People v. Warren

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Warren, 2014 IL App (4th) 120721

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

Caption JOSEPH W. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-12-0721

Filed June 6, 2014

Modified upon

denial of rehearing August 29, 2014

Held Defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled

(Note: This syllabus substance with intent to deliver was upheld over his contention that the

constitutes no part of the State’s case was based on the incredible testimony of the woman who

opinion of the court but was with him at the time of his arrest, but the cause was affirmed in

has been prepared by the part and vacated in part and remanded with directions for the trial

Reporter of Decisions court to reimpose certain mandatory fines that were improperly

for the convenience of imposed by the circuit clerk rather than the trial court and to review the

the reader.)

information provided by the appellate court in Williams in connection

with the imposition of statutorily mandated fines in criminal cases.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County; No. 11-CF-443;

Review the Hon. Heidi N. Ladd, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Martin J. Ryan, all of

Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J.

Robinson, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Pope concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a May 2012 trial, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with

the intent to deliver a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West

2010)) (count I), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS

5/24-1.1(a), (e) (West 2010)) (count II). In July 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to a

30-year term on count I and a concurrent 10-year term on count II. Defendant appeals, arguing

(1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on count I; (2) he is

entitled to a vacation of certain assessments imposed pursuant to his conviction; and (3) he is

entitled to additional sentencing credit for time served. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and

remand with directions.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 21, 2011, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession with intent to

deliver a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The charges

arose from a traffic stop and later search of a hotel room rented by defendant.

¶4 A. The Traffic Stop

¶5 On March 18, 2011, Officer Jeremiah Christian of the Champaign police department, who

was assigned to the Community Action Team, observed defendant driving a green Oldsmobile

Bravada. Upon recognizing defendant as the driver, Officer Christian “conducted surveillance

to see where [defendant] was going.” Officer Christian followed defendant to the Red Roof Inn

on Anthony Drive. Officer Christian observed defendant exit his vehicle and enter a guest

room at the hotel. Officer Christian then left the area to meet with other members of the

Community Action Team.

¶6 The team formulated a plan to return to the area around the hotel to continue surveillance

on defendant’s activities. If defendant was observed leaving the hotel, an officer would follow

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and wait for defendant to commit a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 to

20-402 (West 2010)). The officers would then stop the vehicle and further their investigation.

¶7 Officer Christian returned to the hotel to continue his surveillance. At some point during

his surveillance, Officer Christian observed defendant return to the Oldsmobile Bravada. He

was accompanied by a white female, later identified as Kimberly Rosas. Defendant drove the

vehicle away from the hotel and headed toward Neil Street. Officer Christian went to hotel

management to see whether defendant had rented a room at the hotel. Officer Christian learned

defendant had been renting a room at the hotel since March 8, 2011. The rental agreement

listed only defendant’s name. Officer Christian then went to the room and stood watch to

ensure nobody entered or left the room. Shortly thereafter, Officer Phillip McDonald observed

defendant commit a traffic violation while turning right onto Neil Street, and initiated a traffic

stop at the intersection of Neil Street and Interstate 74. Several other Champaign police

officers, including Katherine Thompson, Marshall Henry, and Robert Sumption, arrived on the

scene to provide backup.

¶8 Officer McDonald approached the vehicle and asked defendant to shut off the car. He

detected an odor of cannabis emanating from the vehicle. Officer Henry also detected the odor

of cannabis. Because the officers detected the odor of cannabis, Officer McDonald asked

defendant to step out of the vehicle so it could be searched. Defendant responded by attempting

to lock the driver’s door and reaching for the key still in the ignition. Officer McDonald then

reached inside the car and grabbed defendant’s arm. Officer Henry assisted Officer McDonald

in removing defendant from the vehicle. After the officers removed defendant from the

vehicle, a lengthy struggle ensued and defendant resisted the officers’ attempts to place him

under arrest.

¶9 During this struggle, Officer Sumption asked Rosas whether anything illegal was located

inside the car. At first she indicated there was not, but she later informed the officer a gun was

in her purse. This prompted Officer Sumption to draw his weapon and point it at Rosas. Officer

Sumption relayed this information to the other officers at the scene. Officer Sumption then

removed Rosas from the vehicle and placed her under arrest. She was escorted to the backseat

of Officer Thompson’s squad car. Officer Sumption removed the gun from Rosas’s purse and

determined the gun was loaded with a magazine containing six rounds of .25-caliber

ammunition. He also determined no rounds were in the weapon’s chamber. While sitting in the

backseat, Rosas told Officer Sumption defendant carried the purse containing the handgun to

the vehicle.

¶ 10 B. Rosas’s Postarrest Interview

¶ 11 As Officer Thompson escorted Rosas to her police car, she asked Rosas whether she had

anything “crotched,” meaning concealed within her undergarments or inside her vaginal or

anal cavity. Rosas stated she did not. While seated in the back of the police car, Rosas told

Officer Sumption that defendant carried the gun in her purse to the car. Rosas told Officer

Sumption approximately half an ounce of crack cocaine was located in the hotel room. Rosas

was then transported to the Red Roof Inn to confirm the location of the room in which she and

defendant had been staying.

¶ 12 Officer Thompson transported Rosas to the Champaign police department to speak with

Officer McDonald. After being informed of and waiving her Miranda rights (Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), Rosas stated she had a current addiction to crack cocaine.

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Officer McDonald inquired about the gun recovered during the traffic stop. Rosas stated

defendant had the gun in his waistband until Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop, when

defendant placed the handgun in Rosas’s purse.

¶ 13 Rosas then expressed her concern over going to jail. After Officer McDonald assured

Rosas she would not go to jail, Rosas stated, “I’ll do anything that you want me to do. I’ll be

helpful, you know, as long as I don’t go to jail.” Rosas then detailed the drug-dealing operation

defendant was running from the hotel room. Defendant would bring large quantities of crack

cocaine to the room and break it down for sale. He used a black scale to assist him in breaking

down the product. Defendant would then package the individual pieces for sale. Once

packaged for sale, defendant would place the individually wrapped pieces of crack cocaine in a

plastic bag and “go deal.”

¶ 14 Rosas believed defendant was bringing at least four ounces of crack cocaine to the room

per day to package for sale. She further believed at least a half-ounce of crack cocaine would

be found in defendant’s black duffel bag inside the room and more would be found outside the

hotel room.

¶ 15 Rosas then asked to use the restroom. Officer Thompson, who stood by during the

interview, escorted Rosas to the restroom. While there, Rosas told Officer Thompson she had

crack cocaine concealed inside her vagina. Officer Thompson looked into the toilet and

observed a plastic bag containing what appeared to be individually packaged pieces of crack

cocaine. Officer Thompson informed Officer McDonald of what she discovered.

¶ 16 Rosas returned to the interview room, where Officer McDonald was to take a statement

regarding the crack cocaine discovered during Rosas’s bathroom break. When asked how the

crack cocaine came to be concealed within her vagina, Rosas initially told Officer McDonald

that defendant physically placed the cocaine inside her vagina just before the traffic stop.

Rosas assured Officer McDonald she was being truthful. Rosas stated this was her first time

out dealing with defendant. She also stated defendant wanted her to accompany him because

he had the gun, but she was not sure whether he wanted her there to take blame for the gun.

¶ 17 After about 15 minutes, Officer McDonald again asked Rosas to speak with him. Officer

McDonald sought clarification as to how the crack cocaine came to be concealed within

Rosas’s vagina. This time, Rosas stated defendant handed her the bag containing crack cocaine

and ordered her to conceal it in her vagina just before the traffic stop. Defendant told her she

would be sorry if she did not do so. Rosas then placed the crack cocaine inside her vagina.

Additionally, Rosas told police the last time she smoked crack was just before she and

defendant were arrested.

¶ 18 C. Search of the Hotel Room

¶ 19 After Rosas was interviewed, she was asked to swear to an affidavit in support of a search

warrant. The affidavit stated Rosas was with defendant when his Oldsmobile Bravada was

stopped. At the time of the stop, defendant removed a weapon, which belonged to him, from

his waistband and placed it into Rosas’s purse. Defendant was the registered occupant of room

258 at the Red Roof Inn on Anthony Drive in Champaign, Illinois, and currently possessed

approximately half an ounce of crack cocaine there in a black leather duffel bag. Defendant

had been using the room for one to two weeks to package cocaine he later distributed.

Defendant was selling approximately four ounces of cocaine per day.

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¶ 20 According to Officer Thompson, she transported Rosas to the Schnuck’s parking lot in

Savoy, Illinois. While there, Rosas swore to her affidavit in front of a judge. The judge issued

the warrant. Officer Thompson transported Rosas back to the Champaign County jail where

she was booked for the possession of the drugs concealed within her vagina.

¶ 21 Armed with a search warrant, the officers searched the hotel room. During the course of the

search, several items of evidentiary value were seized. Officers seized a silver Compaq laptop

computer, its charging chord, and a speaker system, which were all located on a nightstand

next to the bed; a certificate of title for a 1997 Oldsmobile Bravada issued to defendant, found

in a duffel bag later determined to belong to defendant; a rental receipt from the Red Roof Inn

naming defendant as the sole person who rented the room, which was found on the nightstand;

a blank check belonging to defendant, found in the same duffel bag as the certificate of title; an

Illinois identification (ID) card issued to defendant, which was found in a pair of men’s jeans

lying on the floor underneath the sink; and a prescription bottle containing pseudoephedrine

for defendant, which was found on the counter next to the sink.

¶ 22 The officers also seized a velvet Crown Royal bag containing five live rounds of

.25-caliber ammunition, which was found in a dresser drawer (at trial, Rosas testified the

drawer also contained defendant’s clothing, but defendant denied the items were his and

testified they belonged to Rosas); a black digital scale, which was located under the Crown

Royal bag; a box of plastic sandwich Baggies, which was found on top of the microwave;

numerous empty plastic Baggies with both bottom corners removed, which were found in the

garbage can near the bathroom; 17 individual “corner Baggies” containing crack cocaine, all of

which were found in a wadded-up paper towel in the garbage can; and two glass crack pipes

and one metal crack pipe.

¶ 23 D. Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Under Franks v. Delaware

¶ 24 On November 14, 2011, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), seeking to exclude from evidence the items seized from the

hotel room. In support of his motion, defendant attached three affidavits–his own, one drafted

by Cora Holland, and one purportedly drafted and signed by Rosas. The first part of Rosas’s

affidavit to support defendant’s motion to suppress contained argumentative statements about

the lawfulness of the search itself. Rosas’s affidavit goes on to state she felt coerced to answer

the police’s questions at the scene of the traffic stop. The affidavit states she was coerced into

implicating defendant for possession of the weapon and the drugs in the hotel room.

¶ 25 Rosas’s affidavit stated defendant was not in possession of the weapon at any time and it

did not belong to him. Defendant was not aware Rosas had the weapon in her purse. Defendant

was not in possession of any drugs and was unaware Rosas had drugs on her or in the hotel

room. While some of defendant’s possessions were in the hotel room, he would only come by

occasionally to shower and change clothes. Defendant rented the room at the hotel because

Rosas did not have a State ID card.

¶ 26 Rosas’s affidavit further stated Rosas had been addicted to crack cocaine for 11 years. She

supported her drug habit by “dating” men she did not know. One man she “dated” came to the

hotel room and inadvertently left the weapon found in Rosas’s purse in the room. Rosas kept

the weapon because she wanted to trade it for drugs. Defendant always tried to help Rosas

“leave the drug addiction and the drugs dating behind [her].”

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¶ 27 Rosas’s affidavit also stated everything Rosas told the police about defendant’s

drug-dealing operation was not true and she was solely responsible for the drugs and weapon

recovered on March 18, 2011. The last two sentences of Rosas’s affidavit state, “The record

reported that I was transported to [Schnuck’s in Savoy, Illinois], before a judge to swear to a

search warrant to search the hotel room. I was never transported to [S]chnuck’s in

Savoy[, Illinois], before a judge nor did I ever swear to a search warrant before a judge.”

¶ 28 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 29 E. Defendant’s Trial

¶ 30 During the May 2012 jury trial, several people testified to the evidentiary significance of

the items seized from defendant’s vehicle and the hotel room. Officer Christian testified that in

his experience as a police officer, he has encountered velvet Crown Royal bags approximately

50 times. He testified most times he has encountered these bags, they contain narcotics or a

weapon. The .25-caliber ammunition located inside the Crown Royal bag was significant to

Officer Christian because a .25-caliber handgun was recovered during the traffic stop. Officer

Christian also testified regarding the digital scale found in the hotel room. He testified he had

encountered such scales “hundreds, upon hundreds” of times throughout his experience as a

police officer. Officer Christian testified the price of narcotics is generally determined by its

weight. Narcotics dealers use digital scales to ensure they are giving their customers the correct

quantity of narcotics. Narcotics users may also possess scales to make sure they are not

“shorted” when they buy drugs.

¶ 31 Sergeant Dennis Baltzell of the Champaign police department testified to the significance

of the plastic Baggies, of which the corners were removed. The Baggies were indicative of

bags that have been used to package controlled substances, because the corners of the Baggies

were missing. Based on his training and experience, Sergeant Baltzell would expect this type

of Baggie to be found in locations where drugs were being packaged for sale. He would not

expect to find this type of Baggie in a location where controlled substances were merely being

consumed or used.

¶ 32 Sergeant Baltzell also recovered the crack cocaine from the hotel room’s trash can. He

testified that based on his training and experience, he concluded the crack cocaine was

packaged for sale–he found 17 individually wrapped packages, all containing similar amounts

of crack cocaine. Baltzell opined the 17 packages had a street value of $340. Further, if

Sergeant Baltzell were to find individually packaged amounts of a controlled substance, an

electronic scale, additional whole plastic bags, and bags that had been cut off at the corners all

at one location, he would conclude, based on his training and experience, the person in control

of the location was engaged in the manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance.

Narcotics dealers often protect themselves with a firearm. When drug dealers travel in a

vehicle, they often conceal the narcotics within the vehicle and carry a firearm for protection.

Narcotics dealers commonly ask someone else to hold their drugs while transporting them in a

vehicle. Sergeant Baltzell opined the quantity of crack cocaine recovered from the trash can

was not an amount consistent with personal use.

¶ 33 John Carnes, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified he

examined both the handgun and its magazine for latent prints of which he could make a

comparison. Carnes was unable to find any latent prints on the handgun or magazine capable of

comparison. Carnes testified it was possible to touch something and not leave behind

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fingerprints. Further, fingerprint residue is very fragile and not easy to preserve. Carnes was

not given any item to examine for latent prints beside the gun and its magazine.

¶ 34 Cory Formea, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified he

collected a swab from each side of the gun’s handle for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis

and placed the swabs in the evidence vault, per department policy. Aaron Small, a forensic

scientist with the Illinois State Police crime lab, performed the actual DNA analysis. He

compared the swabs taken from the handgun with a standard sample from defendant. Small

testified he obtained single-source DNA profiles from each of the swabs taken from the

handgun. Those DNA profiles matched defendant’s DNA profile. In fact, the matching DNA

profile taken from the gun and defendant would be expected to occur in 1 in 130 quintillion

African-Americans, 1 in 5.8 sextillion Caucasians, and 1 in 45 sextillion southwest Hispanic

unrelated individuals. (Defendant is African-American.) It is possible to touch something and

not leave behind DNA. No sample from Rosas was compared with the swabs from the gun.

¶ 35 John Martin, a forensic scientist at the Illinois State Police crime lab, testified the 17

individual packages recovered from the hotel room all contained a substance testing positive

for cocaine. He determined the aggregate weight of the substance contained within the 17 bags

was 4.6 grams. As for the package recovered from the toilet at the Champaign police

department, it contained a substance testing positive for cocaine. Martin determined the

aggregate weight of the substance recovered from the police department’s toilet was 2.6 grams.

¶ 36 The State also presented the testimony of Rosas. She testified she was 27 years old and had

been smoking crack cocaine for about 17 years. Rosas had had problems with the law over the

past three years, including two misdemeanor convictions and three pending felony charges.

The pending felony charges involved both possession and delivery of a controlled substance.

Rosas had known defendant for about four years, and they had been in a dating relationship for

the past two years. Defendant and Rosas had been sharing the room at the hotel for about two

weeks at the time of their arrest, but defendant spent the night in the hotel room only some of

those nights. Defendant kept a couple changes of clothes, various personal items, and a laptop

computer in the room. Defendant also kept his crack cocaine in the room.

¶ 37 The night before Rosas and defendant were arrested, Rosas observed a man, nicknamed

“Rabbit,” enter the room and leave a large ball of cocaine for defendant. Rabbit and defendant

did not exchange any words. Rosas then observed defendant break down the cocaine using a

safety pin and package it for sale using the scale and plastic Baggies recovered from the room.

¶ 38 Once the crack cocaine was packaged for sale, defendant held onto the packages until

somebody called to set up a deal. Defendant’s customers would call defendant’s cellular

phone. Rosas answered the phone for defendant, took his customers’ orders, and arranged a

place to meet. Rosas would relay this information to defendant, and he would give her the

appropriate amount of crack cocaine. Rosas would deliver the crack cocaine for defendant,

either by bicycle or one of her friends’ vehicles, and return the money to defendant. Rosas

helped defendant deal drugs because she “was an addict, and you know, if I done something for

him, you know, I would get me some dope, myself.”

¶ 39 Rosas testified defendant obtained the handgun from a person in Rantoul. He traded a

couple of bags of crack cocaine for the weapon. Defendant then asked Rosas to hold onto the

gun for him because he was on probation and forbidden from possessing a weapon. Rosas was

scared to hold onto the gun because she had never been in that much trouble. Defendant put the

gun in her purse when they left the hotel on March 18, 2011. Rosas touched the gun only once

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when asked by defendant to wipe off his fingerprints, but Rosas did not do so. Rosas also

testified as to how the crack cocaine came to be concealed within her vagina. She testified just

before Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop, defendant handed her the cocaine and told

her to hide it inside her body, which she understood to mean inside her vagina. Rosas complied

with defendant’s request.

¶ 40 On cross-examination, Rosas admitted she was hoping to receive leniency from the State’s

Attorney in her pending cases by testifying against defendant here. Rosas also admitted she

smoked at least nine $20 pieces of crack cocaine per day. When showed a picture of the dresser

drawer containing the scale and Crown Royal bag, Rosas denied the items were hers. “Rabbit”

sold crack cocaine to Rosas on occasion, but not while she was living at the hotel. She stated

she and defendant both stayed in the hotel room and defendant paid for the room.

¶ 41 Defense counsel then confronted Rosas with the numerous inconsistent statements she had

given throughout the pendency of this case. Rosas admitted she first told Officer Sumption

nothing illegal was contained within the car before she told him a gun was in her purse. While

sitting in the back of the squad car, Rosas told the officers approximately one-half ounce of

crack cocaine was in a black duffel bag in the hotel room. Defense counsel also confronted

Rosas with the inconsistency in her story of the transaction by which defendant came into

possession of the handgun.

¶ 42 Defense counsel confronted Rosas with her conflicting statements regarding how the

handgun got into her purse–she first told police defendant carried her purse containing the

weapon to the vehicle but later told police defendant placed the handgun in her purse just

before Officer McDonald initiated the traffic stop. Defense counsel also confronted Rosas

about the crack cocaine found concealed in her vagina. When her postarrest interview began,

Rosas denied having anything illegal on her person, but during the course of the interview, a

bag containing individually wrapped pieces of cocaine was recovered from the toilet after

Rosas had used it. Rosas told police defendant physically placed the crack cocaine inside her

body, but she later told them defendant handed her the drugs and told her to conceal them

inside her vagina.

¶ 43 Rosas also admitted she told Officer McDonald she would cooperate as long as she did not

go to jail. Defense counsel then confronted Rosas with her affidavit in support of defendant’s

Franks motion to suppress. Rosas admitted she signed the document before the January 2012

hearing on defendant’s Franks motion. Rosas also admitted she testified she signed the

document in front of a notary. When asked whether she wrote the document, Rosas testified

she “helped writing that document.” Rosas then testified she was told to write the portions

incriminating herself and exonerating defendant, but she did not identify who told her to do so.

¶ 44 On redirect examination, the State asked Rosas about the affidavit in support of

defendant’s Franks motion. Rosas testified defendant told her to write the affidavit and to

include the information exonerating defendant. The State inquired about Rosas’s statement in

the affidavit in which she stated she was never taken to Savoy, Illinois, to swear to an affidavit

before a judge. Rosas testified she included this statement, even though she knew it could be

proved false, because she was scared of defendant. She knew if she did not take the blame,

defendant would punch and slap her. Defendant took Rosas to the notary and stood by as the

document was notarized.

¶ 45 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was renting the hotel room for Rosas as a favor

to her. Defendant kept clothing and some toiletries at the hotel room because he would stay the

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night in the room on occasion. Defendant did not keep anything in the drawers. According to

defendant, “[e]verything in that room basically belongs to Ms. Rosas, because the room was

for her, because I had my own place.”

¶ 46 Defendant knew Rosas had a handgun, “[b]ecause she dated a man once who’s named

Jimmy, that’s what she told me, and he was the one that had had the weapon.” Defendant saw

the handgun in Rosas’s possession three days before the traffic stop and asked Rosas to dispose

of it. Rosas kept the gun because she knew she could trade it for drugs. Defendant touched the

gun, only once, because he thought it was a “nice weapon.”

¶ 47 Defendant denied attempting to start his vehicle after Officer McDonald asked him to exit

the car. Defendant denied he ever handled the handgun aside from when he first discovered it

was in Rosas’s possession. Rosas carried the handgun to his vehicle of her own free will.

Defendant denied packaging and selling drugs from the hotel. Defendant denied ever selling

drugs–he was previously a drug user, not a dealer. Rosas did not deliver drugs for defendant.

Defendant did not know drugs were in the hotel room. He knew, however, Rosas supported her

drug habit through prostitution, and he had been present when Rosas brought men to the room.

¶ 48 Defendant denied ever possessing the crack cocaine in Rosas’s vagina. He did not tell

Rosas to hide the crack cocaine inside her vagina. Rosas fabricated her statements

incriminating defendant because she wanted leniency from the State. Defendant denied telling

Rosas what information to include in her affidavit in support of his Franks motion. Defendant

never told Rosas how to testify in another proceeding and never threatened her harm.

¶ 49 On cross-examination, defendant maintained he was helping Rosas rent the hotel room out

of the goodness of his heart. He would take cash she gave him to go pay for the room. He

sometimes paid a portion of the bill out of his own pocket. Sometimes, defendant “dated”

Rosas and gave her money in exchange. Defendant knew Rosas was a drug user on March 18,

2011, but he “never got involved” with what she did. He often told her to go to rehab, but she

was stubborn and would not listen. “She kept her lifestyle,” defendant testified, “and my

mistake was just being around her like that.”

¶ 50 Defendant stated he had not smoked crack cocaine in four to five years. At the time of trial,

defendant still associated with Rosas. When asked whether his relationship with Rosas was the

same as it was on March 18, 2011, defendant stated it was. The last time defendant “dated”

Rosas was about three months prior to trial. Defendant thought he and Rosas would still be on

good terms after her testimony at trial. Rosas was only incriminating him to get leniency from

the State. Defendant was not upset with Rosas’s testimony at trial because he knew she would

testify as she did all along. Defendant knew he was the person the police were really after.

Defendant was never guilty of any offense of which he was accused. This incident, like all his

other previous run-ins with the law, was caused by the fact he is a nice person and others take

advantage of him.

¶ 51 On this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on both counts.

¶ 52 F. Defendant’s Sentence

¶ 53 On July 2, 2012, the cause proceeded to defendant’s sentencing hearing. Prior to the

hearing, the parties were allowed to suggest corrections to the presentence investigation report

(PSI). Only the State took this opportunity, adding dates and case numbers to the portion of the

PSI detailing defendant’s criminal history. After the parties presented evidence in aggravation

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and mitigation and argued the appropriate sentence for this case, defendant addressed the

court. Defendant stated he was innocent of the charges in this case. In fact, he was not guilty of

any offense in his criminal history. On this occasion and in his past, defendant was guilty only

by his association with criminals.

¶ 54 The trial court sentenced defendant to a 30-year term on count I and a concurrent 10-year

term on count II. After announcing this sentence, the court addressed the issues of sentencing

credit and monetary assessments with the parties. The court asked defense counsel whether

145 days was the correct calculation of credit for time served, and counsel responded in the

affirmative. Thereafter, the court awarded defendant 145 days’ credit for time served and

ordered defendant to pay a $100 crime laboratory analysis fee, a $2,000 mandatory

assessment, and a $340 street-value fine for the cocaine recovered from the hotel room. In

addition, the court authorized a $250 DNA analysis fee to be imposed, but only if defendant

had not previously been assessed the fee. Finally, the court ordered defendant to “pay all fines,

fees, and costs as authorized by statute,” but it did not specifically refer to any fine, fee, or cost

other than those already stated. The court asked whether the parties had anything else to add,

and both parties responded they did not.

¶ 55 After defendant’s sentencing hearing, the circuit clerk calculated the statutorily authorized

assessments against defendant, which are reflected in a printout from the clerk. The printout

from the clerk (see appendix), shows defendant was assessed the following fines and fees on

count I: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10 automation assessment; (3) a $100

circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security assessment; (5) a $50 court-finance

assessment; (6) a $40 State’s Attorney assessment (a $30 assessment for felony conviction plus

the $10 remitted to the State’s Attorney as part of the juvenile expungement assessment); (7) a

$2 “State’s Attorney Au” assessment; (8) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (9) a $5

spinal-cord-research assessment; (10) a $250 “State Offender DN” assessment; (11) a $100

trauma-fund assessment; (12) a $590 traffic/criminal surcharge; (13) a $30 juvenile

expungement assessment listed as three separate $10 assessments for the State Police Services

Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund (the $10 assessment for the State’s Attorney is included

in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney on the clerk’s printout), and Circuit Clerk

Operations and Administrative Fund; (14) a $5 drug-court assessment; (15) a $236 violent

crimes victims assistance (VCVA) assessment; (16) a $340 street-value fine; (17) a $1,275

mandatory assessment; and (18) a $10 State Police operations assessment.

¶ 56 On count II, the circuit clerk’s printout shows defendant was assessed the following fines

and fees: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10 automation assessment; (3) a $100

circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security assessment; (5) a $50 court-finance

assessment; (6) a $40 State’s Attorney assessment (a $30 assessment for felony conviction plus

the $10 remitted to the State’s Attorney as part of the juvenile expungement assessment); (7) a

$2 “State’s Attorney Au” assessment; (8) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (9) a $10

traffic/criminal surcharge; (10) a $30 juvenile expungement assessment listed as three separate

$10 assessments for the State Police Services Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund (the $10

assessment for the State’s Attorney is included in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney

on the clerk’s printout), and Circuit Clerk Operations and Administrative Fund; (11) a $5

drug-court assessment; (12) a $4 VCVA assessment (we note the printout also contains an

entry called “VICTIMS FUND–NO FI,” with no dollar amount listed); and (13) a $10 State

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Police operations assessment. The printout also contains an entry for “CRIME LAB,” but no

dollar amount is listed.

¶ 57 This appeal followed.

¶ 58 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 59 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 60 Defendant argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction

for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Specifically, defendant

argues the State’s case was based entirely on the incredible testimony of Kimberly Rosas, and

as a result, defendant’s conviction and sentence for that offense must be vacated. The State

responds the evidence, notwithstanding Rosas’s testimony, is sufficient to sustain his

conviction. Defendant does not challenge his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon

by a felon.

¶ 61 When met with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considers whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.

Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114, 871 N.E.2d 728, 740 (2007). The critical question is whether the

record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

“This standard of review applies, ‘regardless of whether the evidence is direct or

circumstantial [citation], and regardless of whether the defendant receives a bench or jury trial

[citation].’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 743 N.E.2d 32, 40 (2000)).

¶ 62 It is not this court’s function to a retry defendant when met with challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1999).

Instead, our duty is “to carefully examine the evidence while giving due consideration to the

fact that the [trial] court and jury saw and heard the witnesses.” Id. As such, the jury’s findings

regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 115, 871

N.E.2d at 740. The jury’s findings regarding witness credibility are neither conclusive nor

binding, however, because reasonable people may act unreasonably on occasion. Id.

“Accordingly, a conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” Id.

¶ 63 To sustain a conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant had knowledge of

the presence of the controlled substance; (2) the controlled substance was in the immediate

possession or control of the defendant; and (3) the defendant intended to deliver the controlled

substance. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (1995).

¶ 64 Knowledge can rarely be proved by direct evidence and is typically “proved by defendant’s

actions, declarations, or conduct from which an inference of knowledge may be fairly drawn.”

People v. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d 348, 352, 636 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1994). Because knowledge is

difficult to prove, when actual or constructive possession is established, knowledge can

generally be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also People v. Nettles, 23 Ill.

2d 306, 308, 178 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1961) (“where narcotics are found on premises under

defendant’s control, it may be inferred that the defendant had both knowledge and control of

the narcotics”). Actual possession requires actual physical dominion over the contraband,

while constructive possession is established where a defendant has exclusive control of the

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premises in which the contraband is found. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 352-53, 636 N.E.2d

at 90. “The requirement of exclusive control does not mean that possession may not be joint.”

Id. at 353, 636 N.E.2d at 90.

¶ 65 Intent is also rarely proved by direct evidence. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2d at

1026. Courts look to a variety of factors to prove the intent element of the instant offense,

which include:

“whether the quantity of controlled substance in defendant’s possession is too large to

be viewed as being for personal consumption [citation], the high purity of the drug

confiscated [citation], the possession of weapons [citation], the possession of large

amounts of cash [citation], the possession of police scanners, beepers or cellular

telephones [citations], the possession of drug paraphernalia [citation] and the manner in

which the substance is packaged [citation].” Id., 657 N.E.2d at 1026-27.

In People v. Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d 794, 663 N.E.2d 1061 (1996), this court affirmed a

defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled

substance where the drugs were packaged for sale and the State proved one additional factor

tending to show an intent to deliver–the presence of a large amount of cash on defendant’s

person. Id. at 802, 663 N.E.2d at 1066-67; see also People v. Delgado, 256 Ill. App. 3d 119,

123, 628 N.E.2d 727, 730 (1993) (“The minimum this court has required for the affirmance of

a conviction for delivery involving small amounts of drugs is possession of the controlled

substance packaged for sale, plus at least one additional factor indicative of delivery ***.”).

¶ 66 In this case, the record evidence reasonably supports a finding of guilt. Defendant had

exclusive control over the hotel room in which the 4.6 grams of cocaine were found. In this

case, defendant was the only person named in the hotel rental agreement and paid for the room

in cash each day. Defendant kept important personal belongings in the room, such as a blank

check, a laptop computer, the certificate of title to his vehicle, and prescription medication.

Defendant also kept clothes and toiletries in the hotel room. Just because Rosas also had

unfettered access to the room and stayed there more often than defendant does not mean

defendant did not have exclusive control over the premises. See People v. Songer, 229 Ill. App.

3d 901, 905, 594 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1992). Exclusive possession may be joint. People v. Burke,

136 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599, 483 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1985). Because defendant had exclusive

control over the hotel room in which the crack cocaine was found, he constructively possessed

the crack cocaine recovered therefrom.

¶ 67 Since defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine found in the trash can of

the hotel room, the jury was entitled to find defendant had the requisite knowledge crack

cocaine was present in the room. See Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d at 308, 178 N.E.2d at 363. Here, other

facts tend to show defendant had knowledge of the presence of crack cocaine inside the hotel

room. Defendant was aware of the fact Rosas used cocaine. Further, defendant knew Rosas

“dated” men at the hotel to support her crack cocaine addiction. Defendant had the requisite

knowledge crack cocaine was located inside the hotel room.

¶ 68 Based on the record, we also conclude the jury was justified in finding defendant had the

requisite intent to deliver the crack cocaine. While executing the search warrant for the hotel

room, the police recovered a digital scale, live .25-caliber ammunition, whole plastic Baggies,

plastic Baggies of which the bottom corners had been removed, and 17 individually wrapped

pieces of crack cocaine. Because the crack cocaine found in the hotel room was packaged in a

manner consistent with how it is sold, the presence of one additional factor tending to show

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intent can support a finding of intent to deliver a controlled substance. See Beverly, 278 Ill.

App. 3d at 802, 663 N.E.2d at 1066-67. Here, not only was the crack cocaine packaged for sale,

but ammunition and paraphernalia consistent with drug dealing was also found in the hotel

room. Further, the police recovered a gun during the search of defendant’s vehicle. The jury

was entitled to find defendant had the requisite intent to deliver the 4.6 grams of cocaine in the

hotel room.

¶ 69 Turning to the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine recovered from the toilet at the Champaign

police department, the record evidence supports a finding of guilt. Defendant had constructive

possession over the crack cocaine hidden inside Rosas’s body as he had exclusive control over

the vehicle in which Rosas was traveling. Defendant was the sole person listed on the vehicle’s

certificate of title. While the crack cocaine was located in Rosas’s body, giving her actual

possession thereof, the jury was entitled to find defendant constructively possessed the

cocaine. See People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 82, 740 N.E.2d 775, 779 (2000) (“The rule that

possession must be exclusive does not mean that the possession may not be joint ***.”).

¶ 70 Defendant’s constructive possession of the crack cocaine ultimately recovered from the

Champaign police department toilet gives rise to an inference defendant had knowledge of the

presence of the crack cocaine. See Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d at 308, 178 N.E.2d at 363. Further,

testimony of defendant’s attempt to lock the door and start the vehicle supports the inference

defendant had the requisite knowledge.

¶ 71 Finally, the record evidence shows the jury was entitled to find defendant had the requisite

intent to deliver a controlled substance. The crack cocaine ultimately recovered from the

Champaign police department toilet was packaged for sale in the same manner as that

recovered from the hotel room. Further, a loaded handgun was recovered from Rosas’s purse

during the traffic stop.

¶ 72 Defendant asserts the State’s evidence against him “was based entirely on the testimony of

admitted addict and co-defendant Kimberly Rosas.” Defendant argues Rosas’s testimony does

not carry the absolute conviction of its truth and, therefore, does not suffice as proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of his guilt. In support of his argument, defendant cites Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532,

708 N.E.2d 365. In Smith, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on his murder

conviction. Id. at 534, 708 N.E.2d at 366. The supreme court determined the “weakness of the

State’s chief witness, along with the lack of other direct evidence linking defendant to the

crime, required a not guilty verdict as a matter of law.” Id. at 542, 708 N.E.2d at 370. The

supreme court noted “the circumstantial evidence tending to link defendant to the murder

merely narrowed the class of individuals who may have killed the victim, without pointing

specifically to defendant.” Id. at 545, 708 N.E.2d at 371.

¶ 73 The record shows Rosas’s statements throughout the pendency of this case contained

numerous inconsistencies as to how she came into possession of the gun and the drugs

ultimately recovered from her vagina. Her two affidavits appear to be in direct conflict with

one another. Rosas is admittedly addicted to crack cocaine and hoped for leniency from the

State in exchange for her statements incriminating defendant. Rosas’s statements are subject to

question, and they were subjected to scrutiny by the attorneys in this case. Further, Rosas

testified she was charged as defendant’s codefendant with possession of the crack cocaine

hidden in her vagina. On the State’s request, the jury was instructed to view Rosas’s testimony

with caution. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (prior

inconsistent statements); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (4th ed. 2000)

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(accomplice testimony). The trier of fact was entitled to decide which version of events she

gave should be credited.

¶ 74 Moreover, we disagree the State’s case was based entirely on Rosas’s statements and

testimony. The State presented much circumstantial evidence against defendant

notwithstanding Rosas’s statements and testimony. Defendant rented a hotel room in which

extensive evidence of a drug-dealing operation was found. The State presented the testimony

of 11 people in addition to Rosas. Officer Christian and Sergeant Baltzell explained to the jury

the evidentiary significance of the items found in the hotel room–the items found were

indicative of the manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance. The jury was present

throughout the proceedings and found the State’s witnesses more credible than the defendant’s

own self-serving statements of innocence. The evidence presented by the State reasonably

supports a finding of guilt, and our function is not to reweigh this evidence. We affirm

defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

¶ 75 B. Fines and Fees

¶ 76 Defendant contends the trial court improperly duplicated the assessments imposed

pursuant to his conviction. Specifically, defendant argues he was assessed the statutorily

authorized fines and fees on each count within his single case, which is improper under People

v. Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d 612. Defendant argues this court should

vacate the duplicate fines. In addition, defendant argues the circuit clerk improperly assessed a

$250 DNA analysis fee after the court conditionally ordered the fee at his sentencing hearing.

¶ 77 The State concedes defendant was improperly assessed duplicate fines and fees and the

DNA analysis fee. We do not accept the State’s concession as to the duplicate fines and fees.

Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 60, 896 N.E.2d 327, 333 (2008). The State, further,

disagrees the trial court imposed certain fines, instead arguing because the circuit clerk

improperly imposed these assessments, remand is required so the fines may be imposed by the

judge. In addition, the State contends the court, on remand, must increase the street-value fine

imposed pursuant to defendant’s conviction on count I because the court erroneously imposed

the fine on only the cocaine found in the hotel room.

¶ 78 1. Fines and Fees on Each Count: Rethinking Alghadi

¶ 79 Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s imposition of one of each of the following

assessments on each count in his case: (1) a $5 document-storage assessment; (2) a $10

automation assessment; (3) a $100 circuit-clerk assessment; (4) a $25 court-security

assessment; (5) a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment; (6) a $50 court-finance assessment; (7) a

$40 State’s Attorney assessment; (8) a VCVA assessment ($236 on count I and $4 on count II);

and (9) a $10 State Police operations assessment. Defendant contends the court could not

properly impose these duplicate assessments on each count within his case, citing Alghadi,

2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d 612.

¶ 80 a. Trial Court Must Impose Fines as Component of Sentence

¶ 81 We must first consider whether the trial court or the circuit clerk imposed the assessments

in this case. Defendant argues the trial court improperly imposed the duplicate assessments of

which he takes issue. The State, however, points out the circuit clerk imposed the assessments.

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See People v. Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227 (“In appeals raising

statutory credit issues, this requires the parties’ briefs to contain a statement of facts identifying

which specific fines the trial court identified and expressly imposed as part of the sentence–and

which fines the circuit clerk simply assessed after sentencing and without bringing them to the

judge’s attention and having the judge sign off on them in a supplemental sentencing

judgment–and providing appropriate citations to the record. The parties may not agree to

overlook or otherwise ignore the circuit clerk’s imposition of fines not ordered by the trial

court.”). The record shows the court, at defendant’s July 2012 sentencing hearing, ordered

defendant to “pay all fines, fees, and costs as authorized by statute.” The record contains no

docket entry, order, or amended sentencing judgment reflecting the imposition of these

assessments during sentencing. The record does not otherwise indicate the court approved

these assessments, defendant or the attorneys were present for their imposition, or even that

defendant or defense counsel were notified thereof.

¶ 82 In this case, when the trial court ordered defendant to “pay all fines, fees, and costs as

authorized by statute,” it improperly delegated its power to impose a sentence to the circuit

clerk. See People v. Fontana, 251 Ill. App. 3d 694, 709, 622 N.E.2d 893, 904 (1993) (Second

District, “the imposition of a fine is a judicial act which can be performed only by a judge”);

People v. Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 52, 992 N.E.2d 3 (“The circuit clerk has no

authority to impose fines.”); Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶¶ 29-38, 5 N.E.3d 227 (in

finding the clerk improperly imposed the fines at issue, the court held the task of imposing

fines may not be delegated to the clerk); People v. Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993, ¶ 37, 5

N.E.3d 246 (vacating the circuit clerk’s imposition of mandatory fines because the circuit clerk

has no authority to levy fines against a criminal defendant); see also People v. Isaacson, 409

Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1085, 950 N.E.2d 1183, 1189-90 (2011) (trial court expressly imposed a

DNA assessment and a contribution to the Crime Detection Network and ordered defendant to

pay whatever mandatory assessments, including the VCVA fine, listed by the circuit clerk; the

record contained no evidence the court itself determined the mandatory fines that applied to the

defendant’s conviction and the appropriate amounts of those fines; this court held the

conditional discharge order erroneously abdicated that task to the clerk). Any fine imposed by

the clerk must be vacated and the cause remanded for the trial judge to impose the fines.

Montag, 2014 IL App (4th) 120993, ¶ 37, 5 N.E.3d 246.

¶ 83 b. Assessments Imposed by Circuit Clerk

¶ 84 i. Distinction Between Fines and Fees

¶ 85 We next consider whether the assessments levied by the circuit clerk in this case are fines

or fees, because any fine assessed by the clerk must be vacated.

¶ 86 The supreme court has recognized, despite their label as fees, certain assessments imposed

pursuant to a conviction are fines. People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 250, 919 N.E.2d 906,

909-10 (2009); People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 599-600, 861 N.E.2d 967, 985-86 (2006). The

Graves court explained the distinction between fines and fees as follows:

“A fee is defined as a charge that seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the state, or to

compensate the state for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the defendant.

[Citation.] A fine, however, is punitive in nature and is a pecuniary punishment

imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. [Citation.]”

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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250, 919 N.E.2d at 909.

¶ 87 ii. Can Fines and/or Fees Be Imposed on Each Count?

¶ 88 As part of our analysis, we next consider whether the assessments levied in this case can

properly be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case.

¶ 89 This court has addressed the issue of whether certain fines, fees, and costs may be imposed

on each count in a defendant’s single case. In Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, 960 N.E.2d

612, we explained, without the benefit of briefs or argument by the parties, as follows:

“Although a defendant may be charged with multiple counts within the same case

number, the defendant may only be assessed (1) one document-storage fee, (2) one

automation fee, (3) one circuit-clerk fee, (4) one court-security fee, (5) one

arrestee’s-medical assessment, (6) one court-finance fee, (7) one State’s Attorney

assessment, (8) one VCVA fine, and (9) one drug-court fee.” (Emphases in original.)

Alghadi, 2011 IL App (4th) 100012, ¶ 22, 960 N.E.2d 612.

¶ 90 Following this court’s decision in Alghadi, the Second District addressed the issue of

whether fines may be imposed on each count within a defendant’s single case. In People v.

Pohl, 2012 IL App (2d) 100629, 969 N.E.2d 508, and People v. Martino, 2012 IL App (2d)

101244, 970 N.E.2d 1236, the Second District approached the issue by examining the language

of the statute or ordinance imposing each fee to ascertain whether that fee could be imposed

more than once. While the instant appeal was pending, this court decided People v. Larue,

2014 IL App (4th) 120595. In Larue, we declined to apply our own decision in Alghadi, and

instead followed the Second District’s approach to duplicate fines and fees. Id. ¶ 59. We will

examine the statutory language authorizing or mandating each fine or fee to determine whether

the imposition of multiple fines or fees in a defendant’s single case is proper.

¶ 91 iii. The Assessments in This Case

¶ 92 To determine whether an assessment is a fine or a fee and whether the assessment may be

imposed on each count within a defendant’s case, we look to the language of the statutes

providing for their imposition. Because the issues presented are ones of statutory construction,

our review is de novo. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 959 N.E.2d 621. Our primary

objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Id.

The best indication of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which should be

given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6, 980 N.E.2d

1107. “When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as

written without resort to aids of statutory construction.” People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 232

Ill. 2d 179, 184, 902 N.E.2d 667, 671 (2009).

¶ 93 (a) The Document-Storage Assessments:

A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 94 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 document-storage fee (705 ILCS

105/27.3c(a) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, 2014 IL App (4th)

120595, ¶ 62, we held the clerk could only assess one document-storage fee against the

defendant, even though his case resulted in multiple convictions. We vacate one of the

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document-storage fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 95 (b) The Automation Assessments:

A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 96 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 automation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a

(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could assess only

one automation fee per case. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 64. We vacate one of the

automation fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 97 (c) The Circuit-Clerk Assessments:

A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 98 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $100 circuit-clerk fee (705 ILCS

105/27.1a(w) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk

could assess only one circuit-clerk fee per felony complaint. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595,

¶ 66. Here, the two counts filed by the State constituted one felony complaint. We vacate one

of the circuit-clerk fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 99 (d) The Court-Security Assessments:

A Fee Not Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 100 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $25 court-security fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1103

(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could assess only

one court-security fee against the defendant. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 68. We

vacate one of the court-security fees assessed against defendant in this case.

¶ 101 (e) The Court-Finance Assessments:

A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 102 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $50 court-finance fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c),

(g) (West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk can properly

impose a court-finance fee for each judgment of guilty or order of supervision. Larue, 2014 IL

App (4th) 120595, ¶ 70. In this case, because defendant was found guilty of two offenses, the

clerk properly assessed two court-finance fees against defendant.

¶ 103 (f) The State’s Attorney Assessments:

A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 104 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $40 State’s Attorney fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002

(West 2010)) on each count in defendant’s case. In Larue, we held the clerk could impose the

State’s Attorney assessment on a per-conviction basis. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 72.

In this case, because defendant was convicted of two offenses, the circuit clerk properly

assessed two State’s Attorney fees against defendant.

¶ 105 Our review of the statute authorizing the State’s Attorney fee shows the State’s Attorney is

entitled to receive $30 for each felony conviction. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2010). The

additional $10 listed under the State’s Attorney assessment on the circuit clerk’s printout is the

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$10 sum paid to the State’s Attorney out of the $30 juvenile-expungement assessment

discussed below. See 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 2010).

¶ 106 (g) The State’s Attorney Automation Assessments:

A Fee Properly Imposed on Each Count

¶ 107 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $2 State’s Attorney automation fee on each

count in defendant’s case. Section 4-2002(a) of the 2012 version of the Counties Code

provides, in pertinent part:

“State’s attorneys shall be entitled to a $2 fee to be paid by the defendant on a

judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision for a violation of any provision of the

Illinois Vehicle Code or any felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense to discharge the

expenses of the State’s Attorney’s office for establishing and maintaining automated

record keeping systems.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012).

Public Act 97-673 amended section 4-2002 of the Counties Code to add the above-quoted

provision, which does not appear in the version of section 4-2002 in effect when defendant

committed the offenses in question. Pub. Act 97-673, § 5 (eff. June 1, 2012). If the assessment

is a fine, we must vacate its imposition as violating the prohibition on ex post facto

punishment. People v. Dalton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 158, 163, 941 N.E.2d 428, 434 (2010) (“The

prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to laws that are punitive. It does not apply to

fees, which are compensatory instead of punitive.”).

¶ 108 The plain language of section 4-2002(a) evidences the legislature’s intent the $2

assessment be compensatory in nature. The assessment is to be used to “discharge the expenses

of the State’s Attorney’s office for establishing and maintaining automated record keeping

systems.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012). Because the assessment is intended to reimburse

the State’s Attorneys for their expenses related to automated record-keeping systems, the

assessment is not punitive in nature. The assessment is a fee. Thus, the circuit clerk could

properly impose the assessment against defendant, even though the provision authorizing the

assessment became law after defendant committed the offenses charged in this case.

¶ 109 The plain language of section 4-2002(a) clearly evidences the legislature’s intent this fee

be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. A defendant must pay the $2 fee “on a

judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision for *** any felony, misdemeanor, or petty

offense.” 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012). Because a defendant may properly be charged

with and found guilty of multiple felony, misdemeanor, or petty offenses in a single case, the

$2 State’s Attorney automation fees could be imposed on each count in defendant’s case. This

conclusion is bolstered by the language in section 4-2002(a), providing “[n]o fees shall be

charged on more than 10 counts in any one indictment or information on trial and conviction;

nor on more than 10 counts against any one defendant on pleas of guilty.” Id. The circuit clerk

properly assessed two State’s Attorney automation fees against defendant.

¶ 110 (h) The Arrestee’s Medical Assessments:

A Noncreditable Fine That Can Be Imposed by the Court on Each Count

¶ 111 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 arrestee’s medical assessment on each

count in defendant’s case. Section 17 of the County Jail Act (Jail Act) (730 ILCS 125/17 (West

2010)) provides, in pertinent part:

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“The county shall be entitled to a $10 fee for each conviction or order of

supervision for a criminal violation, other than a petty offense or business offense. The

fee shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon

conviction or entry of an order of supervision. The fee shall not be considered a part of

the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine.

All such fees collected shall be deposited by the county in a fund to be established

and known as the County Jail Medical Costs Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used

solely for reimbursement to the county of costs for medical expenses and

administration of the Fund.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2010).

¶ 112 In Larue, this court held the arrestee’s medical fee, despite its label as a “fee,” was actually

a fine and could not be imposed by the circuit clerk. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 57. In

support of this conclusion, we noted a defendant can be required to pay the fine even though

defendant did not receive medical treatment or costs. Id.; see People v. Jackson, 2011 IL

110615, ¶¶ 24, 27, 955 N.E.2d 1164. Additionally, classifying the arrestee’s medical

assessment as a fee would render the language in the statute providing, “[t]he fee shall not be

considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine” (730 ILCS 125/17 (West

2010)), superfluous because fees are not subject to credit under section 110-14 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2010)). People v. Sulton, 395 Ill.

App. 3d 186, 190, 916 N.E.2d 642, 645-46 (2009). Because the arrestee’s medical assessment

is a fine, the clerk could not properly impose it.

¶ 113 The plain language of section 17 of the Jail Act clearly evidences the legislature’s intent

this fine be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The fine is to be imposed “for each

conviction or order of supervision.” 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2010). A defendant may properly

be convicted of multiple offenses in a single case. Because a defendant may properly be

convicted on multiple counts in a given case, the trial court must reimpose the arrestee’s

medical fine on each count in defendant’s case.

¶ 114 (i) The Spinal-Cord-Research Assessment:

A Noncreditable Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 115 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 spinal-cord-research assessment against

defendant on count I only. Section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified

Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2010)) provides:

“(c) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fee of

$5 shall be assessed by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit

Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act

for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This

additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any

reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.” 730 ILCS

5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2010).

¶ 116 In Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 599, 861 N.E.2d at 985, our supreme court held the

spinal-cord-research fee, despite its statutory label as a fee, is a fine. We vacate the

spinal-cord-research fine imposed by the circuit clerk in this case. On remand, the trial court

shall reimpose the fine as mandated by the statute. Because the clerk imposed this fine on

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count I only, we need not address whether the fine can be properly imposed on each count in a

defendant’s case.

¶ 117 (j) The Trauma-Fund Assessment:

A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 118 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $100 trauma-fund assessment on count I only.

Section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code provides:

“(b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fine

of $100 shall be levied by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the

Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of

Courts Act for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund for distribution as provided under

Section 3.225 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.” (Emphases

added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2010).

¶ 119 In Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 593, 861 N.E.2d at 981-82, our supreme court held the trauma-fund

assessment authorized under section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code was clearly a fine because

the legislature labeled it as such. We vacate the trauma-fund fine imposed by the circuit clerk

after defendant’s sentencing. On remand, the trial court must reimpose the trauma-fund fine as

mandated by the statute. Because the clerk imposed this fine on count I only, we need not

address whether the fine can be properly imposed on each count in a defendant’s case.

¶ 120 (k) The Traffic/Criminal Surcharges:

A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 121 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $590 criminal surcharge on count I and a $10

criminal surcharge on count II. Section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code provides, in pertinent

part:

“(c) There shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing for a criminal or

traffic offense, except an offense relating to parking or registration, or offense by a

pedestrian, an additional penalty of $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine

imposed.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010).

¶ 122 The plain language of section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code clearly shows the legislature

intended this assessment to be punitive in nature. The statute refers to the assessment as “an

additional penalty.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010). Further, the statute does not indicate the

assessment is to be used to reimburse the county or the State for the expenses related to the

prosecution of a defendant. Because the circuit clerk imposed the criminal surcharges after

defendant was sentenced by the trial court, we vacate these fines.

¶ 123 The plain language of section 5-9-1(c) shows the legislature intended this assessment be

imposed on each count in a criminal case. The statute provides the fine is to be “imposed in

sentencing for a criminal or traffic offense.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010). Because a

defendant may properly be sentenced for multiple offenses in a single case, a trial judge may

properly impose this fine on each count.

¶ 124 On remand, the trial court must reimpose a criminal surcharge on each count in defendant’s

case. This may require the fine to be recalculated, which will require the trial court to calculate

the total fines on each count and assess an additional $10 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of

fine imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2010); see People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th)

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120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (“ ‘Lump Sum Surcharge’ ” imposed pursuant to section

5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated before the VCVA assessment; the surcharge is

added to the total fines and the VCVA assessment is calculated based on the new total); People

v. O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App (4th) 110018, ¶ 24, 979 N.E.2d 1023 (amount of surcharge fine is

based upon the gross amount of fines levied against defendant; VCVA assessment to be

imposed after surcharge is calculated).

¶ 125 (l) The Juvenile Expungement Fund Assessments:

A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 126 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $30 Juvenile Expungement Fund assessment

on each count in defendant’s case. The $30 juvenile-expungement assessment is listed on the

clerk’s printout as a $10 assessment for the Clerk Operations and Administrative Fund, a $10

assessment for the State’s Attorney Office Fund (the $10 assessment for the State’s Attorney is

included in the $40 charge listed for the State’s Attorney on the clerk’s printout), and a $10

assessment for the State Police Services Fund. Section 5-9-1.17 of the Unified Code provides,

in pertinent part:

“(a) There shall be added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal

offense an additional fine of $30 to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or finding of

guilty resulting in a judgment of conviction.

(b) Ten dollars of each such additional fine shall be remitted to the State Treasurer

for deposit into the State Police Services Fund ***, $10 shall be paid to the State’s

Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the criminal offense, and $10 shall be retained by the

Circuit Clerk for administrative costs associated with the expungement of juvenile

records and shall be deposited into the Circuit Court Clerk Operation and

Administrative Fund.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West 2010).

¶ 127 The plain language of section 5-9-1.17 clearly shows the legislature intended this

assessment to be a fine. The statute refers to the assessment as “an additional fine” that is to “be

added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal offense.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(a)

(West 2010). Further, “the charge [is] used to expunge juvenile records and is in no way related

to the prosecution of the adult defendant against whom the charge is levied.” People v. Wynn,

2013 IL App (2d) 120575, ¶ 16, 3 N.E.3d 400; see Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56

(vacating the $30 juvenile-expungement fine because the clerk lacked authority to assess it).

Because the $30 juvenile-expungement assessment (including the three separate $10

assessments contained therein) is a fine, the circuit clerk cannot properly impose it. We vacate

the $30 juvenile-expungement fine–listed as three separate $10 charges for the Circuit Clerk

Operations and Administrative Fund, State’s Attorney’s Office Fund, and State Police

Services Fund–imposed on each count in defendant’s case. (We note our vacatur of the $10

assessment paid to the State’s Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the offense under section

5-9-1.17 does not affect the $30 to which the State’s Attorney was entitled on each count for

the two felony convictions in this case under section 4-2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS

5/4-2002(a) (West 2010)).)

¶ 128 The plain language of section 5-9-1.17 clearly shows the legislature intended this fine to be

imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The statute provides the fine is to “be added to

every penalty imposed in sentencing for a criminal offense.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS

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5/5-9-1.17(a) (West 2010). The fine is “to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or finding of guilty

resulting in a judgment of conviction.” 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(a) (West 2010). Because a

defendant can properly be found guilty of and sentenced for multiple criminal offenses in a

case, the juvenile-expungement fine can be properly imposed on each count in a defendant’s

case. On remand, the trial court must reimpose the $30 juvenile-expungement fine on each

count in defendant’s case.

¶ 129 (m) The Drug-Court Assessments:

A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 130 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $5 drug-court assessment on each count in

defendant’s case. Section 5-1101(f) of the Counties Code provides, in pertinent part:

“(f) In each county in which a drug court has been created, the county may adopt a

mandatory fee of up to $5 to be assessed as provided in this subsection. Assessments

collected by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to this subsection must be deposited

into an account specifically for the operation and administration of the drug court. ***

The fees are to be paid as follows:

***

(2) a fee of up to $5 paid by the defendant on a judgment of guilty or a grant of

supervision under Section 5-9-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections for a felony; for

a Class A, Class B, or Class C misdemeanor; for a petty offense; and for a business

offense.” 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010).

¶ 131 In this case, the $5 drug-court assessment imposed by the circuit clerk was a fine, despite

its label as a “fee,” because the assessment is intended to be used “for the operation and

administration of the drug court.” 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2010). Because defendant never

participated in drug court, this assessment did not reimburse the state for the costs of

prosecuting defendant. People v. Unander, 404 Ill. App. 3d 884, 886, 936 N.E.2d 795, 797

(2010); Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 53, 992 N.E.2d 3 (“Although the drug court

assessment pursuant to section 5-1101(f) of the Counties Code [citation] is labeled a fee, it is

actually a fine where, as here, defendant did not participate in drug court.”). Because the clerk

imposed the $5 drug-court fines after sentencing, we vacate these fines.

¶ 132 The plain language of section 5-1101(f)(2) of the Counties Code shows the legislature

intended this fine to be imposed on each count in a defendant’s case. The statute provides the

assessment is to be paid by a defendant “on a judgment of guilty or a grant of supervision.” 55

ILCS 5/5-1101(f)(2) (West 2010). Because a defendant may have a judgment of guilty

rendered on each count within a case, the plain language of the statute clearly evidences the

legislature’s intent a defendant may be assessed the drug-court fine on each count within his

case. On remand, the trial court must reimpose a $5 drug-court fine on each count in

defendant’s case.

¶ 133 (n) The VCVA Assessments:

A Noncreditable Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 134 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $236 VCVA assessment on count I and a $4

VCVA assessment on count II. Section 10(b) of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act

provides, in pertinent part:

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“[T]here shall be an additional penalty collected from each defendant upon conviction

of any felony *** of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. *** Such

additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any

reduction made in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.”

(Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010).

¶ 135 The plain language of section 10(b) shows the legislature intended this assessment to be

imposed as punishment in a criminal case. The statute labels the assessment “an additional

penalty” (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010)), which shows the legislature intended this

assessment to be punitive in nature. Further, courts have previously held, some for over 25

years, the circuit clerk is without authority to impose the VCVA assessment, referring to the

assessment as a fine. Rexroad, 2013 IL App (4th) 110981, ¶ 55, 992 N.E.2d 3; People v.

Wisotzke, 204 Ill. App. 3d 44, 50, 561 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (1990) (Second District); People v.

Scott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873, 505 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1987) (Fifth District); People v. Tarbill,

142 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1061, 492 N.E.2d 942, 942 (1986) (Third District). We vacate the

VCVA fines in this case, as those assessments could not properly be imposed by the clerk.

¶ 136 The plain language of the statute clearly evidences the legislature’s intent the fine be

assessed on each count, as the statute provides the penalty is to be imposed upon conviction.

725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010). Because a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses

within a single case, defendant could properly be ordered to pay a VCVA fine on each count.

¶ 137 On remand, the trial court must reimpose a VCVA fine on each count. This task may

require the court to recalculate the fine, which will require the court to calculate the total fines,

including the traffic/criminal surcharge, imposed pursuant to each count and impose an

additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(b)

(West 2010); see Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 914 (“ ‘Lump Sum

Surcharge’ ” imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code is to be calculated

before the VCVA assessment; surcharge is added to the total fines and VCVA assessment is

calculated based on the new total); O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App (4th) 110018, ¶ 24, 979 N.E.2d

1023 (amount of surcharge fine is based upon the gross amount of fines levied against

defendant; VCVA assessment to be imposed after surcharge is calculated).

¶ 138 (o) The State Police Operations Assessments:

A Fine Improperly Imposed by the Clerk

¶ 139 The record shows the circuit clerk imposed a $10 State Police operations assessment on

each count in defendant’s case. Subsection (1.5) of section 27.3a of the Clerks of Courts Act

(Clerks Act) (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West 2010)) provides, in pertinent part:

“1.5. Starting on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General

Assembly, a clerk of the circuit court in any county that imposes a fee pursuant to

subsection 1 of this Section [(the automation fee)], shall charge and collect an

additional fee in an amount equal to the amount of the fee imposed pursuant to

subsection 1 of this Section. This additional fee shall be paid by the defendant in any

felony, traffic, misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case upon a judgment of

guilty or grant of supervision.” (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5) (West

2010).

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Subsection (5) of section 27.3a of the Clerks Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(5) (West 2010))

requires the clerk to remit this additional assessment to the State Treasurer for deposit into the

State Police Operations Assistance Fund.

¶ 140 In People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31, 979 N.E.2d 1030, this court held the

State Police operations assistance fee is a fine for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s

VCVA fine. See 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010). Because this assessment is a fine, the

circuit clerk could not properly impose this assessment against defendant. We vacate its

imposition.

¶ 141 The plain language of section 27.3a(1.5) clearly evidences the legislature’s intent this fine

be assessed only once in a defendant’s case. The fee is to be paid by the defendant “in any

felony, traffic, misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case.” 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5)

(West 2010). Because the language of the statute refers to cases, and not individual

convictions, the State Police operations assistance fine may be assessed only once per case.

See Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 64. On remand, the trial court must reimpose this fine

on only one of the two counts.

¶ 142 2. The DNA Analysis Fee

¶ 143 Defendant argues the circuit clerk improperly assessed defendant a $250 DNA analysis fee

after the trial court conditionally ordered the fee at defendant’s sentencing hearing. Defendant

contends the imposition of this fee is void and must be vacated. The State concedes the $250

DNA analysis fee must be vacated. We accept the State’s concession.

¶ 144 While the DNA analysis assessment is a fee (see People v. Guadarrama, 2011 IL App (2d)

100072, ¶ 13, 955 N.E.2d 615 (holding the DNA analysis assessment is a “fee” because “the

fee is used to cover the costs incurred in collecting and testing a DNA sample that is taken from

a defendant convicted of a qualifying offense”))–meaning the circuit clerk could properly

impose it if a defendant was ordered to submit to DNA analysis–its imposition in this case was

not authorized and, thus, we vacate the $250 DNA analysis fee. In People v. Marshall, the

supreme court found the defendant was improperly ordered to submit to DNA analysis and pay

the attendant fee where he had previously submitted a DNA sample for analysis and paid the

fee. People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303, 950 N.E.2d 668, 679 (2011). In Marshall, the

court held trial courts are authorized “to order the taking, analysis and indexing of a qualifying

offender’s DNA, and the payment of the analysis fee only where that defendant is not currently

registered in the DNA database.” Id. (Based on this language, we also conclude the fee cannot

be imposed on each count in a case.)

¶ 145 In this case, the trial court’s order regarding DNA analysis was consistent with the supreme

court’s holding in Marshall. At defendant’s July 2012 sentencing hearing, the court stated as

follows: “If [defendant] has not already done so–and I can’t imagine how he has not–then he

would have to submit a specimen for genetic testing in accordance with the statute, and only

then would he have to pay the genetic marker grouping analysis fee of $250.” In other words,

the court conditioned the imposition of the DNA analysis fee on whether defendant had

previously submitted a specimen for testing.

¶ 146 Defendant has attached as an appendix to his brief a printout from the Illinois State Police,

Division of Forensic Services, which shows defendant submitted a blood sample for DNA

analysis on February 17, 2005. The record confirms defendant previously submitted a DNA

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sample for a previous case. The PSI states, “On [February 17, 2005], the defendant submitted a

DNA sample on a previous case.” Yet, the circuit clerk’s printout containing the fines and fees

assessed against defendant in this case shows he was assessed a $250 DNA analysis fee.

Because the record shows defendant submitted a DNA sample for analysis in 2005, the DNA

analysis fee imposed by the clerk in this case is void. Id. at 302, 950 N.E.2d at 679. We vacate

the $250 DNA analysis fee imposed by the clerk.

¶ 147 3. The Street-Value Fine

¶ 148 The State argues the trial court, on remand, must increase the $340 street-value fine

imposed to reflect the value of all the crack cocaine seized on March 18, 2011. Specifically, the

State argues defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession with intent to deliver 7.2

grams of crack cocaine, which included the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine located in Rosas’s

vagina. The State argues the court failed to include the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine located in

Rosas’s vagina in its calculation of the street-value fine. The State extrapolates the value of the

additional crack cocaine based on the per-gram value of the crack cocaine, deduced from the

evidence taken at trial on the value of the 4.6 grams found in the hotel room ($340 divided by

4.6 grams is $73.91 per-gram value), and seeks to increase the fine by $192 ($73.91 per gram

multiplied by 2.6 grams is $192).

¶ 149 In his reply brief, defendant characterizes the State’s argument as an unauthorized

cross-appeal. Specifically, defendant argues (1) the State’s contention is a free-standing claim

of error; (2) the State may not properly appeal the imposition of a fine because such appeals by

the State are not authorized by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006); and (3)

the order imposing the street-value fine is “at best” voidable, not void, and as such, the State

forfeited its claim of error.

¶ 150 Defendant contends because he did not challenge the value of the street-value fine imposed

by the judge, “[t]he State’s argument is thus not in response to an argument about a ‘judgment

[***] from which the appeal is taken’ ” (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)). In

this case, defendant’s notice of appeal indicates he is challenging his conviction and sentence.

Therefore, defendant placed his entire sentence, which includes the street-value fine (see

Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 32, 5 N.E.3d 227 (fines are part of sentence a judge must

impose)), before this court for review. Further, defendant seeks an additional two days’ credit

against his sentence, which would be accompanied by a $5 per day credit against creditable

fines, one of which is the street-value fine. We do not, as defendant suggests, characterize the

State’s pointing out of a sentencing error to be a “free-standing claim of error,” because

defendant put his entire sentence at issue.

¶ 151 Even if, for the sake of argument, we considered the State’s street-value fine argument to

be a “free-standing claim of error,” we would not change our conclusion the State could

properly point out this error. Rule 604(a) strictly limits the circumstances under which the

State may appeal a trial court’s judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006); see also

People v. Ramos, 339 Ill. App. 3d 891, 904, 791 N.E.2d 592, 603 (2003) (the rule “strictly

limits the State’s right to appeal”). The rule does not permit the State to challenge the propriety

of the sentence imposed on a defendant. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 509-10,

705 N.E.2d 81, 85 (1998). Where an appeal by the State is not authorized by Rule 604(a), the

appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the issue. In re K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d 530, 540-41,

922 N.E.2d 322, 328 (2009).

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¶ 152 The State may, however, seek to correct a void or partially void judgment on appeal. See

People v. Malchow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 665, 675-76, 714 N.E.2d 583, 591 (1999) (where the trial

court ordered a sentence less than that mandated by statute, the sentence was “illegal and void”

and “the appellate court ha[d] the authority to correct the sentence at any time, and Rule

604(a)(1) [did] not limit the State’s right to appeal”). “A void judgment is one entered by a

court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. A

void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally.” Roman, 184 Ill. 2d

at 510, 705 N.E.2d at 85. A trial court is obligated to order the criminal penalties mandated by

the legislature and has no authority to impose punishment other than what is provided for by

statute. Id. “The court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than what the statute

mandates.” Id. The legislature has mandated the imposition of the street-value fine of an

amount not less than the full street value of the drugs seized. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West

2010); People v. Banks, 213 Ill. App. 3d 205, 213-14, 571 N.E.2d 935, 940 (1991) (because the

street-value fine is mandatory, the court remanded for imposition of the fine).

¶ 153 In this case, defendant was charged in count I with both the 4.6 grams of crack cocaine

located in the hotel room and the 2.6 grams later recovered from Rosas’s person. The State

presented evidence of the street value of only the 4.6 grams recovered from the hotel room.

Sergeant Baltzell testified the 17 individually wrapped packages had a street value of $340.

The trial court orally ordered defendant to pay a $340 street-value fine as part of his sentence.

The court ordered a sentence less than what is mandated by statute because the $340

street-value fine did not account for the 2.6 grams of crack cocaine later recovered from

Rosas’s person. Defendant’s sentence was void to the extent the street-value fine ordered by

the court was less than the street-value of all the crack cocaine recovered in this case.

Accordingly, on remand, the court must increase the street-value fine to reflect the value of all

the crack cocaine seized in this case. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(a) (West 2010).

¶ 154 4. Other Issues With Fines and Fees

¶ 155 Upon our examination of the record, we found other errors neither party raised regarding

the imposition of the fines and fees in this case. For instance, the trial court, at defendant’s

sentencing hearing, ordered defendant to pay a $2,000 mandatory assessment pursuant to

section 411.2(a)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(2) (West

2010)). The circuit clerk’s printout, however, shows the clerk only assessed a $1,275

mandatory assessment. The record provides no explanation for the disparity between what the

court expressly ordered and what the clerk later assessed. Presumably, the clerk assessed the

$2,000 mandatory assessment as ordered by the court and used the $725 credit to which

defendant is entitled to offset part of the assessment, leaving $1,275 of the mandatory

assessment outstanding.

¶ 156 The trial court also ordered defendant to pay a crime-lab analysis fee of $100 during his

sentencing hearing. Although the circuit clerk’s printout contains an entry for the crime-lab

analysis fee, no dollar amount is listed next to the entry. The record again provides no

explanation for the disparity between what the court expressly ordered and the clerk’s failure

to assess it.

¶ 157 On remand, the trial court, when reimposing the fines vacated herein, should ensure the

amended sentencing judgment containing the fines and fees assessed against defendant

contains the $2,000 mandatory assessment (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(2) (West 2010)) and the

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$100 crime-lab analysis fee (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.4(b) (West 2010)) ordered by the court during

defendant’s sentencing hearing, as well as the amounts creditable against either.

¶ 158 C. Sentencing Credit

¶ 159 We initially note the parties agree the PSI lists the incorrect dates for defendant’s first

period of pretrial incarceration. The PSI indicates defendant was in custody for this offense

starting on March 21, 2011, and ending on July 1, 2011, when he posted bond. However, the

parties agree and the record confirms defendant was in custody for this offense starting March

18, 2011, when he was arrested. The PSI also indicates defendant was in custody for this

offense on July 2, 2012, which was the date he was sentenced. The parties agree defendant

should not be credited for July 2, 2012. See People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503, 510, 942

N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (2011) (holding “the date a defendant is sentenced and committed to the

Department [of Corrections] is to be counted as a day of sentence and not as a day of

presentence credit”).

¶ 160 The parties do not agree as to the total amount of days for which defendant is entitled

credit. Defendant initially argued he was entitled to two additional days of credit toward his

sentence for his time in pretrial custody for March 18, 2011, through March 20, 2011 (less one

day for July 2, 2012), and $10 of additional monetary credit toward the creditable fines

imposed upon him.

¶ 161 The State responds by arguing defendant is not entitled to the two additional days of credit.

Specifically, the State argues where, as here, a defendant is out on bond for one offense and is

subsequently arrested and placed in custody for another offense, the defendant is returned to

custody on the initial offense when his or her bond is revoked or withdrawn (People v.

Arnhold, 115 Ill. 2d 379, 383, 504 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1987)), unless he is surrendered on the

initial offense to serve simultaneous custody for both offenses (People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d

452, 459, 667 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (1996)). Using the day defendant’s bond was revoked, May

24, 2012, the State contends the calculation of time served contained in the PSI was correct.

¶ 162 In his reply brief, defendant argues he is actually entitled to three additional days of credit

toward his sentence pursuant to section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2012)) and People v. Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d 147, 150-51, 910 N.E.2d

208, 210 (2009), but he abandons his argument he is entitled to additional monetary credit

against his creditable fines. Specifically, defendant argues the State is arguing for the first time

on appeal the court erred in granting defendant credit for May 22, 2012, and May 23, 2012.

Defendant points out the State relied on facts not in the record–the Champaign County circuit

clerk’s website–to come to its calculation of credit. Using information from the Champaign

County circuit clerk’s website, defendant ascertained he was in custody on May 21, 2012,

through May 23, 2012, for an offense he committed while on bail in Champaign County case

No. 12-CF-773. Because the charges in case No. 12-CF-773 were ultimately dropped,

defendant will not be awarded credit for the three days he spent in jail as a result of the newer

charges. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2010). Therefore, defendant urges he is entitled to

credit for May 21, 2012, May 22, 2012, and May 23, 2012, for a total of 148 days’ credit.

¶ 163 Defendant has the burden to present a record showing the error of which he complains.

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). In this case, the trial

court ordered, with agreement of the parties, defendant is entitled to 145 days’ credit toward

his sentence. To get any credit for May 21, 2012, through May 23, 2012, defendant must show

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he tendered his surrender on the offenses charged in the instant case. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d

at 459, 667 N.E.2d at 1308. The record contains no indication defendant tendered his surrender

for the offenses charged in this case, and as such, he is not entitled to credit for May 21, 2012,

through May 23, 2012. The record does show defendant’s bond was revoked on May 24, 2012.

Using the date defendant’s bond was revoked, the 145 days’ credit listed in the PSI is

correct–although the dates relied on to reach this calculation are incorrect.

¶ 164 In his petition for rehearing, defendant argues our decision in this case is inconsistent with

Cook, where we awarded defendant additional credit against his sentence pursuant to section

5-8-7(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(c) (West 2006)), which has since been

renumbered as section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code. See People v. Clark, 2014 IL App

(4th) 130331, ¶ 21. Section 5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code provides:

“CREDIT; TIME IN CUSTODY; FORMER CHARGE. An offender arrested on one

charge and prosecuted on another charge for conduct that occurred prior to his or her

arrest shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the

minimum term of imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former charge not

credited against another sentence.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(c) (West 2010).

¶ 165 In Cook, the State charged the defendant, on November 16, 2007, with theft for conduct

occurring on November 2, 2007. Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 910 N.E.2d at 209. On

December 10, 2007, the State charged the defendant, in a separate case, with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance. Id. The conduct underlying the possession charge was

committed while the defendant was out on bail for the original theft charge. Id. On January 18,

2008, the State charged the defendant with aggravated criminal sexual abuse for conduct

occurring on August 31, 2007. Id. (Later in the opinion, the majority states, “On January 30,

2008, while defendant was released on bond in both of his 2007 cases, defendant was arrested

and charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse (his 2008 case).” Id. at 149, 910 N.E.2d at

209.). In exchange for a guilty plea as to the theft and possession charges, the State agreed to

drop the remaining charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Id. at 148-49, 910 N.E.2d at

209.

¶ 166 After his arrest on January 30, 2008, for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the defendant

spent 26 days in custody before he, on February 25, 2008, surrendered his bond in the theft and

possession cases. Id. at 149, 910 N.E.2d at 209-10. We awarded the defendant the additional 26

days’ credit against his sentence where he “(1) was arrested for aggravated criminal sexual

abuse ***, (2) was prosecuted for theft over $300 *** which involved conduct that occurred

prior to his arrest in [the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse case], and (3) did not receive credit

for the time spent in custody in [the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse case] against another

sentence.” Id. at 150, 910 N.E.2d at 210.

¶ 167 While defendant’s petition for rehearing was pending, this court decided Clark, 2014 IL

App (4th) 130331. In Clark, we declined to follow the interpretation and analysis of section

5-4.5-100(c) set forth by the majority in Cook. Id. ¶ 25. Instead, we elected to follow the

analysis set forth by Justice Pope in her dissent and held defendant was not entitled to

additional credit where he sought credit against his sentence for the original charge for time he

spent in custody on a subsequent charge. Id. ¶ 26.

¶ 168 Justice Pope’s reading of subsection (c) in her dissent in Cook (Cook, 392 Ill. App. 3d at

151-52, 910 N.E.2d at 211-12 (Pope, J., dissenting)) is consistent with Robinson, wherein the

supreme court explained the purpose of section 5-4.5-100(c) was “to ‘prevent the State from

- 28 -

dropping an initial charge and recharging a defendant with another crime, with the intent of

denying credit for time spent in jail on the first charge.’ ” (Emphases added.) Robinson, 172 Ill.

2d at 460, 667 N.E.2d at 1309 (quoting People v. Townsend, 209 Ill. App. 3d 987, 990, 568

N.E.2d 946, 948 (1991)); see also People v. Kane, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 484 N.E.2d

296, 300 (1985) (“The purpose of subsection (c) is to insure credit for all confinement since

arrest in the circumstance where the original charge is dropped in favor of a new charge which

results in conviction and imprisonment.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks

omitted.)). The Robinson court determined section 5-4.5-100(c) did not apply “[b]ecause the

initial charge against defendant was not dropped in favor of a subsequent charge.” Robinson,

172 Ill. 2d at 461, 667 N.E.2d at 1309.

¶ 169 Here, defendant seeks credit against his sentence for the initial charges, in case No.

11-CF-443, for time he spent in custody as a result of a subsequent charge, in case No.

12-CF-773. Because the initial charges were not dropped in favor of the subsequent charge,

defendant is not entitled to credit for May 21, 2013, to May 23, 2013, under section

5-4.5-100(c) of the Unified Code. Id.; Clark, 2014 IL App (4th) 130331, ¶ 26. We affirm the

court’s order finding defendant is entitled to 145 days’ credit against his sentence and $725

credit toward any creditable fines imposed in this case.

¶ 170 A vast amount of judicial resources are expended in the appellate court to resolve issues

concerning the ever-expanding morass of fines and fees enacted by the legislature. See People

v. Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d 300, 309, 943 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (2010); O’Laughlin, 2012 IL App

(4th) 110018, ¶ 28, 979 N.E.2d 1023; Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 25, 991 N.E.2d

914; Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227; Montag, 2014 IL App (4th)

120993, ¶ 38, 5 N.E.3d 246. In Folks, we called for a “comprehensive legislative revision in

the assessment of fines, fees, costs and the $5-per-day credit for time spent in custody prior to

sentencing.” Folks, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 943 N.E.2d at 1135. The legislature continues to

enact new fines, fees, and costs–in this case, leading to the imposition of 33 separate

assessments. This adds more complexity to many cases where the monetary assessments may

not even be collected. Perhaps the legislature will answer our call.

¶ 171 We stress the importance of the need for all parties involved–the trial court, the State’s

Attorney’s office, the criminal defense bar, and the circuit clerk’s office–to ensure fines are

properly imposed by the trial court with the attorneys and the defendant in attendance and on

notice. This process requires active participation from the parties. We understand it is a burden

to navigate the murky waters of fines and fees, but it is a burden required by law. We recognize

it is the long-standing practice of the circuit court clerks to impose the fees and costs associated

with criminal cases, but this does not excuse the similar treatment of fines, which are a

component of the sentence to be imposed by the sentencing judge. Fines are a component of

the sentence, and we require the help of the parties to fulfill our duties in resolving these issues

on review. This requires the statement of facts in each brief to identify the fines imposed and

whether the court or circuit clerk imposed them, with citations to the record. See Chester, 2014

IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 35, 5 N.E.3d 227.

¶ 172 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 173 We affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s judgment and remand for the trial court

to reimpose the mandatory fines vacated herein and impose all other fines mandated by statute.

We encourage the trial court to review the reference sheet this court provided in Williams,

- 29 -

2013 IL App (4th) 120313, 991 N.E.2d 914 (appendix), to assist in ensuring the statutorily

mandated fines in criminal cases are properly imposed. The State’s Attorney’s office can best

provide guidance as to which fines the county has required by ordinance or resolution. See

Pohl, 2012 IL App (2d) 100629, ¶¶ 11, 21, 969 N.E.2d 508. As part of our judgment, we award

the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS

5/4-2002(a) (West 2012).

¶ 174 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

- 30 -

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