Barnes v. Hendrick Auto.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of

A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA13-537

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

CLAUDE L. BARNES,

Employee, Plaintiff,

v. North Carolina

Industrial Commission

I.C. No. W80523

HENDRICK AUTOMOTIVE,

Employer,

and

FEDERAL INSURANCE CO.,

Carrier, Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award filed 15 January

2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the

Court of Appeals 9 October 2013.

Oxner Thomas & Permar, PLLC, by John R. Landry, Jr., for

Plaintiff.

Jones, Hewson & Woolard, by Lawrence J. Goldman, for

Defendants.

STEPHENS, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

-2-

Plaintiff Claude Barnes suffered a knee injury while

serving in the Vietnam War. Before 20 April 2010, the knee

injury had not “really ever bothered [him] very much at all.” On

that date, however, Plaintiff stepped between two fighting

employees at work. One of the employees hit Plaintiff, resulting

in further injury to his knee and an additional injury to his

shoulder. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Hendrick

Automotive at the time. On 28 April 2010, Plaintiff saw Dr.

Christopher J. Barnes. Dr. Barnes diagnosed right knee

osteoarthritis and noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms were likely

“an exacerbation of his preexisting arthrosis.”

Plaintiff presented to Dr. Murray Seidel on 11 May 2010.

Dr. Seidel determined that Plaintiff had probably lost “full

extension of his knee for many years.” Seven days later, Dr.

Seidel recommended knee arthroplasty. Between his visits to Dr.

Seidel, Plaintiff also met with Dr. Bradley Broussard. Dr.

Broussard diagnosed “tricompartmental degenerative joint

disease” and opined that Plaintiff’s Vietnam War injury was

“probably aggravated” by his workplace injury. Dr. Broussard

advised that Plaintiff was “unable to work in any capacity until

-3-

further notice.”1 Defendants authorized and paid for the

treatment provided in these examinations.

On 18 May 2010, Dr. Seidel allowed Plaintiff to return to

work with the restrictions that he (1) not stand continuously

for eight to ten hours and (2) sit for at least twenty minutes

each hour. There was a dispute regarding Plaintiff’s ability to

work for Defendant-employer under these restrictions, and

Plaintiff thereupon filed a Form 33, requesting a hearing before

the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission”).

By order of the Commission, the parties held a mediated

settlement conference on 22 July 2011. Plaintiff was represented

by counsel during the conference and executed the mediated

settlement agreement (“MSA”) as a result. Pursuant to the MSA,

Plaintiff waived his right to further workers’ compensation

benefits, including any right to reimbursement for expenses paid

by Plaintiff, in return for $15,000. Among other things, the

parties agreed to “execute all necessary [f]orms and/or a

standard [c]ompromise [s]ettlement [a]greement (“CSA”)2 which

complie[d] with [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 97-17.” The CSA was to be

prepared by Defendants. Defendants submitted the CSA to

Plaintiff’s counsel on 1 August 2011. Sixteen days later,

1

The record does not indicate that Plaintiff met with Dr.

Broussard again.

2

A CSA is also known as a “clincher agreement.”

-4-

Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendants’ counsel that Plaintiff

refused to sign the CSA. As a result, Defendants filed a Form 33

requesting a hearing.

The hearing was held on 7 November 2011. Afterward, the

deputy commissioner concluded that the MSA was unenforceable due

to failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17(b)(2) and

Industrial Commission Rule 502. Accordingly, the deputy

commissioner declined to approve the MSA as a final settlement

agreement. Defendants appealed to the full Commission. On 15

January 2013, the Commission concluded that the MSA was a valid

and enforceable contract under section 97-17 and Rule 502. In

addition, the Commission concluded that the MSA was fair and

just and that Plaintiff had failed to establish fraud,

misrepresentation, undue influence, or mutual mistake of fact.

Therefore, Plaintiff was compelled to execute the CSA and

Defendants were ordered to make payments in accordance with that

agreement. Plaintiff appeals the Commission’s 15 January 2013

opinion and award.

Standard of Review

Review of an opinion and award of the Commission “is

limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports

[its] findings of fact and whether the findings support the

Commission’s conclusions of law.” Richardson v. Maxim

-5-

Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584

(2008) (citation omitted). Where there is competent evidence to

support the Commission’s findings, they are binding on appeal

even in light of evidence to support contrary findings. McRae v.

Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700

(2004). The Commission’s conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo. Ramsey v. S. Indus. Constructors, Inc., 178 N.C. App. 25,

30, 630 S.E.2d 681, 685 (2006). Unchallenged findings of fact

are binding on appeal. Johnson v. Herbie’s Place, 157 N.C. App.

168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2003).

Discussion

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in

determining that the MSA was valid and enforceable against him

because (1) the MSA did not comply with Rule 502 or N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 97-17, (2) there was no meeting of the minds between the

parties, and (3) the terms of the MSA were not fair and just.

Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that he is not bound by the terms

of the MSA because he refused to sign it.3 We affirm the

3

Plaintiff also states in numerous places throughout his brief

that “Defendants did not file a Form 60, 61, or 63 with the

Industrial Commission in response to Plaintiff’s Form 18.”

Plaintiff does not explain, however, how this asserted fact

affects the validity of the Commission’s opinion and award or

how it applies to the arguments he has raised on appeal. This

does not constitute a reviewable argument, and we do not address

it further. See generally N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (“The function of

all briefs required or permitted by these rules is to define

-6-

Commission’s opinion and award, which enforced the MSA against

Plaintiff and compelled him to execute the CSA.

I. Rule 502 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17

As Plaintiff notes in his brief, the MSA did not include a

list of Plaintiff’s known medical expenses, but the CSA did. On

appeal, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated Industrial

Commission Rule 502 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17 by failing to

include a list of medical expenses as part of the MSA.

Therefore, Plaintiff contends, he is not bound by that document.

We disagree.

Industrial Commission Rule 502, entitled “Compromise

Settlement Agreements,” states in pertinent part that:

(c) No compromise agreement will be

considered unless the following additional

requirements are met:

. . .

(3) The settlement agreement must

contain a list of all of the known

medical expenses of the employee

related to the injury to the date

of the settlement agreement,

including medical expenses that

the employer or insurance carrier

disputes, when the employer or

carrier has not agreed to pay all

medical expenses of the employee

clearly the issues presented to the reviewing court and to

present the arguments and authorities upon which the parties

rely in support of their respective positions thereon. The scope

of review on appeal is limited to issues so presented in the

several briefs.”).

-7-

related to the injury up to the

date of the settlement agreement.

4 N.C. Admin. Code 10A.0502 (2012).4

The heading for Rule 502 specifies that the language

contained therein, requiring a “list of all known medical

expenses” to be included in the settlement agreement, limits

that requirement to compromise settlement agreements. Because

Defendants included a list of medical expenses as a part of the

compromise settlement agreement in this case — i.e., the CSA —

they did not violate Rule 502. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument

is overruled as it pertains to Rule 502.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17, entitled “Settlements allowed in

accordance with Article,” reads in pertinent part as follows:

(a) This article does not prevent

settlements made by and between the employee

and employer so long as the amount of

compensation and the time and manner of

payment are in accordance with the

provisions of this Article. A copy of a

settlement agreement shall be filed by the

employer with and approved by the

Commission. No party to any agreement for

compensation approved by the Commission

shall deny the truth of the matters

contained in the settlement agreement,

4

Plaintiff refers to this rule as “502(3)(c),” and the

Commission’s website lists it as the same. Workers’ Compensation

Rules, The North Carolina Industrial Commission

http://www.ic.nc.gov/ncic/pages/comprule.htm (revisions

effective 1 January 2011 and 1 January 2013). Title 4 of the

2012 edition of the North Carolina Administrative Code (“the

Code”), however, lists this rule as 502(c)(3). Treating the Code

as the authoritative text, we use the latter designation.

-8-

unless the party is able to show to the

satisfaction of the Commission that there

has been error due to fraud,

misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual

mistake, in which event the Commission may

set aside the agreement. . . .

(b) The Commission shall not approve a

settlement agreement under this section,

unless all of the following conditions are

satisfied:

(1) The settlement agreement is

deemed by the Commission to be

fair and just, and that the

interests of all of the parties

and of any person, including a

health benefit plan that paid

medical expenses of the

employee[,] have been considered.

(2) The settlement agreement

contains a list of all the known

medical expenses of the employee

related to the injury to the date

of the settlement agreement,

including medical expenses that

the employer or carrier disputes,

and a list of medical expenses, if

any, that will be paid by the

employer under the settlement

agreement.

(3) The settlement agreement

contains a finding that the

positions of all of the parties to

the agreement are reasonable as to

the payment of medical

expenses. . . .

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17(a)–(b) (2013) (emphasis added).

While section 97-17 does not expressly use the term

“compromise settlement agreement,” as Rule 502 does, we conclude

-9-

that the “settlement agreement” to which section 97-17 pertains

is the final compromise settlement agreement required to be

approved by the Commission. See id. The mediated settlement

agreement is simply the document used to memorialize the

substantive terms reached between the parties during the

mediated settlement conference. It is not the settlement

agreement that the Commission approves. While the terms

memorialized in a mediated settlement agreement may be used to

enforce the parties’ settlement, the practice of memorializing

the settlement in a mediated settlement agreement document is

not — and was never meant to be — the same as the creation of

the final settlement agreement strictly regulated under section

97-17. That is the role of the compromise settlement agreement.

See, e.g., Lemly v. Colvard Oil Co., 157 N.C. App. 99, 104, 577

S.E.2d 712, 716 (2003) (holding that the mediated settlement

agreement was enforceable against the plaintiff even though the

agreement lacked “all the required terms and language” because

it was signed by the parties and conformed with the compromise

settlement agreement). Therefore, we hold that the MSA is not

unenforceable under Rule 502 or section 97-17 for lacking a list

of medical expenses when such a list was included in the CSA.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first argument is overruled.

II. Meeting of the Minds

-10-

In his second argument on appeal, Plaintiff contends that

the MSA is unenforceable because there was no “meeting of the

minds” during the mediated settlement conference. For support,

Plaintiff cites an alleged contradiction between (a) the MSA and

his own testimony as compared to (b) a statement made by counsel

for Defendants during the 7 November 2011 hearing before the

deputy commissioner. The MSA states that “Defendants have

reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claims for compensation.” At the

hearing, Plaintiff testified that he understood Defendants had

“denied the whole [20 April 2010] claim.” At the same hearing,

however, counsel for Defendants stated that “Plaintiff sustained

an admittedly compensable right knee injury on [20 April 2010].”

Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that the MSA is not enforceable

because “[t]he foregoing facts offer competent evidence that

there was not a meeting of the minds as to the accepted versus

denied status of Plaintiff’s claim for purposes of settlement of

his claim via the [MSA].” We disagree.

Plaintiff’s argument misapprehends our role in reviewing an

opinion and award of the Commission. As noted above, we review

the Commission’s conclusions of law to ensure they are supported

by its findings of fact and review its findings of fact to

ensure that they are supported by competent evidence.

Richardson, 362 N.C. at 660, 669 S.E.2d at 584. We lack the

-11-

authority to weigh the evidence and make findings based on that

evidence. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411,

414 (1998) (“The findings of fact by the Industrial Commission

are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence.

Thus, on appeal, [the appellate court] does not have the right

to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its

weight. The court’s duty goes no further than to determine

whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the

finding.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted;

emphasis added).

In this case, the Commission found the following pertinent

facts:

5. Although[] the July 22, 2011 [MSA]

indicates in regards to “Compensability”

that “Defendants have reasonably denied

Plaintiff’s claims for compensation,”

Defendants’ post-hearing contentions

submitted to the Deputy Commissioner stated

that “Plaintiff sustained an admittedly

compensable right knee injury on April 20,

2010.”

. . .

17. In considering whether the settlement

amount is fair and just and in the best

interest of all parties, the . . .

Commission has considered that there were

contested issues in this claim, which

included the differing medical opinions as

to the extent of Plaintiff’s work

restrictions, whether Defendant-[e]mployer

could accommodate those work restrictions,

and the need for future medical treatment

-12-

and whether the potential future surgery

referenced by Dr. Seidel would be related to

the work injury or entirely the result of

the pre-existing knee injury from

Plaintiff’s military service in Vietnam, as

well as Plaintiff’s alleged failure to

recall his reading or signing the [MSA] due

to low blood sugar. Based upon a

preponderance of the evidence of record, the

. . . Commission finds that the $15,000.00

settlement amount was fair and just and in

the best interests of all parties.

18. . . . Plaintiff knowingly and willingly,

and with counsel, entered into a binding

contractual agreement at mediation to

execute a [CSA] that would compromise and

finally settle the workers’ compensation

claim related to his April 20, 2010 injury.

Acknowledging counsel for Defendants’ post-hearing contention to

the deputy commissioner, the Commission nonetheless determined

that the MSA constituted a binding contractual agreement.

Plaintiff does not dispute this finding as not based on

competent evidence or not supporting the Commission’s

conclusions of law. Therefore, it is binding on appeal, “even

though there is evidence that would support findings to the

contrary,” McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 700,5 and

Plaintiff’s second argument is overruled.

5

We note that the post-hearing statement made by counsel for

Defendants was not necessarily contradictory. It is reasonable

to admit the occurrence of an on-the-job incident, but deny for

other reasons the existence of a right to compensation, as was

clearly the case here.

-13-

Even assuming that Plaintiff properly challenged the

Commission’s findings as not based on competent evidence or not

supporting its conclusions of law, we note that there is

evidence in the record to support the existence of a meeting of

the minds between the parties during the mediated settlement

conference. As a rule, “compromise settlement agreements,

including mediated settlement agreements, are governed by

general principles of contract law.” Kee v. Caromont Health,

Inc., 209 N.C. App. 193, 195, 706 S.E.2d 781, 783 (2011)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such principles

dictate that

[t]he court is to interpret a contract

according to the intent of the parties to

the contract, unless such intent is contrary

to law. If the plain language of a contract

is clear, the intention of the parties is

inferred from the words of the contract.

When the language of the contract is clear

and unambiguous, construction of the

agreement is a matter of law for the court,

and the court cannot look beyond the terms

of the contract to determine the intentions

of the parties.

Williams v. Habul, __ N.C. App. __, __, 724 S.E.2d 104, 111

(2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is

a well-settled principle of contract law that a valid contract

exists only where there has been a meeting of the minds as to

all essential terms of the agreement.” Northington v.

Michelotti, 121 N.C. App. 180, 184, 464 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1995)

-14-

(citation omitted). “When a party affixes his signature to a

contract, he is manifesting his assent to the contract.” Mosley

v. WAM, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 594, 599, 606 S.E.2d 140, 143 (2004)

(citation omitted).

In this case, the MSA clearly stated that Defendants

reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claim for compensation. That

document was signed by both Plaintiff and Defendants. Therefore,

the parties’ signatures, alone, constituted competent evidence

to support the Commission’s conclusion that they entered into a

binding, contractual agreement. See generally Mosley, 167 N.C.

App. at 599, 606 S.E.2d at 143. The post-hearing statement made

by counsel for Defendants could not change this fact.

III. Fair and Just

Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred in

determining that the terms of the MSA were fair and just and,

thus, in enforcing the MSA against him. For support, Plaintiff

asserts that the Commission erroneously (1) failed to establish

whether Plaintiff’s claim was contested or uncontested, (2)

shifted to Plaintiff “the burden of proof as to the causal

relationship between the recommended knee arthroplasty and

Plaintiff’s compensable knee injury,” and (3) based its

determination on information not available at the time of the

settlement negotiations. We are unpersuaded.

-15-

Section 97-17(b) provides that the Commission shall not

approve a settlement agreement unless the agreement is, inter

alia, deemed “fair and just” by the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 97-17(b). Rule 502(a) also provides that “[o]nly those

[compromise settlement] agreements deemed fair and just and in

the best interest of all parties will be approved.” 4 N.C.

Admin. Code 10A.0502 (2012).

“Every compensation and compromise agreement between an

employer and an injured employee must be determined by the

Commission to be fair and just prior to its approval.” Lewis v.

Craven Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 N.C. App. 438, 441, 518 S.E.2d 1, 3

(1999), affirmed, 352 N.C. 668, 535 S.E.2d 33 (2000). In making

that determination, the Commission must undertake a

full investigation . . . in order to assure

that the settlement is in accord with the

intent and purpose of the [Workers’

Compensation] Act that an injured employee

receive the disability benefits to which he

is entitled, and, particularly, that an

employee qualifying for disability

compensation under both sections 97-29

and -31 have the benefit of the more

favorable remedy.

Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 432–33, 444

S.E.2d 191, 195 (1994). Generally speaking,

the fair and just determination is somewhat

subjective in nature. Neither the statutory

Workers’ Compensation Act nor the Workers’

Compensation Rules provide a specific

procedure or guideline for deciding what is

-16-

fair and just. While Rule 502 sets forth

what must be contained in a compromise

agreement, it does not specify how the

Commission should go about its fair and just

determination. The Commission must

necessarily take into account the validity

of the plaintiff’s claim, despite the fact

that the issue of compensability is not

before it. In many instances, the amount of

the settlement reached reflects how the

parties perceive the viability of the

plaintiff’s claim. The Commission is not

blind to this reality, but it must determine

for itself whether the settlement is fair

and just based on the evidence before it.

Malloy v. Davis Mechanical Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 720 S.E.2d

739, 744 (2011). In determining whether the settlement agreement

is fair and just, the Commission should consider the information

available to the parties at the time of the settlement

negotiations and take into account whether the plaintiff was

represented by counsel. See id. at __, 720 S.E.2d at 743; Kyle

v. Holston Grp., 188 N.C. App. 686, 696, 656 S.E.2d 667, 674

(2008) (holding that the settlement agreement was unenforceable

as not fair and just, in part because the plaintiff was

“unrepresented and unaware at the time of settling his case

that, under the law, he was entitled to the most favorable

remedy available to him, including total disability benefits if

he was totally disabled”).

-17-

In addition to finding of fact 17, quoted above, the

Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact

regarding whether the settlement agreement was fair and just:

16. At the hearing before the Deputy

Commissioner, Plaintiff, who was represented

by counsel at the mediation on July 22,

2011, testified he did not remember reading

or signing the [MSA] as a result of low

blood sugar resulting from his diabetic

condition. Plaintiff also testified that he

did not notify his attorney that he was not

feeling well at the time of the mediation

and at no time requested to take a

break. . . .

. . .

18. Based upon a preponderance of the

evidence of record, the . . . Commission

finds that Plaintiff knowingly and

willingly, and with counsel, entered into a

binding contractual agreement at mediation

to execute a [c]ompromise [s]ettlement

[a]greement that would compromise and

finally settle the workers’ compensation

claim related to his April 20, 2010 injury.

19. When viewed in light of the facts of the

case at the time of the settlement, and

based upon a preponderance of the evidence

of record, the . . . Commission finds that

the [CSA] that was drafted by Defendants and

which Plaintiff refused to sign was fair and

just and in the interests of all of the

parties.

A. The Commission’s Duty to Consider the Contested or

Uncontested Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim

-18-

Citing Malloy, Plaintiff first contends that the settlement

agreement is not fair and just because the Commission made no

determination regarding whether Plaintiff’s claim was contested

or uncontested on the issue of compensability. Plaintiff

contends that this determination is “vital” to the Commission’s

decision because it impacts whether the Commission considers the

fair and just issue in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. We

are unpersuaded.

In Malloy, we stated in obiter dictum that we believed the

Commission erred in reviewing the plaintiff’s claim “in the most

favorable manner” to the plaintiff because that claim was

contested on the issue of compensability. Malloy, __ N.C. App.

at __, 720 S.E.2d at 744. We reasoned that,

[w]hen a claim is contested, . . . the

plaintiff is not able to select the more

favorable remedy. In that situation, the

plaintiff is faced with the possibility of

receiving no compensation if he or she

proceeds to a hearing on compensability and

does not prevail. The plaintiff must

scrutinize the validity of his or her claim

and determine if a settlement would be in

his or her best interest.

Id. We also noted that the Commission should make its fair and

just determination by considering the facts in a manner most

favorable to the plaintiff only when the plaintiff’s claim is

uncontested. Id. In that circumstance, “the Commission is, in a

sense, considering the plaintiff’s claim in the most favorable

-19-

manner in order to ensure that the plaintiff is receiving the

maximum remedy possible in an uncontested claim.” Id. (emphasis

added). This is because (1) the defendant has already admitted

compensability and (2) the Commission must ensure that the

plaintiff is treated fairly for essentially agreeing to waive

the judicial process and accept compensation without those

safeguards.

In this case, Plaintiff’s claim was contested on multiple

issues. Though the Commission did not label Plaintiff’s claim as

“contested” on the particular issue of compensability, it

enforced the MSA, which stipulated that “Defendants have

reasonably denied Plaintiff’s claims for compensation,” and

described a number of “contested issues” in finding of fact 17

supporting Defendant’s denial of those claims. For these

reasons, Plaintiff’s claim was not subject to the special

consideration described in Malloy. Accordingly, we hold that the

Commission’s opinion and award sufficiently described

Plaintiff’s claim for the purposes of engaging in its fair and

just decision-making process. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first

argument is overruled.

B. Burden of Proof

In his second argument regarding the Commission’s fair and

just determination, Plaintiff contends that the Commission

-20-

misapplied the law. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the

Commission “incorrectly shift[ed] the burden of proof” as to the

causal relationship between the knee surgery recommended by Dr.

Seidel and Plaintiff’s knee injury in its findings of fact 8 and

17, requiring Plaintiff to prove that future treatment is

related to the workplace injury. Plaintiff contends that, in

fact, “there is a presumption that Plaintiff’s recommended

additional medical treatment, including surgery, is related to

his compensation [sic] knee injury, unless there is evidence

offered to rebut such presumption and no such evidence was

offered to rebut the presumption in this matter.” We are

unpersuaded.

Finding of fact 8 reads as follows:

On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff again presented

to Dr. Seidel who placed work restrictions

on Plaintiff of no standing continuously for

eight to ten hours with sitting twenty

minutes every hour. Dr. Seidel noted the

work restrictions would remain in effect for

three weeks. Dr. Seidel noted that Plaintiff

would have to seriously consider a knee

arthroplasty; however, the . . . Commission

finds that there is insufficient evidence to

determine whether Dr. Seidel considered such

surgery related to the Vietnam injury

exclusively or due to an aggravation of the

pre-existing condition as a result of the

work injury.

-21-

Finding of fact 17, quoted above, lists as a “contested issue[]”

whether the “potential future surgery” would be related to the

work injury or the Vietnam injury.

Plaintiff’s argument evidences a misunderstanding of the

process the Commission must undertake when determining whether a

settlement agreement is fair and just. This Court has stated

that “[t]he Commission is required to . . . determine that a

settlement agreement is fair and just in order to assure that

the settlement is in accord with the intent and purpose of the

[Workers’ Compensation] Act that an injured employee receive the

disability benefits to which he is entitled.” Kyle, 188 N.C.

App. at 695, 656 S.E.2d at 673 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). While this process sometimes requires the

Commission to take the validity of the plaintiff’s claim into

consideration, it does not impose the burden of engaging in a

detailed analysis of the law as it applies to the facts of a

particular claim.

Here, as Defendants point out, the Commission “was not

determining whether future medical treatment was related to the

original work injury. [It] recognized that the future medical

treatment was a contested issue,” which would have been in

contention in a hearing. As a matter of procedure, such

questions must be addressed in a separate hearing before the

-22-

deputy commissioner — not in an argument on appeal as to the

enforceability of the parties’ settlement agreement. Therefore,

to the extent Plaintiff’s argument has any substantive legal

merit,6 it does not support his larger contention that the

settlement agreement is not fair and just. Accordingly, that

argument is overruled.

C. Information Available to the Parties at the Time of

the Settlement Negotiation

Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred in its

fair and just determination because the information available to

the parties at the time of the negotiation was contradictory.

Specifically, Plaintiff points out that, while the MSA listed

his claim as “denied,” the Commission found that Plaintiff

sustained “compensable injuries” and counsel for Defendants

stated in a post-hearing contention that “Plaintiff sustained an

admittedly compensable right knee injury on April 20, 2010.”

Plaintiff concludes that “the information available to the

parties at the time of settlement is not consistent with the

information used by the . . . Commission in its analysis as to

whether or not the terms of the [MSA] are fair and just.” We

disagree.

Plaintiff’s argument misapplies the facts and misapprehends

the requirement that the fair and just determination take into

6

We offer no opinion on whether it does.

-23-

account only the information known by the parties at the time of

the settlement negotiations. See Malloy, __ N.C. App. at __, 720

S.E.2d at 743 (“[T]he Commission is required to evaluate the

settlement or mediation agreement based strictly on the evidence

available at the time the agreement was reached. To hold

otherwise would potentially permit either party to avoid their

contractual obligation should new circumstances arise prior to

approval by the Commission.”). First, Plaintiff’s assertion that

the Commission found he sustained compensable injuries to his

right knee and right shoulder is incorrect. The Commission only

found that “Plaintiff sustained a right knee and right shoulder

injury at work . . . .” It properly declined to make any

findings regarding the consequences of Plaintiff’s injury as

they relate to compensability. Second, even assuming that

Defendants’ post-hearing statements to the deputy commissioner

regarding the compensability of Plaintiff’s injury are relevant

to the cited rule7 or are contradictory, such comments were made

after the settlement negotiations occurred and, thus, have no

bearing on the Commission’s fair and just determination as it

pertains to the information available to the parties at the time

of the settlement negotiations. Moreover, we reiterate that

7

As the rule only requires the Commission to take into account

the information available to the parties at the time of the

settlement negotiations, we do not believe those statements are

relevant.

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while Defendants did not contest the occurrence of an on-the-job

accident involving Plaintiff’s right knee, they raised multiple

issues as to the compensable consequences, if any, of that

accident. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third argument is overruled.

IV. The CSA

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the Commission is prevented

from enforcing the CSA against him pursuant to Rule 502(c)(2)

because it was not signed by the parties. This argument is

without merit.

As discussed above, the CSA comprises the fully executed

settlement agreement between the parties. Because the MSA was

signed by the parties and is valid and enforceable, the

signature requirement of Rule 502(c)(2) is satisfied.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s final argument is overruled, and the

Commission’s opinion and award is

AFFIRMED.

Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).