Opinion

Chine v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections

  • 2011 Ohio 5574
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Oct 31, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.4%

The opinion

[Cite as Chine v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2011-Ohio-5574.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT

LOUIS CHINE JR., )

)

PETITIONER, )

)

VS. ) CASE NO. 11-MA-168

)

MAHONING COUNTY BOARD OF ) OPINION

ELECTIONS, ) AND

) JUDGMENT ENTRY

RESPONDENT. )

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for Writ of Mandamus

JUDGMENT: Dismissed

APPEARANCES:

For Petitioner Attorney Robert Rohrbaugh

4800 Market Street

Suite A

Boardman, Ohio 44512

For Respondent Attorney Gina Bricker

Assistant Prosecutor

21 West Boardman Street

5th Floor

Youngstown, Ohio 44503

JUDGES:

Hon. Gene Donofrio

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich

Hon. Mary DeGenaro

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Dated: October 24, 2011

[Cite as Chine v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2011-Ohio-5574.]

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Relator Louis Chine, Jr. has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

against respondent Mahoning County Board of Elections. Chine seeks to compel the

board to certify him as a candidate in the November 8, 2011 election for the

Austintown Local School Board. The board rejected Chine’s petition for candidacy

because the number of verified signatures was less than the number of signatures

appearing on the petition. The number of verified signatures was fifteen when the

petition actually contained a sixteenth signature that appeared outside the marked

area of the petition designated for signatures. The board has filed a motion to

dismiss this action, both on procedural and substantive grounds.

Procedural Deficiencies

{¶2} This court is vested with jurisdiction to hear an original mandamus

action pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(1) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C.

2731.02. There are three specific requirements for the filing of an application for a

writ of mandamus. The application (1) must be by petition, (2) in the name of the

state on the relation of the person applying, and (3) verified by affidavit. R.C.

2731.04. Here, as the board points out, Chine’s petition does not meet the second

and third requirements – it was not captioned in the name of the state on the relation

of the person applying and it was not verified by affidavit.

{¶3} Chine’s failure to verify his mandamus petition by affidavit, as required

by R.C. 2731.04, is not a fatal defect by itself since the verification requirements

contained in R.C. 2731.04 have been displaced by Civ.R. 11. State ex rel. Madison v.

Cotner (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 448, 449, 20 O.O.3d 381, 423 N.E.2d 72; State ex rel.

Clark v. Krichbaum, 7th Dist. No. 07-MA-66, 2007-Ohio-3185, ¶10.

{¶4} However, Chine’s failure to caption his mandamus action in the name of

the state on the relation of the person applying is a different matter. If a respondent

alerts a relator of his or her failure to properly caption a mandamus action and the

relator does not seek leave to amend his or her complaint to comply with R.C.

2731.04, the mandamus action must be dismissed. Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103

Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶36, citing Litigaide, Inc. v.

Lakewood Police Dept. Custodian of Records (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 508, 664 N.E.2d

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521. Here, the board of elections alerted Chine of his failure to properly caption his

mandamus action by way of its motion to dismiss filed on October 3, 2011. Chine

has not responded to the motion or sought leave to amend his complaint to comply

with R.C. 2731.04. Therefore, Chine’s omission is sufficient grounds to dismiss his

mandamus action. Blankenship, supra.

{¶5} The board also argues that Chine’s mandamus petition is barred by the

doctrine of laches. “Relators in election cases must exercise the utmost diligence.”

State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 221, 2002-Ohio-

5922, 778 N.E.2d 37, ¶7. “‘If relators do not act with the required promptness, laches

may bar the action for extraordinary relief in an election-related matter.’” State ex rel.

Miller v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 103 Ohio St.3d 477, 2004-Ohio-5532, 817

N.E.2d 1, ¶21, quoting State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-

Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶12.

{¶6} The board cites Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d

139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, in support of its laches argument. Rust

involved a prospective candidate in the November 8, 2005 election for the Toledo

Board of Election. The prospective candidate filed his nominating petition, including

his statement of candidacy, with the Lucas County Board of Elections on August 23,

2005. On September 8, 2005, the board of elections informed him that it was

rejecting his petition and refusing to certify his candidacy because the number of

signatures verified in the circulator’s affidavit was less than the number of signatures

appearing on the petition. Twenty-days later, on October 6, 2005, the prospective

candidate sued the board in mandamus seeking to have his name placed on the

ballot. The Ohio Supreme Court characterized petitioner’s waiting twenty-eight days

from the time the board notified him of its rejection of his candidacy to the time he

filed his mandamus action as prejudicial and dilatory. The Court noted that by the

time petitioner filed his mandamus action, the statutory deadline to have absentee

ballots printed and ready for use had passed, citing R.C. 3509.01.

{¶7} Given the very time-sensitive nature of the election cases, Chine’s

conduct has been equally prejudicial and dilatory as the petitioner in Rust. Here, the

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board of elections notified Chine that it was rejecting his petition on August 20, 2011.

Chine waited thirty-eight days until September 27, 2011, to file this mandamus action.

Substantive Merits

{¶8} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must

have a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) the respondent must have a clear

legal duty to perform the requested act; and (3) the relator has no plain and adequate

remedy at law. State ex rel. Frease v. Wellington, 7th Dist. No. 02-CA-54, 2002-Ohio-

7455, at ¶4; State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 591 N.E.2d 1186.

{¶9} The board of elections has a statutory duty under R.C. 3501.11(K) to

“[r]eview, examine, and certify the sufficiency and validity of petitions and nomination

papers, and, after certification, return to the secretary of state all petitions and

nomination papers that the secretary of state forwarded to the board[.]”

{¶10} Absent language allowing substantial compliance, election statutes are

mandatory and require strict compliance. State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio

St.3d 288, 915 N.E.2d 1215, 2009-Ohio-5327, ¶15. Chine argues that his petition

rejected by the board substantially complied with Ohio’s election statutes, pointing to

R.C. 3513.07, which governs the content and appearance of the form of declaration

of candidacy and petition for candidate. R.C. 3513.07, specifically allows for

substantial compliance with its provisions: “The form of declaration of candidacy and

petition of a person desiring to be a candidate for a party nomination or a candidate

for election to an office or position to be voted for at a primary election shall be

substantially as follows: * * *” (Emphasis added.) That section then sets forth the

content and appearance of that form.

{¶11} Chine’s reliance on the substantial-compliance language of R.C.

3513.07 is misguided. The board did not reject Chine’s petition because it did not

substantially comply with R.C. 3513.07’s petition form specifications. Rather, the

board rejected the petition because of the misstatement concerning the number of

signatures contained in the petition. The provision concerning the number of

signatures on a petition is found in R.C. 3501.38(E)(1). That provision employs

mandatory language and does not allow for substantial compliance:

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{¶12} “On each petition paper, the circulator shall (emphasis added) indicate

the number of signatures contained on it, and shall sign a statement made under

penalty of election falsification that the circulator witnessed the affixing of every

signature, that all signers were to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and belief

qualified to sign, and that every signature is to the best of the circulator’s knowledge

and belief the signature of the person whose signature it purports to be or of an

attorney in fact acting pursuant to section 3501.382 of the Revised Code. * * *”

{¶13} Because R.C. 3501.38(E)(1)’s use of the word shall, the provision is

mandatory and requires strict compliance. Husted, supra. Additionally, R.C.

3501.38(E)(1) refers to the number of signatures contained on the petition, not the

number of signatures appearing in the marked area for such signatures.

Consequently, the verification on Chine’s petition that it contained fifteen signatures

when in fact it contained sixteen was not in strict compliance with R.C.

3501.38(E)(1)’s requirements.

{¶14} The purpose of R.C. 3501.38(E)(1)’s requirement “is to protect against

signatures being added after the circulator’s statement is made.” Rust v. Lucas Cty.

Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, ¶11. The

Ohio Supreme Court has deemed the requirement a “substantial, reasonable

requirement.” Id.; see, also, State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Taxation v. Scioto

Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 167, 172, 602 N.E.2d 615, State ex rel.

Loss v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 233, 234, 58 O.O.2d 488,

281 N.E.2d 186.

{¶15} Chine states that the reason the circulator verified a number of

signatures less than the number of signatures appearing on the petition was because

one of the signatures was outside the marked area designated for signatures. The

petitioner in Rust, supra, advanced a similar argument, claiming that one of the

signatures came from a person who was not qualified to sign the petition. However,

the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the circulator “could have complied with all of the

requirements of R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) by striking the signatures of persons he had

discovered to be unqualified before submitting the petition to the board of elections.

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See R.C. 3501.38(G) (‘The circulator of a petition may, before filing it in a public

office, strike from it any signature the circulator does not wish to present as part of

the petition’); State ex rel. Oster v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d

480, 484, 756 N.E.2d 649. Thus, [petitioner] was not left without any remedy when

he discovered, before filing the petition, that an unqualified person had signed it.”

Rust, 108 Ohio St.3d 139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, ¶14.

{¶16} Based on the foregoing, Chine is not entitled to the requested

extraordinary relief in mandamus. Accordingly, we deny the writ.

{¶17} Costs taxed against Chine. Final order. Clerk to serve notice as

provided by the Civil Rules.

Donofrio, J. concurs.

Vukovich, J. concurs.

DeGenaro, J. conurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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