Opinion

Ralph P. Gallo & a. v. Susan Traina & a.

  • 166 N.H. 737
Court
Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Filed
Sep 12, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Dalianis
On the bench
Dalianis, Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, Bassett
Cited by
375 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.8%

holding that a party failed to demonstrate that a trial court committed reversible error, where the trial court asserted that a "mere casual entry by the record owner for a limited purpose is not necessarily sufficient to destroy adverse possession" (quotation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a party failed to demonstrate that a trial court committed reversible error, where the trial court asserted that a "mere casual entry by the record owner for a limited purpose is not necessarily sufficient to destroy adverse possession" (quotation omitted)
  • holding that the appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error
  • stating that the appealing party has the burden of demonstrating reversible error
  • holding that the appealing party has the burden of demonstrating reversible error

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as

well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports.

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Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any

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to press. Errors may be reported by E-mail at the following address:

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page is: http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme.

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Rockingham

No. 2013-652

RALPH P. GALLO & a.

v.

SUSAN TRAINA & a.

Argued: June 18, 2014

Opinion Issued: September 12, 2014

Brown and LaPointe, P.A., of Epping (Scott W. LaPointe on the brief and

orally), for the petitioners.

Casassa and Ryan, of Hampton (Daniel R. Hartley on the brief and

orally), for the respondents.

DALIANIS, C.J. The respondents, Susan and Joseph Traina (the

Trainas), appeal an order of the Superior Court (Delker, J.) ruling in favor of

the petitioners, Ralph P. and Ruth L. Gallo (the Gallos), on their petition to

quiet title to land that the Gallos use to access their home on Captain’s Pond in

Salem. We affirm.

The trial court found the following facts after a two-day evidentiary

hearing and a view of the property in question. In 1986, the Gallos purchased

land on Emilio Lane Extension in Salem. They tore down the existing

structures and, in 1987, built their current home. They built a garage in

September 1988.

Since purchasing the property, the Gallos have accessed it by using a

looped driveway that ends on Emilio Lane Extension. They paved the driveway

in May 1989. Before doing so, the Gallos installed a cement retaining wall and

a decorative stone wall, planted a “burning bush” inside the stone wall, and

planted various flowers and other vegetation along one side of the paved

driveway.

In 1997, Susan Traina purchased property on Captain’s Pond. In 2004,

as part of a settlement agreement with her cousin, Ronald Peredna, she

became the owner of a strip of land immediately to the east of the Gallos’

property, which includes a paved area directly in front of the Gallos’ walkway to

their home and garage, a portion of their retaining wall and decorative stone

wall, and the “burning bush.” At some point, Peredna had acquired an

easement to use a strip of land between the Gallos’ property and his own

property. The strip of land is currently owned by Dennis Iannalfo and his wife.

Peredna later conveyed an easement deed to Susan, purporting to convey the

easement to her. The Gallos’ paved driveway and plantings are included on the

Iannalfo strip of land.

The instant lawsuit was prompted by a long-running dispute between the

neighbors that culminated in Susan’s threat to build a fence around her

property to cut off the Gallos’ access to their garage. She also demanded that

the Gallos remove the stone wall and plantings. The Gallos sought a

declaration that they had a prescriptive easement to use their paved driveway

located on the strip of land owned by the Iannalfos and that they had the right,

by adverse possession, to maintain their retaining and decorative stone walls

and plantings on Susan’s land. Susan filed a cross-petition asserting a

superior right to use the Iannalfo strip of land. On the morning of trial, Susan

added her husband as a party. Although she originally purchased the subject

property in her own name, it has since been transferred to her and her

husband as joint tenants.

With regard to the Gallos’ use of the land owned by the Trainas, the trial

court ruled as follows. The court decided that land on which the retaining and

stone walls and the bush sit belongs to the Gallos by adverse possession. The

trial court rejected the Trainas’ assertion that the granite post and fence that

they installed in 2007 on their boundary line, to the south of the Gallos’

retaining wall, and their occasional yard work around the burning bush

interfered with the Gallos’ exclusive use of the property. Specifically, the court

found that “[b]y placing the fence there,” the Trainas “in no way interfered with

the Gallos’ burning bush, retaining wall, or stone wall” and that the fence and

maintenance of the land did not constitute “a co-occuring use of the land.”

2

The court explained that “to interrupt the adverse possession, the record

owner must perform some act which constitutes an ouster of the adverse

claimant.” Such conduct, the court observed, “must be such as would put a

reasonably prudent person on notice that he or she actually has been ousted.”

(Quotation omitted.) Accordingly, the court stated, “[a] mere casual entry for a

limited purpose by the record owner is not necessarily sufficient to destroy

adverse possession.” (Quotation omitted.) Based upon the evidence at the

hearing and its view of the property, the court concluded that the Trainas’

actions were insufficient to interrupt the Gallos’ adverse use.

The court also determined that the Gallos have only a prescriptive

easement to use the paved area in front of their driveway and walkway, which

is located on the land in dispute. The court ruled that the easement allowed

the Gallos to access their property over the paved area. The court concluded

that “[c]onsistent with their 20 years of notorious, open, and adverse use of

[the] land, the Gallos may also maintain this paved portion by having it

repaved, refinished, plowed, or other similar actions necessary to maintain the

access in the manner that [they] have been using it since 1989.” Nevertheless,

because the land itself belongs to the Trainas, the court ruled that the Gallos

could not “block the paved area or engage in any other actions that would

restrict the Trainas’ . . . use of their property.”

With regard to the Gallos’ use of the strip of land owned by the Iannalfos,

the court found that “the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Gallos have

used the easement area in an open and notorious manner that is inconsistent

with an easement broader than the paved driveway.” The court observed that

“[t]he Gallos planted trees and other vegetation along the western side of the

driveway 20 years ago at the same time that they paved the dirt path” and that

“[t]hey continue to maintain that area,” including the trees and vegetation.

Based upon the evidence at the hearing and its view of the property, the court

found that “the use of the land immediately to the west of the paved driveway is

inconsistent with any easement access Susan . . . may have obtained.” The

court concluded that “because the Gallos have openly, notoriously, and

adversely used the easement area west of the paved driveway for more than 20

years, their adverse possession of this area, vis-à-vis Susan . . . , has

extinguished any right [she] may have obtained to pass over this area.” The

Trainas unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, and

this appeal followed.

In an action to quiet title, the burden is on each party to prove good title

as against all other parties whose rights may be affected by the court’s decree.

Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 514 (2007). We will uphold the trial court’s

determination unless it is erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by the

evidence. Id.

3

The Trainas argue that the trial court erred when it determined that the

Gallos owned by adverse possession the land underneath the retaining and

stone walls and the burning bush. They contend that the Gallos’ use of that

property was not exclusive and that they successfully interfered with the

Gallos’ use by, among other things, making “numerous entries onto the land

for landscaping, surveying, and installation of a fence.” The Trainas also argue

that the trial court erred when it found that their easement was extinguished

by the Gallos’ adverse possession of the strip of land owned by the Iannalfos.

As the appealing parties, the Trainas have the burden of demonstrating

reversible error. See Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100 (2001). Based upon

our review of the trial court’s order, the Trainas’ challenges to it, and the record

submitted on appeal, we conclude that the Trainas have not demonstrated

reversible error.

Affirmed.

HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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