Singletary v. District of Columbia

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 7, 2014 Decided September 12, 2014

No. 12-7077

CHARLES SINGLETARY,

APPELLEE

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00752)

Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for appellant. On the briefs were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Donna

Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General at the time the brief was

filed, and Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Stephen C. Leckar argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief were Neal Goldfarb, Steven R. Kiersh, and

Edward C. Sussman.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia

Board of Parole revoked plaintiff Charles Singletary’s parole

based primarily on unreliable multiple-hearsay testimony.

This court later determined that the evidentiary basis for his

parole revocation failed to satisfy the requirements of the Due

Process Clause. Singletary then sued the District under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District bore responsibility

for the Board’s unconstitutional revocation decision. The

district court found the District liable, and a jury awarded $2.3

million in damages for the period of Singletary’s confinement

following the revocation of his parole.

The District now appeals. The District argues that, under

the standards for municipal liability set forth in Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), it cannot

be held responsible for the Board’s revocation decision. The

District points out that it had no general policy or custom of

basing parole-revocation decisions on evidence falling below

the constitutional threshold for reliability. The District also

denies that the Board’s action in this case was that of a final

policymaker in the area of parole revocation. We agree with

the District that the Board’s action cannot be attributed to the

District in the circumstances presented here. We therefore

vacate the judgment of the district court.

I.

A.

In the early 1980s, Charles Singletary was convicted of

armed robbery and assault. See Singletary v. District of

Columbia (Singletary I), 685 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C.

2010). He received a sentence of nine to twenty-seven years

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of imprisonment. In 1990, after serving more than seven

years of his sentence, Singletary was released on parole. Id.

In June 1995, he was arrested in connection with the murder

of Leroy Houtman. See Singletary v. District of Columbia

(Singletary II), 800 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C. 2011). The

prosecution dismissed the case at the preliminary hearing, and

Singletary was released. Id.; Singletary v. Reilly (Singletary-

habeas), 452 F.3d 868, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Although Singletary was never indicted in connection

with the Houtman murder, the D.C. Board of Parole held a

hearing a year later to consider revoking his parole based on

his alleged participation in the crime. Singletary-habeas, 452

F.3d at 869. Singletary denied the charges against him. See

id. As far as the available record shows, see id., the Board

heard testimony from a prosecutor and a police detective

involved with the criminal investigation—neither of whom

had first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts. See Singletary

II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 60. The prosecutor and the detective

recounted statements made by two other witnesses, who were

never identified during the hearing. See Singletary-habeas,

452 F.3d at 869-70. The unnamed witnesses themselves had

no first-hand knowledge of the murder, but instead had

reported conversations with a third witness that implicated

Singletary. Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 60. In August

1996, based primarily on that multiple-hearsay testimony, the

Board revoked Singletary’s parole. Singletary-habeas, 452

F.3d at 871.

Singletary subsequently sought habeas relief, filing his

first application in 1997. The D.C. Superior Court denied his

claims, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. See

Singletary v. Quick, No. 97-SP-1984 (D.C. July 24, 1998)

(unpublished order). After he filed a second application in

2000, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the Superior

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Court’s denial. See Singletary v. D.C. Bd. of Parole, 794

A.2d 56 (D.C. 2001) (unpublished table decision). Singletary

next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia. See Singletary v. D.C. Bd.

of Parole, No. CIV A 00–1263 RBW, 2003 WL 25258497

(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2003). The district court denied the petition,

finding that the hearsay evidence presented at the revocation

hearing was sufficiently reliable. See id. at *3-5. Around that

time, the D.C. Board of Parole was abolished and replaced by

the United States Parole Commission, which was substituted

as a defendant on appeal. See id. at *1 n.1; Singletary-

habeas, 452 F.3d at 871 n.4.

This court then reversed and granted the habeas petition.

See Singletary-habeas, 452 F.3d at 871-75. We noted that the

Due Process Clause requires a hearing prior to parole

revocation (although the hearing need not contain the full

safeguards of a criminal trial). See id. at 871-72 (citing

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1972)). While

there is no “per se” prohibition against relying on hearsay in

revocation proceedings, “the burden [is] on the ‘parole

authorities to ensure, before relying on hearsay, that there are

sufficient indicia of reliability under the circumstances at

hand to protect the prisoner’s due process rights.’” Id. at 872

(quoting Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 128-29 (D.C.

Cir. 2003)). After examining the “shoddy” record at

Singletary’s hearing, id. at 869, we found that “the hearsay

presented . . . was not demonstrated to be reliable and that the

Board’s decision to revoke Singletary’s parole was therefore

‘totally lacking in evidentiary support.’” Id. at 873 (quoting

Crawford, 323 F.3d at 129). As a result, the proceedings

failed to “ensure fundamental due process rights.” Id. at 874

(quoting Crawford, 323 F.3d at 128) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We remanded for Singletary to receive a new

revocation hearing. Id. at 875.

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The U.S. Parole Commission held a new hearing in

October 2006. The Commission determined that there was

insufficient evidence to support finding a parole violation.

See Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 61. The Commission

therefore reinstated Singletary to supervised release. Id.

B.

In 2009, Singletary sued the District of Columbia in

federal district court, seeking monetary damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 62. The complaint alleged that the

District had “revoked [Singletary’s] parole, and imprisoned

him for ten years, based on unreliable multiple hearsay, in

violation of Singletary’s Fifth Amendment right to due

process.” J.A. 13. The District moved to dismiss the suit,

contending that it could not be held responsible for the

Board’s revocation decision. Denying the motion, the district

court held that Singletary had adequately pled municipal

liability under § 1983 based on a theory that “the decision to

revoke his parole was made by the ‘final municipal

decisionmaker and is therefore properly attributable to the

municipality.’” Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 83, 90

(quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407

(1997)) (alterations omitted).

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district

court granted partial summary judgment to Singletary on the

question of liability. See Singletary II, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 59.

In the district court’s view, this court’s habeas opinion had

already established that the Board violated Singletary’s due

process rights when it revoked his parole. See id. at 60-61, 63

(citing Singletary-habeas, 452 F.3d at 868). The district court

further held that the District was liable under § 1983 for the

Board’s unconstitutional revocation decision because the

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“Board was the final policymaker for the District on matters

of parole revocation” under D.C. law. Id. at 64. As a result,

municipal liability could be imposed on the District for the

Board’s unconstitutional decision. See id. at 67-74 (citing

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).

After a trial on damages, the jury awarded Singletary

$2.3 million for his ten years of confinement. See Singletary

v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108 (D.D.C.

2012). The district court denied the District’s request for a

new trial. See id. at 122. The District now appeals the

judgment against it.

II.

As a threshold matter, the District contends that the

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Singletary’s case due

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We conclude that the

present suit is not within Rooker-Feldman’s “limited grasp.”

Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the

only two cases in which the Supreme Court has applied it:

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462 (1983). See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). In both cases, the “losing

party in state court filed suit in a U.S. District Court after the

state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by

the state-court judgment.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297

(footnote omitted). In both cases, the plaintiff in the federal

suit “asked the District Court” to “review” and “overturn the

injurious state-court judgment.” Id. And in both cases, the

Supreme Court held that the district court “lacked subject-

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matter jurisdiction over such claims, for 28 U.S.C. § 1257

‘vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in

[the Supreme Court].’” Id. (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292).

In the decades following the 1983 Feldman decision,

some courts construed Rooker and Feldman “to extend far

beyond the contours” of the two cases. Exxon, 544 U.S. at

283. The Supreme Court firmly ended this practice in its

2005 Exxon decision. Emphasizing the “narrow ground”

occupied by the doctrine, the Court explained that Rooker-

Feldman is “confined to cases of the kind from which [it]

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . .

and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Id. at 284. Put another way, the “doctrine

merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original

jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise

appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which

Congress has reserved to this Court, see [28 U.S.C.]

§ 1257(a).” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S.

635, 644 n.3 (2002). The doctrine otherwise has no effect on

overlapping state and federal litigation, and it does not

“override or supplant” other principles—like preclusion and

abstention—that govern in such circumstances. See Exxon,

544 U.S. at 284, 292-93; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.

459, 466 (2006) (per curiam) (“Rooker–Feldman is not

simply preclusion by another name.”).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon exhibits the

limited office of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The parties in

Exxon litigated claims in federal court that they had already

litigated to a judgment in state court. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at

289-90. Unlike the plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman, who

asked the federal court to “overturn” the “injurious state-court

judgment[s]” themselves, the Exxon plaintiff did not seek to

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“undo” the state-court judgment. Id. at 292-93. Instead, the

plaintiff simply pursued parallel state and federal litigation of

the same claims. Rooker-Feldman thus posed no obstacle to

federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 293-94. The

Court reaffirmed that understanding on similar facts in

Skinner, where the plaintiff again did “not challenge the

adverse [state-court] decisions themselves.” 131 S. Ct. at

1298.

Singletary’s litigation likewise “encounters no Rooker-

Feldman shoal.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297. As in Exxon

and Skinner, Singletary’s suit does not seek to “review” or

“undo” any D.C.-court decision. Rather, his § 1983 claim

seeks review of a decision made by the Board of Parole—“an

executive entity,” not a court. Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at

92. Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial review of

executive action, including determinations made by a state

administrative agency.” Verizon Md., 535 U.S. at 644 n.3.

The fact that the D.C. courts have ruled on habeas petitions

related to (but ultimately different than) Singletary’s current

§ 1983 claim is of no consequence for jurisdictional purposes.

“‘If a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim,’ it is not

an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the

‘same or a related question’ was earlier aired between the

parties in state court.” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1297 (quoting

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted); see Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747-

48 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Preclusion,” not Rooker-Feldman,

“applies when a federal plaintiff complains of an injury that

was not caused by the state court, but which the state court

has previously failed to rectify.”). And while the District now

urges us (in a footnote) to apply issue preclusion to the D.C.

courts’ habeas decisions upholding the constitutionality of

Singletary’s parole revocation, the District forfeited any issue-

preclusion argument by failing to raise it before the district

9

court. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d

1174, 1176 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

We conclude, in short, that Rooker-Feldman posed no bar

to the district court’s jurisdiction over Singletary’s § 1983

claim.

III.

On the merits, the District challenges the district court’s

grant of partial summary judgment to Singletary on the

question whether the Board’s revocation decision is

attributable to the District. Reviewing the issue de novo, see

Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2009), we

hold that the District is not liable under § 1983 for the Board’s

decision.

Although a municipality is a “person” subject to suit

under § 1983 for constitutional violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

it “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, it is only “when execution

of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that

the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.

at 694; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385

(1989). Consequently, the court must determine whether “a

policy or custom of the District of Columbia caused the

constitutional violation alleged.” Baker v. District of

Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Harris, 489 U.S. at 389). Our

decisions have identified various “ways in which a ‘policy’

can be set by a municipality to cause it to be liable under

§ 1983.” Id.; see Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d

1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Warren v. District of Columbia,

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353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). None of those ways is

demonstrated here.

Singletary does not allege that the District had any formal

policy of revoking parole based on unreliable hearsay or other

evidence falling below the requirements of the Due Process

Clause. The relevant regulations permitted the Board to

revoke parole only if it found a violation “by a preponderance

of evidence.” D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28, ch. 2, § 219.6. Courts

have found that the preponderance standard itself incorporates

a requirement that evidence “must meet a minimum threshold

of reliability.” United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1333

(11th Cir. 2004). As a result, “the government cannot meet its

burden, even under only a preponderance standard, with

evidence that is speculative, unsupported, and unreliable.”

United States v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 230 (2d Cir. 1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Singletary also makes no

allegation that the Board had any informal custom or practice

of basing revocation decisions on inadequate evidentiary

bases. See Warren, 353 F.3d at 39; Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306.

Singletary contends that the District nonetheless bears

responsibility for the Board’s revocation decision because the

Board was a final municipal policymaker in the area of parole

revocation. As the Supreme Court has held, “municipal

liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal

policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v.

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see City of St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-30 (1988) (plurality

op.); Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Monell’s “‘official policy’

requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and

thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action

for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 479. Accordingly, if “the decision to adopt that

11

particular course of action is properly made by [the]

government’s authorized decisionmakers,” it “represents an

act of official government ‘policy’” regardless of “whether

that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.”

Id. at 481. But liability can attach only if the decision is made

by a “municipal policymaker[],” id. at 480, i.e., one with

authority to “establish governmental policy,” id. at 481.

Applying that approach, the Court in Pembaur found

municipal liability based on a county prosecutor’s one-time

decision to instruct sheriffs to forcibly enter the plaintiff’s

place of business. See id. at 473, 476-77.

Here, by contrast, we are unable to conclude that the

Board’s revocation decision can be considered the action of a

final policymaker for the District on matters of parole-

revocation policy. The Board was a five-member body in the

District’s executive branch. See D.C. Code § 24-201.1(a);

Singletary I, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 92. The Mayor possessed

rulemaking authority to implement the statutory provisions

governing the Board’s exercise of its powers. See D.C. Code

§ 24-201.3. New rules had to be submitted to the D.C.

Council for a sixty-day review period. Id. The Mayor

designated one Board member to act as the Chairperson. See

id. §§ 24-201.1(b), 24-201.2(c). At the time of Singletary’s

parole revocation, the Mayor had delegated his statutory

rulemaking authority to the Chairperson. See Mayor’s Order

89-10 (Jan. 6, 1989). With respect to revocation decisions in

individual cases, the Board acted by majority vote assuming

the presence of a quorum of three members. D.C. Code § 24-

201.2(b). Singletary’s parole revocation was effected by a

three-member quorum (that did not include the then-

Chairperson).

In these circumstances, the decision to revoke

Singletary’s parole based on evidence falling short of

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constitutional standards was not “the action of a policy maker

within the government.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. The

Mayor possessed authority to establish rules governing the

Board’s proceedings, subject to disapproval by the D.C.

Council; but there is no suggestion or allegation that the

Board acted under direction of any such rule when it revoked

Singletary’s parole based on unreliable evidence. It is true

that the Board possessed authority to render final revocation

decisions in individual cases. See D.C. Code § 24-

201.2(a)(4). But such discretion is insufficient to create

municipal liability unless the decisionmaker had been granted

final policymaking authority under D.C. law in the area of

parole revocation. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81; id. at

481-83 & n.12 (plurality op.); see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

at 129-30 (plurality op.). Such authority was lacking here.

Neither the Board as a whole nor the three-member quorum

that revoked Singletary’s parole was authorized to promulgate

general rules or other policies. And while the Mayor

delegated his rulemaking authority to the Chairperson, we

have no reason to suppose that the Chairperson’s rulemaking

authority was subject to approval by the Board. The

Chairperson, moreover, did not promulgate any pertinent rule

for review by the D.C. Council. Even if the mere

participation of the Chairperson in an individual revocation

decision could suffice to constitute action by a District

policymaker for purposes of municipal liability—an issue we

do not reach—the Chairperson was not one of the three voting

Board members in Singletary’s case.

The Board thus was “constrained by policies not of [its]

making,” and its decision to “depart[]” from those policies by

revoking Singletary’s parole based on unreliable hearsay was

not an “act of the municipality” for purposes of § 1983.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (plurality op.). We therefore hold

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that the District was entitled to summary judgment on the

question of its liability.

* * * * *

This court previously held that Singletary suffered a

violation of his constitutional rights when the Board revoked

his parole based on evidence lacking adequate indicia of

reliability. He served a lengthy period in confinement

pending the resolution of that constitutional claim. The issue

we now confront, however, is the distinct one of whether “a

custom or policy of the [District] caused the violation” of his

constitutional rights for purposes of attributing the violation to

the District. Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Answering that

question in the negative, we vacate the judgment of the

district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.