Opinion

Lollini v. Brown

  • 2010 Ohio 2697
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Jun 7, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 47.6%

The opinion

[Cite as Lollini v. Brown, 2010-Ohio-2697.]

STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT

MARY LOLLINI, et al., )

) CASE NO. 10 JE 8

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, )

) OPINION

- VS - ) AND

) JUDGMENT ENTRY

THOMAS BROWN, )

)

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. )

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court,

Case No. 07CV633.

JUDGMENT: Appeal dismissed.

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiffs-Appellees: Attorney Theodore Tsoras

Robinson Law Offices

1140 Main Street, Third Floor

Wheeling, West Virginia 26003

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Daniel Clevenger

Day Ketterer

Millennium Centre, Suite 300

200 Market Avenue North

P.O. Box 24213

Canton, Ohio 44701

JUDGES:

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich

Hon. Gene Donofrio

Hon. Mary DeGenaro

Dated: June 7, 2010

PER CURIAM.

-2-

¶{1} This matter comes on appeal from a March 3, 2010 judgment of the

Common Pleas Court ordering appellant to provide medical records and any related

criminal records of the defendant to the court for review and to be kept under seal.

¶{2} In response to a directive from this Court, each party has filed a

jurisdictional memorandum. Appellant asserts that defendant’s medical records are

not discoverable under Civ.R. 26(B) because they are protected under R.C.

2317.02(B), physician-patient privilege. Calihan v. Fullen (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 266.

Moreover, appellant argues that the trial court here has already verbalized an intent to

allow discovery of the defendant’s medical records. He cites to a hearing transcript of

March 1, 2010 page 9, where the Court stated as follows:

¶{3} “COURT: Okay…if you could prove the force of the impact (to plaintiff’s

counsel), I will be looking at ways to put them in.”

¶{4} In response, appellee points out that the medical records (and criminal

record, if any) were ordered for in camera inspection, not to be given to counsel for

appellee. In addition, the order clearly allowed for the filing of a protective order.

Appellee also argues that the underlying cause is an ordinary tort for personal injury,

which was recognized at common law. Therefore, any attempt by appellant to view

the matter as a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) is misplaced.

¶{5} Appellee argues that the holding in Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67

Ohio St.3d 60, is controlling. In Bell, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly stated “The

action of a trial court directing a witness opposing a discovery request to submit the

requested materials to an in camera review so that the court may determine their

discoverable nature is not a final appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.” Bell,

syllabus.

¶{6} In his reply brief, appellant argues that Bell is factually distinguishable in

that the documents ordered produced here are statutorily protected from production

pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(B) unless certain prerequisites are met. Appellant contends

that appellant’s medical records are “clearly privileged” and there is no need to make

an in camera inspection to make that determination.

¶{7} Other appellate districts have held that the order to submit documents for

in camera inspection is not a final appealable order as defined by R.C. 2505.02.

Huntsman v. Aultman Hospital, 5th Dist. No. 2006CA331, 2008-Ohio-2554 (order

-3-

requiring liability insurance carriers and medical network providers to submit

documents to the trial court for in camera inspection); Keller v. Kehoe, 8th Dist. No.

89218, 2007-Ohio-6625 (order to file under seal documents for in camera inspection

relating to the operation of a law business). It has further been held that only if the

court compelled disclosure after an in camera inspection would the order become final

and appealable. Gupta v. Lima (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 300.

¶{8} In this Court’s decision announced in Wilson v. Barnesville Hospital, 7th

Dist. No. 01BE40, 2001-Ohio-3499, we held that “* * * when a party demonstrates that

a substantial right is implicated by a discovery order of confidential information, there

is an immediate right to review of the discovery order.” Here, no discovery order

requiring the disclosure of confidential or privileged material has yet occurred.

Appellant has every opportunity to present the same argument regarding privileged

information should a discovery order be issued by the trial court. This appeal is

premature.

¶{9} Under the limited facts of this case, we hold that an order of a trial court

which compels a party to submit documents to a trial court for in camera inspection is

not a final or appealable order as defined by R.C. 2505.02. Only after a discovery

order is issued which affects a substantial right of a party, as defined by R.C.

2505.02(A)(1), may a party bring an appeal under the provisional remedy section of

R.C. 2505.02.

¶{10} Appeal sua sponte dismissed for lack of a final or appealable order as

defined by R.C. 2505.02. Costs taxed against appellant.

Vukovich, P.J., concurs.

Donofrio, J., concurs.

DeGenaro, J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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