leaving open possibility that judge may grant immunity to defense witness where government has engaged in “deliberate intent to distort the fact-finding process”
How later courts described this case
- leaving open possibility that judge may grant immunity to defense witness where government has engaged in “deliberate intent to distort the fact-finding process”
- video surveillance identification testimony of detective was improperly admitted when record did not reveal that ‘‘detective possessed any special familiarity with the defendant that the jury lacked, or that the defendant’s appearance had changed since the time the footage was taken, such that the jury needed assistance in identifying the individual depicted’’
- defendant had lost twenty-five pounds since photograph was taken, and officer had known defendant for long time and seen him often
- "We have recognized the 'increase[d] potential for inappropriate prejudice to the defendant stemming from identification testimony from a police officer who is so designated'"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
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SJC-11220
COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT B. VACHER.
Barnstable. April 11, 2014. - August 19, 2014.
1
Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.
Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions,
Search and seizure, Voluntariness of statement, Probable
cause. Search and Seizure, Standing to object, Probable
cause. Evidence, Identification, Opinion, Photograph,
Immunized witness. Identification. Practice, Criminal,
Admissions and confessions, Agreement between prosecutor
and witness, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Motion to
suppress, Standing, Voluntariness of statement. Joint
Enterprise. Witness, Immunity.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on April 10, 2009.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Gary A.
Nickerson, J., and the cases was tried before Robert C. Rufo, J.
James L. Sultan (Kerry Haberlin with him) for the
defendant.
Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
1
Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on
this case prior to his retirement.
2
LENK, J. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder. 2
On appeal, the defendant asks us to recognize for the first time
the concept of "target standing," and to declare the witness
immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, § 20C, unconstitutional. He
argues that, in litigating his own motions to suppress, he
should have been afforded target standing to challenge the
violation of his alleged coventurers' constitutional rights. He
further argues that the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233,
§ 20C, is facially unconstitutional, in that it operates to
benefit only the Commonwealth and unfairly skews the adversary
system, and unconstitutional as applied to him, in that the
Commonwealth's reliance on a "spate" of immunized witnesses
deprived him of a fair trial.
The defendant also contends that the trial judge's failure
to exclude identification testimony, and his failure to instruct
the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass.
423, 447-448 (2004), concerning the partial recording of the
defendant's interrogation by police, were erroneous and require
a new trial. Concluding that there was no prejudicial error, we
2
The defendant also was convicted of armed robbery, the
predicate felony underlying the felony-murder conviction; two
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon;
and disinterring a body.
3
affirm the defendant's convictions. After a review of the
entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no
reason to exercise our power to reduce the defendant's
conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.
1. Introduction. On December 16, 2008, the victim's body
was found burning in a pit on Jennifer Lane in Hyannis. The
victim, sixteen year old Jordan Mendes, had been stabbed in the
neck and face twenty-seven times, and had suffered a gunshot
wound to the chest. 3 He was last seen alive shortly after
2 P.M., the end of the school day, on December 15, 2008. 4 Forty-
five witnesses testified at the defendant's trial, five of them
pursuant to a grant of immunity. The prosecutor elicited
testimony that the victim, his half-brother Charlie M. 5 (then
aged thirteen), and the defendant (then aged twenty), were
involved in the sale of drugs, particularly the prescription
painkiller Percocet. The Commonwealth's theory at trial was
3
The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound to
the torso with perforations of the liver and colon, and incise
and stab wounds to the head and neck, including trachea and
major blood vessels.
4
There was no testimony concerning the time of death.
5
A pseudonym. We refer to all of the middle school, high
school, and college witnesses and alleged participants by
pseudonyms.
Charlie is the defendant's first cousin; Charlie's mother
and the defendant's mother are sisters. The defendant is not
related to the victim.
4
that the defendant, as part of a joint venture with Charlie and
John R., also thirteen at that time, killed the victim in a
scheme to steal drugs and cash from him. The defense theory was
that Charlie, the picked-on younger brother of the victim, was
the true culprit, who retaliated against the victim's bullying
by killing him, without the defendant's involvement.
Before the defendant was questioned in connection with the
victim's death, police interviewed both Charlie and John on
December 18, 2008. Charlie and John made statements inculpating
the defendant, and based on those statements, police issued a
"be on the lookout" alert for the defendant. Police stopped the
defendant in his vehicle later that night and brought him to
Barnstable police headquarters, where he was interrogated.
Information learned in the course of John's interview also
was set forth in the affidavit supporting the application for a
warrant to search the defendant's vehicle, which was allowed.
In proceedings against Charlie and John, however, a Juvenile
Court judge suppressed the entirety of Charlie's December 18,
2008, statement to police, and most of John's, due to the
officers' failure to follow proper procedures for interrogating
juveniles under the age of fourteen. Before trial, the
defendant unsuccessfully sought to have suppressed the evidence
seized pursuant to the search of his vehicle. He argued, inter
alia, that information in the search warrant affidavit that had
5
been obtained from John in contravention of John's
constitutional rights should have been redacted, and that what
would have remained following such redaction was insufficient to
establish probable cause. A Superior Court judge disagreed,
ruling that there was no need to suppress evidence against the
defendant obtained as a result of a violation of a third party's
constitutional rights, and that, in any event, even if the
affidavit were redacted as the defendant wanted, there would
still have been probable cause for the search.
2. Facts. Based on the evidence at trial, the jury could
have found the following. The victim, a sophomore at Barnstable
High School, lived with his grandmother in an apartment in
Hyannis. He had his own bedroom, which he always locked when he
was not at home; even his grandmother could not access his
bedroom without the key. He also had installed locks on his
closet doors. On his belt loop, he carried a key chain that
included a key to his grandmother's apartment, a key to a safe,
and a key bearing the Boston Red Sox insignia. The victim's
room was very neat, and he swept the floor in a particular
manner so that he would be able to see footprints if someone had
been in his room.
The victim spent a great deal of time with his half-brother
Charlie and was often at Charlie's mother's house on Arrowhead
Drive in Hyannis (Arrowhead Drive house). The two were both
6
involved in selling drugs, particularly Percocet. The victim
often carried large amounts of cash, and at least once was seen
with up to $10,000 on his person, which he organized into stacks
of $1,000, folding each stack in half and wrapping it with a
rubber band.
a. Monday, December 15, 2008. After school ended at
2 P.M. on December 15, 2008, a classmate dropped the victim off
on Arrowhead Drive. Charlie, John, and the defendant also had
been dropped off at the Arrowhead Drive house around the same
time by Diana R., 6 one of the defendant's classmates at Cape Cod
Community College. Charlie telephoned Louis L., 7 a student at
Barnstable High School, expressing interest in purchasing a
black Nissan Maxima that Louis was selling for $11,000. Louis
and his girl friend picked up Charlie and the defendant in the
Nissan and drove to the high school parking lot. At the school,
Charlie gave Louis $11,000 in cash, which was organized into
piles of $1,000, with each stack folded in half and wrapped in a
rubber band; a photograph of Charlie holding the cash, taken by
Louis, was admitted in evidence at trial. The defendant showed
Louis his driver's license, and Louis agreed to let the
defendant test drive the vehicle with Charlie.
6
Diana R. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.
7
Louis L. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.
7
At some point after 4 P.M., Charlie's grandmother, who was
also the victim's grandmother, saw Charlie enter her locked
apartment through the front door, using the victim's keys. 8
Charlie had never before used the victim's keys to enter the
apartment. She asked Charlie if he would buy her some ginger
ale, because she was not feeling well. After a stop at a
convenience store, Charlie returned with the ginger ale to his
grandmother's apartment, in a black vehicle, between 7 and
9 P.M. 9 Charlie's grandmother asked him if he had a cigarette,
and he gave her a filtered menthol cigarette.
Later that evening, Charlie dropped by the house of the
victim's godmother in Hyannis. The victim kept some of his
belongings in the closet of the upstairs bathroom there,
including a safe box containing money. Although another
bathroom was available, Charlie waited for someone else to
finish showering in order to use the upstairs bathroom in
particular. After making use of that bathroom, he left.
At approximately 8:00 P.M., the defendant, Charlie, and
John met Louis at a pharmacy in Hyannis to return the Nissan,
8
The victim's grandmother recognized the keys as belonging
to the victim based on the Boston Red Sox logo on one of them.
9
Still photographs taken from video surveillance footage of
the convenience store, showing the defendant inside the store,
carrying what appears to be a soda bottle, were introduced at
trial. As discussed infra, the defendant argues that a
detective's testimony identifying him as the person in the
photographs was improper.
8
which the defendant had been driving, and Louis gave them back
the $11,000 in cash. As they were walking away, Louis called
after them that they had left their keys on a key chain in the
ignition; he testified that he recognized the keys as belonging
to the victim.
At some time during the evening, the defendant telephoned
Diana and told her that he would give her ten Percocet pills if
she came to the Arrowhead Drive house right away, where he,
Charlie, and John were. When Diana arrived at the house, she
saw that the three of them had a "big bag" containing, in her
estimation, approximately one thousand Percocet pills; she
testified that she never before had seen them with such a large
supply. The four of them then spent time at another house on
Elm Street before returning to the Arrowhead Drive house for the
night. Diana initially did not want to spend the night at the
Arrowhead Drive house, preferring instead to spend time with the
victim, with whom she was "hooking up," but the three males
repeatedly assured her that the victim would be coming to the
house. While she waited for the victim to arrive, Diana
consumed Percocet and Oxycontin with the others, and eventually
agreed to spend the night. 10 Diana telephoned the victim
10
Diana testified that, at some point in the past, she had
seen a gun in Charlie's bedroom in the basement of the Arrowhead
Drive house. She also had been with Charlie when he purchased a
black knife that he called "the Hawk." She had seen the knife
9
throughout the night, but was unable to reach him. The victim
never showed up at the Arrowhead Drive house.
b. Tuesday, December 16, 2008. In the morning, Charlie
asked Diana to drive him to his grandmother's apartment, because
he was worried that the victim had not come to the Arrowhead
Drive house the night before. Diana drove Charlie, John, and
the defendant to the apartment. Once there, Charlie went into
the victim's bedroom and then left the apartment.
Charlie then said that he "wanted to get a car," so Diana
drove them to a dealership in Hyannis. 11 Charlie and the
defendant spoke with a salesman about purchasing a silver 2000
BMW and negotiated a sale price for the vehicle, which had a
sticker price of $10,995. 12 Charlie presented $7,500 in cash and
the defendant supplied the difference, grouped in $1,000
increments and wrapped in rubber bands. The vehicle was
registered in the defendant's name.
Meanwhile, the victim's grandmother was growing
increasingly worried about her grandson, whom she had not seen
since the previous day. She and the victim's mother drove to
on a washing machine in the basement sometime during the day on
December 15, 2008.
11
Diana testified that she did not know how old Charlie was
at the time, and that he had told her that he was seventeen.
12
The salesman noticed that Charlie looked "very young" but
did not specifically inquire into his age.
10
the houses of different friends and family members, looking for
the victim, to no avail. Charlie returned to his grandmother's
apartment with John between 5 and 6 P.M. that evening, wearing a
new jacket. His grandmother took the victim's keys from Charlie
and went into the victim's bedroom. She noticed that there was
duct tape on a door in the room; she testified that the victim
was "immaculate about his room" and would not have put tape on
his door.
The victim's grandmother then received a telephone call
from her son, the father of both Charlie and the victim, who
told her to take the victim's sister with her to check the
places where the children used to play. Charlie and John then
left the apartment. Sometime early that evening, Charlie was
seen behind the wheel of a BMW at a local gasoline station, as
the defendant walked towards it, carrying a red gasoline can.
The defendant got into the BMW and John came out of it, holding
the can as he walked toward the gasoline pumps.
Approximately twenty-five minutes after leaving her
apartment, the victim's grandmother and sister arrived at a
place in the woods where the children often spent time. They
noticed a bright orange light in the distance, and realized that
it was a fire emanating from a pit. The victim's body was
burning at the bottom of the pit. Emergency personnel arrived
at the scene, extinguished the fire, and extracted the victim's
11
body, which had been wrapped in a sheet and a comforter. 13
Evidence later recovered from the scene included a package of
Newport menthol cigarettes, 14 a red pushpin, and a pink Starburst
candy; 15 a certified accelerant detection dog also twice alerted
to the presence of gasoline.
After she received news of the victim's death, Diana
telephoned the defendant and asked him if he knew what had
happened and whether he knew who was responsible. The defendant
responded, "We think we have an idea," and told her that he and
Charlie were going to New York. 16
c. Thursday, December 18, 2008. On December 18, 2008, the
defendant drove in the BMW to the home of his friend Sam T. 17
The defendant was carrying bags of Oxycontin and Percocet pills,
and showed Sam a "wad" of cash that appeared to be at least
13
The victim's grandmother testified that she recognized
the comforter as one that Charlie used when he lived with her in
2007.
14
As mentioned, testimony at trial indicated Charlie had
been seen with menthol cigarettes.
15
Colored pushpins and a package of Starburst candy were
later found in the basement of the Arrowhead Drive house.
16
The defendant did not go to New York after the discovery
of the victim's body, but spent the night of December 17 at a
motel in Attleboro.
17
Sam T. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.
12
$1,000. 18 Along with two other friends, they went to the mall,
where the defendant spent cash on purchases for a friend and
himself.
Later that evening, after dropping off the other friends,
Sam and the defendant drove to Wellfleet to meet their friend
Ella M. During the trip, the defendant said, "I have something
to tell you. I killed Jordan Mendes. I shot him, and I stabbed
him. I bodied him." He said that he and Charlie had planned to
rob the victim for his money, 19 but then "shit went bad" and he
shot the victim while they were in the basement of the Arrowhead
Drive house after school one day, and also stabbed him in the
neck. The defendant told Sam that he and Charlie had rolled the
body in a blanket, thrown it in a ditch, and burned it with
gasoline. The defendant went on to say that he was not worried
about getting caught because he had "cleaned it up" with bleach.
In Wellfleet, the two picked up Ella 20 and drove to a
restaurant. Sam went inside the restaurant while the defendant
and Ella consumed a crushed Percocet pill in the vehicle, using
18
Sam testified that he never had seen the defendant, whom
he had known since childhood, with that amount of cash before.
19
Another witness, one of the defendant's classmates,
testified that, one week before the victim's death, the
defendant told her that "within a week, he was going to be
getting a BMW for ten stacks."
20
Ella M. testified pursuant to a grant of immunity.
13
a $100 bill that the defendant supplied to inhale it. 21 The
defendant told Ella that he "had all the money in the world" and
wanted to spoil her and take her out to dinner whenever she
desired. After they were seated inside the restaurant, the
defendant told Ella that he loved her but that he was "going
away for a long time" and that she would not be able to see him.
He then took a "wad of money" out of his pocket and scattered it
on the table. Ella counted somewhere between $500 and $1,000,
but the defendant said that he had over $28,000.
After dinner, Ella and the defendant continued to talk in
the BMW. When Ella asked him how he came to have so much money,
the defendant told her, "We jumped someone," and that he had
robbed that person of his pills and money. 22 The defendant,
"very nervous [and] shaking," said that "it was a mess" and
"mentioned something about blood." He said that he was going to
21
Ella also testified that she had met the defendant
earlier that day at the Registry of Motor Vehicles in Yarmouth
to buy drugs from him. The defendant was with Charlie and
carried a bag of at least fifty Percocet and Oxycontin pills.
The defendant showed Ella his new BMW, telling her that he had
purchased it with cash.
22
In addition to confessing to Sam and Ella, the defendant
confessed to an inmate in the Barnstable house of correction
shortly after he was arrested. According to the inmate, who was
housed in the cell adjacent to the defendant, the defendant said
that he and "Little Jordan" had shot and stabbed the victim and
burned the body in a ditch. The inmate also testified that the
defendant said that he and Charlie had taken apart and disposed
of the gun that was used to shoot the victim.
14
be in a lot of trouble and reiterated that he would be going
away for a long time.
Sam and the defendant dropped off Ella and returned to
Sam's house, where the defendant left pills, approximately
$2,000 in cash, and a knife. On the way back from Sam's house,
the defendant was stopped by police, who had received a "be on
the lookout" alert regarding a BMW registered to the defendant.
An officer of the Barnstable police department read the
defendant the Miranda rights after the defendant got out of the
vehicle, but did not place him under arrest. Another officer
asked the defendant if he would go voluntarily to the police
station to speak with detectives about a recent homicide, and
the defendant agreed. The BMW was towed to the police station.
A redacted 23 recording of the defendant's interview with
police was played for the jury. 24 During the interview, the
defendant did not admit to killing the victim, but made
statements concerning his whereabouts over the prior days that
were inconsistent with other evidence. For example, he claimed
23
The interview was redacted primarily to remove any
reference to statements made by Charlie and John implicating the
defendant.
24
The audio portion of the first four minutes of the
interview was not recorded. One of the interviewing officers
testified that, although the video recording was motion-
activated, turning on the audio recording required manual
intervention. The officers initiated the audio recording after
a preliminary exchange concerning the logistics of the
interview.
15
that, after Diana dropped him off at the Arrowhead Drive house
on the afternoon of December 15, 2008, he stayed there for the
rest of the day, and maintained that he spent the entirety of
December 16, 2008 at his own home in South Yarmouth.
d. Police investigation. i. Search of Arrowhead Drive
house. Police searched the Arrowhead Drive house pursuant to a
warrant, finding, among other things, a number of stains in the
basement that tested positive for the presence of blood. 25 A
forensic expert testified that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
consistent with the victim's DNA profile was found in several of
the blood stains, including stains on the wall, on an end table,
on a remote control, and on the floor. 26 She testified that the
probability of the DNA profile of a randomly selected Caucasian
individual matching that found in the blood stains was at least
1 in 19.18 quintillion. 27 Additionally, a DNA mixture from at
least two individuals was found on a sneaker, to which the
25
The basement, to which Charlie had a key, was partitioned
into makeshift rooms using sheets that had been affixed to the
ceiling beams with multicolored pushpins. In one of the ceiling
beams, investigators noted holes several feet apart but no
sheet. A package of Starburst candies also was found in the
basement, and a red gasoline tank was recovered from a shed in
the backyard.
26
The defendant presented one witness, a different
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) expert, who testified that she would
have excluded the defendant as a potential contributor to the
DNA found on the knife blade.
27
The defendant is Caucasian.
16
victim and the defendant were included as potential contributors
and Charlie and John were excluded.
ii. Search of Nissan. In Louis's Nissan, between the
passenger seat and the center console, police found a black
folding knife that tested positive for the presence of blood and
contained a DNA mixture of at least two individuals. The major
profile of DNA extracted from the knife blade was consistent
with that of the victim, and the defendant could not be excluded
as a potential contributor. The probability of DNA in the
mixture matching the DNA profile of a randomly selected
Caucasian individual was 1 in 28. A tennis racquet that tested
positive for the presence of blood and bore DNA consistent with
the victim's was found in the Nissan's trunk.
iii. Search of BMW. Pursuant to a search warrant, police
found a number of new articles of clothing, with store tags
still on them, in the trunk of the defendant's BMW, as well as
some clothing that appeared to have been worn. One T-shirt and
one pair of sneakers that appeared to have been worn tested
positive for the presence of blood; DNA found on the T-shirt
matched the defendant's profile, and neither the victim nor John
could be excluded as contributors to DNA found on the sneaker.
3. Discussion. The defendant raises constitutional issues
concerning the availability of "target standing" under art. 14
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the
17
constitutionality of the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233,
§§ 20C-20E. The defendant also argues that there was error in
the admission of testimony from a police officer who identified
him as the person shown in surveillance footage, and in the
judge's failure to instruct the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v.
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004).
a. Target standing. Probable cause to stop and search the
defendant's BMW rested in part on statements made by John and
Charlie implicating the defendant. A Juvenile Court judge
ordered the majority of those statements suppressed in the
juvenile proceedings against John and Charlie, primarily due to
the failure of police to adhere to the protocol established by
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134 (1983), for
interrogating juveniles under the age of fourteen. The
defendant argues that, as the real target of the police
investigation, he should have been granted standing to assert
the violation of John and Charlie's constitutional rights in
litigating his own motions to suppress, and the failure to
afford him such standing resulted in the erroneous denial of his
motions. He asks this court to recognize the concept of target
standing, which we have not done previously.
Although the United States Supreme Court has rejected the
theory under the Fourth Amendment, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133-138 (1978), "[w]e have left open the question
18
whether target standing has vitality under art. 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights." Commonwealth v.
Scardamaglia, 410 Mass. 375, 379 (1991), citing Commonwealth v.
Manning, 406 Mass. 425, 429 (1990). We have expressed a
"reluctance to grant a wide scope to target standing, and
perhaps thereby to deny the trier of fact highly relevant
evidence of guilt," id. at 380, but have recognized certain
circumstances in which allowing such standing may have a
salutary deterrent effect on police misconduct.
For example, "[u]nconstitutional [police conduct directed
at] small fish intentionally undertaken in order to catch big
ones may have to be discouraged by allowing the big fish, when
caught, to rely on the violation of the rights of the small
fish, as to whose prosecution the police are relatively
indifferent." Commonwealth v. Manning, supra at 429, citing 4
W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 354-355 (2d ed.
1987). See 6 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 301
(5th ed. 2012) (posing hypothetical situation in which target
standing might lie where X is arrested for armed robbery, and
subsequently, "acting with the specific intention of finding
additional evidence incriminating X with respect to that crime,
the police conduct a fruitful search of X's wife").
Nonetheless, "the need to create a deterrent effect on police
misconduct by the recognition of target standing is not great
19
except perhaps in the case of distinctly egregious police
conduct." Commonwealth v. Scardamaglia, supra at 380.
We need not resolve in this case the extent of the
availability of target standing under art. 14, because the
defendant's claim that he was, in fact, the target of the police
investigation is belied by the record. Rather than pointing to
the defendant as the "big fish" that police sought, the record
indicates that, before conducting the interviews, police had
information suggesting that Charlie and John, in addition to the
defendant, could have played significant roles in the victim's
death, and actively were pursuing both juveniles as suspects.
Police officers testified at the hearing on the defendant's
motions to suppress that they knew prior to the interviews that
Charlie had used the victim's keys to access the victim's
bedroom on December 15, 2008, and that the victim never gave his
keys to anyone; that the victim's grandmother believed that the
victim had in his possession a large amount of cash, which
Charlie was trying to find; that Charlie was known to own a gun;
that John, who had been with Charlie earlier in the day on
December 16, 2008, had been seen running from the rear of the
Arrowhead Drive house as police approached; that the defendant
recently had purchased a BMW; and that Charlie, John, and
someone matching the defendant's description had been seen near
a silver BMW with a gasoline container.
20
Thus, unlike a wife who is searched by police with the
specific intent of finding evidence incriminating her husband,
Charlie and John were not ostensibly innocent "small fish, as to
whose prosecution the police [were] relatively indifferent."
Commonwealth v. Manning, supra at 429. Rather, insofar as
information already known to police suggested the juveniles'
material involvement in the victim's death, it appears that
police "were genuinely interested in implicating [them], and
thus the added threat of exclusion vis-à-vis [the defendant]
would not seem necessary in such circumstances." 6 W.R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.3(h), at 305 (5th ed. 2012).
Indeed, it is not the case that Charlie and John were
without opportunity to contest the police misconduct directed at
them, a circumstance which otherwise might counsel in favor of
allowing a third party to assert their rights instead. To the
contrary, in separate criminal proceedings, Charlie and John
both successfully challenged the violations of their respective
constitutional rights, resulting in the suppression of all
statements obtained as a result of those violations. To be
sure, because both Charlie and John were juveniles under the age
of fourteen, only the defendant could be prosecuted as an adult,
subject to the prospect of a life sentence without the
possibility of parole. See G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 58, 72B. See
also G. L. c. 265, § 2. But that alone cannot suffice to
21
establish the defendant as the actual target of the
investigation, particularly where, as here, there was ample
evidence of the juveniles' involvement. Thus, even assuming the
availability of target standing under art. 14, the defendant
cannot establish that he was the prime target of the police
investigation and therefore was properly denied target standing
to challenge the violations of the juveniles' constitutional
rights. 28,29
b. Constitutionality of immunity statute, G. L. c. 233,
§§ 20C-20E. The defendant also challenges the constitutional
validity of the witness immunity statute, G. L. c. 233, §§ 20C-
20E, both facially and as applied to him. The defendant argues
28
Since the defendant's argument fails because he was not
in fact the prime target of the police investigation, we do not
consider whether the police misconduct directed at John and
Charlie was "distinctly egregious." Commonwealth v.
Scardamaglia, 410 Mass. 375, 380 (1991).
29
We note also that the Superior Court motion judge found
that there was probable cause to stop the defendant's BMW, seize
it, and interrogate the defendant even without considering the
information gleaned from illegally obtained statements, a
finding that is supported by the record. In particular, before
police issued the "be on the lookout" alert for the defendant or
stopped his vehicle, they had information that the defendant had
been at the Arrowhead Drive house around the time that the
victim was last seen alive; that Charlie and the defendant had
purchased a BMW with cash on the day that the victim's body was
discovered, which was particularly significant given that the
killing appeared to be motivated by robbery of a large amount of
cash; and that Charlie, John, and a person matching the
defendant's description were seen with a gasoline container
shortly before the victim's body was found burning in a pit
amidst an odor of gasoline.
22
that the scheme for immunizing witnesses in the Commonwealth,
whereby an order granting immunity to a trial witness may be
issued only "at the request of the attorney general or a
district attorney," G. L. c. 233, § 20E (a), is unconstitutional
insofar as it "clearly inures to the benefit of only one party
in our adversary system of justice." That the power to seek
immunity for witnesses lies only with the government, the
defendant contends, bestows on the prosecution "an undue
tactical advantage," rendering a defendant's trial
"fundamentally unfair and its result unreliable." The defendant
argues that the Commonwealth's reliance on a "spate" of
immunized witnesses in his case deprived him of his Federal and
State constitutional rights by undermining "the procedural
safeguards which ostensibly protect the defendant from
conviction based upon false evidence."
Turning first to the defendant's as-applied challenge, the
Commonwealth in this case elicited testimony from five immunized
witnesses: Diana, Louis, Sam, Sam's mother, and Ella. 30 Based
on their testimony, viewed in the aggregate, the jury could have
found that the defendant had been at the Arrowhead Drive house
around the time that the victim was last seen alive on December
30
The Commonwealth also intended to offer immunity to a
sixth witness, and obtained an order granting immunity to a
seventh witness. Both nonetheless refused to testify and were
found to be in contempt.
23
15, 2008; that he test-drove Louis's Nissan on December 15,
2008, in which the victim's keys were seen at the time and a
knife later was found; that he had at least $2,000 in cash and
large bags of pills on his person on December 18, 2008, some of
which he sold; and that he confessed to shooting and stabbing
the victim and robbing him of pills and money.
Defense counsel lodged his first objection to the
Commonwealth's asserted overreliance on immunized witnesses
before the fifth such witness took the stand, arguing that this
excessive resort to offers of immunity constituted a "structural
flaw." The judge took no action, noting that the objection had
been raised "at the eleventh hour." 31
Our jurisprudence has not vested criminal defendants with
expansive rights vis-à-vis the immunization of witnesses. To
the contrary, "[w]e have held, without qualification, that a
defendant 'has no standing to argue that the testimony of . . .
purportedly immunized witnesses [is] the product of improper
grants of immunity,'" reasoning that "[t]he privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal right of the witness, and one
that the witness is in a position to protect by his own means."
Smith v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 345, 349 (1982), citing
31
In a motion for a required finding of not guilty at the
close of the Commonwealth's case, defense counsel also raised
the issue of the Commonwealth's excessive reliance on immunized
witnesses.
24
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 370 Mass. 119, 121 (1976). While a
prospective defense witness's assertion of his right under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution could affect a
defendant's ability to present his defense most effectively, the
compulsory process provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions do not mandate a judicial grant of immunity to
such a witness as a matter of course. See Commonwealth v.
Curtis, 388 Mass. 637, 646 (1983), S.C., 417 Mass. 619 (1994).
Although we have left open the possibility that "unique
circumstances" could require a judge to grant a limited form of
immunity to a defense witness, see id., we have not been
presented yet with such a scenario. See Pixley v. Commonwealth,
453 Mass. 827, 834 n.7 (2009) (collecting cases).
Other courts have recognized that such unique circumstances
might emerge "where there exists prosecutorial misconduct
arising from the government's deliberate intent to distort the
fact-finding process." United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,
1190 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Granito v. United States,
498 U.S. 845 (1990), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Cash,
64 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818 (2005), quoting Curtis v. Duval, 124
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (judicial grant of immunity not
required where there was no evidence of "attempt to harass or
intimidate potential witnesses, or . . . that the prosecutor
25
deliberately withheld immunity for the purpose of hiding
exculpatory evidence from the jury").
Here, however, the defendant has pointed to no such
prosecutorial misconduct, nor has he even suggested the
existence of a witness who was deterred from testifying in his
favor due to his inability to secure a grant of immunity. Under
these circumstances, "we see no logical basis for departing from
the principle . . . that 'it is up to the jury to evaluate the
credibility of a[n immunized] witness' . . . based merely upon
the number of witnesses that received inducements from the
government in exchange for their testimony." United States v.
Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 878 (1998), quoting United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539,
1552 (5th Cir. 1994). See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53,
74, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012) (assessing credibility
of witnesses who have received consideration in exchange for
testimony is within province of jury). Standing alone, the
Commonwealth's presentation of immunized witnesses, particularly
where a defendant has not sought to immunize his own prospective
witness, does not deprive a defendant of his right to a fair
trial. 32
32
We decline the defendant's invitation to exercise our
general superintendence power pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to
announce a rule limiting the Commonwealth's authority to
immunize witnesses. A prerequisite to the invocation of this
26
The Commonwealth is, in any event, constrained by G. L.
c. 233, § 20I, which provides that a defendant cannot be
convicted solely on the basis of immunized testimony. That was
not the situation here, as the immunized testimony was amply
corroborated by nonimmunized witnesses. See Commonwealth v.
Fernandes, 425 Mass. 357, 360 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v.
Scanlon, 373 Mass. 11, 19 (1977) ("[T]o provide the requisite
credibility, 'there must be some evidence in support of the
testimony of an immunized witness on at least one element of
proof essential to convict the defendant'"). There was evidence
that a blood mixture containing DNA matching the victim's, to
which the defendant could not be excluded as a potential
contributor, was found on a knife discovered in a vehicle that
the defendant had been driving. There was also testimony that,
approximately one week before the victim's death and the
defendant's purchase of the BMW, the defendant told a classmate
that, within a week, he would "be getting a BMW for ten stacks."
Although two of the immunized witnesses provided powerful
testimony concerning the defendant's confession to them that he
had killed the victim, a third, nonimmunized witness also
testified to a similar statement by the defendant. Finally, the
court's "truly extraordinary" general superintendence power is
"a substantial claim of violation of [a litigant's] substantive
rights," which has not been demonstrated here. See McMenimen v.
Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 184 (2008), S.C., 458 Mass. 1007
(2010).
27
defendant was seen holding a tank of gasoline at a gasoline
station shortly before the victim's body was discovered on fire,
having been doused with an accelerant. This evidence "not only
corroborate[d] the essential elements needed to convict the
defendant but also link[ed him] to the crime." Id.
Other safeguards further preserved the defendant's right to
a fair trial. The judge instructed the jury, before each
immunized witness testified, that they could consider a
witness's grant of immunity in assessing his or her credibility,
and gave a similar instruction in his final charge. The judge
also instructed the jury in his final charge that they could not
convict solely on the basis of immunized testimony. In
addition, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined four of the
five immunized witnesses on the nature of the inducements they
received from the government. Cf. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458
Mass. 100, 110-111 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011)
(rejecting due process challenge to witness payments contingent
on outcome of case where, inter alia, judge gave "comprehensive
instructions concerning witness credibility" and defense counsel
cross-examined witnesses on nature of payments). We discern no
basis to doubt that the defendant received a fair trial.
Finally, because we conclude that G. L. c. 233, § 20E, is
constitutional as applied to the defendant, his facial challenge
must fail. See Commonwealth v. Abramms, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 576,
28
587 (2006) (Brown, J., concurring), citing Blixt v. Blixt, 437
Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003)
("Where a constitutional construction of a challenged statute is
possible, a facial challenge must be rejected").
c. Other errors. i. Identification testimony. Eight
still photographs extracted from video surveillance footage
taken on December 15, 2008, at a convenience store were admitted
in evidence at trial. A detective testified, over objection,
that the person seen in the photographs was the defendant. The
defendant argues that such identification testimony was improper
and unduly prejudicial, because the criteria for the admission
of lay opinion identification testimony were not met.
The defendant is correct that the admission of this
testimony was erroneous. The general rule is that a "witness's
opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a
surveillance photograph is admissible if there is some basis for
concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify
the defendant from the photograph than is the jury."
Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 326 (2000),
quoting United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th
Cir. 1984). "Put another way, 'such testimony is admissible
. . . when the witness possesses sufficiently relevant
familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also
possess.'" Id. at 326-327, quoting United States v. Jackman, 48
29
F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1995). If the witness lacks such
familiarity, it is the province of the jury to draw their own
conclusions regarding the identity of the person depicted
without the witness's assistance. See Commonwealth v. Austin,
421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995); Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37,
41-42 (1966), S.C., 354 Mass. 249 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1039 (1969), quoting Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122,
137 (1875).
Here, there is no indication that the detective possessed
any special familiarity with the defendant that the jury lacked,
or that the defendant's appearance had changed since the time
the footage was taken, such that the jury needed assistance in
identifying the individual depicted. Contrast Commonwealth v.
Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 460 (1978) (police officer's testimony
could aid jury in identifying person in photograph as defendant
where officer testified that he had known defendant for long
time and had seen him often, and defendant testified that he had
lost twenty-five pounds since date photograph was taken).
Although we are cognizant of the "increase[d] potential for
inappropriate prejudice to the defendant" stemming from
"identification testimony from a police officer who is so
designated," Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 879 (2013),
quoting Commonwealth v. Pleas, supra at 327, we cannot say that
the improper testimony here constituted reversible error. The
30
testimony, brief and fleeting as it was, did not overwhelm the
other compelling, properly-admitted evidence against the
defendant. The defendant argues that the testimony "placed
[him] near [the victim's] apartment around the time that the
Commonwealth alleged he was murdered," but, where there was no
indication that the defendant's appearance at trial was
different than it was in the photographs, the jury were capable
of drawing the same conclusion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Anderson,
19 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 969 (1985) (erroneous identification
testimony harmless where "photographs upon which the non-
eyewitnesses based their opinions were introduced in evidence,
permitting the jury to decide independently whether the
defendant was the person on film"). Moreover, the defendant, in
his interview with police, admitted to being in the convenience
store on the night in question. Thus, the improper testimony
was not prejudicial.
ii. Failure to give DiGiambattista instruction. As
discussed, see note 24, supra, the audio portion of the first
four minutes of the defendant's police interview was not
recorded, although there was a complete video recording. The
defendant contends that the judge's failure to give an
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442
Mass. 423 (2004) (DiGiambattista), was prejudicial, where the
prosecutor argued in her closing argument that there was no
31
coercion during the interview, and where the jury asked to
review the digital video disc (DVD) of the interview during
deliberations.
We do not agree with the defendant that the issue properly
was preserved for appellate review. Generally, if defense
counsel requests a specific instruction and the judge rejects
it, or gives an instruction inconsistent with the requested one,
we consider the objection to have been preserved. See
Commonwealth v. Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 253-254 (1995). Here,
however, although defense counsel requested a DiGiambattista
instruction, the judge never rejected the request; rather, he
told counsel that he would consider giving such an instruction
in his final charge, but ultimately did not do so. Under the
circumstances, "it was entirely likely that the omission was
inadvertent and that the judge would have rectified the error
had it been brought to his attention. [Defense counsel] should
have brought the omission to the judge's attention by objecting
at the end of the charge." Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass.
133, 139 (2008). Because he did not, our review is for a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992).
We held in DiGiambattista, supra at 447-448, that
"when the prosecution introduces evidence of a
defendant's confession or statement that is the
product of a custodial interrogation or an
32
interrogation conducted at a place of detention (e.g.,
a police station), and there is not at least an
audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the
defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury
instruction advising that the State's highest court
has expressed a preference that such interrogations be
recorded whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury
that, because of the absence of any recording of the
interrogation in the case before them, they should
weigh evidence of the defendant's alleged statement
with great caution and care."
Further, "[w]here voluntariness is a live issue and the humane
practice instruction is given, [as it was here,] the jury should
also be advised that the absence of a recording permits (but
does not compel) them to conclude that the Commonwealth has
failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at 448.
The failure to give a DiGiambattista instruction was
erroneous. Contrary to the Commonwealth's suggestion, the State
police sergeant's testimony 33 concerning the substance of the
unrecorded portion of the interview does not cure "the failure
to preserve the evidence in the first place." Id. at 447 n.23.
Nor is it the case, as the Commonwealth argues, that there was
no need for a cautionary instruction because the entire
recording was available to the defendant -- the defendant had
33
The State police sergeant testified that, during the
unrecorded portion of the interview, he thanked the defendant
for agreeing to speak with police, explained that they were
conducting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
the death of the victim, and asked whether the defendant would
be willing to speak about that; the defendant agreed to do so.
33
the full video recording, but no party had the full audio
recording, which did not exist. Since the audiotape recording
of the defendant's interrogation was incomplete and defense
counsel requested the DiGiambattista instruction, the
requirements for giving such an instruction were met, and the
instruction should have been given.
Nonetheless, there was no substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. The defendant does not contest the
interviewing State police sergeant's testimony as to the
introductory nature of the first four minutes of the interview,
and nothing in the record suggests that any substantive exchange
took place during that time. To the contrary, the recorded
portion began as the sergeant introduced himself and his partner
to the defendant and explained that the interview would be
recorded, tending to corroborate the sergeant's trial testimony.
See note 33, supra. The recorded portion, spanning thirty-five
pages of transcript, also captured the defendant's waiver of
Miranda rights, and the form memorializing the waiver was
admitted at trial. Thus, it appears that most, if not all, of
the substance of the interview was recorded and played for the
jury, who accordingly were well situated to determine the
voluntariness of the defendant's statements.
In any event, even if the jury had disregarded the
defendant's recorded statements in their entirety, there was
34
ample other evidence supporting a conviction of murder in the
first degree. The defendant's statements did not directly
incriminate him, while other overwhelming evidence did. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 801-802 (2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011) (trial judge's error in giving
only part of DiGiambattista instruction did not prejudice
defendant where his unrecorded police interview was "some of the
weakest evidence against him").
4. Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Pursuant to
our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we consider an error neither
objected to by the defendant at trial nor raised in his appeal
to this court.
Where, as here, the Commonwealth proceeds against a
defendant on a joint venture theory of an offense that includes
possession of a weapon as an element, the judge should instruct
the jury that they must find that the defendant knew of his
coventurers' possession of that weapon. See Commonwealth v.
Lee, 460 Mass. 64, 68-70 (2011), and cases cited. After the
defendant's 2011 trial, we clarified that, where the
Commonwealth proceeds on alternate theories of a defendant's
guilt (that the defendant was the main perpetrator of the
offense or that his coventurer in fact carried out the offense),
further explanation is required. In such a case, the judge
should instruct the jury that, to convict the defendant, they
35
must find either that a coventurer committed the offense and the
defendant participated while knowing that the coventurer
possessed a weapon, or that the defendant himself committed the
offense with a weapon. See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass.
440, 450 (2012). "[T]he requirement of knowledge of a weapon in
the context of murder in the first degree on a joint venture
theory applies only where the conviction is for felony-murder
and the underlying felony has as one of its elements the use or
possession of a weapon." Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87,
100 (2013).
On all four offenses charged, the Commonwealth here
proceeded against the defendant on alternate theories of his
guilt. Three of those offenses included an element of
possession of a weapon, namely, felony-murder with armed robbery
as the predicate offense, 34 the armed robbery itself, and assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon. As such, the judge should
have instructed the jury regarding the requirement of the
defendant's knowledge of his alleged coventurers' possession of
a dangerous weapon. However, his failure to do so did not
34
Because the defendant was convicted of murder on three
different theories, the defendant's conviction of armed robbery
was not duplicative of his conviction of felony-murder. "Where,
as here, the conviction of murder is based on a theory [or
theories] in addition to the theory of felony-murder, the
conviction of the underlying felony stands." Commonwealth v.
Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 370-371 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v.
Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 200 n.1 (2004).
36
result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
The defendant did not argue at trial that his alleged
coventurers carried out the offenses with weapons that he did
not know they possessed. Indeed, such a position would have
been weak at best in light of evidence, such as confessions to
two different people as well as DNA evidence, that the defendant
himself used a weapon to kill the victim. It is therefore
unlikely that the omitted jury instruction would have affected
the outcome of the case, and we discern no reason, on this or
any other basis, to order a new trial or to reduce the
conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt.
Judgments affirmed.