Opinion

Interval Licensing LLC v. Aol, Inc.

  • 766 F.3d 1364
  • 112 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1188
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17459
  • 2014 WL 4435871
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Sep 10, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Chen
On the bench
Chen, Taranto
Cited by
209 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.3%

holding that a patentee’s attempt to use one of two embodiments that unclearly define the term “ ‘unobtrusive manner’ ... does not provide a reasonably clear and exclusive definition” and “leav[es] the facially subjective claim language without an objective boundary” and therefore, indefinite

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a patentee’s attempt to use one of two embodiments that unclearly define the term “ ‘unobtrusive manner’ ... does not provide a reasonably clear and exclusive definition” and “leav[es] the facially subjective claim language without an objective boundary” and therefore, indefinite
  • finding that the term “unobtrusive manner” was indefinite under § 112 because it was “highly subjective,” “provide[d] little guidance to-one of skill in the art,” and “offer[ed] no objective indication of the manner in which content images are to be displayed to the user”
  • explaining that a specification that “is at best muddled” provides for a “hazy relationship between the claims and the written description” and therefore “fails to provide the clarity that . . . subjective claim language needs”
  • explaining that “there is an indefiniteness problem if the 8 claim language ‘might mean several different things and no informed and confident choice is 9 10 available among the contending definitions’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AOL, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

YAHOO! INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________

2013-1282, -1283, -1284, -1285

______________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington in Nos. 13-CV-0263, 13-

CV-0264, 13-CV-0265 and 13-CV-0266, Judge Marsha J.

Pechman.

______________________

2 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

Decided: September 10, 2014

______________________

THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN, Goldstein & Russell, PC, of

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Of coun-

sel on the brief were MICHAEL HEIM, NATHAN J. DAVIS,

and DOUGLAS R. WILSON, Heim, Payne & Chorush LLP, of

Houston, Texas; JUSTIN A. NELSON, Susman Godfrey

L.L.P., of Seattle, Washington, and MAX L. TRIBBLE, JR.,

of Houston, Texas.

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for

all defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were

GERALD F. IVEY, CORTNEY S. ALEXANDER, ROBERT L.

BURNS, II, and ERIK R. PUKNYS, for AOL Inc.; ELIZABETH

DAY, DAVID ALBERTI, and MARC C. BELLOLI, Feinberg Day

Alberti & Thompson LLP, of Menlo Park, California, and

BRIAN BERLINER, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, of Los Ange-

les, California, for Apple Inc.; WARREN S. HEIT, CARMEN

LO, and WENDI R. SCHEPLER, White & Case LLP, of Palo

Alto, California, and KEVIN MCGANN and DIMITRIOS T.

DRIVAS, of New York, New York, for Google Inc.; and

DEANNE MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of Washing-

ton, DC, and MICHAEL A. JACOBS and MATTHEW I.

KREEGER, of San Francisco, California, for Yahoo! Inc.

______________________

Before TARANTO and CHEN, Circuit Judges. ∗

∗

Randall R. Rader, who retired from the position of

Circuit Judge on June 30, 2014, did not participate in this

decision.

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 3

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Interval Licensing LLC (“Interval”) appeals from four

stipulated final judgment orders of the United States

District Court for the Western District of Washington. 1

Each order granted: (1) final judgment of invalidity of

claims 4–8, 11, 34, and 35 of U.S. Patent 6,034,652 (“the

’652 patent”) and claims 1–4 and 7–15 of U.S. Patent

6,788,314 (“the ’314 patent”), based on the court’s deter-

mination that those claims are indefinite; and (2) final

judgment of non-infringement of claims 15–18 of the ’652

patent, based on the court’s claim construction of the

phrase “during operation of an attention manager.” While

we agree with the court’s indefiniteness determination,

we do not agree with the court’s construction of “attention

manager” and thus modify that construction. Additional-

ly, we modify the court’s construction of the term “instruc-

tions.” For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

judgments of invalidity, vacate the judgments of non-

infringement, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The ’652 and ’314 patents are directed to an “attention

manager for occupying the peripheral attention of a

person in the vicinity of a display device.” The patents,

which share a common specification, describe a system

that acquires data from a content provider, schedules the

display of the content data, generates images from the

content data, and then displays the images on a device.

1 Interval sued the four appellees for infringement

in the district court. Due to complicated procedural

reasons not relevant here, the court severed all of the

claims and counterclaims into four cases, issuing separate

final judgment orders of invalidity and non-infringement

for each case. Interval appealed each order, and the four

appeals were consolidated into the present appeal.

4 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

The patents explain that the term “image” is used “broad-

ly here to mean any sensory stimulus that is produced

from the set of content data, including, for example, visual

imagery (e.g., moving or still pictures, text, or numerical

information) and audio imagery (i.e., sounds).” ’652

patent, 6:60–64. The content data presented in the imag-

es are “virtually limitless,” and may include advertise-

ments, video nature scenes, and radio talk shows. Id. at

7:26–38. As for the users of the attention manager, the

patents contemplate that the system will typically occupy

the attention of human users, but may also be used to

occupy the attention of dogs, cats, and parrots. See id. at

29:32–40. The primary issues raised on appeal center on

the manner in which the patented invention displays

content data—specifically, how the attention manager

displays “images” so as to attract the peripheral attention

of the user.

To engage the “peripheral attention” of a user in “the

vicinity of a display device,” the attention manager

“[g]enerally . . . makes use of ‘unused capacity’ of the

display device.” Id. at 2:3–9. The specification discloses

two primary approaches to utilizing “unused capacity.”

First, the specification describes a “screen saver embodi-

ment” that displays images “automatically after detection

of an idle period” or after activation of the screen saver by

the user. Id. at 3:19–22, 9:24–36. The patents use screen

savers—typically used for preventing screen burnout and

for “aesthetic or entertainment value”—for the purpose of

“display[ing] content from a remote location via a comput-

er network.” Id. at 1:39–67. The screen saver embodi-

ment may be employed “while a primary interaction is

ongoing, but during inactive periods (i.e., when the user is

not engaged in an intensive interaction with the appa-

ratus).” Id. at 6:35–38.

Second, the specification describes a wallpaper em-

bodiment. “Wallpaper,” the specification explains, is “a

pattern generated in the background portions on a com-

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 5

puter display screen.” Id. at 1:51–52. The patents’ “wall-

paper embodiment” displays images “while the user is

engaged in a primary interaction with the apparatus,

which primary interaction can result in the display of an

image or images in addition to the image or images gen-

erated from the set of content data.” Id. at 3:25–31. The

wallpaper embodiment makes use of the “unused” spatial

capacity of a screen, displaying information in areas not

used by the user’s primary interaction. Id. at 6:38–51.

On August 27, 2010, Interval sued AOL Inc., Apple

Inc., Google Inc., and Yahoo! Inc. (the “Defendants”) in the

Western District of Washington, alleging infringement of

four patents, including the ’652 and ’314 patents. Inter-

val’s suit alleged that the Defendants infringe the patents

through products and software that use “pop-up” notifica-

tions to present information to users. In early 2011, two

of the Defendants filed a request for ex parte reexamina-

tion of the ’652 patent, while another defendant filed a

request for inter partes reexamination of the ’314 patent.

The district court stayed the litigation pending the

USPTO’s reexaminations. Examiners found the asserted

claims of both patents to be patentable in view of the cited

prior art. 2 The district court then lifted the stay with

respect to the ’652 and ’314 patents, proceeding to claim

construction.

Of the twenty-five claims Interval asserted in the ’652

and ’314 patents, all but four contain or depend on the

2 After the present appeal was argued, the Patent

Trial and Appeal Board reversed the examiner’s decision

of the inter partes reexamination of the ’314 patent. The

Board rejected all of the asserted claims of the ’314 patent

as obvious, anticipated, or both. See Apple, Inc. v. Inter-

val Licensing LLC, No. 2013-005424, 2014 WL 1322685,

at *16 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Apr. 1, 2014). Interval has

indicated that it intends to appeal the Board’s decision.

6 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

phrase “in an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a

user.” Claim 1 of the ’314 patent is representative:

A method for engaging the peripheral attention of

a person in the vicinity of a display device,

comprising the steps of:

providing one or more sets of content data to a

content display system associated with the

display device and located entirely in the

same physical location as the display device;

providing to the content display system a set of

instructions for enabling the content display

system to selectively display, in an unob-

trusive manner that does not distract a

user of the display device or an appa-

ratus associated with the display device

from a primary interaction with the

display device or apparatus, an image

or images generated from a set of con-

tent data; and

auditing the display of sets of content data by

the content display system;

wherein the one or more sets of content data

are selected from a plurality of sets of con-

tent data, each set being provided by an as-

sociated content provider, wherein each

associated content provider is located in a

different physical location than at least one

other content provider and each content pro-

vider provides its content data to the content

display system independently of each other

content provider and without the content da-

ta being aggregated at a common physical lo-

cation remote from the content display

system prior to being provided to the content

display system, and wherein for each set the

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 7

respective content provider may provide

scheduling instructions tailored to the set of

content data to control at least one of the du-

ration, sequencing, and timing of the display

of said image or images generated from the

set of content data.

’314 patent, 29:53–30:18 (emphasis added).

Although all of the asserted claims in the ’314 patent

depend on the “unobtrusive manner” language, four of the

asserted claims in the ’652 patent do not. Representative

claim 15 recites:

A computer readable medium encoded with one or

more computer programs for enabling acquisi-

tion of a set of content data and display of an

image or images generated from the set of con-

tent data on a display device during opera-

tion of an attention manager, comprising:

acquisition instructions for enabling acquisition

of a set of content data from a specified in-

formation source;

user interface installation instructions for ena-

bling provision of a user interface that allows

a person to request the set of content data

from the specified information source;

content data scheduling instructions for provid-

ing temporal constraints on the display of

the image or images generated from the set

of content data, wherein the content data

scheduling instructions further comprise se-

quencing instructions that specify an order

in which the images generated from a set of

content data are displayed; and

8 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

display instructions for enabling display of the

image or images generated from the set of

content data.

’652 patent, 32:37–58 (emphasis added).

In its claim construction order, the district court

found that “the terms ‘in an unobtrusive manner’ and

‘does not distract’ a user, whether used together or sepa-

rately,” 3 are indefinite. Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL,

Inc., C10-1385MJP, 2013 WL 792791, at *3 (W.D. Wash.

Feb. 28, 2013). After reviewing the claim language, the

written description, and the prosecution history, the

district court offered two primary reasons for holding the

claim language indefinite: (1) “because the patents fail to

provide an objective standard by which to define the scope

of [the ‘unobtrusive manner’ phrase]”; and (2) “because

the determination of whether an accused product would

meet the claim limitations depends on its usage in chang-

ing circumstances.” Id. at *5.

The district court also construed several disputed

claim terms. Relevant here, the court construed the term

“attention manager” as limited to the specific screensaver

and wallpaper embodiments. See id. at *10–11 (adopting

Defendants’ construction of “a system that displays imag-

es to a user either when the program detects that the user

is not engaged in a primary interaction or as a back-

ground of the computer screen”). The court also adopted

3 As Interval observes, much of the district court’s

indefiniteness analysis treats “unobtrusive manner” and

“does not distract a user” as distinct claim limitations.

Interval argues that “[b]ecause the phrase is used as a

whole repeatedly throughout the specification and

claims . . . all of the words of the phrase should be con-

strued together.” Appellant’s Br. 28 n.5. We agree and

evaluate the phrase accordingly in this opinion.

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 9

the Defendants’ construction of “instructions,” a term

which appears in many of the asserted claims. See id. at

*15–16 (construing “instructions” as “a statement in a

programming language that specifies a function to be

performed by a system”).

Based on the claim construction order, the parties

stipulated that twenty-one claims in both patents were

invalid as indefinite, and that claims 15–18 of the ’652

patent were not infringed by the Defendants. On Febru-

ary 18, 2013, the district court issued final judgment

orders to that effect, which Interval timely appeals.

Interval asks us to reverse the district court’s holding that

the claim phrase “in an unobtrusive manner that does not

distract a user” is indefinite, 4 vacate the court’s construc-

tion of “attention manager,” and clarify the court’s con-

struction of “instructions.”

4 The district court separately addressed independ-

ent claim 4 of the ’652 patent, which uses the “unobtru-

sive manner” phrase in a means-plus-function limitation.

See ’652 patent, 30:29–33 (claiming a “means for selective-

ly displaying on the display device, in an unobtrusive

manner that does not distract a user”). The court held

that claim 4 and its dependent claims were indefinite

because the specification does not disclose an algorithm

that would constitute sufficient structure for accomplish-

ing the recited function. Interval, 2013 WL 792791, at *9.

Interval asks us to reverse that holding. However, be-

cause we affirm the district court’s determination that the

“in an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user”

phrase is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 for the

reasons stated in this opinion, we find it unnecessary to

address the district court’s additional determination that

the means-plus-function claims are indefinite due to a

lack of corresponding structure in the specification.

10 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Indefiniteness

A patent must “conclude with one or more claims par-

ticularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject

matter which the applicant regards as [the] invention.”

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006). 5 A claim fails to satisfy this

statutory requirement and is thus invalid for indefinite-

ness if its language, when read in light of the specification

and the prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with rea-

sonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope

of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). We review the district

court’s indefiniteness determination here de novo. See

Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1365

(Fed. Cir. 2011); Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336,

1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 6

5 Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with

newly designated § 112(b) when § 4(c) of the America

Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on

September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting

in the patents at issue in this case were filed before that

date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112.

6 We note that the district court’s indefiniteness de-

termination rests only on intrinsic evidence, and that

there are no disputes about underlying questions of fact.

Although the Defendants point to the testimony of Inter-

val’s expert in support of their argument that the “unob-

trusive manner” phrase is indefinite, see Appellee’s Br. 32,

we find it unnecessary to rely on that testimony (or any

other extrinsic evidence) to reach our conclusion. Like the

district court, we find the claims indefinite based on the

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 11

A

After the present appeal was argued, the Supreme

Court issued its opinion in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig In-

struments, Inc., which addressed our use of the expres-

sions “insolubly ambiguous” and “amenable to

construction” in applying § 112, ¶ 2. The Court explained

that the statute’s definiteness requirement calls for a

“delicate balance.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,

Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)). The definiteness standard

“must allow for a modicum of uncertainty” to provide

incentives for innovation, but must also require “clear

notice of what is claimed, thereby appris[ing] the public of

what is still open to them.” Id. at 1228, 1229 (internal

citations omitted). In light of that balance, the Court

characterized our “insolubly ambiguous” and “amenable

to construction” expressions as “more amorphous than the

statutory definiteness requirement allows.” Id. at 2131.

What the statute requires, the Court clarified, “is that a

patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and

prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about

the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Id.

at 2129.

The key claim language at issue in this appeal in-

cludes a term of degree (“unobtrusive manner”). We do

not understand the Supreme Court to have implied in

Nautilus, and we do not hold today, that terms of degree

are inherently indefinite. Claim language employing

terms of degree has long been found definite where it

provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when

read in the context of the invention. See, e.g., Eibel Pro-

cess Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45,

65–66 (1923) (finding “substantial pitch” sufficiently

claims, the written description, and the prosecution

history.

12 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

definite because one skilled in the art “had no difficul-

ty . . . in determining what was the substantial pitch

needed” to practice the invention). As the Supreme Court

recognized in Nautilus, “absolute precision” in claim

language is “unattainable.” 134 S. Ct. at 2129; see also

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the claim phrase “not inter-

fering substantially” was not indefinite even though the

construction “define[d] the term without reference to a

precise numerical measurement”); Invitrogen Corp. v.

Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(“[A] patentee need not define his invention with mathe-

matical precision in order to comply with the definiteness

requirement.”).

Although absolute or mathematical precision is not

required, it is not enough, as some of the language in our

prior cases may have suggested, to identify “some stand-

ard for measuring the scope of the phrase.” See Appel-

lant’s Br. 31 (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree

Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The

Supreme Court explained that a patent does not satisfy

the definiteness requirement of § 112 merely because “a

court can ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims.”

Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130. The claims, when read in

light of the specification and the prosecution history, must

provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.

See id. at 2130 & n.8 (indicating that there is an indefi-

niteness problem if the claim language “might mean

several different things and ‘no informed and confident

choice is available among the contending definitions’”

(quoting Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2014 WL 869092, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Mar. 5, 2014)); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.

M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The fact

that [the patent holder] can articulate a definition sup-

ported by the specification . . . does not end the inquiry.

Even if a claim term’s definition can be reduced to words,

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 13

the claim is still indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in

the art cannot translate the definition into meaningfully

precise claim scope.”).

B

The patents’ “unobtrusive manner” phrase is highly

subjective and, on its face, provides little guidance to one

of skill in the art. Although the patented invention is a

system that displays content, the claim language offers no

objective indication of the manner in which content imag-

es are to be displayed to the user. As the district court

observed, “whether something distracts a user from his

primary interaction depends on the preferences of the

particular user and the circumstances under which any

single user interacts with the display.” Interval, 2013 WL

792791, at *4. The lack of objective boundaries in the

claim language is particularly troubling in light of the

patents’ command to read “the term ‘image’ . . . broadly to

mean any sensory stimulus that is produced from the set

of content data,” including sounds and video. ’652 patent,

6:60–64. The patents contemplate a variety of stimuli

that could impact different users in different ways. As we

have explained, a term of degree fails to provide sufficient

notice of its scope if it depends “on the unpredictable

vagaries of any one person’s opinion.” Datamize, 417 F.3d

at 1350.

Where, as here, we are faced with a “purely subjec-

tive” claim phrase, we must look to the written descrip-

tion for guidance. Id. at 1351; see also Chimie v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We

find, however, that sufficient guidance is lacking in the

written description of the asserted patents.

i

Interval contends that the “unobtrusive manner”

phrase is sufficiently defined through its relationship to

one of the two primary embodiments. The phrase, Inter-

14 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

val maintains, is tied exclusively to the wallpaper embod-

iment, thus informing those of skill in the art that “unob-

trusive” has only a spatial meaning in the context of the

patents. “Because the district court failed to appreciate

that the language describing display ‘in an unobtrusive

manner that does not distract a user’ is tied to specific

type of display described in the specification,” Interval

argues, the district court “improperly divorced its analysis

from the context of the written description and incorrectly

focused on irrelevant hypotheticals . . . .” Appellant’s Br.

23.

We do not agree with Interval that it is reasonably

clear that the “unobtrusive manner” language is tied to a

specific type of display. Although Interval identifies

portions of the specification that appear to use the “unob-

trusive manner” phrase in conjunction with the wallpaper

embodiment, see ’652 patent, 2:12–19, 13:11–14, other

portions of the specification suggest that the phrase may

also be tied to the screen saver embodiment.

According to one aspect of the invention, an atten-

tion manager engages the peripheral attention of

a person in the vicinity of a display device of an

apparatus by acquiring one or more sets of con-

tent data from a content providing system and se-

lectively displaying on the display device, in an

unobtrusive manner that does not distract a

user of the apparatus from a primary inter-

action with the apparatus, an image or images

generated from the set of content data. Accord-

ing to a further aspect of the invention, the

selective display of the image or images be-

gins automatically after detection of an idle

period of predetermined duration (the

“screen saver embodiment”). This aspect can

be implemented, for example, using the screen

saver API (application program interface) that is

part of many operating systems. According to

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 15

another further aspect of the invention, the

selective display of an image or images oc-

curs while the user is engaged in a primary

interaction with the apparatus, which pri-

mary interaction can result in the display of

an image or images in addition to the image

or images generated from the set of content

data (the “wallpaper embodiment”).

Id. at 3:11–31 (emphases added).

The specification here suggests that possibly both the

screen saver and wallpaper embodiments are “further

aspects” of an attention manager that displays content “in

an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user of

the apparatus from a primary interaction with the appa-

ratus.” Although Interval disputes this reading, we find

that the specification is at best muddled, leaving one

unsure of whether the “unobtrusive manner” phrase has

temporal dimensions as well as spatial dimensions. The

hazy relationship between the claims and the written

description fails to provide the clarity that the subjective

claim language needs. See Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1352

(holding claim term “aesthetically pleasing” indefinite

because, even though the preferred embodiment provided

“examples of aesthetic features of screen displays that can

be controlled by the authoring system,” the specification

did not indicate “what selection of these features would be

‘aesthetically pleasing’”); In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378,

1381–82 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding claims invalid for indef-

initeness where claims “serv[ed] as a shadowy framework

upon which are located words lacking in precise referents

in the specification” (internal quotations omitted)).

The prosecution history further illustrates the diffi-

culty in pinning down the relationship between the writ-

ten description and the “in an unobtrusive manner that

does not distract the user” claim phrase. The statements

of Interval, and the responses of the USPTO, reflect

16 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

considerable uncertainty about which embodiments were

tied to the “unobtrusive manner” language. During

prosecution in 1998, Interval relied on a different reading

than the one it offers now, stating that “[t]he display of

images in an unobtrusive manner in a system as recited

in Claim 1 can be implemented by, for example, display-

ing images during an inactive period (e.g., when the user

has not interacted with the apparatus for a predeter-

mined period of time) of a primary interaction with the

apparatus (the ‘screensaver embodiment’).” J.A. 985.

Interval points out, however, that the examiner appeared

not to share Interval’s initial understanding: later in the

prosecution, the examiner discussed the “unobtrusive

manner” limitation in conjunction with the wallpaper

embodiment but not the screen saver embodiment. J.A.

1073.

The USPTO expressed a similar understanding dur-

ing reexaminations of the ’652 and ’314 patents, with

examiners finding that the specification links the “unob-

trusive manner” language to the wallpaper embodiment,

excluding the screensaver embodiment. See J.A. 1090–91,

1311. But in a recent decision addressing the scope and

validity of the ’314 patent, the Patent Trial and Appeal

Board disagreed with the examiner. Apple, Inc. v. Inter-

val Licensing LLC, No. 2013-005424, 2014 WL 1322685

(Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Apr. 1, 2014). 7 The Board con-

7 The Board’s decision was a response to an appeal

from an inter partes reexamination. Per 37 C.F.R.

§ 1.906, the Board was limited to the question of whether

the challenged claims should be rejected on the basis of

prior art patents or printed publications. Neither the

examiner nor the Board could address claim definiteness.

The claims were given “their broadest reasonable con-

struction” during reexamination. In re Am. Acad. Of Sci.

Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 17

cluded that, in light of “the ambiguous nature” of the

specification, “the claim term ‘unobtrusive manner’ in-

cludes the screensaver embodiment.” Id. at *7. 8

After reviewing the specification and prosecution his-

tory, we find that the “unobtrusive manner” phrase has

too uncertain a relationship to the patents’ embodiments.

Contrary to Interval’s suggestion, the wallpaper embodi-

ment does not provide a reasonably clear and exclusive

definition, leaving the facially subjective claim language

without an objective boundary.

ii

In the alternative, Interval suggests that if we are not

persuaded that the wallpaper embodiment defines the

“unobtrusive manner” phrase, then we must at least

adopt a “narrow example” from the specification. That

example lies in the Summary of the Invention, which

explains that information can be presented “in an unob-

trusive manner that does not distract the user from the

primary interaction with the apparatus (e.g., the infor-

mation is presented in areas of a display screen that are

not used by displayed information associated with the

primary interaction with the apparatus).” ’652 patent,

2:15–19 (emphasis added).

We recognize that a patent which defines a claim

phrase through examples may satisfy the definiteness

requirement. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, 599 F.3d at 1336

8 At the hearing before the Board, counsel for In-

terval acknowledged the lack of clarity in column 3 of the

specification: “I would say in this summary location

within the specification [the drafters] were a little bit less

precise, a little bit sloppy here . . . it might seem less

precise or even possibly contradictory. . . . My point is

simply that at best it’s ambiguous.” Id. at *6 (internal

citations omitted).

18 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

(holding that “not interfering substantially” is sufficiently

definite because one of skill in the art could use “the

examples in the specification to determine whether inter-

ference with hybridization is substantial”). In this case,

however, we decline to cull out a single “e.g.” phrase from

a lengthy written description to serve as the exclusive

definition of a facially subjective claim term. See Nauti-

lus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 (disfavoring “post hoc” efforts to

“ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims”).

Had the phrase been cast as a definition instead of as

an example—if the phrase had been preceded by “i.e.”

instead of “e.g.”—then it would help provide the clarity

that the specification lacks. But as the specification is

written, we agree with the district court that a person of

ordinary skill in the art would not understand the “e.g.”

phrase to constitute an exclusive definition of “unobtru-

sive manner that does not distract a user.” See Interval,

2013 WL 792791, at *4. With this lone example, a skilled

artisan is still left to wonder what other forms of display

are unobtrusive and non-distracting. What if a displayed

image takes up 20% of the screen space occupied by the

primary application with which the user is interacting? Is

the image unobtrusive? The specification offers no indica-

tion, thus leaving the skilled artisan to consult the “un-

predictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.” See

Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350. Such ambiguity falls within

“the innovation-discouraging ‘zone of uncertainty’ against

which [the Supreme Court] has warned.” Nautilus, 134

S. Ct. at 2130 (internal citation omitted).

In sum, the “unobtrusive manner that does not dis-

tract a user” phrase, when viewed in light of the specifica-

tion and prosecution history, fails to “inform those skilled

in the art about the scope of the invention with reasona-

ble certainty.” See id. at 2129. The claims that depend on

that phrase are thus invalid for indefiniteness.

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 19

II. Claim Construction

We review claim construction de novo. Lighting Bal-

last Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d

1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Cybor Corp. v.

FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en

banc). The words of a claim “are generally given their

ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the “meaning

that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in

the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(en banc) (internal citations omitted). Claim language

must be viewed in light of the specification, which is “the

single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id.

at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90

F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). In addition to consult-

ing the specification, we may also consider the prosecu-

tion history and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Id. at

1315–17.

A. Construction of “Attention Manager”

As discussed in the Background, supra, the phrase

“attention manager” appears in claims 15–18 of the ’652

patent. In its claim construction order, the district court

adopted the Defendants’ proposed construction: “a system

that displays images to a user either when the program

detects that the user is not engaged in a primary interac-

tion or as a background of the computer screen.” Interval,

2013 WL 792791, at *11. The court explained that it

relied on “the only description in the specification that

gives objective boundaries to the scope of this limitation:

the ‘screensaver’ and ‘wallpaper’ embodiments.” Id.

In contrast to the “in an unobtrusive manner that

does not distract a user” phrase, there is no uncertainty

about the definitional relationship between the claim

term “attention manager” and the written description.

The patented invention is a self-coined “attention manag-

er.” No one disputes that the “attention manager” is

20 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

defined by all of the disclosed embodiments. What is in

dispute, and what we must consider in reviewing the

construction of “attention manager,” is whether the

district court read the embodiments too narrowly and

thus improperly limited the scope of the claim term.

Interval proposes modifying the claim construction as

follows:

a system that displays images to a user either

when the program detects that the user is not en-

gaged in a primary interaction or as a background

of the computer screen an area of the display

screen that is not substantially used by the

user’s primary activity.

See Appellant’s Br. 53.

With regard to the first proposed modification—the

removal of “the program detects that” phrase—Interval

argues that the district court mistakenly limited the

screen saver to a single mode of operation. Interval notes

that the specification describes two ways of activating the

screen saver: (1) through the detection of an idle period

or, alternatively, (2) through direct user activation. See

’652 patent, 9:21–36. In response, the Defendants suggest

that the system still “detects” user activation even in the

alternative embodiment, and that the district court’s

inclusion of “detects” is thus consistent with the patents’

description of the screen saver. Although the Defendants’

reading is plausible, we think that Interval’s reading

better conforms to the distinction drawn between “detec-

tion” and “user-activation” in the written description. We

therefore agree with Interval that the phrase “the pro-

gram detects that” should be removed from the construc-

tion.

With regard to the second proposed modification—the

replacement of “a background of the computer screen”

with “as an area of the display screen that is not substan-

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 21

tially used by the user’s primary activity”—Interval

argues that its change is faithful to a “lexicographical

definition” in the specification of the ’652 patent. Appel-

lant’s Br. 53 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321). Interval

faults the district court for basing its construction on a

general definition of “wallpaper” in the specification. See

’652 patent, 1:50–52 (describing wallpaper as “a pattern

generated in the background portions on a computer

display”). Instead, Interval urges, the construction should

be based on an express definition of “wallpaper embodi-

ment”:

According to another further aspect of the inven-

tion, the selective display of an image or images

occurs while the user is engaged in a primary in-

teraction with the apparatus, which primary in-

teraction can result in the display of an image or

images in addition to the image or images gener-

ated from the set of content data (the “wallpaper

embodiment”).

Id. at 3:25–31.

We agree with Interval that the wallpaper embodi-

ment of the attention manager should not be strictly

limited to the “background” of a computer screen, and we

agree that the specification’s description of the embodi-

ment should inform our construction. The district court’s

construction suggests that displayed images must be

integrated into the background display, similar to the

“patterns” of the traditional wallpaper described in the

background of the invention. See id. at 1:50–52. But the

patents’ description of the wallpaper embodiment sup-

ports a broader reading. The patent describes the embod-

iment as making use of unused spatial capacity—that is,

space in the display not used by the user’s primary inter-

action. See id. at 3:25–31, 6:45–51. The specification does

not indicate that the images must be displayed as part of

the background of the display device.

22 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

We note, however, that Interval’s proposed modifica-

tion (“an area of the display screen that is not substantial-

ly used by the user’s primary activity”) is not taken

directly from the cited “lexicography.” Rather, the pro-

posed language appears to be Interval’s interpretation of

where the images will be displayed while the user is

engaged in a primary interaction. Based on our reading

of the specification, the attention manager is better

construed as displaying images in areas “not used”—

instead of “not substantially used”—by the user’s primary

activity. The specification consistently describes how the

attention manager makes use of “unused capacity.”

Moreover, the specification twice contrasts a user’s “pri-

mary interaction with the apparatus” with the display of

information in areas “not used” by the information associ-

ated with the primary interaction. See id. at 2:15–19,

6:43–45. The phrase “not substantially used,” by contrast,

appears nowhere in the specification.

In sum, with the exception of the addition of the word

“substantially,” we agree with Interval’s proposed con-

struction of “attention manager.” Accordingly, we adopt

the following construction: “a system that displays imag-

es to a user either when the user is not engaged in a

primary interaction or in an area of the display screen

that is not used by the user’s primary activity.”

B. Construction of “Instructions”

The district court construed “instructions” as “a

statement in a programming language that specifies a

function to be performed by a system.” Interval, 2013 WL

792791, at *15–16. Although the district court’s construc-

tion of “instructions” was not dispositive with respect to

the final judgment of invalidity and non-infringement,

Interval asks us to review that construction now. Specifi-

cally, Interval asks us to clarify that “instructions,” in the

context of the patents, “may encompass ‘data’” and “need

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 23

not be written ‘in a programming language.’” Appellant’s

Br. 61–62.

In the interest of judicial economy, we have the dis-

cretion to review a non-dispositive claim construction if

we believe that the construction may become important

on remand. See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d

1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Advanced Software Design

Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 641 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

Because we are vacating the judgment of non-

infringement as to claims 15–18 of the ’652 patent, and

because those claims include the term “instructions,” we

take this opportunity to address the claim construction of

that term.

During claim construction, Interval argued that “in-

structions” should be construed to cover “data related to

the accomplishment of a function.” J.A. 27. Relying

principally on the distinction between “instructions” and

“data” in the specification, the district court refused to

adopt Interval’s construction. See Interval, 2013 WL

792791, at *15–16. We share the district court’s reading.

Interval notes that the specification refers to certain

“instructions” as “functional components,” ’652 patent,

14:49–53, which may be represented by “data.” Id. at

14:53–57 (“Each of the functional components are repre-

sented by a set of instructions and/or data. In particular,

each of the instructions may include, if appropriate, data

related to accomplishment of the functions associated

with the set of instructions . . . .”). Although Interval

reads the cited portion of the specification as showing that

data alone can constitute an “instruction,” we read the

specification as maintaining a distinction between “in-

structions” and “data.” An instruction “may . . . include

data,” not consist of data; the instruction is not the data

itself. As the district court observed, “[i]f ‘data’ is a type

of ‘instructions,’ then the phrase ‘instructions and/or data’

would not make sense.” Interval, 2013 WL 792791, at

24 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

*16. Moreover, the district court’s reading is consistent

with extrinsic evidence suggesting that the distinction

between “instructions” and “data” is widely recognized in

the field of art. See J.A. 845 (“The distinction between

program (instructions) and data is a fundamental one in

computing.” (quoting Oxford Dictionary of Computing)).

For these reasons, we decline Interval’s invitation to call

into question the distinction between “instructions” and

“data” in the district court’s construction.

As for Interval’s concerns regarding the “in a pro-

gramming language” phrase, we find that a modification

to the construction is necessary. Although the district

court carefully explained why the intrinsic evidence

supported the exclusion of the word “data” from its con-

struction, the court offered no direct explanation for its

inclusion of the “in a programming language” limitation.

The patents’ specification does not indicate that instruc-

tions must take the form of programming language

statements. The source of that limitation is the IEEE

Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms

(6th ed. 1996) (“IEEE Dictionary”), which the Defendants

relied on for their proposed construction. See J.A. 419,

484.

The IEEE Dictionary includes five different defini-

tions of “computer instruction,” with two definitions

specifically directed towards “software” computer instruc-

tions. The Defendants based their construction on one of

those two definitions: “A statement in a programming

language, specifying an operation to be performed by a

computer and the addresses or values of the associated

operands; for example, Move A to B.” Id. at 484. The

second definition, which the Defendants did not reference,

reads: “Loosely, any executable statement in a computer

program.” Id.

We have recognized that technical dictionaries “can

assist the court in determining the meaning of particular

INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC. 25

terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. At the same time, we have

cautioned against relying on dictionary definitions at the

expense of a fair reading of the claims, which must be

understood in light of the specification. See id. at 1321–

22. Here, considering that the patents’ specification does

not use “instructions” in relation to “programming lan-

guage statements,” we find that the broader dictionary

definition (“any executable statement in a computer

program”) is preferable.

Moreover, we share Interval’s concern that the “in a

programming language” limitation will breed unnecessary

uncertainty about whether “instructions” may take the

form of object code. As Interval notes, one could argue

that object code—which may consist of strings of 1’s and

0’s—is not a “programming language.” The IEEE Dic-

tionary, however, defines “object code” as “[c]omputer

instructions and data definitions in a form output by an

assembler or a compiler.”

In sum, the extrinsic source on which the district

court relied suggests a broader construction of “instruc-

tions” than the court adopted. We conclude that a con-

struction without the “in a programming language”

phrase is both simpler and more accurate. Accordingly,

we adopt the following construction: “a statement that

specifies a function to be performed by a system.”

CONCLUSION

We hold that the claim phrase “in an unobtrusive

manner that does not distract a user” is indefinite under

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Therefore, the district court correct-

ly granted judgments of invalidity as to claims 4–8, 11,

34, and 35 of the ’652 patent and claims 1–4 and 7–15 of

the ’314 patent. However, the district court erred in

granting judgments of non-infringement as to claims 15–

18 of the ’652 patent based on the erroneous claim con-

struction of “attention manager.” We therefore affirm the

26 INTERVAL LICENSING LLC v. AOL, INC.

judgments of invalidity, vacate the judgments of non-

infringement, and remand to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED–IN–PART, VACATED–IN–PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.