Opinion

State v. Brown

  • 2013 Ohio 5391
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Dec 10, 2013
Status
Published
On the bench
Tyack
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 45.1%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Brown, 2013-Ohio-5391.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

v. : No. 13AP-164

(C.P.C. No. 12CR-986)

Irvin M. Brown, :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on December 10, 2013

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Valerie B. Swanson,

for appellee.

R. William Meeks Co., LPA, and David H. Thomas, for

appellant.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

TYACK, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Irvin M. Brown ("appellant"), is appealing his

convictions on one count of felonious assault and two counts of kidnapping in the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

{¶ 2} Appellant assigns four errors for our consideration:

[I.] The prosecuting attorney's remarks during closing

arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct

which deprived Appellant of a fair trial in violation of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and comparable provisions of the

Ohio Constitution.

No. 13AP-164 2

[II.] The Appellant's trial counsel's failure to object to

the prosecutor's improper statements during closing

arguments deprived him of his rights to a fair trial,

effective assistance of counsel, and due process of law

as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution and

comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.

[III.] The trial court erred by overruling Appellant's

Criminal Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,

as the prosecution failed to offer sufficient evidence to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every

element of the crimes charged, and thereby deprived

Appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and comparable provisions of the

Ohio Constitution.

[IV.] The trial court erred and thereby deprived

Appellant of due process of law as guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio

Constitution by finding Appellant guilty of two counts

of kidnapping and one count of felonious assault, as

the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The prosecution presented the following at trial. In the fall of 2011,

appellant met both Laurika Starks and Andrea Bostic. The women were neighbors who

lived in adjoining units in an apartment complex. Appellant and Starks began to have a

sexual relationship around November 2011. Starks ended the relationship in January

2012 because appellant had issues within himself and he was being argumentative. After

the relationship ended with Starks, appellant began to have a sexual relationship with

Bostic.

{¶ 4} On February 12, 2012, Bostic asked appellant to leave her apartment and

ended the relationship saying that she did not want him in her house on account of her

kids. Starks then let appellant into her apartment around noon on February 12, because

they were still friends and cordial with one another. Appellant ignored Starks for most of

the day. From about noon until midnight he was focused on a laptop computer and

No. 13AP-164 3

talking to family. He also communicated with various people on Facebook during this

time. Starks said it was clear he was upset.

{¶ 5} We cannot tell from the evidentiary record before us whether or not Starks

ever asked appellant to leave before he put a gun in her face. In her testimony at trial,

Starks jumped right to the point where appellant is pointing a gun at her face without any

explanation how the situation escalated. She stated she was terrified and could not leave

because of the gun. Appellant initially pulled the gun around midnight. Starks then tried

to talk him out of her apartment to get him to leave.

{¶ 6} Starks said that appellant kept playing with the ammunition clip by taking it

in and out of the gun. She testified she was able to take the clip when he put it down and

hide it in the couch. Appellant apparently forced Starks to pray multiple times while

pointing the gun at her, and asked her whether she loved Jesus and if she loved Tupac.

{¶ 7} When Starks' 10-year-old daughter came partially down the stairs of the

apartment around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m., on February 13, appellant decided to leave, but he

took the gun and the clip with him. Starks locked the door and tried to act as if the

incident never happened. Starks stated she did not think appellant would shoot her and

she did not think that he would shoot Bostic so she was not worried when he finally left.

{¶ 8} Starks testified she did not hear any arguing between appellant and Bostic

through the walls of the adjoining apartment on the morning of February 13, but thought

she could hear appellant arguing with himself through the walls on other occasions.

Starks testified she next saw appellant at about 8:00 a.m. on February 13, when appellant

was yelling on a cell phone outside.

{¶ 9} Starks testified the topic of her being detained did not come up with the

police during her initial questioning at the time of appellant's arrest, but she did affirm to

police that Bostic was detained by appellant. Starks stated she just did not want to get

involved. Starks only told the police her entire story about being detained with a gun the

following week.

{¶ 10} Bostic testified that she was the only one home in the early morning of

February 13, 2012. When Bostic first opened the door for appellant around 2:30 a.m., she

stated he said "I just scared the -- scared the hell out of your neighbor." (Tr. Vol. I, at

142.) When asked why, appellant responded "I just put the gun to her head." (Tr. Vol. I,

No. 13AP-164 4

at 143.) Bostic testified that appellant fired a warning shot, to see if anybody would come.

Starks however never testified to hearing this warning shot which was supposed to have

happened fairly soon after appellant arrived at Bostic's apartment after he just left Starks.

{¶ 11} Bostic's testimony is clear that appellant put the gun to her chin, made her

pray, repent, and state bible verses while he called her dumb bitch and other names.

Bostic was shot in the ankle when she was sitting on the couch with her face covered by

her hands. Appellant was standing a little distance away from her with the gun pointed at

her when he shot her. Once Bostic was shot, she covered her legs with a blanket because

she did not believe appellant was aware that she was injured. For two hours after Bostic

was shot and covered with the blanket, appellant was torturing her, hitting her, and

making her state bible verses.

{¶ 12} When appellant discovered that Bostic had been shot, he said that he did

not mean to shoot her, but continued to ramble and ask bible questions stating "This time

you better answer this or else I'm gonna blow your damn head off." (Tr. Vol. I, at 166.)

After appellant saw that Bostic was hurt, he let her go to the bathroom and then tried to

put a towel around her ankle.

{¶ 13} Bostic was able to get away at one point and went to her child's bedroom,

intending to jump out the window. She saw her neighbor TJ going to work. TJ saw her

and asked what was wrong. Ms. Bostic either said help me or he shot me. Appellant

returned with the gun at that moment and banged on the door demanding to be let in.

{¶ 14} When appellant saw her at the window, he asked her if she was going to

jump. Bostic replied that she thought she saw her kids but it was the neighbor TJ.

Apparently, at this point, appellant went to the window and said something to TJ after

putting the gun down on the child's bed.

{¶ 15} As appellant was having a conversation with TJ, Bostic hid the gun under

some blankets on the bed and went downstairs and then outside. TJ let her go to his

house and stated he would wait outside for appellant. Once Bostic locked TJ's front door

behind her, she called her children's father, Frasier, who was already late in bringing the

kids home to Bostic's apartment. Frasier ended up calling the police who arrived within a

few minutes. At trial, Bostic denied stating to medical personnel that the shooting was an

accident.

No. 13AP-164 5

{¶ 16} Appellant sent Ms. Bostic letters after the incident. On February 17, 2012,

appellant wrote that the devil took his mind that there were no drugs involved. He also

wrote that he was sorry.

{¶ 17} On March 29, appellant asked Bostic to forgive him and marry him. He

promised to get help. On March 30, 2012, appellant wrote that he did not mean to shoot

Bostic and that he was wrong for his actions.

{¶ 18} As indicated earlier, appellant was indicted on two counts of kidnapping in

violation of R.C. 2905.01 and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11.

On January 29, 2013, a three-day jury trial commenced in which appellant was convicted

on all counts. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February 5, 2013.

There was No Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Closing Argument

{¶ 19} The first assignment of error argues that the prosecuting attorney's remarks

during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct which deprived appellant

of a fair trial. Upon examination, the prosecuting attorney's closing remarks do not shift

the burden of proof to the defendant and do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.

The comments focus on the lack of evidence supporting the defendant's theory of the case

that the gun went off accidentally.

{¶ 20} "The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is

whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected

substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984). A

prosecutor's conduct cannot be grounds for error unless such conduct deprived the

defendant of a fair trial. State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 240 (1992). Absent the

deprivation of a fair trial, no constitutional error occurs. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.

168, 183 (1986). The Supreme Court of Ohio has cautioned that prosecutorial misconduct

constitutes reversible error only in rare instances. State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402,

405 (1993). Additionally, a failure to object requires that we review any error under the

stringent plain error standard. Crim.R. 52(B); see Evans at 240.

{¶ 21} We must review a closing argument in its entirety to determine whether

prejudicial error exists. State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 94. A

prosecutor's statements are not be taken out of context and given their most damaging

meaning. Id. Further, pursuant to the doctrine of cumulative error, "a conviction will be

No. 13AP-164 6

reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the

constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court

error does not individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d

49, 64 (1995).

{¶ 22} Prosecutors are given considerable latitude in closing argument. State v.

Dillon, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1211, 2005-Ohio-4124, ¶ 50. The prosecutor is entitled to

comment on "what the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn

therefrom." State v. Butler, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-800, 2005-Ohio-579, ¶ 11.

{¶ 23} Prosecutorial misconduct exists when the language used by the prosecutor

"was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and

necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." (Emphasis

sic.) State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 328 (1994). The Supreme Court has clearly

identified that a prosecution's comments on the defense's failure to provide evidence to

support a theory of a case does not necessarily shift the burden of proof or necessarily go

to a defendant's refusal to testify:

It is long-standing precedent that the state may

comment upon a defendant's failure to offer evidence

in support of its case. Such comments do not imply

that the burden of proof has shifted to the defense, nor

do they necessarily constitute a penalty on the

defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent. A prosecutor may jeopardize the

integrity of a trial by commenting on a criminal

defendant's decision not to testify. Nevertheless, the

prosecutor is not precluded from challenging the

weight of the evidence offered in support of an

exculpatory theory presented by the defense. Neither

must the state, in order to satisfy its own burden of

proof, disprove every speculative set of possibly

exculpatory circumstances a defendant can suggest,

nor refrain from arguing the defendant's failure to

provide evidence to support proffered theories of

excuse or innocence.

(Citations omitted.) State v. Collins, 89 Ohio St.3d 524, 527 (2000). A prosecutor is

permitted to highlight the lack of evidence supporting a defendant's theory of case.

No. 13AP-164 7

{¶ 24} Appellant argues that various statements made by the prosecution during

closing arguments where comments on appellant's failure to testify or shifted the burden

of proof onto appellant. "You're going to hear absolutely no explanation of why he would

continue to contact her and want to marry her, because there is none if he didn't do this."

(Tr. Vol. II, at 139.) "You're not gonna hear how this accident could have happened if --

why he had the gun in the first place. * * * And you're not going to hear an explanation for

the trajectory of the path of the bullet." (Tr. Vol. II, at 140.)

{¶ 25} In the closing rebuttal, the prosecution made similar statements: "You

heard no explanation for the trajectory of the bullet other than this tug-of-war which is

pure conjecture and does not fit the evidence. And no explanation for how his firearm

could be tested in twelve different ways * * * and not go off. No explanation." (Tr. Vol. II,

at 216.)

{¶ 26} These statements and similar ones made during the prosecution's closing

argument addressed the lack of evidence to support appellant's theory of the case and are

not comments on appellant's failure to testify. The prosecution is addressing the jury in a

future tense referring to appellant's counsel's explanation of the evidence that would

occur in appellant's closing argument or in the past tense during the prosecution's

rebuttal. These statements do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.

{¶ 27} The following statement was also made in the closing rebuttal: "Where are

these Facebook posts, these people he was talking to on the phone. Where are they? They

are his family. What good is that gonna do? Are they gonna come in and testify against

him? Does that make any sense?" (Tr. Vol. II, at 207.) This comment was objected to

and sustained. However, the comment does not amount to misconduct.

{¶ 28} Defense counsel, in closing argument, stated that there was no evidence to

support Starks' claims that appellant was on Facebook and the phone all day becoming

upset and rambling:

Where is the evidence? Where is all this Facebook

rambling stuff? Where's transcripts of all that, or

printouts of all this Facebook rambling that Mr.

Brown is supposedly doing all day long?

Who are all these people he's talking on the phone to?

Where's his phone records? Who's he on the phone

No. 13AP-164 8

talking to all day long doing all this rambling? We

have no evidence, no evidence whatsoever to back up

these women's claims or Laurika's claims that he's on

Facebook all day and rambling and rambling. Where

is all that crazy rambling on Facebook?

We have no proof of that other than Laurika Stark's

word.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 148.)

{¶ 29} The prosecuting attorney was responding to defense counsel's argument

that the State failed to offer some evidence, not that appellant failed to testify. The

prosecution's statements about the State not producing Facebook posts or having

appellant's family testify were neither manifestly intended to be a comment on the

accused failure to testify, nor would the jury naturally and necessarily take them to be.

{¶ 30} It is improper for a prosecuting attorney to make arguments or remarks

likely to inflame the passions of the jurors, if intended to lead them to convict for an

improper reason. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

{¶ 31} Appellant argues that these statements were likely to inflame the passions of

the jurors: "So he has this history of erratic behavior * * *." "He's getting upset all about

Facebook. Is that what we would do? Probably not. So keep this in mind when you're

thinking about all of these people." (Tr. Vol. II, at 113-14.)

You are talking about the kind of guy who writes those

kind of letters, who rambles all the time, who talks to

himself, argues with himself, and who gets so worked

up over a Facebook post that he cries. There's nothing

wrong with that, I'm just -- with men crying, I'm just

saying this is overly emotional. This is how he reacts.

Remember, Laurika [Starks] said he has his issues,

issues. His behavior became erratic so she had to get

him to leave.

(Tr. Vol. II, at 143.)

{¶ 32} These comments about appellant's behavior are not intended to inflame the

passions of the jurors, but are comments on the evidence given by the two witnesses of,

what the prosecution argues, was appellant's irrational behavior. The prosecutor may

comment on what the evidence has shown and what are reasonable inferences from that

No. 13AP-164 9

evidence. Butler at ¶ 11. These are proper comments on the evidence properly before the

jury and do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.

{¶ 33} We find there was no prosecutorial misconduct during the closing

arguments or in the closing rebuttal.

{¶ 34} The first assignment of error is overruled.

There was No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 35} The second assignment of error argues that appellant's trial counsel's failure

to object to the prosecutor's improper statements during closing arguments deprived him

of his rights to a fair trial. As previously noted, we find that there was no prosecutorial

misconduct during the closing argument or rebuttal, therefore defense counsel's conduct

did not rise to ineffective assistance of counsel.

{¶ 36} A two-step process is employed when considering allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel. "First, there must be a determination as to whether there has been

a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client. Next, and

analytically separate from the question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment

rights were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the defense was

prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness." State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396-97 (1976),

vacated in part on other grounds.

{¶ 37} A counsel performance "will not be deemed ineffective unless and until

counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable

representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance." State v.

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, paragraph two of the syllabus. The question is whether

counsel acted "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689. Appellate courts must be highly deferential in

scrutinizing counsel's performance. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. * * * There are

countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case." Id.

{¶ 38} Appellant claims that his defense counsel was ineffective and deprived him

of his constitutional rights by failing to object to all the remarks he claims were improper

that were made during the prosecution's closing argument. We have found that there was

No. 13AP-164 10

no prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument and therefore cannot find

defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to such remarks.

{¶ 39} The second assignment of error is overruled.

Sufficient Evidence was Presented to Overcome a Civ.R. 29 Motion

{¶ 40} The third assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by overruling

appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The prosecution, however,

presented sufficient evidence going to each element of the case

{¶ 41} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction an

appellate court must examine the evidence that, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

The claim of insufficient evidence invokes an inquiry about due process. It raises a

question of law, the resolution of which does not allow the court to weigh the evidence.

State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 42} When there is conflicting evidence, "it [is] the function of the jury to weigh

the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses in arriving at its verdict. Where

reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon conflicting evidence,

determination as to what occurred is a question for the trier of fact. It is not the function

of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder." Jenks at 279.

{¶ 43} In the case at bar, the State presented the testimony of the two victims,

Laurika Stark and Andrea Bostic, who testified to being held at gunpoint and in Bostic's

case, being shot. The State also presented evidence by forensic experts who testified to

the trajectory of the bullet; that residue of a gunshot was found on appellant's hand; and

that the gun was tested dozens of times and showed that it would not discharge

accidentally.

{¶ 44} We find, when viewing the evidence most favorably for the prosecution, that

there was sufficient evidence going to each and every element of case from which the jury

could reasonably find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

{¶ 45} The third assignment of error is overruled.

No. 13AP-164 11

The Jury's Verdict is Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 46} In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the verdict was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reviewing the record, we find that the

verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and there is competent and

credible evidence to support it.

{¶ 47} A manifest weight argument, in contrast to a claim of insufficient evidence,

requires us to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether there is

enough competent and credible evidence so as to permit reasonable minds to find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt and, thereby, to support the judgment of conviction. State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Issues of witness credibility and concerning

the weight to attach to specific testimony remain primarily within the province of the trier

of fact, whose opportunity to make those determinations is superior to that of a reviewing

court. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). The question is whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio

St. 3d 57, 63, quoting Martin at 175. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should

be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against a

conviction. Thompkins at 387.

{¶ 48} A jury may "take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them

accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the

manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09-

1236 (May 28, 1996). "Furthermore, it is within the province of the jury to make the

credibility of witnesses. ('It is the province of the jury to determine where the truth

probably lies from conflicting statements, not only of different witnesses but by the same

witness')." (Citations omitted.) Dillon at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Harris, 73 Ohio App.3d 57,

63 (10th Dist.1991).

{¶ 49} While there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the two victims in this

case, these inconstancies are not great nor do they detract from the other consistent

evidence in this case; that appellant was in both victims' homes with a gun, both victims

felt terrorized, appellant was clearly angry and emotional, and one victim was shot.

Further, the forensic evidence does not indicate that Bostic was shot accidentally. The

No. 13AP-164 12

evidence does not support appellant's argument that the jury clearly lost its way or even

the defense's theory that the gun went off accidentally. After reviewing the entire record

with caution and deference to the role of the trier of fact, we find that the verdict is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 50} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 51} Having overruled all the assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

KLATT, P.J., and T. BRYANT, J., concur.

T. BRYANT, J., retired, of the Third Appellate District,

assigned to active duty under the authority of Ohio

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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