Elmer Cox v. Nueces County, Texas

Case: 13-41343 Document: 00512726379 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/07/2014

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 13-41343 FILED

Summary Calendar August 7, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

ELMER COX,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JIM KAELIN, Individually,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:12-CV-339

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Elmer Cox, a former employee of the Nueces County Sheriff’s

Department, brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jim Kaelin,

the Sheriff of Nueces County, Texas, asserting that Kaelin violated his First

Amendment rights. Cox alleges that Kaelin retaliated against him in response

to his support for Kaelin’s opponent in the 2012 race for Nueces County Sheriff

and his involvement in the political process, in violation of his First

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Amendment rights to free speech and association. The district court denied

Kaelin’s motion to dismiss, in which he asserted that Cox had failed to state a

claim on which relief could be granted and raised the defense of qualified

immunity. Kaelin brings this interlocutory appeal of that judgment. For the

reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

I.

In Cox’s Fifth Amended Complaint, he alleges the following:

Prior to his termination, Cox had been employed by the Nueces County

Sheriff’s Department for over twenty years. During the last ten years of his

employment, he had served as the President of the Nueces County Sheriff

Officers’ Association, a Political Action Committee (“PAC”). In early May

2012, Kaelin—who was the Sheriff of Nueces County at the time—became

upset that Thomas Burnside—who was employed by the Sheriff’s Department

and was a chairman of the PAC—began supporting Kaelin’s opponent in the

upcoming election. The PAC itself, as well as Cox, also seemed to be supporting

Kaelin’s opponent, which apparently also upset Kaelin.

Sometime around May 15, 2012, Kaelin advised Cox that he should

remove Burnside as a chairman of the PAC, in an apparent attempt to sway

the PAC to support his candidacy. Kaelin informed Cox that Burnside was

going to be transferred to a position working in the Nueces County Jail, which

he reportedly characterized as a demotion. Kaelin threatened the same action

against Cox, who at the time had been working on a task force for the U.S.

Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), should he ignore Kaelin’s request

to remove Burnside from his chairmanship. Kaelin presented Cox with an

ultimatum, stating he had until May 18, 2012 to respond to Kaelin’s request.

Cox thereafter suspended the PAC for a short period of time in order to

determine his course of action and to fill vacancies. However, Cox reinstated

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the PAC, which resumed its activities and held a meeting sometime around

May 28, 2012.

On May 31, 2012, Cox was summoned into his supervisor’s office, where

he was told to call Kaelin on his cell phone. During the phone conversation,

Kaelin allegedly became very upset, accused Cox of lying to him, and

remarked, “Remember what I said I was going to do?” Kaelin thereafter

reassigned Cox to a position in the jail, giving him 48 hours to vacate his

position on the DEA Task Force. Cox characterizes this reassignment as a

demotion. As a result of his transfer to the jail, Cox’s vehicle was taken away,

including the gas, mileage, and insurance benefits that came with it. In

addition, Cox was no longer eligible for overtime pay, which amounted to over

$10,000 per year. Cox was initially assigned to work the “graveyard shift,”

which encompasses early morning hours, and remained in that position for an

extended period of time.

On March 28, 2013, Cox’s employment with the Nueces County Sheriff’s

Department was terminated. Cox presumes that his employment was

terminated due to his dissemination of a recorded conversation, wherein

Kaelin threatened an officer who has since resigned from his position. At the

time, Cox was working in the jail along with Burnside and another employee

who apparently was previously assigned to the DEA Task Force, but who was

also reassigned by Kaelin to jail duty for political-related reasons.

Cox avers that his involvement with the PAC, Burnside, or the election

was in no way associated with his employment, and he did not discuss these

matters during work hours. Cox asserts that his involvement with the political

process and his known support for Kaelin’s opponent in the upcoming election

were the causes of his demotion to a position in the jail, as well as his eventual

termination.

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II.

Cox then filed this § 1983 action in federal court, naming both Nueces

County, Texas, a municipality, and Kaelin, individually, as defendants. Cox

asserted that the defendants maintain a pattern or practice of depriving

persons of their First Amendment rights, and that defendants retaliated

against him in violation of the First Amendment because he engaged in free

speech and association in regards to the political process.

In response, Kaelin filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, in addition to raising the defense of qualified immunity. In support

of this motion, Kaelin argued that: (1) Cox’s pleadings were conclusory and did

not meet the necessary pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss; (2)

Cox had not pleaded a policy on which his claim was based; (3) Cox had not

pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim of retaliation for engaging in conduct

protected by the First Amendment; and (4) Cox’s pleadings failed to negate

Kaelin’s qualified immunity defense. The matter was referred to a United

States Magistrate Judge, who found that Cox had pleaded sufficient facts to

support all of the required elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim

and had pleaded sufficient facts to negate Kaelin’s qualified immunity defense

at the motion to dismiss stage. The Magistrate Judge further found that the

issue of whether there was a practice or policy violative of the First

Amendment was not relevant to the cause of action against Kaelin. The

Magistrate Judge therefore recommended that Kaelin’s motion to dismiss be

denied. The district court thereafter overruled all of Kaelin’s objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, adopted its findings and conclusions, and

denied Kaelin’s motion to dismiss. Kaelin then filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION

I.

In his brief, Cox asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the

district court’s denial of Kaelin’s motion to dismiss, arguing that the district

court did not reject Kaelin’s defense of qualified immunity, but rather made a

“preliminary determination” that Cox had pleaded sufficient facts that, if

proven, would negate Kaelin’s qualified immunity defense. However, a district

court order denying a government official’s claim of qualified immunity is

immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, provided “it turns

on an issue of law.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009). A district court

order ruling on the sufficiency of the pleadings on the basis of qualified

immunity “turns on an issue of law,” as “evaluating the sufficiency of a

complaint is not a ‘fact-based’ question of law.” Id. at 674. Therefore, the denial

of the motion to dismiss in this case is “an order rejecting qualified immunity

at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a proceeding,” which gives this Court

jurisdiction to review that order pursuant to the collateral-order doctrine. Id.

at 672. Our jurisdiction in this case is not limited to reviewing the rejection of

the qualified immunity defense; we also have jurisdiction to review whether

the pleadings sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.

at 673 (holding that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the

sufficiency of the pleadings because “the sufficiency of respondent’s pleadings

is both inextricably intertwined with and directly implicated by the qualified

immunity defense” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

II.

At the outset, Kaelin complains generally that the Magistrate Judge

relied on matters outside of the pleadings in denying his motion to dismiss;

namely, Kaelin asserts that the Magistrate Judge relied on the pleadings from

a separate action against Kaelin. Kaelin argues that this is reversible error

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without any further elaboration. However, “federal courts are permitted to

refer to matters of public record when deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,”

so long as the court does not rely on those matters when deciding the motion.

Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Cinel v. Connick,

15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir.1994)). If the Magistrate Judge did in fact rely

on pleadings from a separate case, the district court “should have converted

the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, given the parties

notice, and then considered all of the evidence presented.” Scanlan v. Tex.

A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 2003). “Only if it appears that the

district court did rely on matters outside the pleadings should an appellate

court treat the dismissal as a summary judgment.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied

Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). There is

nothing in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation to

suggest that the Magistrate Judge placed any reliance on facts outside the

pleadings, including those alleged by Kaelin, in arriving at his conclusions; all

of the Recommendation’s findings are fully supported by the pleadings

themselves. Further, this Court must give credence to the district court’s

explicit statement that the Recommendation “is based strictly on the

pleadings.” See id. (citing Ware v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d

413, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1980)). Therefore, the district court committed no error

and the Court will review the denial of the motion to dismiss solely on the basis

of the pleadings.

III.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint

on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Atteberry v. Nocono Gen. Hosp.,

430 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 2005). “In applying this standard, we accept all

well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), “in order

to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements will not do.” Id. (internal quotation

marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In order for a public employee to recover for a free speech retaliation

claim, the plaintiff must satisfy four elements: “(1) the plaintiff must suffer an

adverse employment decision; (2) the plaintiff’s speech must involve a matter

of public concern; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in commenting on matters of public

concern must outweigh the defendant’s interest in promoting efficiency; and

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(4) the plaintiff’s speech must have motivated the defendant’s actions.” Finch

v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 563 (5th Cir. 2003).

Cox has pleaded a First Amendment retaliation claim with sufficient

facts to render it plausible on its face. It is plausible from the facts Cox alleges

that his reassignment to a position in the jail, as well as his discharge, were

adverse employment decisions. “Adverse employment actions are discharges,

demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.”

Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (1998). Cox’s alleged

discharge is clearly an adverse employment decision. Id. It is also plausible

that his reassignment to the jail was an adverse employment decision, as he

alleges that Kaelin himself referred to Burnside’s reassignment to the jail as a

demotion. See id. This Court has previously held that transfers to jail duty,

even without a decrease in pay, can be adverse employment decisions because

“jobs in the jail are not as interesting or prestigious as jobs in the law

enforcement section.” Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992). We

made that finding only after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, and

thus we can only make such a finding in this case after further facts have been

adduced. However, it is certainly plausible that a position in the jail is less

prestigious or interesting than Cox’s previous position on a DEA task force.

Thus, it is plausible from the facts alleged, including the loss of various

benefits, that Cox’s reassignment to the jail was indeed an adverse

employment decision.

Regarding the second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim,

we must determine whether it is plausible from the pleadings that Cox “spoke

as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,

418 (2006). The first step of this inquiry questions whether Cox engaged in

First Amendment speech as a citizen or in his role as a public employee. See

Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378-80 (2014). It is clear that Cox did not

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participate in the PAC and support for Kaelin’s opponent in the course of his

ordinary duties as a public employee; on the contrary, Kaelin specifically

pleaded that he never discussed his involvement with the PAC or the upcoming

election during work hours. Thus, it is clear that Cox engaged in these

activities as a citizen. His role as a citizen is impacted neither by the

relationship between the PAC—which is an association of sheriff officers—and

his employment as a deputy sheriff, nor by the fact that he was supporting the

opponent of his superior officer in an upcoming election, as “the critical

question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope

of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” Id. at

2379.

Next, we must determine whether the speech involved a matter of public

concern. See id. at 2380. “Speech involves matters of public concern when it

can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other

concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest;

that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The inquiry turns on the ‘content,

form, and context’ of the speech.” Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,

147-48 (1983)). The content—support for Kaelin’s opponent—and form—

participation in a PAC—of the speech at issue clearly support the notion that

it involved matters of public concern, as we have previously held that “there

can be no question that . . . associating with political organizations and

campaigning for a political candidate[] related to a matter of public concern.”

Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885 (5th Cir. 1995). The context of the speech,

insofar as it occurred in the midst of an upcoming local election, bolsters the

conclusion that Cox’s speech involved a matter of public concern. Kaelin

argues that Cox has not specifically pleaded any facts that suggest he had

actually engaged in verbal speech, and that this omission belies any claim that

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Cox engaged in protected speech. However, we have previously held that

political associations qualify as speech under the First Amendment, and thus

Kaelin’s argument is meritless. See Steadman v. Texas Rangers, 179 F.3d 360,

367 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that verbal enunciation of political views is not

required to receive First Amendment protection; political association is

sufficient in itself). Therefore, it is plausible from the facts alleged that Cox

engaged in speech in the role of a citizen on matters of public concern.

Kaelin further argues that the district court erred in not conducting a

balancing analysis, weighing Cox’s interest in commenting on matters of public

concern against the defendant’s interest in promoting efficiency in the

workplace, in order to determine the sufficiency of the pleadings in regards to

the third element. Kaelin cites Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library, 224

F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2000), among various other authorities, in support of the

proposition that such a balancing inquiry must be made at the motion to

dismiss stage of a proceeding. However, Kennedy explicitly opposes this

assertion, stating, “The third element, being the factually-sensitive balancing

test that it is, implicates only the summary judgment, not failure to state a

claim, analysis.” Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library, 224 F.3d 359, 366

n.9 (5th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563)).

Therefore, such a balancing inquiry is not warranted at this stage of the

proceedings, and it suffices that Cox’s pleadings, in which he avers he did not

discuss his political affiliations at work, render it plausible that his interest in

commenting on matters of public concern outweighed Kaelin’s interest in

promoting efficiency in the workplace.

Cox has also pleaded sufficient facts to support his claim that his

transfer to the jail and subsequent termination were motivated by his political

activity. Cox specifically pleads that Kaelin threatened a transfer to the jail

should Cox ignore his request to remove Burnside as chairman of the PAC.

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Cox additionally pleads that Kaelin referenced that previous threat in the

phone call during which Kaelin actually transferred Cox to the jail.

Additionally, Cox pleads that his support for Kaelin’s opponent was “known,”

and thus it is plausible that his political activity and “known support” for

Kaelin’s opponent motivated his eventual termination, aside from Cox’s

further claim that his termination was presumably due to the dissemination

of a recording. Kaelin argues that the ten-month lapse of time between Cox’s

transfer and his termination undermines any claim that his termination was

motivated by his political activity. However, Kaelin’s argument presupposes

that Cox’s political activity and support for Kaelin’s opponent ceased upon

being reassigned to the jail. The pleadings support the inference that Cox’s

political activity continued following his reassignment, and thus it is plausible

that his termination was also motivated by his political activity. Whether

Cox’s political activity did indeed continue following his transfer is a question

better suited for determination at a later stage of the proceedings. Therefore,

it is plausible from Cox’s pleadings that both his transfer to the jail and

subsequent termination were motivated by his political activity.

Accordingly, Cox’s complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter . . . to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” as it is plausible from the

complaint that Cox can succeed on all the elements of a First Amendment

retaliation claim, and it therefore withstands Kaelin’s motion to dismiss.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV.

Regarding Kaelin’s claimed defense of qualified immunity, he argues

that a heightened pleading standard applies when the defense of qualified

immunity is asserted, relying on Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir.

1995). Kaelin’s argument, however, misreads this Court’s opinion in that case.

In Schultea, we held that “a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 [must]

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file a short and plain statement of his complaint, a statement that rests on

more than conclusions alone.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.

1995). We further held that a district court “may, in its discretion, insist that

a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified

immunity.” Id. at 1433-34. The power to order such a detailed reply is based

on the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, and was not derived from

the heightened pleading standards espoused in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

9(b). Id. The district court, in its discretion, did not insist that Cox file such a

reply, as it found that he had met his burden to negate the defense of qualified

immunity because he had alleged sufficient facts in the short and plain

statement that Schultea initially requires. We review that decision de novo.

Atteberry, 430 F.3d at 252.

In order to negate the defense of qualified immunity, Cox must plead

sufficient facts to make it plausible that Kaelin’s conduct: (1) violated a “clearly

established federal constitutional right;” and (2) was not “objectively

reasonable in light of clearly established law.” Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385,

387 (5th Cir. 2003). The law is clearly established that a public employee may

be neither discharged nor demoted in retaliation for exercising his First

Amendment Rights. More specifically, the Supreme Court has consistently

held that governmental officials are forbidden from discharging public

employees for their political affiliations. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,

497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347 (1976). Further, we have held that “[t]he law was established clearly

enough in this circuit [as far back as] January 1988 that a reasonable officer

should have known that if he retaliated against an employee for exercising his

First Amendment rights, he could not escape liability by demoting and

transferring the employee rather than discharging him.” Click, 970 F.2d at

111. Kaelin argues, citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), that

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these statements of law are impermissibly general and thus do not constitute

clearly established law. This argument, wherein Kaelin attempts to equate

the fairly specific principle barring the discharge or demotion of public

employees for exercising their First Amendment rights with the broad notion

“that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,”

which the Court in al-Kidd cited as an overly general proposition, is, at best,

baseless. Therefore, it is plausible from the facts alleged that Kaelin violated

a clearly established constitutional right and his conduct was objectively

unreasonable. Accordingly, on the face of the pleadings, Cox has negated

Kaelin’s qualified immunity defense for the purposes of this stage of the

proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of Kaelin’s motion

to dismiss is AFFIRMED.

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