State of Arizona v. Ronnie Roy Vera

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

v.

RONNIE ROY VERA,

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0154-PR

Filed September 16, 2014

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. CR51483

The Honorable Kyle A. Bryson, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney

By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson

Counsel for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

Arizona Justice Project

By Natman Schaye, Tucson

Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

OPINION

Presiding Judge Kelly authored the opinion of this Court, in which

Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Howard concurred.

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

K E L L Y, Presiding Judge:

¶1 The state seeks review of the trial court’s January 2014

ruling granting relief on Ronnie Vera’s petition for post-conviction

relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Vera has filed a

cross-petition and maintains the court abused its discretion in

denying his request for immediate release from prison. We grant

review and, for the following reasons, we grant relief to the state

and vacate the court’s order directing that Vera be resentenced.

Specifically, we conclude legislation enacted after the court’s ruling

now provides Vera an adequate remedy for his claim. We deny

Vera’s cross-petition as moot in light of this resolution.

Background

¶2 Vera was convicted of first-degree murder and two

counts of first-degree burglary, committed in October 1995, and

sentenced to “life without parole for twenty-five (25) years” for the

murder and concurrent terms for the burglaries. In affirming his

convictions and sentences on appeal, we described the facts as

follows:

Sixteen-year-old Vera and his friend, Greg

Valencia, were on foot in a condominium

complex. Vera stole a bicycle from inside

the walled patio of a condominium . . . .

Later, at about 10:30 p.m., he was riding the

stolen bicycle when Valencia entered

another walled patio in the same complex

to steal a second bicycle . . . . The victim

and his wife heard what sounded like their

patio gate rattling, and the victim went

outside to investigate. The victim

confronted the two youths in a common

area outside the victim’s patio and

attempted to restrain them. Vera threw the

first bicycle at the victim and ran; Valencia

then drew a handgun and shot the victim

once, fatally. After a transfer hearing in

2

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

juvenile court, Vera was tried as an adult.

The state prosecuted him for first-degree

murder on a felony murder theory, with a

predicate felony of burglary.

State v. Vera, Nos. 2 CA-CR 96-0657, 2 CA-CR 98-0544-PR

(consolidated) (memorandum decision filed Aug. 31, 2000).

¶3 In his Rule 32 petition below, Vera argued that Miller v.

Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), was a significant change

in the law that entitled him to relief, see Rule 32.1(g), Ariz. R.

Crim. P., and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment

under the rule announced in that case. In Miller, the Supreme Court

held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that

mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile

offenders.” ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The trial court agreed,

concluding Miller applied retroactively to Vera’s case and writing

that it could not “find that the possibility of commutation or pardon

is equivalent to parole.” The court explained, “[A]lthough the

sentencing court exercised some discretion to decide whether to

sentence petitioner to natural life without possibility of release or life

without possibility of release for 25 years, the abolition of parole by

the legislature essentially made the life sentence [without parole]

mandatory.” The court concluded Vera’s sentence violated the

Eighth Amendment under the rule announced in Miller, granted his

petition for post-conviction relief, and scheduled the case for

resentencing.

¶4 On April 1, 2014, the trial court denied a motion for

rehearing in which the state had argued Miller did not apply

retroactively to Vera’s sentence; the state then had thirty days to

petition this court for review of the court’s rulings, see Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.9(a), (c), and the court granted a motion to stay Vera’s

resentencing pending our review. Later that month, the Arizona

legislature passed H.B. 2593 and thereby enacted A.R.S. § 13-716,

which appears to provide parole eligibility for Vera and other

similarly sentenced juvenile offenders after their mandatory

minimum terms have been served. 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 156,

§ 2. Section 13-716 is effective as of July 24, 2014. See True v. Stewart,

199 Ariz. 396, n.1, 18 P.3d 707, 708 n.1 (2001).

3

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

¶5 On April 23, the state asked the trial court to lift the stay

and reconsider its ruling in light of the new law, and, on May 1, the

state filed its petition for review in this court. The court denied the

motion to reconsider, concluding it lacked jurisdiction “to take any

action except that in furtherance” of this court’s review.

Discussion

¶6 On review, the state argues Vera’s claim is defeated by

the legislature’s recent enactment of § 13-716, which provides,

Notwithstanding any other law, a person

who is sentenced to life imprisonment with

the possibility of release after serving a

minimum number of calendar years for an

offense that was committed before the

person attained eighteen years of age is

eligible for parole on completion of service

of the minimum sentence, regardless of

whether the offense was committed on or

after January 1, 1994. If granted parole, the

person shall remain on parole for the

remainder of the person’s life except that

the person’s parole may be revoked

pursuant to § 31-415.1

In the alternative, the state maintains Miller does not apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review; that Arizona law, even

before the enactment of § 13-716, did not violate the rule in Miller;

and that Vera’s claim is not ripe for review.

¶7 Vera argues the trial court correctly found Miller

applied retroactively and entitled him to relief. Relying on State v.

1The legislature also amended A.R.S. § 41-1604.09, which

governs parole eligibility certification, to provide that section applies

not only to prisoners whose offenses were committed before January

1, 1994, but also to “[a] person who is sentenced to life imprisonment

and who is eligible for parole pursuant to section 13-716.” 2014

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 156, § 3.

4

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

Brita, 158 Ariz. 121, 124, 761 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1988) and Burns v.

Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 40, 993 P.2d 1119, 1129 (App. 1999), he argues

it is “‘highly undesirable’” for this court “to address issues not

decided below,” such as the effect of § 13-716 on his claim. He also

argues the recent legislation may not be applied retroactively and, in

any event, provides an insufficient remedy for his Miller claim.

Consideration of § 13-716 on Review

¶8 Vera is correct that we ordinarily do not consider issues

on review that have not been considered and decided by the trial

court; this is particularly true when we are reviewing a court’s

decision to grant or deny post-conviction relief under Rule 32. See

State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (App. 1980)

(appellate court does not consider issues raised for first time in

petition for review); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii) (petition

for review “shall contain . . . issues which were decided by the trial

court and which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate

court for review”).

¶9 In the context of direct appeals, we have recognized the

rule that “an appealing party may not urge as grounds for reversal a

theory which he failed to present below” as one of procedure, not

jurisdiction. Stokes v. Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592, 694 P.2d 1204, 1206

(App. 1984). We may suspend the rule in our discretion when “‘the

facts are fully developed, undisputed, and the issue can be resolved

as a matter of law’ or when the question is one of statewide public

importance.” Sw. Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Nowak, 234 Ariz. 387, n.7,

322 P.3d 204, 210 n.7 (App. 2014), quoting State ex rel. Horne v.

Campos, 226 Ariz. 424, n.5, 250 P.3d 201, 205 n.5 (App. 2011).

¶10 We find these authorities persuasive. Our decision to

consider the recent legislation also is influenced by the unusual

circumstances in this case. First, there has been no waiver by the

state; § 13-716 was not enacted until after the state had filed its

motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 32.9. Nonetheless, the trial

court properly denied the state’s subsequent motion for

reconsideration; Rule 32.9 provides only for a motion for rehearing,

and does not authorize a motion for reconsideration filed after a

request for rehearing has been denied. In addition, this petition for

5

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

review has been filed by the state, which has no opportunity to seek

relief under Rule 32 and has limited opportunity for review of the

trial court’s decision.2

¶11 In addition, the effect of § 13-716 is a question “of

substantive law,” and “the parties may present the issue as

thoroughly in the appellate court as it could have been presented

below, without injury to either one.” Town of S. Tucson v. Bd. of

Supervisors, 52 Ariz. 575, 583, 84 P.2d 581, 584 (1938). The parties

have done so here. And, because our eventual review of a trial

court’s ruling on the issue would be de novo, see State v. Decenzo, 199

Ariz. 355, ¶ 2, 18 P.3d 149, 150 (App. 2001), our consideration now

“impels the speedy enforcement of a right, or redress of a wrong,

and, as a correct exposition of the law, is appropriate to the facts

involved,” Rubens v. Costello, 75 Ariz. 5, 9, 251 P.2d 306, 308 (1952).

Miller Claim

¶12 In concluding that a state could not, consistent with the

Eighth Amendment, mandate a life sentence without parole for a

juvenile homicide offender, the Supreme Court in Miller relied on

past decisions in which it concluded the Eighth Amendment

prohibited the death penalty for offenders who had been under the

age of eighteen when their crimes were committed, Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), and also prohibited a sentence of

life without parole for a juvenile offender who had committed a

non-homicide offense, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). The

Court reasoned that because “juveniles have diminished culpability

and greater prospects for reform,” they “are constitutionally

different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, ___ U.S. at

___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“juveniles have

2For example, we might decline to consider a Rule 32

petitioner’s request for review and relief based on recent legislation

that had not been available for the trial court’s consideration,

knowing that the petitioner could initiate a subsequent Rule 32

proceeding alleging a non-precluded claim based on a significant

change in the law. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). The state has no

such opportunity.

6

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

lessened culpability [and therefore] are less deserving of the most

severe punishments”).

¶13 In Graham, the Court had held that, although “[a] State

is not required to guarantee eventual freedom” for juvenile non-

homicide offenders sentenced to life in prison, it must provide

“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 70, 75

(finding “remote possibility” of executive clemency insufficient to

“mitigate the harshness of the sentence”); accord Miller, ___ U.S. at

___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (addressing sentencing option required for

juvenile homicide offenders). The Court in Miller stated Graham had

“suggested a distinctive set of legal rules” for sentencing juvenile

offenders to life imprisonment without parole, “[i]n part because we

viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death

penalty.” Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, citing Graham, 560

U.S. at 60-61, 69-71.

¶14 Accordingly, the Court also relied on its past rulings

“demanding individualized sentencing when imposing the death

penalty” and its particular insistence “that a sentencer have the

ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth.’” Miller, ___

U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,

367 (1993). Although the Court did not “foreclose a sentencer’s

ability” to impose, under state law, a life sentence without parole for

a particular juvenile homicide offender, it held laws in Alabama and

Arkansas mandating such sentences violated the Eighth

Amendment because, “by their nature,” they “preclude a sentencer

from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of

characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at ___, ___, 132

S. Ct. at 2467, 2469. The Court concluded the “risk of

disproportionate punishment” required a sentencing court to “take

into account how children are different, and how those differences

counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”

Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

¶15 When Vera committed his offenses in October 1995,

Arizona law provided that a person convicted of first-degree murder

“shall suffer death or imprisonment in the custody of the state

department of corrections for life.” See former A.R.S. § 13-703(A),

7

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 153, § 1.3 But the statute provided for two

types of life sentences, “natural life” and “life.” Id. Specifically, a

sentencing court could “order that the defendant not be released on

any basis for the remainder of the defendant’s natural life,” and a

natural life sentence was “not subject to commutation or parole,

work furlough or work release.” Id. As an alternative, the statute

provided, “If the court does not sentence the defendant to natural

life, the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the

completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years . . . .” Id.

¶16 The statute also included a defendant’s age among the

mitigating circumstances a court must consider “[i]n determining

whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment.” § 13-

703(E). And, in Vera’s case, the trial court stated at sentencing that it

was imposing the “lesser sentence” of “life without parole for 25

calend[a]r years” based on the mitigating factors of Vera’s age and

his “somewhat lesser role” in the circumstances that caused the

victim’s death.

¶17 On its face, the Arizona statute did not mandate a life

sentence without parole, but provided a lesser alternative that

resembled “life with the possibility of parole” and allowed a

sentencer to “tak[e] account of an offender’s age” as a reason to

impose that lesser term. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. at

2460, 2467. Nonetheless, the trial court’s observations about Vera’s

sentence were correct at the time of its ruling granting post-

conviction relief: Because the Arizona legislature had eliminated

parole for all offenders who committed offenses after January 1,

1994, and replaced it with a system of “earned release credits,” see

3Section 13-703 was amended multiple times after 1993. See

1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 104, § 1; 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 260, § 1;

2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws 5th Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 1; 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws,

ch. 255, § 1; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 166, § 2; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws,

ch. 188, § 3; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 325, § 2. In 2008, it was

renumbered A.R.S. § 13-751, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 301, §§ 26, 38,

and § 13-751 was again amended in 2012, 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch.

207, § 2. None of these subsequent amendments affect our analysis

of the relevant provisions.

8

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 86—which has no ready application

to an indeterminate life sentence—Vera’s “only possibilities for

release . . . would be through a pardon or commutation by the

governor,” see generally, A.R.S. § 31-402(C)(4).4 Thus, Vera has

argued, and the court agreed, that in Arizona, a sentence of life

imprisonment without parole was, in effect, mandatory, in violation

of the rule announced in Miller.

¶18 The Arizona Legislature’s recent enactment of § 13-716

appears to provide a juvenile sentenced to a twenty-five year to life

term with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.

Because we conclude § 13-716 provides an adequate remedy for

Vera’s Miller claim, we need not consider whether, before that

statute was enacted, Arizona law was consistent with the rule

announced in Miller, or whether Miller applies retroactively to cases

on collateral review. We will, however, address Vera’s arguments

that § 13-716 may not be applied retroactively to his sentence and

provides an insufficient remedy for his claim.

Section 13-716 Not Retroactive

¶19 Vera contends the application of § 13-716 to his sentence

would be “retroactive,” in violation of A.R.S. § 1-2445 and “the

separation of powers established by Article 3 of the Arizona

Constitution.” As an initial matter, we agree with the state that

4“[T]he board of executive clemency . . . . [s]hall receive

petitions from individuals, organizations or the department [of

corrections] for review and commutation of sentences and

pardoning of offenders in extraordinary cases and may make

recommendations to the governor.” § 31-402(C)(4). “[T]he governor

retains ultimate authority to grant or deny a recommended

commutation.” McDonald v. Thomas, 202 Ariz. 35, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 819,

824 (2002); see also Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195 Ariz. 432, ¶ 24, 990

P.2d 26, 33 (App. 1999) (under present law, “an Arizona governor’s

discretion to act on the Board’s recommendations remains

unfettered, subjective, arbitrary, and a matter of grace”).

5“No statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein.”

9

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

§ 13-716 is not a “retroactive” statute. “The fact that [a statute] may

in application relate to antecedent events does not make it

retroactive in application.” Tyree v. Moran, 113 Ariz. 275, 277, 550

P.2d 1076, 1078 (1976).

¶20 In Tyree, an inmate sought the “temporar[y] release[]”

afforded by an amended parole statute that did not take effect until

after he had been sentenced. Id. at 276-77, 550 P.2d at 1077-78. In

rejecting the argument that the amendment applied only to inmates

sentenced after its effective date, the court reasoned, “The

amendment is remedial in nature, and such statutes do not normally

come within the rule against retrospective operation.” Id. In

addition, the court observed the amendment “[did] not alter the

penalty which was attached to any offense, nor create a new penalty,

nor change the sentence imposed” and concluded it “was meant to

be effective as to all prisoners irrespective of the date of imposition

of sentence.” Id.

¶21 Similarly, § 13-716 does not alter Vera’s penalty, create

an additional penalty, or change the sentence imposed. As this court

has explained,

Courts have power to impose sentences

only as authorized by statute and within

the limits set down by the legislature.

Whether or not a prisoner is eligible for

release on parole or absolute discharge is

not for courts to decide—it is within the

control of the board of [executive

clemency] . . . or the department of

corrections.

State v. Harris, 133 Ariz. 30, 31, 648 P.2d 145, 146 (App. 1982) (citation

omitted). Section 13-716 affects only the implementation of Vera’s

sentence by establishing his eligibility for parole after he has served

10

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

the minimum term of twenty-five years. It is a remedial statute that

affects future events; it is not a “retroactive” statute.6

¶22 Neither are we persuaded by Vera’s argument that § 13-

716 impermissibly infringes on the role of the judiciary. Vera relies

on State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 982 P.2d 1287 (1999), for the

proposition that the legislature may not “‘change the legal

consequence of events completed before [a] statute’s enactment,’”

because “[t]he substantive legal consequence of past events is

determined by the law in effect at the time of the event, and the

determination of that law is for the courts to decide.” Id. ¶ 6, quoting

San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, ¶ 16, 972 P.2d

179, 189 (1999) (alteration in Murray). But our supreme court has

limited this statement, explaining that Murray involved “a statute

retroactively restricting a defendant’s vested right to parole

eligibility.” State v. Montes, 226 Ariz. 194, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d 879, 882

(2011). The court observed, “In holding that the statute violated

separation of powers, we noted that parole eligibility on sentencing

is a ‘substantive right’ and the Legislature ‘may not disturb vested

substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to

completed events.’” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13 (legislature “does not violate

separation of powers when it acts to make a law retroactive without

disturbing vested rights, overruling a court decision, or precluding

judicial decision-making”), quoting Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, ¶ 6, 982

P.2d at 1289. In contrast to the statute at issue in Murray, § 13-716

does not impair vested rights. Rather, it affords an additional

opportunity for release for juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment,

available only after their mandatory minimum terms have been

served.7

6Accordingly, although we agree that Vera’s “constitutional

claim is moot” as a result of § 13-716, State v. Randles, 693 Ariz. Adv.

Rep. 3, ¶ 10 (Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2014), we do not agree with that

court’s conclusion that the statute “applies retroactively,” and we

see no need to “modify [a defendant’s] sentence in accordance with”

§ 13-716, as the court did in that case, id.

7Conversely, Vera’s concern “that any remedy provided by

the legislature may be quickly modified or withdrawn” appears to

11

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

Individualized Sentencing Requirement

¶23 Relying on People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014),

Vera also argues the enactment of § 13-716 “does not remedy the

unconstitutional life sentence the judge was required to impose,”

because “Miller made clear that judges must have discretion at

sentencing.” In Gutierrez, the California Supreme Court concluded

that recent legislation had failed to remedy the imposition of

presumptive life sentences without parole for juvenile homicide

offenders. Id. at 266-67. The legislation permitted such offenders to

petition for resentencing after serving fifteen, twenty, or twenty-four

years in prison. Id. Noting the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Miller

on individualized sentencing, the court concluded this was

insufficient to remedy a sentencing court’s “underlying judgment of

the offender’s incorrigibility ‘at the outset,’” and remanded the cases

for resentencing. Id. at 267, 270, quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.

¶24 But in this case, the trial court exercised discretion,

consistent with Miller, in considering whether to impose a sentence

of natural life or the “lesser sentence” of life without release for

twenty-five years. It expressly considered Vera’s age as a mitigating

factor when it imposed “the lesser sentence” available. And, in

imposing a sentence of “life without parole for twenty-five (25)

years,” the court clearly believed this alternative sentence would

provide Vera with a meaningful opportunity of release, telling Vera,

Your life is not over. What you do with the

rest of it is up to you on a daily basis. You

can between now and the time you get out

of prison, and one day you will, you can

educate yourself and you can be become a

spokesperson so that perhaps your

influence will prevent some other young

person from dropping out of school and

becoming involved in a situation where

be foreclosed by Murray, at least to the extent such future legislation

would impair substantive rights now afforded by § 13-716. See

Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, ¶ 6, 982 P.2d at 1289.

12

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

guns are used by people who are utterly

clueless about the consequences.

Nonetheless, Vera is correct that, when his sentence was imposed,

the court had been mistaken about the availability of parole or other

systematic release and that, in fact, his “only possibility of release

after 25 years [would have been] through a pardon or commutation

by the governor.” See A.R.S. §§ 31-402(C), 31-443.8

¶25 We conclude the sentencing court’s misunderstanding

about the law did not affect its exercise of discretion in considering

and imposing what it believed to be a meaningfully lesser term of

imprisonment, based “fundamentally” on Vera’s age. See Harris, 133

Ariz. at 31, 648 P.2d at 146 (prisoner’s eligibility for release “is not

for courts to decide” at sentencing).

¶26 We cannot agree that Arizona’s sentencing statute

violated the rule in Miller by “preclud[ing] a sentencer from taking

account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and

circumstances attendant to it.” Miller, ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 132 S. Ct.

at 2467, 2469. To the contrary, at all times relevant to this decision,

the sentencing statute has provided what appears to be a lesser

alternative to a sentence of “natural life,” which renders a defendant

ineligibile “for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or

release from confinement on any basis.” § 13-751(A); see also 1993

Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 153, § 1. Thus, when the Court in Miller

counted Arizona among “the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without

parole for children,” it did not refer to the sentencing statute alone,

but considered it in the context of the release statute that eliminated

parole for offenses committed after 1994. Miller, ___ U.S. at ___ &

8As one court observed, in addressing the application of

earned release credits under the “‘old code’” as it existed in 1974, “it

is impossible to deduct time from an indeterminate denominate—a

person’s life.” Escalanti v. Dep’t of Corr., 174 Ariz. 526, 528, 851 P.2d

151, 153 (App. 1993) (“as a practical matter,” parole-eligible prisoner

sentenced to twenty-five years to life “will not receive any reduction

in his sentence because of any statutory credits”).

13

STATE v. VERA

Opinion of the Court

n.13, 132 S. Ct. at 2473 & n.13, citing A.R.S. §§ 13-752 and 41-

1604.09(I).

¶27 The Arizona legislature has now remedied that

circumstance. By enacting § 13-716, it has provided Vera and

similarly situated prisoners an opportunity for parole, consistent

with the “meaningful opportunity” for release contemplated by

Miller and Graham. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.

Disposition

¶28 For the foregoing reasons, we grant relief on the State’s

petition for review, and deny as moot Vera’s cross-petition for

review seeking immediate release. We vacate the trial court’s order

granting Vera relief and directing that he be resentenced.

14