Opinion

Michael Alexander v. United States

  • 721 F.3d 418
  • 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13060
  • 2013 WL 3215667
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Jun 26, 2013
Status
Published
Author
Wood
On the bench
Posner, Wood, Tinder
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
1,381 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.8%

explaining that under Indiana law a malicious‐prosecution claim can be made against a defend‐ ant who did not himself initiate the prosecution when the prosecution is initiated solely based on information provid‐ ed by the defendant

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that under Indiana law a malicious‐prosecution claim can be made against a defend‐ ant who did not himself initiate the prosecution when the prosecution is initiated solely based on information provid‐ ed by the defendant
  • reversing order granting motion to dismiss; "While we agree that [the plaintiff's] tale would undoubtedly seem more probable if he offered some reason for the . . . animus . . . , probability is not the standard." (emphasis in original)
  • reversing dismissal of malicious prosecution claim brought under Indiana law and stating that Rule 8(a)(2) does not “demand that a plaintiff come to court ready to plead facts . . . that he has no way of knowing prior to discovery”
  • noting that federal claim-accrual rules apply in FTCA suits

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2190

M ICHAEL A LEXANDER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:11-cv-00762-SEB-DKL—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

A RGUED JANUARY 15, 2013—D ECIDED JUNE 26, 2013

Before P OSNER, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges.

W OOD , Circuit Judge. Michael Alexander, an Indiana

criminal defense lawyer, brings this suit for malicious

prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional

distress against the United States pursuant to the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.

His core allegation is that Neal Freeman and James Howell,

agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

conspired with Indiana state prosecutor Mark McKinney

2 No. 12-2190

and father-son criminal duo Stanley Chrisp and Adrian

Kirtz to frame him for bribery. The district court dis-

missed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure 12(b)(6), finding that it failed to state a claim

for malicious prosecution and that the claim for inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress was time-barred.

For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.

I

Because the district court dismissed this case under

Rule 12(b)(6), for present purposes we accept the facts

presented in the complaint as true. The origins of the

conspiracy against Alexander date back to June 2006,

when FBI agents Freeman and Howell began to investi-

gate Alexander’s longtime investigator, Jeff Hinds, for

bribery. The agents suspected that Hinds was bribing

witnesses, including Kirtz, in cases involving Alexander’s

clients. In an effort to determine whether Alexander

was aware of or involved in Hinds’s extralegal

efforts for his clients, the agents equipped Kirtz and

Chrisp with recording devices and sent them to meet

with Alexander in July 2006 to discuss the bribes. At the

meeting, Alexander told Kirtz and Chrisp that he did

not know anything about Hinds’s bribery, but he said he

would attempt to figure out what was going on. Although

Kirtz and Chrisp both later confirmed that this meeting

took place and that they handed over recordings of the

meeting to the FBI, the agents never produced these

recordings and repeatedly claimed both that the

meeting had never occurred and that the recordings

did not exist.

No. 12-2190 3

After July 2006, the bribery investigation lay dormant

for months. It heated up again, however, in January

2007, when McKinney took office as the new prosecutor

for the 46th Indiana Judicial Circuit. McKinney harbored

a grudge against Alexander because Alexander had

been a vocal critic of McKinney’s handling of drug for-

feitures during his tenure as attorney for the City of

Muncie/Delaware County Drug Task Force. According

to the complaint, upon taking office McKinney entered

into a conspiracy with agents Freeman and Howell, as

well as Kirtz and Chrisp (both of whom were now

under investigation for their participation in an arson

ring) to manufacture evidence to support a bribery case

against Alexander.

As part of this conspiracy, agents Freeman and Howell

both participated in the destruction of the evidence of

Kirtz and Chrisp’s July 2006 meeting with Alexander;

they also worked with Kirtz to create false evidence

of Alexander’s guilt. On February 1, 2007, Freeman sent

Kirtz to meet with Alexander and record their conver-

sation. Freeman and Kirtz created a false “exit inter-

view” summarizing the meeting, in which Kirtz repre-

sented that Alexander had indicated that he was

involved in and aware of Hinds’s bribery scheme. Al-

though the tape of the meeting would have demon-

strated that Kirtz’s claims were false (and that

Alexander had again denied any knowledge of a bribery

scheme), the recording Freeman submitted to the FBI

was blank. The agents additionally manipulated a

third recorded conversation with Alexander from

February 15, 2007, to exclude exculpatory evidence.

4 No. 12-2190

Freeman then personally prepared a probable-cause

affidavit to charge Alexander with bribery. The affidavit

included the false and manipulated evidence from the

February 1 and 15 meetings with Alexander, while it

excluded the evidence from the July 2006 meeting in

which Alexander had denied knowing anything about

the bribery. Based on this affidavit, an arrest warrant

was issued, and Freeman led other officers in arresting

Alexander in February 2008.

Over a year passed between Alexander’s arrest and

trial. During that time, Freeman testified in two

separate depositions. In each one, he denied that the

July 2006 meeting between Alexander, Kirtz, and Chrisp

took place. Also during that time, Stanley Wills—one of

the people Hinds had allegedly bribed—met with Alex-

ander and gave a taped statement in which he con-

firmed that he had never interacted with Alexander

and swore that the entire bribery scheme had been fabri-

cated by Kirtz and Chrisp. The complaint alleges that

shortly after Alexander released this taped statement

to the court and to the media, Freeman met with Wills

and pressured Wills into falsely testifying that he had

made this statement only after being threatened with

physical harm.

Alexander went to trial in Delaware County in March

2009. Freeman testified at trial, where he claimed (falsely)

that recordings of Alexander containing exculpatory evi-

dence did not exist, and repeated the (false) story that

Wills had been coerced into giving a taped statement

to Alexander. The jury acquitted Alexander after just

over an hour of deliberations.

No. 12-2190 5

Although he was eventually acquitted, Alexander

alleges that the ordeal of his arrest and trial on trumped-

up charges was quite distressing to him. In addition, as

a result of the trial he suffered considerable negative

publicity, which damaged his reputation and hurt his

law practice. Accordingly, Alexander filed a Notice of

Tort Claim with the FBI on October 21, 2010, announcing

his intention to sue the United States under the FTCA.

After the FBI declined to act on the claim, Alexander

initiated this suit in federal district court, bringing

claims for, as is relevant for this appeal, malicious pros-

ecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), finding that Alexander failed to state a

claim for malicious prosecution and that his claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress was untimely.

This appeal followed.

II

A

Because this appeal hinges on what, precisely, the

pleading standards embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure require Alexander to allege in

order to state a claim, we begin with a brief review of

those standards. Although the Supreme Court’s recent

interpretations of Rule 8 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),

have clarified that a plaintiff must do something more

than “put[] a few words on paper that, in the hands of

an imaginative reader, might suggest that something

6 No. 12-2190

has happened to her that might be redressed by the

law,” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir.

2010) (emphasis in original), neither decision questions

the ongoing validity of Rule 8(a)(2) itself. The Rule re-

quires, as it always has, that a complaint include “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” To meet this standard, a

plaintiff is not required to include “detailed factual al-

legations.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has signaled

on several occasions that it has not amended the rules

of civil procedure sub silentio to abolish notice pleading

and return to the old fact pleading standards that

pre-dated the modern civil rules. See Skinner v. Switzer,

131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Instead, in order

to assure that a pleading suffices to give effective notice

to the opposing party, the Court has said that a com-

plaint must contain facts that are sufficient, when ac-

cepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Plausibility” for

purposes of Rule 8 is not synonymous with “proba-

bility”; it is not, for instance, necessary (or appropriate) “to

stack up inferences side by side and allow the case to

go forward only if the plaintiff’s inferences seem more

compelling than the opposing inferences.” Swanson, 614

F.3d at 404; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (plausibility is

“not akin to a probability requirement”) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted). Rather, the plausibility require-

ment demands only that a plaintiff provide sufficient

detail “to present a story that holds together.” Swanson,

614 F.3d at 404.

No. 12-2190 7

Turning to the particulars of Alexander’s case, we

begin with his claim for malicious prosecution. Because

the FTCA generally provides for liability in circum-

stances in which a private person would be liable to

the plaintiff under the laws of the state where the

wrongful acts occurred, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and the

intentional torts alleged here appear to fall within its

scope, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the first task is to identify

what state we are talking about. Here, it is Indiana,

where all of the relevant events took place and Alexander’s

injury occurred. The Indiana tort of malicious prosecu-

tion requires a plaintiff to establish that: “(1) the

defendant . . . instituted or caused to be instituted an

action against the plaintiff . . .; (2) the defendant acted

with malice in doing so; (3) the defendant had no

probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the

original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.”

City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind.

2001). While no party disputes that the fourth element

is satisfied here (since Alexander was acquitted of the

charges against him), the district court found the com-

plaint deficient with respect to the other three.

In our view, the court asked too much of Alexander.

The complaint more or less tracks the first element of

the claim, because it expressly alleges that the agents’

actions directly caused Alexander’s arrest and trial. And,

perhaps to ensure that he has included enough to

escape the criticism that the complaint is nothing but

a “[t]hreadbare recital[] of the elements of [his] cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,”

see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Alexander has provided numer-

8 No. 12-2190

ous supporting details: (1) a description of the steps

the agents took to manufacture evidence of Alexander’s

guilt and suppress evidence that tended to show his

innocence; (2) an allegation that Freeman personally

prepared the probable-cause affidavit that was the basis

for Alexander’s arrest; and (3) the identification of

the actions the agents took after Alexander’s arrest to

further the prosecution, which included testifying in

depositions and at trial and intimidating a potential

defense witness. Whatever the floor may be, these al-

legations are comfortably above it: they are more

than sufficient to assert a causal link between the

agents’ actions and the subsequent prosecution. The

district court thought this element insufficiently pleaded

because “it was not the United States that prosecuted

[Alexander] in state court,” but Indiana cases confirm

that a person may “cause” an action to be instituted

for purposes of malicious prosecution even if that

person does not conduct the prosecution personally. See

Kroger Food Stores, Inc. v. Clark, 598 N.E.2d 1084, 1086-87

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming verdict in favor of plain-

tiff in a malicious prosecution case against employer

that caused employee to be prosecuted for theft); F.W.

Woolworth Co. v. Anderson, 471 N.E.2d 1249, 1253

(Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (first element of malicious prosecu-

tion claim “absolutely clear” when defendants prompted

prosecution by reporting alleged theft to local pros-

ecutor, who then instituted prosecution).

The complaint also adequately alleges that Alexander

was prosecuted in the absence of probable cause. It

states that the probable-cause affidavit that served as

No. 12-2190 9

the basis for Alexander’s arrest and prosecution was

based on fabricated evidence and excluded evidence that

favored Alexander. Knowingly false statements by the

affiant cannot support a finding of probable cause, and

as we read the complaint, that is all there was. Accord

K Mart Corp. v. Brzezinski, 540 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1989) (while a judicial determination of prob-

able cause is prima facie evidence of probable cause

in a subsequent malicious prosecution suit, that evi-

dence is rebutted if the judicial determination is made

in reliance on false information). Although the dis-

trict court may have assumed that there was

other, non-tainted evidence against Alexander, such an

assumption is not supported by anything in the com-

plaint. Although we acknowledge that Alexander

nowhere explicitly alleged that the probable cause af-

fidavit was based entirely on tainted information, that

is a fair inference from what the complaint does say,

and at this stage we are required to draw all reasonable

inferences in Alexander’s favor.

Finally, the complaint adequately pleads malice. In

Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), the

Indiana Court of Appeals held that “[m]alice may

be inferred from a total lack of probable cause.” Id. at 208

(citing Bd. of Comm’rs of Hendricks Cnty. v. King, 481

N.E.2d 1327, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“Malice may be

inferred from a total lack of probable cause or from

failure to make a reasonable or suitable inquiry.”)); see

also Kroger Food Stores, 598 N.E.2d at 1089. This is not to

say that such an inference cannot be rebutted at a later

stage of the proceeding. Lack of probable cause might

10 No. 12-2190

be the result of stupidity or carelessness, rather than

malice or recklessness. But Alexander was not required

to anticipate this type of defense in his complaint. In

any event, the allegations about the feud between

McKinney and Alexander also provide notice of Alex-

ander’s reasons for believing that malice was present.

For purposes of pleading, this is enough.

The district court faulted Alexander for failing to

include any allegations that the agents harbored personal

animosity toward him. This failure, it thought, undercut

Alexander’s allegations of malice, but the court’s com-

ment may also have reflected a more general unease

that the pattern of events described in the complaint

was, at bottom, not “plausible.” The notion that

federal agents would participate in a retaliatory prosecu-

tion by fabricating evidence and committing perjury

is surely a shocking one, and the district court may

simply have found the allegations too difficult to credit,

at least absent additional allegations to suggest some

sort of motive. But Rule 8 does not demand that a

plaintiff prove his case at the outset of the litigation,

nor does it demand that a plaintiff come to court ready

to plead facts (such as the motivations of agents

Freeman and Howell) that he has no way of knowing

prior to discovery. And none of Alexander’s allega-

tions pulled him into the territory covered by the first

sentence of Rule 9(b), which does require more specific-

ity. (The second sentence helps Alexander: it provides

that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions

of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”) While

we agree that Alexander’s tale would undoubtedly

No. 12-2190 11

seem more probable if he offered some reason for the

agents’ animus (for example, an allegation that Freeman

was romantically involved with Alexander’s wife or that

Howell owed money to prosecutor McKinney, who,

according to the complaint, did have a motive for

framing Alexander), probability is not the standard.

Unfortunately, in a world where public corruption is

hardly unknown, we cannot agree that Alexander’s

complaint is too implausible to hold together absent

allegations of this sort. We might wish to live in a world

in which such an egregious abuse of one’s official

position would be unthinkable, but experience suggests

that we do not. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d

585, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Maloney, 71

F.3d 645, 650-52 (7th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the

complaint for malicious prosecution sets forth enough

plausible detail to provide adequate notice to the de-

fendants and thus to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

B

The complaint further alleges that the agents’ actions

amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress

(IIED), which Indiana law defines as “extreme and outra-

geous conduct [that] intentionally or recklessly causes

severe emotional distress to another.” Cullison v. Medley,

570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991). Like all claims under the

FTCA, Alexander’s IIED claim is subject to a two-year

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Relying on

the general principle that a claim accrues when: “(A) the

plaintiff discovers; or (B) a reasonable person in the plain-

12 No. 12-2190

tiff’s position would have discovered that he has been

injured by an act or omission attributable to the gov-

ernment,” Arroyo v. United States, 656 F.3d 663, 668 (7th

Cir. 2011), the district court concluded that the claim

was time-barred. The court reasoned that Alexander

must have known that he had been framed at the time

of his arrest in February 2008, and that even if he was

not immediately aware that the trumped-up bribery

charges were attributable to the FBI agents (and thus

the federal government), he must have realized this no

later than July 2008, when Freeman falsely stated in a

deposition that exculpatory evidence from Alexander’s

July 2006 meeting with Kirtz and Chrisp did not exist.

Yet Alexander did not file his Notice of Tort Claim with

the FBI until October 2010, more than two years after

Freeman’s deposition. (Alexander did file his Notice of

Tort Claim within two years of his acquittal, which oc-

curred in March 2009. For this reason, his malicious

prosecution claim—which did not accrue until the

charges in the criminal case were resolved in his favor—

was timely.)

Though we have no quarrel with the district court’s

conclusion that Alexander knew or should have known

by the time of Freeman’s July 2008 deposition that agents

of the federal government potentially caused his injury,

it does not follow from this that Alexander’s IIED claim

is untimely, because the agents’ alleged extreme and

outrageous conduct did not cease with either Alex-

ander’s arrest or Freeman’s deposition. Rather, the com-

plaint alleges that the tortious conduct—which in-

cluded witness intimidation, perjury, and suborning of

No. 12-2190 13

perjury—continued right through Alexander’s trial. Any

one of these later actions might suffice to provide the

basis for a timely IIED claim. (We make no comment on

any other possible bar to an IIED claim based on a wit-

ness’s trial testimony, because the time for considering

such arguments never arrived in the district court.)

The complaint gives no reason for confining the IIED

analysis to events leading up to Alexander’s arrest. In

situations such as this, where the alleged injury can be

characterized as a continuing one, federal claim-accrual

rules (which govern in cases arising under the FTCA, id.)

dictate that the statute of limitations “does not start to

run any earlier than the last day of the ongoing injury.”

Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis

in original); see also Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318-19

(7th Cir. 2001) (discussing the federal “continuing viola-

tion” doctrine). And even if the continuing violation

doctrine has been modified by cases such as Ledbetter v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), and

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101

(2002), Alexander has alleged many specific events that

fall well within the applicable limitation period. Re-

gardless of whether we view the agents’ conduct as a

continuing wrong or as a series of discrete, independently

actionable harms, some of which occurred within the

limitation period, we conclude that Alexander’s IIED

claim is timely.

All that remains is for us to determine whether the

complaint adequately states a claim for IIED. We

conclude that it does. The conduct described in the com-

plaint is extreme and outrageous (as well as criminal),

14 No. 12-2190

and there are sufficient allegations to support the in-

ferences both that this conduct was intended to cause

Alexander severe emotional distress and that Alexander

suffered such emotional distress as a result of his or-

deal. Mindful of the relatively low bar Alexander is

required to clear at this preliminary stage of his case,

we conclude that the IIED claim is also sufficient to

pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, we R EVERSE the district court’s judgment

dismissing Alexander’s claims for malicious prosecu-

tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress

and R EMAND for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

6-26-13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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