that the action pending before the court

was not one seeking administrative review. In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 55-56; Grau,

263 Ill. App. 3d at 876, 877. In addition, though Grau makes reference to the

“subject-matter jurisdiction” of the circuit court (Grau, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 877), careful

examination of the reasoning in that case reveals that this phrase actually refers to the

court’s authority to order relief that invalidates an administrative decision, not to the

jurisdiction of the court to hear the general class of cases to which the action belonged.

Consequently, In re Austin W. and Grau provide no support for Holy Family Villa’s

argument in this case.

¶ 41 Moreover, our interpretation of the interplay between these two Code provisions

and section 3-104 of the Administrative Review Law is consistent with the

well-established common law distinction between jurisdiction and venue. “Jurisdiction

and venue are distinct legal concepts. Jurisdiction relates to the power of a court to

decide the merits of a case, while venue determines where the case is to be heard.

Statutory venue requirements are procedural only and do not have any relation to the

question of jurisdiction.” Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 328

(1977) (citing United Biscuit Co. of America v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 407 Ill. 488

(1950)); see also Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 40

(1990). It must be presumed that the legislature was aware of this generally accepted

principle when the Administrative Review Law was enacted in 1945. See 67 C.J.

Venue § 1, at 11 (1934) (observing that “[t]he distinction between ‘jurisdiction’ and

‘venue’ has been said to be plainly established and has frequently been recognized”).

¶ 42 Also, the plain language of section 3-104 incorporates this long-standing

distinction by treating the two concepts separately. The first sentence of section 3-104

deals solely with jurisdiction and vests jurisdiction to review administrative decisions

in the circuit courts—referenced in the plural and without any specific geographic

designation—with the exception of final decisions by the Educational Labor Relations

Board, which are reviewed in the appellate court of the judicial district in which the

Board maintains an office. 735 ILCS 5/3-104 (West 2012). The second and third

sentences address venue exclusively by stating that any specification of venue in the

governing statute will control, but, in the absence of such a specification, the three-part

test discussed above is to be applied in determining proper venue. Id. Section 3-104

- 13 -

addresses jurisdiction and venue separately, demonstrating the legislature’s

recognition of the distinction between these two concepts.

¶ 43 For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a circuit court is not deprived of

jurisdiction to review an administrative decision because the action was filed in an

improper venue.

¶ 44 The Proper Relief

¶ 45 Finally, we address the Department’s request for cross-relief. According to the

Department, the appellate court erred in vacating the circuit court’s judgment and

remanding the cause with directions to transfer the cause to the circuit court of Cook

County for review of the Department’s decision. We agree.

¶ 46 Because the circuit court of Sangamon County had jurisdiction to review the

Department’s decision, the judgment confirming the Department’s decision was valid

and subject to appeal as a matter of right. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (providing

that final judgments may be appealed as a matter of right from the circuit court to the

appellate court); Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) (“Every final judgment of a circuit

court in a civil case is appealable as of right.”). As set forth above, section 2-104(a) of

the Code provides that “[n]o order or judgment is void because rendered in the wrong

venue.” 735 ILCS 5/2-104(a) (West 2012). Pursuant to this provision, the judgment of

the circuit court of Sangamon County was not rendered void merely because the action

was filed in an improper venue. In light of this circumstance, the appellate court should

have considered the merits of Slepicka’s appeal challenging the Department’s decision.

¶ 47 CONCLUSION

¶ 48 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the appellate court correctly held

that Sangamon County was not a permissible venue for Slepicka’s administrative

review action, but that circumstance did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to

review the Department’s decision. We also find that it would be a waste of resources

for both the judiciary and the parties to require the circuit court of Cook County to

review the Department’s decision again. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the

appellate court’s judgment that vacated the circuit court’s decision and remanded with

directions that the cause be transferred, and we remand the cause to the Appellate

- 14 -

Court, First District, with the direction to review the Department’s decision on the

merits.

¶ 49 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 50 Cause remanded with directions.

- 15 -