Opinion

Patrick Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.

  • 761 F.3d 732
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14871
  • 2014 WL 3765935
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Aug 1, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Bauer
On the bench
Bauer, Williams, Tinder
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
825 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

holding that an unfairness claim that "sounds in fraud" can implicate Rule 9(b)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that an unfairness claim that "sounds in fraud" can implicate Rule 9(b)
  • holding that fraud allegations need not “provide the precise date, time, and location” of the advertisement “or every word that was included on it,” but must include more than an “assertion that merchandise was offered at sales prices”
  • concluding that plaintiff failed to meet Rule 9(b) where he only alleged that an advertisement said merchandise was being offered at “sale prices” and was “on sale” but offered no other details about the misrepresentation
  • holding that an ICFA plaintiff can show actual damage where the product was “worth less than what [she] actually paid” or where she “could have shopped around and found a better price in the marketplace”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2831

PATRICK E. CAMASTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOS. A. BANK CLOTHIERS, INC., also

known as JOS. A. BANK,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 7782 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 8, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 1, 2014

Before BAUER, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Patrick E. Camasta

(“Camasta”) filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Jos. A. Bank

Clothiers, Inc. (“JAB”), alleging violations of the Illinois

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

(“ICFA”) in regard to certain JAB sale practices. JAB filed a

motion to dismiss Camasta’s First Amended Complaint on the

basis of a failure to state a claim under which relief could be

2 No. 13-2831

granted. The district court granted JAB’s motion and dismissed

the lawsuit in its entirety with prejudice. We find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

JAB is a company that designs, manufactures, and sells

men’s tailored and casual clothing and accessories. JAB has

thirty-one retail locations in Illinois. On July 27, 2012, Camasta

went to a JAB retail location in Deer Park, Illinois. Prior

to making his purchases, Camasta contends that he saw an

advertisement about “sale prices” for certain items. Camasta

did not specify when or where he saw the advertisements,

what exactly the advertisements said, what the “sale prices”

were, or what particular merchandise was eligible for the sale.

When Camasta visited JAB, customers were offered a

promotion: “buy one shirt, get two shirts free.” Camasta chose

to take advantage of the offer and purchased six shirts for $167

without tax. Specifically, Camasta paid $79.50 for one shirt

getting two similar shirts for free, and bought another shirt for

$87.50 allowing him to receive an additional two similar shirts

for free.

After this purchase, Camasta claims that he learned the JAB

“sale” was not actually a reduced price, but instead that it was

the JAB pattern and practice to advertise normal retail prices

as temporary price reductions. Camasta claims that this sales

technique was used in all of JAB’s Illinois retail locations. He

did not indicate when, where, or how he learned of the claimed

fraudulent sales technique. Camasta asserts that but for his

belief that the advertised sale was a limited time offer, he

would not have purchased the six shirts and could have

No. 13-2831 3

purchased the shirts for a lower price at another store, or could

have shopped around to obtain a better price elsewhere.

Camasta provided no factual support for these assertions.

Camasta did not claim that he was denied the terms or

pricing he saw advertised or that he did not receive the shirts

he selected. He does not claim that there was anything about

the shirts themselves that made them defective or caused him

to change his opinion about their value. Camasta simply

argues that his expectations for the discount he received were

unrealized when he learned that the sale was not a temporary

price reduction, but rather the normal retail price of JAB’s

merchandise.

On behalf of himself and a putative class, Camasta filed his

first complaint against JAB on August 29, 2012. Camasta’s two-

count complaint accused JAB of violating both the ICFA and

the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”) based

on the company’s “sales practice of advertising the normal

retail price as a temporary price reduction.” The putative class

consisted of consumers who purchased any “on sale” item at

any JAB retail location in Illinois. In his complaint, Camasta

included a non-exhaustive list he compiled of JAB’s advertised

sales promotions and discounted prices between August 25,

2010, and August 24, 2012. The various purported sales were

promoted through print, radio, television, direct mailings,

e-mails, and in-store displays.

JAB removed the case to federal court and moved to

dismiss Camasta’s original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In the original complaint, Camasta

requested the court to apply the less-stringent pleading

4 No. 13-2831

standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) because he

claimed “unfair” conduct under the ICFA, not fraud. The

district court rejected Camasta’s request, granted JAB’s motion

to dismiss without prejudice, and gave Camasta leave to file

an amended complaint to adequately state a claim.

Camasta filed his First Amended Complaint on behalf of

himself and the putative class, claiming that JAB violated

the ICFA based on unlawful sales practices and included the

same list of JAB’s advertised sales that he included in

his original complaint. He offered no additional facts to

support the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).

Again, JAB moved to dismiss Camasta’s complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6). Camasta did not request leave to amend.

The district court found that Camasta’s First Amended

Complaint lacked “any analysis or explanation of how [Cama-

sta] fulfilled Rule 9(b)’s requirements” and that he “failed to

provide any specific details” in support of his claim under the

ICFA. The district court identified five primary reasons for the

deficiency of Camasta’s claim: (1) Camasta did not provide any

additional details about the content of the advertisement he

saw the day he purchased shirts from JAB beyond the claim

that merchandise was being offered at “sale prices” and was

“on sale;” (2) he vaguely asserted that he learned that the sale

was not a temporary price reduction, but failed to give any

particulars as to how that knowledge was brought to his

attention; (3) he provided insufficient evidence to show that

the claimed sales technique employed by JAB was part of a

general sales practice utilized by JAB; (4) the claim that he

suffered “actual damage” was speculative and conclusory

because he did not allege that he paid more for the shirts than

No. 13-2831 5

their actual value; and (5) his request for injunctive relief failed

to allege future harm from JAB’s conduct.

The district court dismissed Camasta’s First Amended

Complaint with prejudice. Camasta timely appealed to this

court.

II. DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by

arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease

Revolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). A district

court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss is reviewed de

novo. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

complaint must provide enough factual information to “state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Even so, the complaint does not

need to state all possible legal theories. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d

485, 486–87 (7th Cir. 2002).

Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon

which relief may be granted is dependant upon the context of

the case and “requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). While all well-pled facts are taken as true

and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Hatmaker

v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2010),

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

6 No. 13-2831

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Since Camasta’s claim was of fraud under the ICFA, the

sufficiency of his complaint is analyzed under the heightened

pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

9(b). See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust

v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 9(b)

requires a pleading to “state with particularity the circum-

stances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). While the

precise level of particularity required under Rule 9(b) depends

upon the facts of the case, the pleading “ordinarily requires

describing the who, what, when, where, and how of the

fraud.” Anchorbank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir.

2011) (internal quotations omitted). One of the purposes of the

particularity and specificity required under Rule 9(b) is “to

force the plaintiff to do more than the usual investigation

before filing his complaint.” Ackerman v. Northwestern Mutual

Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999).

Camasta argues that he should only have to meet the less-

stringent pleading standard of Rule 8(a). This less stringent

pleading standard provides that “[a] complaint need not

narrate all relevant facts or recite the law; all it has to do is set

out a claim for relief.” Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 981

F.2d 962, 963 (7th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However,

in analogous cases we have required the heightened pleading

standard of Rule 9(b). In Pirelli, the plaintiff argued that the

pleading requirement of Rule 8(a) should apply to his claim

because he included an allegation of fraudulent conduct that

was “unfair” under the ICFA. 631 F.3d at 446. We upheld the

district court’s dismissal of the complaint for failing to comply

No. 13-2831 7

with the requirements of Rule 9(b) because “[a] claim that

‘sounds in fraud’—in other words, one that is premised upon

a course of fraudulent conduct—can implicate 9(b)’s height-

ened pleading requirements.” Id. at 446–47 (citing Borsellino v.

Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, Camasta claims that he was induced to purchase

shirts from JAB by their “fraudulent sales practices” that

“mislead,” “misrepresent,” and “defraud.” While Camasta

adds language of unfairness, his allegations of “unfair prac-

tice” are clearly premised upon the primary claim that JAB

utilized a fraudulent sales technique. Simply adding language

of “unfairness” instead of “misrepresentation” does not alter

the fact that Camasta’s allegations are entirely grounded in

fraud under the ICFA. Based on our holding in Pirelli, we find

the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) applies.

A. Rule 9(b) Pleading Requirements

The district court identified multiple deficiencies in Cama-

sta’s complaint. In response, Camasta claims that the only

content at issue related to JAB’s advertisement was that it said

merchandise was being offered at “sale prices” and was “on

sale.” While Rule 9(b) “does not require a plaintiff to plead

facts that if true would show that the defendant’s alleged

misrepresentations were indeed false, it does require the

plaintiff to state ‘the identity of the person making the misrep-

resentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresenta-

tion, and the method by which the misrepresentation was

communicated to the plaintiff.’” Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx,

Inc., 974 F.2d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Bankers Trust Co. v.

Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992). We do

8 No. 13-2831

not require that Camasta provide the precise date, time, and

location that he saw the advertisement or every word that was

included on it, but something more than Camasta’s assertion

that “merchandise was offered at ‘sale prices’” is needed.

Camasta argues that the precise details of the sale are

“irrelevant” because his sales receipt is sufficient evidence of

the content of the advertisement. A sales receipt provided to a

consumer after a purchase cannot show what was supposedly

advertised; the representation must have been made to him

before the purchase of the merchandise. Verb v. Motorola, Inc.,

672 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Camasta’s statement and

sales receipt are insufficient to substantiate a finding of a

“deceptive or unfair act or promise” by JAB: a requisite

condition of an allegation of fraud under the ICFA.

Camasta also argues that he should not be required to

further detail how he subjectively learned that the sales were

not temporary price reductions. This argument fails for the

same reasons given above. While we allow Camasta some

flexibility in the factual support required for his claim, a

plaintiff alleging fraud “does not have unlimited leeway” in

satisfying the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) when the

circumstances are pleaded solely on “information and belief.”

Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 442.

Camasta then points to the list he compiled of apparent

sales conducted by JAB between August 2010 and August 2012

to assert that he has proven “context” that supports an infer-

ence that JAB participates in the “pattern and practice of

advertising” sale prices that are simply regular prices since the

merchandise is always “on sale.”

No. 13-2831 9

Again, Camasta’s sparse allegations fail to satisfy the

particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). “By requiring the

plaintiff to allege the who, what, where, and when of the

alleged fraud, the rule requires the plaintiff to conduct a

precomplaint investigation in sufficient depth to assure that

the charge of fraud is responsible and supported, rather than

defamatory and extortionate.” Ackerman, 172 F.3d at 469–70.

Camasta’s admittedly non-exhaustive list illustrates that JAB

offered a number of sales promotions to its customers over a

two-year period, but it does not show a constant or perpetual

sale of any particular merchandise. We agree with the district

court that Camasta’s list actually reduces the effect of his

argument because it shows that there were a variety of sales

for different periods of time, under different terms, and that

included different types of merchandise. Moreover, the fact

that JAB has frequent sales of various items does not support

an inference that those sales were fraudulent or deceptive.

Camasta argues that his claim is supported by the New

York Attorney General’s investigation of JAB’s sales practices

that occurred in 2003 and 2004. The investigation resulted in

JAB entering into an “Assurance of Discontinuance” and

paying a $475,000 fine in September 2004. In the Assurance of

Discontinuation, the New York Attorney General took the

position that JAB was not selling its merchandise at a regular

price and instead had items that were “perpetually ‘on sale.’”

The Attorney General stated that he believed those practices

had the ability to mislead customers into thinking they were

receiving a temporary price reduction when they in fact were

not. JAB entered into the agreement stating specifically that

10 No. 13-2831

“[JAB] is willing to enter into this Assurance without admitting

to the Attorney General’s finding or to any violation of law.”

The 2004 Assurance of Discontinuation that JAB entered

into does not affect the outcome of this case. We agree with the

district court that Camasta failed to explain how the New York

advertising practices that were the subject of the 2004 investi-

gation are the same or similar to practices employed by JAB

in Illinois between 2009 and 2012. Camasta argues that he

sufficiently proved this simply by stating in his complaint

that the practices were “the exact type of fraudulent sales

practices complained of here.” While the facts of Camasta’s

complaint are viewed in his favor, simply stating that the sales

practices are the same in two different states during two

different time periods without any factual support is insuffi-

cient to satisfy the pleading requirement. See Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclu-

sions.”) (internal citation omitted).

In short, the district court correctly concluded that Rule 9(b)

applied and that its requirements were not satisfied by Cama-

sta’s First Amended Complaint.

B. Actual Damages

The intent of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act is “to protect consumers, borrowers, and

business persons against fraud, unfair methods of competition,

and other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Siegel v.

Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Robinson v.

Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403, 416–17 (2002)). In order

to state a claim under the ICFA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a

No. 13-2831 11

deceptive or unfair act or promise by the defendant; (2) the

defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deceptive or

unfair practice; and (3) that the unfair or deceptive practice

occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or

commerce.” Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 574

(7th Cir. 2012).

When the plaintiff is a private party as Camasta is here, an

action brought under the ICFA requires the plaintiff to show

he suffered “actual damage” as a result of the defendant’s

violation of the act. 815 ILCS 505/10a; Kim v. Carter’s Inc., 598

F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010); Mulligan v. QVC, Inc., 888 N.E.2d

1190, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). In a private ICFA action, the

element of actual damages “requires that the plaintiff suffer

actual pecuniary loss.” Kim, 598 F.3d at 365 (internal citation

omitted). The district court correctly found that Camasta failed

to allege facts showing he suffered actual damage.

Central to Camasta’s argument is the claim that the

advertised “sale prices” were in fact just the normal or regular

retail prices being promoted as temporary price reductions.

Camasta claims that this sales technique encourages a sense of

urgency and makes customers feel “pressure” to make pur-

chases before an expected deadline. However, Camasta failed

to provide any evidence that he paid more than the actual

value of the merchandise he received.

Without factual support or justification, Camasta asserts

that he could have shopped around and found the same shirts

for a lower price. Yet, he fails to assert that he did, in fact, shop

around and find the same shirts for a lower price. The district

court found Camasta’s statement to be “speculative

12 No. 13-2831

and conclusory” and insufficient to prove actual damages. We

agree.

In Kim, this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

a claim for a violation of the ICFA when the plaintiffs failed to

prove actual damages. 598 F.3d at 365. The defendant clothing

retailer used price tags displaying “suggested prices,” fre-

quently accompanied by an advertised percentage discount off

of that amount. Id. at 363. The plaintiffs argued that these

advertisements gave consumers the impression that they

were receiving a “deal” on the merchandise when, in fact, the

“suggested prices” were inflated in order to sell products at a

regular price without actual savings. Id. This court, however,

denied plaintiffs’ claim because it found that they “got the

benefit of their bargain.” In other words, the plaintiffs agreed

to pay a certain price for the defendant’s merchandise, did not

allege the merchandise was defective or worth less than what

they actually paid, and did not allege that they could have

shopped around and found a better price in the marketplace.

Id. at 365–66.

Camasta argues that he proved actual damage by stating

that he could have “shopped around and obtained a better

price in the marketplace.” This statement alone cannot support

a claim of actual damage. As this court found in Ackerman,

Camasta is required to at least conduct a minimal “pre-

complaint investigation” to gather sufficient factual informa-

tion to support his fraud claim. 172 F.3d at 469. While Camasta

claims that he had an “impractical ability to comparison shop,”

there is no reason why he could not have gone to other stores

after his purchase from JAB to discover whether he could have

found a better price for similar shirts elsewhere.

No. 13-2831 13

Camasta then claims he paid more than the shirts were

worth because, when all reasonable inferences are viewed in

his favor, he essentially paid $167 plus tax for two shirts: one

for $87.50 and one for $79.50. Since he actually received six

shirts for that price, Camasta claims that a reasonable inference

is to divide the price of each shirt by three to get the true value

of the shirts: that is, the first type of shirt is valued at $29.16

and the second at $26.50. Camasta claims, without any factual

support, that he paid more than the value of the shirts when he

spent $87.50 on a shirt worth $29.16 and spent $79.50 on a shirt

worth $26.50. The prices Camasta contends are the true values

of the shirts are mere guesses void of any substantial analysis.

Even under Rule 8(a), “naked assertions devoid of further

factual enhancement” are insufficient to support a claim. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). Without any facts

to support his conclusory assertions of actual damage, Camasta

has not sufficiently pleaded that he paid more than the actual

value of the merchandise he received.

C. Injunctive Relief

Finally, Camasta makes a claim for injunctive relief.

Camasta argues that the district court improperly dismissed

his claim for injunctive relief under the ICFA because he

sufficiently alleged in another case that the conduct in question

was deceptive. Camasta v. Omaha Steaks Intern., No. 12 CV

08285, 2013 WL 4495661, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013). While

Camasta successfully alleged a deceptive sales practice in that

case, he failed to do so here. Absent a showing of a violation of

the ICFA, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. See, e.g.,

B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 868,

873 (N.D. Ill. 1999).

14 No. 13-2831

Likewise, Camasta cannot obtain injunctive relief under the

UDTPA because he failed to sufficiently allege that JAB’s

conduct will likely cause him harm in the future. See

Kensington’s Wine Auctioneers & Brokers, Inc. v. John Hart Fine

Wine, Ltd., 909 N.E.2d 848, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“To be

eligible for injunctive relief under the Deceptive Practices Act,

a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct will likely

cause it to suffer damages in the future.”). Camasta’s claim is

based solely on the conjecture that because JAB harmed him in

the past, they are likely to harm him in the future. However,

“[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a

present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” O’Shea

v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). Since Camasta is now

aware of JAB’s sales practices, he is not likely to be harmed by

the practices in the future. Without more than the speculative

claim that he will again be harmed by JAB, Camasta is not

entitled to injunctive relief.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s dismissal of Camasta’s First Amended

Complaint is AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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