Opinion

Priscilla A. Eberhardt v. United States Postal Service

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Aug 20, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PRISCILLA A. EBERHARDT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0353-11-0436-B-2

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: August 20, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Samuel L. Lovett, Sr., Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Earl L. Cotton, Sr., Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,

which dismissed her restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons

discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

remand initial decision, and ORDER the agency to provide the appellant with

back pay and other benefits.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant was a Mail Processing Clerk at the agency’s North Metro

Processing and Distribution Center in Atlanta, Georgia. She suffered a

compensable injury in 1990 and worked in several limited-duty assignments until

September 25, 2010, when she was sent home for the first time. MSPB Docket

No. AT-0353-11-0436-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF) (I-1), Tab 5 at 43. On

January 5, 2011, the agency offered the appellant a modified job assignment,

which she accepted. Id. at 25. The appellant returned to work on January 13,

2011. Hearing Recording (HR), File 1 at 8:05 to 8:40. 2 On January 24, 2011, the

agency issued the appellant a letter rescinding the January 5 offer and notifying

her that there was no work available within her medical restrictions. IAF (I-1),

Tab 5 at 23. In its original decision in this matter, the Board found that the

appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that the denial of restoration on

January 24, 2011, was arbitrary and capricious on the basis of the appellant’s

assertion that the work she had been performing was still available and that other

employees were performing that work. MSPB Docket No. AT-0353-11-0436-I-1,

Remand Order at 5 (May 11, 2012). After the administrative judge again

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Board again vacated the initial

decision and remanded the appeal, noting that the administrative judge failed to

address the appellant’s evidence indicating that the agency may have approved a

Casual Hiring Request Form to hire a Postal Support Employee (PSE) to absorb

her former duties. The Board indicated that this would have been improper if it

occurred because PSEs, unlike employees in the regular workforce, are not

2

A compact disc containing the hearing recording is located at Tab 13 of the initial

appeal file, and contains three audio (MP3) files.

3

guaranteed any minimum amount of work. MSPB Docket No. AT-0353-11-0436-

B-1, Remand Order at 3 (June 13, 2013).

¶3 Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued a third initial decision

dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He found that: (1) the Casual

Hiring Request Form was never processed and that no casual or PSE employees

were hired pursuant to this request, or any other request, during the relevant

period; (2) the PSE employees who were working during the January 13, to

January 24, 2011, period performed duties that career employees could not do

because of medical restrictions; (3) modified duty assignments were reserved for

bid employees who had medical restrictions; (4) the appellant could have bid on

these assignments but did not; and (5) as a result of the appellant’s failure to bid

on an assignment, career employees who were junior to the appellant were

awarded modified duty assignments that the appellant could have had. Initial

Decision (ID) at 6. Based on these findings, the judge concluded that the

appellant failed to establish that the tasks she previously performed were, or

currently are, being performed by casual or PSE employees; these duties were

being performed by career employees with bid assignments. ID at 6-7.

¶4 In her petition for review, the appellant contends that the non-execution of

the Casual Hiring Request Form was irrelevant because the casual and/or PSE

employees who were working at the same time she was in January 2011 had been

hired previously, and she reiterates her assertions that these employees performed

the same duties she was performing during that time and after she was sent home.

Petition for Review File, Tab 1.

ANALYSIS

The appellant established that the agency’s termination of her limited duty

assignment was arbitrary and capricious.

¶5 As stated in the Board’s previous decisions, the relevant framework in cases

such as this for determining whether the denial of restoration was arbitrary and

capricious is as follows: (1) are the tasks of the appellant’s former modified

4

assignment still being performed by other employees or are there other tasks

within her medical restrictions that were available for her to perform; (2) if so,

did those employees lack sufficient work prior to absorbing the appellant’s

modified duties; (3) if so, did the reassignment of that work violate any other law,

rule, or regulation? Latham v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 33

(2012). If, as the appellant asserted, the duties she was performing during the

period from January 13, through January 25, 2011, 3 were also being performed by

casual and/or PSE employees, and those employees absorbed the duties she was

performing after she was forced out on January 25, then the agency’s action

sending the appellant home would be arbitrary and capricious.

¶6 The agency’s January 5, 2011 limited duty assignment offer indicated that

the appellant’s duties would be in Operation 030, Manual Letter Operations. IAF

(I-1), Tab 5 at 25. The appellant testified that, in addition to working in

Operation 030, she worked in Operation 896 (handling letters coming off letter

sorting machines) and in Operation 074 (casing manual flats). HR, File 1 at 3:10

to 4:15. She said she spent most of her time in Operation 896 and that she was

doing this sort of work on January 25, when she was called off the floor and her

limited duty assignment was terminated. Id. at 8:08 to 8:40.

¶7 The appellant testified that there were a lot of casuals working in

January 2011, including in Operations 030, 074, and 896, and that she worked

side by side with them during the January 13-25 period. HR, File 1 at 37:05

to 37:20, 10:15 to 10:55. She said she knew they were casual or temporary

employees because, having been a Postal employee for 25 years, she knew regular

employees by sight and saw a lot of unfamiliar faces in January 2011. She said

she asked one of the supervisors who these workers were and was informed that

they were casuals. Id. at 10:55 to 11:20. She said she asked some of the persons

3

Although the agency’s letter rescinding the offer of January 5, 2011, was dated

January 24, 2011, the appellant testified that she did not receive this letter until the

following day while at work. HR, File 1 at 10:00 to 10:15.

5

with whom she was working their status, and they told her they were casuals. Id.

at 11:20 to 11:45. The appellant further testified that both regular employees and

casual employees were working overtime during this period. HR, File 1 at 8:45

to 9:00, 12:30 to 12:45, 33:05 to 33:20.

¶8 A maintenance mechanic who was an officer of the American Postal

Workers Union testified that a number of casuals were employed at the North

Metro facility in January 2011, that they worked on the same Operations as did

the appellant, and that the casual employees were still working after the

appellant’s limited duty assignment was terminated. HR, File 2 at 25:00 to 25:55.

She further testified that casuals were used in 2011 to replace regular employees

on limited duty assignments and that work was available then (and at the time of

the hearing) that the appellant could perform. Id. at 27:35 to 27:50.

¶9 The Operations Support Specialist for the North Metro facility during the

period in question was the agency’s only witness. She testified that PSEs were

hired for work on the automation machine that sorts mail or the mechanization

machine that sorts flats. HR, File 2 at 59:30 to 59:59. Regarding work records

concerning a casual employee who was working at the same time as the appellant

in January 2011, she testified that he appears to have been working in the 074

Operation casing manual flats. HR, File 3 at 1:05 to 1:35. She testified that, to

her knowledge, the appellant did not work in Operation 074 and that the appellant

would not have worked side by side with 074 employees because they worked in a

different part of the building than did 030 employees. Id. at 3:15 to 3:50. This

witness conceded during cross-examination that she is not a supervisor and would

not know what specific duties the appellant was assigned. HR, File 3 at 16:20

to 17:00. In addition, although she testified that, to her knowledge, no casual

employees were working in Operation 030 at the pertinent time, she conceded that

supervisors could move employees among Operations as needed, and she would

not know if supervisors assigned casual employees to the 030 Operation. Id.

at 21:50 to 22:35.

6

¶10 Based on the above evidence, we conclude that the appellant established by

preponderant evidence that casual and/or PSE employees were performing many

of the same limited duties she was performing during the period from January 13

to January 25, 2011, and that they continued to do so after her limited duty

assignment was terminated that day. 4 Accordingly, we conclude that the

termination of the appellant’s limited duty assignment was arbitrary and

capricious.

The appropriate remedy is back pay and associated benefits from the date of the

improper denial of restoration until the effective date of the appellant’s

retirement.

¶11 When an agency’s denial of restoration has been determined to have been

arbitrary and capricious, the Board has ordered the agency to restore the appellant

to her former modified assignment. See Ashley v. U.S. Postal Service,

118 M.S.P.R. 231, ¶ 19 (2012), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 210 M.S.P.R.

363 (2013) (Table); Coles v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 249, ¶¶ 2, 11

(2012). The appellant retired from her position effective June 20, 2012. MSPB

Docket No. AT-0353-11-0436-B-1, IAF (B-1), Tab 3. As restoration to duty is no

longer possible, the appropriate remedy in this case is to order the agency to

provide the appellant back pay and other benefits for the period from January 25,

2011, when the agency arbitrarily and capriciously denied her restoration, until

June 20, 2012.

4

We note the administrative judge’s statement that the appellant’s representative “in his

closing statement admitted that the appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof.”

ID at 7 n.4. The representative stated that, based on the appellant’s credible testimony

at the hearing, it was “more than likely” that the appellant’s duties were absorbed by

casual employees. HR, File 3 at 36:35 to 36:50. The representative then added: “Can

we prove that? No, we can’t prove that. That is a hill that is entirely too steep to

climb.” Id. at 36:50 to 37:00. The burden of proof in this case was by a preponderance

of the evidence, i.e., “more likely than not.” See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2). The

representative was clearly asserting that his client had met this burden of proof. The

“too steep to climb” quotation obviously referred to some burden higher than a

preponderance of the evidence.

7

ORDER

¶12 We ORDER the agency to provide back pay and benefits for the period

from January 25, 2011, to June 19, 2012. See Kerr v. National Endowment for

the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no

later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

¶13 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back

pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal

Service Regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date

of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the

agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due,

and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out

the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest

due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the

undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.

¶14 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it

took to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the

agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

¶15 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement

with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

¶16 For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance

Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and

Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision

8

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all

documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be

made within the 60-day period set forth above.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees

WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You

must file your attorney fees motion with the office that issued the initial decision

on your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board's final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You have the right to

request the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review this

final decision. You must submit your request to the court at the following

address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

9

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

DFAS CHECKLIST

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY DFAS IN

ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED

UPON IN SETTLEMENT CASES OR AS

ORDERED BY THE MERIT SYSTEMS

PROTECTION BOARD

AS CHECKLIST: INFORMATION REQUIRED BY IN ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN SETTLEMENT

CASES

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE MUST NOTIFY CIVILIAN PAYROLL

OFFICE VIA COMMAND LETTER WITH THE FOLLOWING:

1. Statement if Unemployment Benefits are to be deducted, with dollar amount, address

and POC to send.

2. Statement that employee was counseled concerning Health Benefits and TSP and the

election forms if necessary.

3. Statement concerning entitlement to overtime, night differential, shift premium,

Sunday Premium, etc, with number of hours and dates for each entitlement.

4. If Back Pay Settlement was prior to conversion to DCPS (Defense Civilian Pay

System), a statement certifying any lump sum payment with number of hours and

amount paid and/or any severance pay that was paid with dollar amount.

5. Statement if interest is payable with beginning date of accrual.

6. Corrected Time and Attendance if applicable.

ATTACHMENTS TO THE LETTER SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

1. Copy of Settlement Agreement and/or the MSPB Order.

2. Corrected or cancelled SF 50's.

3. Election forms for Health Benefits and/or TSP if applicable.

4. Statement certified to be accurate by the employee which includes:

a. Outside earnings with copies of W2's or statement from employer.

b. Statement that employee was ready, willing and able to work during the period.

c. Statement of erroneous payments employee received such as; lump sum leave, severance

pay, VERA/VSIP, retirement annuity payments (if applicable) and if employee withdrew

Retirement Funds.

5. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the

type of leave to be charged and number of hours.

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES

Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process

payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as

ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.

1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise

information describing what to do in accordance with decision.

2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:

a. Employee name and social security number.

b. Detailed explanation of request.

c. Valid agency accounting.

d. Authorized signature (Table 63)

e. If interest is to be included.

f. Check mailing address.

g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.

h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to

be collected. (if applicable)

Attachments to AD-343

1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday

Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement. (if applicable)

2. Copies of SF-50's (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and

amounts.

3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.

4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address

to return monies.

5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)

6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of

the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.

7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual

Leave to be paid.

NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay

Period and required data in 1-7 above.

The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump

Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)

a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.

b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.

c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.

If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s

Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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