Opinion

David M. Ryder v. Office of Personnel Management

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 9, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID M. RYDER, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-844E-13-1894-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: September 9, 2014

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Cornelius J. P. Sullivan, Esquire, Mattapan, Massachusetts, for the

appellant.

Thomas L. Styer, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

affirmed the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) reconsideration decision

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

denying the appellant’s application for disability retirement under the Federal

Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). Generally, we grant petitions such as

this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material

fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or

regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were

not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and

the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence

or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM

the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(b).

¶2 The appellant was a City Letter Carrier with the United States Postal

Service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 21. He resigned from employment on

June 22, 2011, id. at 22, and applied to OPM for FERS disability retirement

annuity benefits, id. at 19-28, 174-79. In his application, he based his request for

benefits on the following conditions: bipolar disorder, chronic post-traumatic

stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, work-related stress, mood lability, 2

2

Mood lability is a term used in the field of psychology to refer to a poorly-modulated

emotional response that falls outside the conventionally accepted range and may be

marked by a great fluctuations in mood. See Theodore P. Beauchaine et al., Polyvagal

Theory and Developmental Psychopathology: Emotion Dysregulation and Conduct

Problems from Preschool to Adolescence, 74 B IOLOGICAL P SYCHOLOGY 2, 174-84

(2007).

3

colitis, 3 hypertension, IgA nephropathy, 4 tinnitus, 5 hypothyroidism, kidney cysts,

and cardiac arrest. Id. at 19. OPM issued an initial decision denying the

appellant’s application for disability retirement benefits. Id. at 13-17. The

appellant requested reconsideration and OPM again denied his request for

disability retirement benefits. Id. at 4-8. The appellant filed an appeal of OPM’s

reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 1. In an initial decision, the administrative

judge affirmed OPM’s reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision

(ID) at 1, 14. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review

(PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

¶3 An individual bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence his

entitlement to disability retirement. Henderson v. Office of Personnel

Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 8 (2008); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2). To qualify

for disability retirement benefits under FERS, an individual must meet the

following requirements: (1) the individual must have completed at least

18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) the individual, while employed in a

position subject to FERS, must have become disabled because of a medical

condition, resulting in a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or if

there is no such deficiency, the disabling medical condition must be incompatible

with either useful and efficient service or retention in the position;

(3) the disabling medical condition must be expected to continue for at least

1 year from the date the disability retirement benefits application is filed;

3

Colitis is inflammation of the large intestine. George Longstreth, Colitis,

M EDLINE P LUS (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/

001125.htm.

4

IgA nephropathy is a kidney disease that occurs when an antibody called

immunoglobulin A (IgA) lodges in the kidneys and results in local inflammation. IgA

Nephropathy, M AYO C LINIC (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-

conditions/iga-nephropathy/basics/definition/CON-20034366.

5

Tinnitus is noise or ringing in the ears. Tinnitus, M AYO C LINIC (Feb. 5, 2013),

http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/tinnitus/basics/definition/con-20021487.

4

(4) accommodation of the disabling medical condition in the position held must

be unreasonable; and (5) the individual must not have declined a reasonable offer

of reassignment to a vacant position. Henderson, 109 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 8; 5 C.F.R.

§ 844.103(a); see 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a).

¶4 The Board has held that there are two ways to meet the statutory

requirement that the individual “be unable, because of disease or injury, to render

useful and efficient service in the employee’s position”; namely, by showing that

the medical condition: (1) caused a deficiency in performance, attendance, or

conduct; or (2) is incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in

the position. Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313,

¶ 16 (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B); 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a)(2); see also

Jackson v. Office of Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 7 (2012) (finding

that the standard is the same under both the Civil Service Retirement System and

FERS). Under the first method, an individual can establish entitlement by

showing that the medical condition affects his ability to perform specific work

requirements or prevented him from being regular in attendance or caused him to

act inappropriately. Henderson, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 16. Under the second

method, an individual can establish entitlement by showing that the medical

condition is inconsistent with working in general, working in a particular line of

work, or working in a particular type of setting. Id.

¶5 A determination of disability is based on objective clinical findings,

diagnoses and medical opinions, subjective evidence of pain and disability, and

evidence showing the effect of the individual’s condition on his ability to perform

the duties of his position. Id., ¶ 19. The ultimate question, based on all relevant

evidence, is: Do the individual’s medical impairments preclude him from

rendering useful and efficient service in his position? Id., ¶ 20. This question

must be answered in the affirmative if the totality of the evidence makes that

conclusion more likely to be true than not true. Id.

5

¶6 Here, the administrative judge properly considered the totality of the

evidence and concluded that the appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that his medical condition prevented him from rendering useful and

efficient service in his former position.

¶7 In his petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge

erred by substituting his opinion for the agency’s opinion as expressed in the

Supervisor’s Statement and Agency Certification of Reassignment and

Accommodation Efforts. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; see IAF, Tab 4 at 21-26 (Standard

Forms 3112B and 3112D). The appellant claims that the agency “certified that

the appellant could not provide [useful and efficient] service.” PFR File, Tab 1

at 2. We disagree. The agency did not certify that the appellant could not

provide useful and efficient service. See IAF, Tab 4 at 21-26. Instead, the

appellant’s supervisor stated in the Supervisor’s Statement his opinion that the

appellant has had unacceptable conduct since October 2006. See id. at 21-23.

The Supervisor’s Statement does not prove that the appellant had a medical

condition that caused his unacceptable conduct, nor does it suggest that the

appellant’s supervisor believed that the appellant’s unacceptable conduct was

caused by a medical condition. Moreover, the appellant was diagnosed with

bipolar disorder and PTSD on April 26, 2011, more than 5 years after

October 2006. Id. at 84. The diagnosing psychiatrist also noted that the appellant

never needed treatment for his bipolar disorder or PTSD until his diagnosis. Id.

at 74, 76. Therefore, the Supervisor’s Statement concerning the appellant’s

unacceptable conduct is not dispositive and the administrative judge did not

improperly substitute his opinion for the agency’s opinion. As a result, we agree

with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to meet the statutory

requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B) to show that his medical condition

caused a deficiency in performance, attendance, or conduct. See

Henderson, 117 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 16.

6

¶8 The appellant also claims on review that the administrative judge

erroneously discounted the appellant’s subjective evidence. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2.

Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the administrative judge explicitly expressed

his disagreement with OPM’s insistence that a psychological disability must be

supported by objective evidence. ID at 12. Even though the medical opinions of

psychiatrists are based primarily on the appellant’s own descriptions of symptoms

and indicia of disability, OPM still must consider such medical evidence. See

Vanieken-Ryals v. Office of Personnel Management, 508 F.3d 1034, 1041 (Fed.

Cir. 2007). The administrative judge properly considered the appellant’s affidavit

and description of his symptoms as told to health care providers, ID at 3, 6-9, in

concluding that the appellant failed to prove that his medical condition was

disabling or incompatible with useful and efficient service, ID at 12-13. Thus,

the administrative judge properly considered all pertinent evidence in the record,

including the appellant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability.

¶9 Next, the appellant argues that the administrative judge should not have

considered the improvement of the appellant’s mental health to mean that he has

fully recovered. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. The administrative judge did not state

that the appellant was fully recovered and recognized that the appellant’s

treatment is ongoing. See ID at 13. However, the administrative judge properly

considered the extent to which the appellant’s disability could or could not be

controlled. Id.; see Smedley v. Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R.

31, ¶ 23 (2008). Thus, the administrative judge properly considered the

appellant’s mental health improvement with therapy and medicine to determine

whether the appellant proved an inability to provide useful and efficient service.

¶10 Further, the appellant objects to the administrative judge’s consideration of

the appellant’s ability to work for his family business. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. The

appellant distinguishes his ability to work for his family business from his

inability to work for the agency, given the less-stressful work environment and

accommodating nature of his family business. Id. We recognize that the

7

appellant’s work for his family business might differ from his work at the agency.

See, e.g., Confer v. Office of Personnel Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶¶ 15-16

(2009) (the appellant’s position after her resignation entailed very different

responsibilities from her former agency position). In fact, the administrative

judge gave adequate consideration to the appellant’s testimony on his work for

his family business. ID at 3-4. However, the administrative judge properly

considered evidence concerning the appellant’s subsequent work history as

support for the conclusion that the appellant’s medical conditions were amenable

to control. ID at 13. Thus, the administrative judge properly considered the

appellant’s ability to work for his family business in concluding that the appellant

did not show an inability to provide useful and efficient service in his former

government position.

¶11 The appellant, moreover, restates that he was awarded social security

disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA). PFR File, Tab 1

at 2. To the extent that the appellant is claiming that the administrative judge did

not properly consider the SSA award, he is mistaken. The administrative judge

explicitly addressed the appellant’s receipt of SSA benefits in the initial decision.

ID at 13-14. Although the Board must consider SSA decisions in adjudicating

disability retirement cases, it is not bound by such decisions. Givens v. Office of

Personnel Management, 95 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 9 (2003). Additionally, where there

is no indication as to the basis for the SSA determination, the determination is not

a significant factor in deciding an OPM disability retirement appeal. See

Confer, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 6. Because the basis for the appellant’s SSA award

in this appeal was unclear, see ID at 13-14, the administrative judge properly

considered the SSA award to be of little probative value.

¶12 Although the appellant asserts on review that the agency could not provide

him with reasonable accommodations, PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, we need not address

this claim because he failed to establish that he was unable, because of disease or

injury, to render useful and efficient service in his former position, see 5 U.S.C.

8

§ 8451(a)(1)(B); Guthrie v. Office of Personnel Management, 105 M.S.P.R. 530,

¶ 13 (2007) (arguments about accommodation need not be considered when the

appellant did not demonstrate that she had a disabling condition that would

require any accommodation). Likewise, we need not address whether the

appellant established the other eligibility requirements for disability retirement,

i.e., whether the disabling medical condition was expected to continue for at least

1 year from the date the disability retirement benefits application was filed, and

whether the appellant declined an offer of reassignment to a vacant position.

See 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a).

¶13 In conclusion, we find that the appellant has not provided a reason to

disturb the administrative judge’s decision affirming OPM’s denial of the

appellant’s application for disability retirement.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

9

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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